Shahin Enterprises Pty Ltd v Virgo Industries Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

SHAHIN ENTERPRISES PTY LTD v VIRGO INDUSTRIES PTY LTD

[2019] SASC 94

Ruling of The Honourable Justice Parker

5 June 2019

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - PLEADINGS - PARTICULAR PLEADINGS - DEFENCE

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - PLEADINGS

This is a ruling as to whether the defendant should be granted leave to file and serve a third defence to the plaintiff’s third statement of claim.  The plaintiff contends that in several respects the proposed third defence does not comply with the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA).

Held, per Parker J:

1.  While ordinarily it is not permissible to plead an allegation of law as a material fact, that is permissible where necessary for the sake of clarity and so as to ensure that the other party is informed of the case put against it (at [10]).

2.  Clauses 15.3.1, 15.3.3, 15.3.4, 15A.1, 15A.2, 15A.3, 15A.4 and 15A.9 do not offend the rules and practice as to pleadings (at [11]-[40], [43]-[45]).

3.  The defendant is to provide further particulars in relation to the matters referred to at cl 15A.6 (at [41]-[42], [46]).

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 100, referred to.
Kirby v Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 135, applied.

SHAHIN ENTERPRISES PTY LTD v VIRGO INDUSTRIES PTY LTD
[2019] SASC 94

  1. PARKER J:          The subject of this ruling is whether the defendant should be granted leave to file and serve a third defence to the plaintiff’s third statement of claim.  The plaintiff contends that in several respects the proposed third defence does not comply with the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA).  It is necessary to consider each of the objections separately as, to some extent, they raise different issues.  Before doing so, it is necessary to briefly state the background.

  2. The plaintiff redevelops and operates services stations under the trading name of “On the Run”.  In 2017 it entered into a lease with the defendant to occupy certain premises.  The plaintiff contends that the commencement of the lease was to be determined following remediation of the site by the previous tenant, Caltex.  It is further alleged that it was a condition of the lease between the defendant and Caltex that the latter would provide a certificate to the defendant to the effect that remediation of the site had been completed.  The plaintiff contends that the certificate provided by Caltex is defective and does not satisfy either the requirements of the defendant’s lease with Caltex or its lease with the plaintiff. 

  3. The plaintiff further contends that, in breach of its lease, the defendant accepted the certificate provided by Caltex and purported to set a commencement date for the lease between the plaintiff and the defendant.   It is further alleged that the defendant subsequently withdrew its acceptance of the certificate because it did not comply with the terms of the lease to Caltex.  The plaintiff…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 94
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Shahin Enterprises Pty Ltd v Virgo Industries Pty Ltd, the dispute arose out of a contractual relationship involving a lease agreement and the subsequent contamination of the leased premises. The plaintiff, Shahin Enterprises, sought to challenge the defendant's, Virgo Industries, proposed third defence in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The crux of the objection was the assertion by Shahin that the defence improperly rehearsed legal conclusions and did not provide sufficient particulars to allow for a proper response.

The legal issues the court was required to decide centered around the propriety of the defendant's pleadings, specifically whether certain clauses in the proposed third defence were permissible. The plaintiff argued that these clauses amounted to pleading conclusions of law and were not sufficiently particularised, potentially misleading the court and denying the plaintiff the opportunity to properly respond. The court had to determine whether the defendant's defence was appropriately framed, or if it needed to be amended to provide clearer particulars.

The court held that while it is generally impermissible to plead a conclusion of law as a material fact, exceptions exist where such pleading is necessary for clarity and to ensure the opposing party is adequately informed of the case against them. The court found that in this case, given the complexity of the leases and the legal issues surrounding them, the defendant's approach in pleading the conclusions was justified. The court also noted that the plaintiff's objections could be overcome with appropriate particulars. As such, the court did not find the proposed third defence to be objectionable on the grounds raised by the plaintiff.

The final orders of the court were that the objections made by Shahin Enterprises to the proposed third defence were not upheld, allowing the defence to stand as proposed by Virgo Industries. The court noted that if further particulars were required, these should be provided to ensure clarity and fairness in the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Against that background I turn to consider the objections made by the plaintiff to the proposed third defence.Pleading a conclusion of law A number of the objections made by the plaintiff to the terms of the proposed third defence complain about pleading a conclusion of law. While ordinarily it is not permissible to plead an allegation of law as a material fact, that is permissible where necessary for the sake of clarity and so as to ensure that the other party is informed of the case put against it.[1] In my view, given that a central issue in these proceedings is the proper construction and legal effect of two leases the defendant has been justified in taking that approach in the proposed third defence.[1] Kirby v Sanderson Motors Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 135 at 142-143 (Hodgson JA); Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Thomson Reuters, 10th ed, 2014) at [6.220].Clause 15.3.1 Clause 15.3.1 of the proposed third defence asserts that Caltex has an ongoing liability for all contamination caused during its tenancy. The plaintiff contends that this amounts to pleading a conclusion of law. It is also says that the terms of the Caltex lease are irrelevant to the alleged breach of the lease between the plaintiff and the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff indicated that it would not maintain the objection if it were provided with appropriate particulars explaining why it was contended that Caltex remained responsible for the condition of the premises. The defendant contends that cl 15.3.1 is a proper pleading as it gives fair notice of its contention as to the effect of the Caltex lease. This defence is also relevant to the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant has become responsible for the condition of the premises. I have revised the view that I provisionally expressed during the hearing of this interlocutory application. My revised view is now as follows. In other circumstances cl 15.3.1 would be objectionable as it pleads a conclusion of law. I have already indicated why I do not accept that objection in this case. The clause gives fair notice of the defendant’s contention as to the effect of the Caltex lease by asserting a particular construction. Clause 15.3.3 The proposed cl 15.3.3 contends that it is not the practice of the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) to exercise its statutory powers so as to require a current occupier to either cease trading or to undertake further environmental clean-up work to deal with contamination caused by others. That is said particularly to be the case where the original polluter (in this case Caltex) remains a commercial trading entity and the plaintiff already has in place planning approval to redevelop the land as a service station. The plaintiff contends that the proposed pleading is entirely vague. Moreover, an estoppel cannot operate against the exercise of a statutory power. The plaintiff cannot be left to interpret what is the practice of the EPA in order to determine its reply. It should also not be required to examine the evidence in support of the defendant’s case to identify the issue. Instead, the plea should be clear on its face. The plea must identify by reference to a particular document, if there is one, the alleged practice of the EPA. Alternatively, if it is a matter of evidence, that can be identified in correspondence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established