Shane Bridges v Caloundra Sub Branch RSL & Services Club T/A Caloundra RSL

[2017] FWC 1607

[2017] FWC 1607

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

REASONS FOR DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Shane Bridges
v
Caloundra Sub Branch RSL & Services Club T/A Caloundra RSL
(U2017/1030)

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT DRAKE SYDNEY, 21 MARCH 2017

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy.

[1] This decision arises from an application for an extension of time for lodgement of an application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act).

[2] The relationship between Mr Bridges and the respondent ended on 1 July 2016. Mr Bridges lodged his application at the Fair Work Commission on 2 February 2017. Mr Bridges’ application was lodged 196 days outside the statutory time limit.

[3] When determining this application I had before me the Application for Unfair Dismissal lodged by Mr Bridges. I wrote to Mr Bridges on 28 February 2017 outlining the matters I was required to consider by the Act and asked him to provide a statement addressing these matters within 14 days. Mr Bridges provided a statement on 13 March 2017. I considered Mr Bridges’ statement. For the reasons set out in this decision I will issue an Order refusing his application for an extension of time and dismiss his application.

[4] The relevant legislative framework for the exercise of the Fair Work Commission’s discretion in relation to applications of this kind is set out below:

394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
...

(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and

(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and

(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) the merits of the application; and

(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.

[5] The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 975 where the Full Bench said:

“[10]It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of FWA considered the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.394(3) and held:

“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.”

[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).

[12] The ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” was considered by Rares J in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 a case involving in s.106KA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). His Honour observed:

“23. I am of opinion that the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires consideration of all the circumstances. In Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 372 at 379 Brennan and Dawson JJ considered a statutory provision which entitled either a parole board or a court to specify a shorter non-parole period than that required under another section only if it determined that the circumstances justified that course. They said of the appellant’s circumstances:

‘Although no one of these factors was exceptional, in combination they may reasonably be regarded as amounting to exceptional circumstances.’

24. Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the failure in that case to evaluate the relevant circumstances in combination was a failure to consider matters which were relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the section (167 CLR at 379). Deane J, (with whom Gaudron and McHugh JJ expressed their concurrence on this point, albeit that they were dissenting) explained that the power under consideration allowed departure from the norm only in the exceptional or special case where the circumstances justified it (167 CLR at 383, 397).

25. And, in Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 573 [173] Callinan J referred with approval to what Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ had said in R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198 at 208, namely:

‘We must construe "exceptional" as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’

26. Exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 106KA(2) can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the usual course of events.

27. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.”

[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.” [Endnotes not reproduced]

[6] For exceptional circumstances to arise as contemplated by s.394 of the Act, it is not necessary that the applicant for that extension of time be overtaken by a catastrophic event. Reasons for delay in the category of extreme events are not necessary to meet the test. All of the factors outlined in s.394(3) must be considered and weighed when deciding whether or not exceptional circumstances, circumstances sufficient to support an exception, exist.

[7] Mr Bridges response to my request is set out below:

“Please find below my statement to support my late lodgement of my unfair dismissal claim.

The reason for my delay was despite knowing my dismissal was not as it seemed, all of the evidence pointed otherwise.

I was presented with a letter which clearly stated that a review had taken place and my position made redundant.

I of course found out that no such review took place, and that the board was asked to sign off after the fact on my dismissal which they did. Senior management cannot be dismissed without the consent of the board, and signing off on the dismissal after the fact under duress highlights both the board and the general manager were compliant in the unfair dismissal.

They only alerted me to the situation when they wanted to use my testimony to remove the General Manager from his position. This happened well outside the 21 days allowed for applying. They could have used this moment to rectify the situation, instead they only used it for their own needs.

As an employee you feel you have very little protection against a company, especially one with a history of redundancies. I felt I had absolutely no recourse at the time and so I took no action.

It was only after the president of the club informed me that procedure hadn’t been followed that I realised I actually had evidence to support what I already knew. This was then taken a step further when they then hired a marketing co-ordinator to perform my duties.

Obviously my chances of getting further are slim, especially since I cannot afford a lawyer and they were able to bring in out of state expert to fight this. But I felt like if I didn’t at least try then others wouldn’t. And even if this goes no further at least maybe now someone will take a look at the firing practices of the Caloundra RSL and their continued improper use of redundancies to remove staff.

Employees have a right to protection, the Caloundra RSL continually flaunts this including in my case where 24 hours after disagreeing with the general manager I was made redundant after a non-existent review of my position.”

[8] I considered the various criteria to which my attention is directed by s.394 (3) of the Act.

reason for the delay-s.394(3)(a)

[9] The reason Mr Bridge provided for his delay in lodgement was that he had inadequate information and resources to oppose the respondent’s actions in terminating his employment.

[10] Mr Bridges had time to make his application because he considered that his dismissal was unfair when it took place but he delayed, gathering information, until he felt that he had sufficient information.

[11] While sympathetic to these circumstances I was not persuaded that Mr Bridges difficulties were out of the ordinary, unusual or uncommon.

whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect-s.394(3)(b)

[12] Mr Bridges became aware of the end of his relationship with the respondent on 1 July 2016.

any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal-s.394(3)(c)

[13] Mr Bridges first disputed his dismissal by lodging this application.

prejudice to the employer-s.394(3)(d)

[14] I was satisfied that there would be no greater prejudice to the respondent caused by Mr Bridges’ application being listed now than there would have been had it been lodged in time. Prejudice to the respondent was a neutral consideration.

the merits of the application-s.394(3)(e)

[15] Merit was a neutral issue in my consideration of this application.

fairness as between Mr Bridges and other persons in a similar position-S.394(3)(f)

[16] There was no issue of fairness in relation to any other person in a similar position.

[17] Having considered all of the matters to which my attention is directed by the Act I was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances which would warrant my granting an exception to the statutory time limit and on that basis dismissed the application. Mr Bridges’ circumstances were not out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT

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