Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1927

Appeal from: Sharma & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1791
File number: VID 754 of 2019
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 14 November 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 19 November 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Temporary Work (Skilled) (Subclass 457) Visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – history of prior administrative decision-making replete with a litany of errors – Appellant blameless for those errors – Administrative Appeals Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review Delegate’s decision under s 338(2)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – jurisdictional error not established – appeal dismissed with no order as to costs
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 338(2)(d), 351

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sched 2 cl 457.223(4)(d)

Cases cited: Ahmad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 182; 237 FCR 365
Date of hearing: 14 November 2019
Date of last submissions: 24 October 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 30
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

VID 754 of 2019
BETWEEN:

MANISHA SHARMA

First Appellant

KRISH SHARMA

Second Appellant

RAHUL SHARMA

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 NOVEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

KERR J:

  1. The Appellants in this case have experienced a series of almost Kafka-esque impediments and setbacks since Ms Sharma first applied in June 2013 for a Temporary Work (Skilled) (Subclass 457) Visa (Visa) to enable her to work in Australia.  As Mr Swan, counsel for the Minister, accepted, the events prior to this appeal include a litany of errors made by others, including by the former Migration Review Tribunal; glacial administrative procedures; and simple misfortunes of timing.  Ms Sharma, whose constant intention has been to utilise her professional skills in employment, has been caught up in a nightmare of applications, reviews, appeals and refusals which have culminated in her appeal to this Court. Mr Swan properly acknowledged that Ms Sharma is blameless for the circumstances.

  2. More than six years after Ms Sharma first sought her Visa, she comes before this Court to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA): Sharma & Ors v Minister for Immigration (2019) FCCA 1791. In that decision, in July of this year Judge Mercuri of the FCCA dismissed her application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 17 May 2017.…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1927
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by Sharma and others against the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The dispute concerned the refusal of a Temporary Work (Skilled) (Subclass 457) Visa application. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia had previously dismissed the Appellants' application for judicial review, and they now appealed to the Federal Court. The Appellants argued that the Department of Home Affairs and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had delayed their application, leading to the expiration of the nomination. They sought to amend their application and argued that they should be granted additional time to lodge the nomination.

The central legal issue was whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate under section 338(2)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction when the sponsor had applied for approval but had not yet been approved as a sponsor at the time of the review application. Another issue was whether the Appellants were entitled to amend their application to include additional arguments and facts.

The court found that the Tribunal was correct in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision. The court held that section 338(2)(d) of the Act did not extend to situations where a sponsor had applied for approval but had not yet been approved at the time of the review application. The court also found that the Appellants had not demonstrated a jurisdictional error and that the Tribunal's decision should be upheld. The court further held that the Appellants were not entitled to amend their application to include additional arguments and facts.

The appeal was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs. The Federal Court upheld the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision. The court also found that the Appellants had not demonstrated a jurisdictional error and that the Tribunal's decision should be upheld. The Appellants were not granted leave to amend their application, and the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delay within the Department, on this occasion in deciding KLM Food’s application, had again proved fatal to the Appellants’ interests.THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT On 1 June 2017 the Appellants filed an application seeking judicial review in the FCCA. The Appellants set out a compendious list of grounds, which are not necessary to recite. They were not then legally represented, nor have they been since. The form of their appeal grounds in the FCCA understandably reflected a want of understanding of the law. However one of the self-prepared grounds of review identified their claim that the Tribunal had erred in finding that it was without jurisdiction. The learned primary judge dealt with that contention carefully and comprehensively: 58. Subparagraph (i) of the Act is not satisfied as the first applicant was not sponsored by an approved sponsor on the date that the application for review was filed. Rather KLM Foods had applied for approval as a standard business sponsor on 29 March 2016.59. In addition, although KLM Foods had also lodged a nomination form nominating the applicant on 29 March 2016, this also does not satisfy section 338(2)(d)(ii) of the Act as, neither at the time the nomination was made, or, more importantly, at the time the application for review was submitted, was KLM an approved sponsor.60. In this case, as at 21 April 2017:a) Loveleen Gupta was neither an approved sponsor, nor did Loveleen Gupta have on foot an application to review any decision not to approve him as a sponsor; andb) KLM Foods was not an approved sponsor, nor did KLM Foods have on foot an application to review any decision not to approve it as a sponsor.61. This is the very situation which section 338(2)(d) of the Act was intended to avoid. If the intention was to extend the operation of section 338(2) of the Act to situations where a person had lodged an application for approval as a sponsor but that application had not yet been determined by the Department, this could have been made clear in the terms of section 338(2)(d) of the Act.62. Consequently, the tribunal was correct in determining that the delegate’s decision was not a part 5 reviewable decision and the tribunal therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the application filed by the applicants on 21 April 2017.(Footnote omitted) Their application for judicial review having been refused by the FCCA, the Appellants appealed to this Court. The grounds of the appeal are as follows.1.That the judge erred in dismissing the appellants review application by not granting the leave to amend the appellants application filed in federal circuit court by not considering or taking into account the legal arguments raised by the applicant.2.The judge erred in dismissing the appellants application filed in court without considering the facts and did not consider the compelling and compassionate grounds not to refuse the case without the basis of law and facts3.The applicant was not provided with extra time to lodge the SBS of the company and the matter must be overlooked again as the delay in the process was due to the wrong decision of immigration department and AAT which was proven by the Federal court.4.The department of home affairs failed to consider that the delay in the case cause the nomination to get expired and failed to provide extended time and made the decision without even getting the result of the nomination.5.The matter must be heard again and enough time must be provided to the appellants to apply for further application of nomination as the sponsor is still happy to lodge the file.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established