Sharman Networks Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sharman Networks Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – authorisation of multiple infringements of copyright established – prior sale of realty of one respondent to primary proceedings – payment of substantial part of proceeds of sale to offshore company in purported repayment of loan – absence of material establishing original making and purpose of loan – Mareva and ancillary orders made by primary judge – affidavits disclosing assets sworn – orders made requiring filing of further affidavits of disclosure and cross-examination of one respondent to primary proceedings on her disclosure affidavit – no error in making further ancillary orders – leave refused

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 10(2)

Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1 cited
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 406 cited
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 441 cited
Sharman License Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 505 cited
Sharman License Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 802 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corp Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 165 cited
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Proprietary Limited v Phillip Morris Incorporated (1981) 148 CLR 170 cited
Brilliant Digital Entertainment Pty Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 373 discussed
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Wong [2002] FCAFC 327 discussed
Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478 cited
Den Norske Bank ASA v Antonatos [1999] QB 271 cited
House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1985] FSR 173 cited
Bayer AG v Winter (No 2) [1986] 1 WLR 540 discussed
Planet International v Garcia (No 2) (1991) 1 Qd R 426 discussed
Motorola Credit Corporation v Uzan (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 113 discussed
Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 cited

SHARMAN NETWORKS LTD & SHARMAN LICENCE HOLDINGS LTD
& NICOLA ANNE HEMMING v UNIVERSAL MUSIC AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & FESTIVAL RECORDS PTY LTD AND MUSHROOM RECORDS PTY LTD T/AS FESTIVAL MUSHROOM RECORDS & EMI MUSIC AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED & WARNER MUSIC AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED & BMG AUSTRALIA LIMITED & UMG RECORDS, INC & SHADY RECORDS, INC/INTERSCOPE RECORDS & AFTERMATH RECORDS & REAL HORRORSHOW PTY LTD & THE LIVING END PTY LTD & VIRGIN RECORDS AMERICA, INC & EMI RECORDS LTD & CAPITOL RECORDS, INC & ARISTA RECORDS, LLC (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ARISTA RECORDS, INC) & CIRCA RECORDS LTD & CHRYSALIS RECORDS LTD & SONY MUSIC (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD & SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (CANADA), INC & SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT & MAYER MUSIC LLC & TIMOTHY JAMES FREEDMAN & WARNER BROS. RECORDS, INC & ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION &…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sharman Networks Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd involves Sharman Networks, a company engaged in litigation over copyright infringement, seeking to appeal a decision made by Moore J that allowed Universal Music Australia to cross-examine Sharman's CEO, Ms Hemming, regarding her affidavits in a Mareva injunction context. The Sharman applicants argued that the primary judge erred in granting permission for cross-examination, claiming that it would result in substantial injustice due to procedural missteps and a misunderstanding of the legal principles governing such cases. The appeal sought to overturn the decision and prevent the cross-examination from proceeding.

The legal issues central to this case revolved around the scope of judicial discretion in permitting cross-examination of affidavit deponents in the context of Mareva injunctions, particularly in relation to the establishment of 'sufficient doubt' and the potential for substantial injustice. The Sharman applicants contended that the primary judge's decision to allow cross-examination was flawed and did not align with established legal principles, asserting that the cross-examination would infringe upon their procedural rights and potentially cause significant harm. The respondents, Universal Music Australia, defended the primary judge's decision, arguing that the cross-examination was necessary to address the complex circumstances surrounding the offshore trust structure and substantial financial transactions involving Sharman Networks.

In addressing these issues, the court found that the primary judge's decision to permit cross-examination was justified given the context and the need for clarity regarding the Sharman applicants' financial dealings. The court held that the primary judge's reasoning was sound and aligned with established legal principles, particularly considering the substantial sum transferred offshore and the implications for the case's outcome. The Sharman applicants' argument for leave to appeal was deemed insufficient to justify such leave, as the decision did not present a case of 'sufficient doubt' or procedural error. The court emphasised that the primary judge's approach to granting leave to cross-examine was appropriately cautious and aligned with the case's evidentiary needs.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the Sharman applicants pay the respondents' costs associated with the application. Additionally, the court authorised the respondents to inspect the contents of a sealed envelope identified in the primary judgment, ensuring transparency and access to relevant information in the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. Applicants for leave to appeal to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

3. The respondents are hereby authorised to have access to the contents of the sealed envelope identified in [15] of the reasons for judgment by way of file inspection.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around a dispute initiated by Sharman Networks Ltd against Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. Sharman Networks Ltd, led by Ms Hemming, is engaged in the business of providing internet-based music services. Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd, along with other music companies, initiated legal proceedings against Sharman Networks Ltd, seeking relief under the Mareva injunction to prevent Sharman Networks Ltd from disposing of or diminishing their assets. Ms Hemming, the Chief Executive Officer of Sharman Networks Ltd, sold her home in Sydney and transferred a significant portion of the proceeds to a bank account in Vanuatu, where the Sharman Companies are incorporated. This transaction occurred amidst the legal dispute and raised concerns about asset concealment and the potential for substantial injustice if Ms Hemming were to be cross-examined on her disclosure affidavit.

