Shanahan v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shanahan v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 175

WORKPLACE RELATIONS – employment – claim of harsh, unjust or unreasonable termination of employment – application for prerogative relief in relation to a decision of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission – issue about whether applicant’s misconduct occasioned by psychiatric condition – whether there was jurisdictional error in respect of question to be addressed

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 45(1)(c), 45(2), 45(6)(a), 45(7), 170CB(1)(c), 170CE(1)(a) 170CE(5)(a), 170CE(5A), 170CE(5B), 170CE(7), 170CG(1) 170CG(3), 170CH, 170CI, 170 JF(2) and 347(1)

Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Re Polites; Ex Parte The Hoyts Corporation Pty Limited (1991) 173 CLR 78
Laws v London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd [1959] 2 All ER 285
North v Television Corporation Ltd (1976) 11 ALR 599

IAN SHANAHAN v AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION AND UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY
NSD 693 OF 2006

MARSHALL, GRAHAM AND JESSUP JJ
13 DECEMBER 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 693 OF 2006

ON REMITTAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

IAN SHANAHAN
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
First Respondent

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MARSHALL, GRAHAM AND JESSUP JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

13 DECEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application for an Order to Show Cause be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 693 OF 2006

ON REMITTAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

IAN SHANAHAN
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
First Respondent

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MARSHALL, GRAHAM AND JESSUP JJ

DATE:

13 DECEMBER 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARSHALL AND GRAHAM JJ

  1. Under s 170CE(1)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘the Act’) as it stood on 24 July 2003 it was open to an employee whose employment had been terminated by his employer to apply to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (‘the Commission’) for relief in respect of the termination of his employment on the ground that the termination was ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’.

  2. The limitations upon the making of an application under s 170CE(1)(a) were satisfied in the present case (see s 170CB(1)(c), s 170CE(5)(a), s 170CE(5A), s 170CE(5B) and s 170CE(7)).

  3. By virtue of s 170CG(1) of the Act the Commission was empowered to arbitrate matters arising under s 170CE(1)(a) applications. In relation to such arbitrations s 170CG(3) provided:

    ‘170CG(3)In determining, for the purposes of the arbitration, whether a termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the Commission must have regard to:

    (a)whether there was a valid reason for the termination related to the capacity or…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Shanahan v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (No 2) involved the applicant, who was employed as an academic and dismissed from his position after allegations of misconduct, specifically instances of physical contact with students. The applicant appealed the dismissal decision to the Full Bench of the Commission. The primary legal issue was whether the Senior Deputy President of the Commission erred in the weight given to certain medical evidence and the reasons provided for that decision. The Full Bench found that the Senior Deputy President had indeed erred by not appropriately weighing the medical evidence and providing insufficient reasons for doing so.

The Full Bench of the Commission, comprising Senior Deputy President Hamberger and Commissioner Raffaelli, examined the grounds of appeal submitted by the applicant, focusing particularly on Ground 7. They identified that Senior Deputy President Cartwright had failed to adequately consider the medical evidence of Dr Teoh, which was crucial in understanding the applicant's conduct and its context. The Full Bench emphasised that Senior Deputy President Cartwright's decision to undervalue Dr Teoh's evidence was not based on reasonable grounds and did not align with the principles set out in House v The King. The majority concluded that the error in assessing the medical evidence constituted a failure to meet the standards of procedural fairness, thus impacting the overall fairness of the decision-making process.

The Full Bench's decision to uphold the error in the weight given to Dr Teoh's evidence led to the conclusion that the original decision needed to be reconsidered. Consequently, the Full Bench ordered that the application for an order to show cause be dismissed, indicating that the procedural error warranted a re-evaluation of the dismissal decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Application for an Order to Show Cause be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

In paragraph 4 of their submissions in this Court, counsel for the applicant provided a pithy summary of ‘THE BACKGROUND’. In that section of their submissions they stated:‘4.2… the Plaintiff [applicant] had been employed for 7 years in an academic capacity teaching music to students enrolled with the Defendant [presumably intended as a reference to the second respondent].4.3He was dismissed from his employment with the Second Defendant [second respondent] in 2003 following a number of events characterised by the Second Defendant [second respondent] as misconduct.4.4The alleged misconduct related to the plaintiff’s [applicant’s] dealings with students, in particular, instances of physical contact with students.4.5In substance, the complaint against the Plaintiff [applicant] was that he had behaved in an “unwelcome” way to students.4.6 It was clear at all times that the matters complained of had occurred.’ The applicant accepts that his employment was terminated. There has been no suggestion that the decision of the Vice-Chancellor was colourable. The reasons for decision of Senior Deputy President Cartwright included the following:‘[29] … the Applicant’s conduct as a lecturer lifting and tickling female students remains improper conduct in a University teacher/student situation. The other findings of inappropriate conduct as a teacher compound the impropriety. High standards are required of those in positions of trust. Such conduct is, in my view, unacceptable and constitutes serious misconduct within the meaning of the Agreement. It does not become so because the University has published a policy on harassment; in my view self-evident principles which any academic staff member can reasonably be expected to follow dictate that such conduct for a teacher toward students is unacceptable. Even allowing for different value judgements on this question, it cannot be said that a decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment for conduct of this type is “capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudicial”. In my view it is “sound, defensible and well-founded”. I find that there was a valid reason for the termination related to the Applicant’s conduct.’ When the matter came before the Full Bench of the Commission seven grounds of appeal were relied upon by the applicant in his written submissions as demonstrating error on the part of Senior Deputy President Cartwright. Ground 7 was expressed by the Full Bench of the Commission as follows:‘7. He failed to give weight to the views of Dr Teoh and gave no reasons for so doing.’ The majority in the Full Bench (Senior Deputy President Hamberger and Commissioner Raffaelli) dealt with Ground 7 in their reasons for decision at [196] – [205]. The majority found that Senior Deputy President Cartwright had fallen into error in accordance with the statement of principle set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 per Dixon, Evatt and McTeirnan JJ. The majority found that Senior President Cartwright erred in taking into account some extraneous considerations as grounds for giving relatively little weight to the medical evidence of Dr Teoh, erred in placing less emphasis on the medical evidence because of the way it found itself introduced into the proceedings and erred in failing to give appropriate weight to the medical evidence of Dr Teoh. They also found that a number of the reasons given by Senior Deputy President Cartwright for giving less weight to Dr Teoh’s evidence were not reasonable (see [199], [202] and [205] of the reasons for decision of the Full Bench).