Sharma v Legal Aid Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sharma v Legal Aid Queensland [2001] FCA 1699

HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY - racial discrimination in employment - use of selection criteria in appointment - whether decision not to appoint highest-scoring candidate based on race - whether decision that candidate did not meet an essential criterion based on race - whether physical appearance of candidate taken into account by selection panel members - whether procedural differences adopted by panel based on race of candidate - standard of proof to be applied - small number of people from non-English speaking backgrounds employed by organisation not indicative of racist attitude

Statutes
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 9, 15, 18B

Cases
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 Applied
State of Victoria v McKenna (2000) EOC 93-080 Referred to
West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive v Jaquant Singh [1988] 1 WLR 730 Cited

SHARMA v LEGAL AID QUEENSLAND
Q184 OF 2001

KIEFEL J
BRISBANE
4 DECEMBER 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q184 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

NARENDRA KUMAR SHARMA
APPLICANT

AND:

LEGAL AID QUEENSLAND
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q184 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

NARENDRA KUMAR SHARMA
APPLICANT

AND:

LEGAL AID QUEENSLAND
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE:

4 DECEMBER 2001

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Mr Sharma, the applicant, was employed with Legal Aid Queensland, the respondent, from 19 December 1997.  He commenced in a casual position but thereafter applied for other positions with that organisation.  Two such positions, the Solicitor-in-Charge of the Mackay office and that of Senior Solicitor in Mt Isa, are the focus of the applicant’s claims that he was discriminated against on account of his race and that this resulted in him not being offered the positions.  In the case of the position in Mackay, the applicant’s case is that he fulfilled the selection criteria and was the highest scoring candidate, but nevertheless was not offered the position.  With respect to that in Mt Isa, he was not rated as highly as the other candidate, but he says that he was not given the same latitude in preparing answers to questions.  The difference in the panel’s treatment of him can be explained only on the basis of views pertaining to his race, it is submitted.  The balance of the submissions made on his behalf rely upon a composite picture drawn from other treatment of the applicant by other employees of the respondent during the course of his employment;  from the respondent’s lack of assistance in his training and by reference to the position of persons from non-English speaking backgrounds within the organisation.

  2. The applicant applied for the position of Solicitor-in-Charge of the Mackay office after the position was advertised in August 1998.…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1699
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sharma v Legal Aid Queensland was a case where the applicant alleged racial discrimination in his workplace. The applicant claimed he was denied equal opportunities for practical experience in mediation compared to a fellow staff member and that he was only allowed to attend training sessions if they did not conflict with his work schedule. The court had to decide whether these claims constituted racial discrimination under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.

The court examined the evidence and noted that while the existence of racism in society is acknowledged, it alone does not necessarily mean that it influenced the decision-making process. The court also considered the higher standard of proof required for such claims, as established in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, and that discrimination might not always be apparent. The court found that while there was a possibility of racial bias in the decision-making process, there was insufficient evidence to draw a firm conclusion that it actually influenced the decision.

Given the evidence presented, the court concluded that the applicant had not satisfied the required standard of proof for racial discrimination. The court dismissed the application and made no orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL J
The applicant also alleges that he was not given the same opportunity for obtaining practical experience in mediation as another staff member, but this person points out that she only obtained approval for the training after putting forward a submission to explain how it could be utilised by her in her position with the organisation. The fact that such training was limited in its availability is confirmed by the organiser. The applicant’s complaint that he was only permitted to attend mediation training sessions on the condition that it did not conflict with his work is explained as being necessary because he was then working full-time with the legal support team. CONCLUSION It was accepted by Counsel for the applicant that the standard of proof for breaches of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 is the higher standard referred to in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361-2. It was also pointed out that claims brought under such legislation present special problems of proof, since prejudice is not always apparent and indeed persons discriminating on the grounds of race may not even be aware of them. It was then submitted that the Court should start from a point which assumes the fact of the existence of racism, and that an initial inference of racial discrimination can be drawn based upon knowledge of the existence of the phenomenon in the community. The argument sought to draw support from State of Victoria v McKenna (2000) EOC 93-080, 74,262. The existence of racism in the community is acknowledged by the legislation in question. A possibility, in a given case, that it may explain a choice made in the appointment of a person, may arise. Whether that possibility can then be converted to a more substantial finding, one which allows an inference that racism in fact operated on the decision-making so as to satisfy the requisite standard, is a question of fact in each case. Counsel for the applicant submitted that an inference could be drawn because of the known existence of racism combined with the fact that the decision in question was one to be made between people of different races. It would seem to me that the two factors identified, considered individually or collectively, raise no more than a possibility that race might operate as a factor in the decision-making. In this case the evidence could only be said to have raised a real concern in one respect: what was in the minds of two of the panel members in connexion with the “public face” issue. A possibility that it contained an underlying reference to someone of the applicant’s race, as not fulfilling that image, was raised. However a more definite conclusion cannot be drawn. Counsel for the applicant also submitted that one should take a view of the whole of the evidence rather than just the facts surrounding the two applications. In some cases practices of an organisation and conduct in the workplace might confirm other evidence tending to suggest an approach based in race. In this case the numerous complaints in this regard have not been shown to be of substance.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL J

Full text does not contain this section.