The music companies sought an order that Ms Hemming be cross-examined on her affidavit to clarify the circumstances of the substantial transfer of funds. Sharman Networks Ltd opposed this application, arguing that there was no sufficient doubt about the music companies' case, and that cross-examination of Ms Hemming would cause substantial injustice. The primary judge, Moore J, granted leave for Ms Hemming to be cross-examined, leading to Sharman Networks Ltd's application for leave to appeal this decision.

The matter originated as an application by Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and other music companies for a Mareva injunction against Sharman Networks Ltd. The application was heard by Moore J, who granted the injunction and also allowed the music companies to cross-examine Ms Hemming on her disclosure affidavit. Sharman Networks Ltd then applied to the Full Court for leave to appeal against Moore J's decision to permit cross-examination. This appeal application was heard by the Full Court, which needed to decide whether the application for leave to appeal was sufficiently cogent to justify the grant of leave.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CONTI J
In conclusion therefore, it was the case of the Sharman applicants that Moore J failed correctly to apply the relevant legal principles in committing Ms Hemming to cross-examination on her disclosure affidavit, and that it must follow that the Sharman applicants would inherently suffer ‘substantial injustice’ if Ms Hemming be so required to submit to cross‑examination in accordance with the relief granted by the primary judge. In short, the complaint was that Moore J gave leave for the cross-examination to take place because the Court might ‘be left with a greater measure of certainty’ [36], and further ‘because cross‑examination may lead to greater clarity’ [37], and that so much exemplified errors in principle in the exercise of his discretion.Conclusions upon the principal matters raised In my opinion, and for the reasons I have largely foreshadowed in my observations upon the submissions already recorded, the application for leave to appeal brought by the Sharman applicants has not sufficient cogency to justify the grant of any such leave. The case of the Music companies presented to the primary judge (Moore J) for relief of the nature and to the extent granted was sufficiently in line with established principle as to be clear from ‘sufficient doubt’. I do not think that the United Kingdom and Australian authorities establish inflexible requirements to the extent postulated by the Sharman applicants, in particular concerning the Court’s jurisdiction to grant leave to cross-examine the deponents of disclosure affidavits in Mareva contexts. His Honour’s approach in particular to the issue of granting leave to the Music companies to cross-examine Ms Hemming was soundly justified in the light of the evidentiary circumstances concerning the Sharman applicants’ offshore trust structure, and the circumstances of and context in which such a substantial sum of money was transferred to an offshore company in the amount and in the context that occurred. It is readily apparent that the primary judge placed significant weight, and I think rightly so, upon the following findings made by Lindgren J in the context of the preceding interlocutory proceedings of Sharman License Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 802, being proceedings which I have referred to earlier. At [15] of his reasons for judgment, Lindgren J observed as follows:‘As noted earlier, the Sharman Companies were ultimately beneficially owned by TIL as trustee of the Sharman Trust, and, notwithstanding the reference to “discretion” and the right of termination, the client services agreement provided evidence before his Honour that TIL, including TIL as trustee of the Sharman Trust, was likely to act at the direction of Ms Hemming. Since TIL, as trustee of the Sharman Trust was the ultimate beneficial owner of all the issued shares in the Sharman Companies, there was evidence before his Honour to show that they were also likely to act at her direction.’Earlier, at [4], his Honour had observed:‘On 4 February 2005, Ms Hemming and Richard Kilmer-Barber settled a sale of their home at Castle Cove in Sydney to John Simon Myers for $2,100,000. Title was transferred on 16 February 2005. Ms Hemming and Dr Kilmer-Barber continued to occupy the property. Ms Hemming’s interest in the home was apparently her only substantial asset within the jurisdiction. There was evidence before his Honour that Mr Myers occupied some role such as accountant or bookkeeper of the Sharman Companies. Ms Hemming was the Chief Executive Officer of the Sharman Companies. Out of the proceeds of sale, $1,116,405.63 was transferred to a bank account in Vanuatu… which is where the Sharman Companies are incorporated.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CONTI J

The Court found that the Sharman applicants' case for leave to appeal lacked sufficient cogency, as the primary judge's decision was in line with established principles and the circumstances of the case warranted cross-examination of Ms Hemming. The Court noted that the primary judge appropriately considered the offshore trust structure of the Sharman applicants and the transfer of funds to an offshore company. The Court also highlighted that the primary judge gave significant weight to the findings made by Lindgren J in previous interlocutory proceedings, particularly concerning the Sharman Companies' ownership and the potential direction by Ms Hemming. The Court did not find the United Kingdom and Australian authorities to establish inflexible requirements in granting leave to cross-examine deponents of disclosure affidavits in Mareva contexts. The primary judge's approach to the issue of cross-examining Ms Hemming was soundly justified, and the Court concluded that the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion in allowing the cross-examination.