Shah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Shah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 967

File number(s): SYG 685 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS
Date of judgment: 23 June 2025
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – Extension of Time Application – where the application for review was 612 days out of time – where the applicant did not provide an adequate explanation for the delay – where prejudice to the public interest caused by excessive delay weighs against grant of the extension of time – where the proposed ground of judicial review has no reasonable prospect of success – application dismissed
Legislation:

 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 48, 65, 359, 477(1), 477(2), 477(3)(a)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) rr 2.03AA(2)(a), 2.03AA(3)

Cases cited:

Bechara v Bates [2018] FCA 460

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; 268 CLR 29

Jamal v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 916

Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187; [1986] FCA 473

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1

MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110

MZZGC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842

Re Commonwealth of Australia;Ex-Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491

SZSDAvMinister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; 135 ALD 17

SZVBN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 898

Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28

WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 85
Date of hearing: 6 May 2025
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicant: Oliver Jones
Solicitor for the Applicant: Attia Lawyers and Consultants
Solicitor for the Respondents: Julian Pinder

ORDERS

SYG 685 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

MOHD SHAFIQ ASHRAF BIN KAMAL SHAH

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SKAROS

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.The application for an extension of time filed on 22 April 2021 pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 967
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Shah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicant, a citizen of Malaysia, sought an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Administrative Review Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse the grant of a Temporary Business Entry visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the applicant's application for review was filed within the prescribed time limit and, if not, whether the court should exercise its discretion under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to extend that time.

The court considered the principles relevant to the exercise of its discretion to extend time, including the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the Minister, and the merits of the applicant's case. The court found that the applicant's application for review was 612 days out of time, and he did not provide an adequate explanation for the delay. Additionally, the court considered that the proposed ground of judicial review had no reasonable prospect of success. The court noted that the delay was excessive and caused prejudice to the public interest, which weighed against the grant of an extension of time.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the applicant's application for an extension of time. The court was not satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for the applicant to seek judicial review. The court held that the delay was lengthy and unexplained, and the applicant had not demonstrated that his case was strong or exceptional enough to warrant an extension of time. The court also found that the proposed ground of judicial review was unlikely to succeed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

By application filed on 22 April 2021, the applicant seeks an order pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal[1] (the Tribunal) dated 25 July 2019. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the First Respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicant a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) (the visa) under s 65 of the Act. [1] The Court notes that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has been superseded by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Item 10, Part 2 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that for any proceedings that were pending in any court or tribunal immediately before the transition time and to which the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was a party, the Administrative Review Tribunal is, after the transition time, substituted for the Tribunal as a party to the proceedings. BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia. He applied for the visa on 28 February 2018. On 14 September 2018, the Department requested the applicant provide supporting documents which relevantly included police certificates from each country where he had lived for a total of 12 months or more in the last 10 years, as evidence that he had satisfied the character requirements. In responding to this request, the applicant provided evidence of an application made on 6 October 2018 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia for a certificate of good conduct. On 22 January 2018, the delegate made a decision to refuse the visa on the basis that the requirement in r 2.03AA(2)(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) was not met as the applicant had not provided the requested statements about whether or not he had a criminal history. On 10 February 2019, the applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision. On 8 April 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant requesting him to provide a copy of the outcome of his application for a Malaysian certificate of good conduct. No response was received by the Tribunal to that correspondence. On 23 April 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant pursuant to s 359 of the Act, inviting him to provide a copy of the certificate of good conduct issued by the Malaysian Government. The Tribunal requested the provision of this information by 7 May 2019. On 2 May 2019, the applicant advised the Tribunal that he was unable to provide the requested information by the due date and required additional time. On 13 May 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered his email and granted him an extension until 2 July 2019 for the provision of the information. On 30 June 2019, the applicant advised the Tribunal that he had contacted the Malaysian Government regarding his application for a Certificate of Good Conduct. The applicant provided an email dated 14 June 2019 from SKB Unit (Letter of Good Conduct) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, advising inter alia that processing would take approximately one to two months to complete. The applicant requested the Tribunal provide a further extension of one month.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 25 July 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant the visa. TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant provided a statement from an appropriate authority about whether or not he had a criminal history in all countries of residence: r 2.03AA(2)(a). The Tribunal also considered whether it was not reasonable for the applicant to provide the requested statement for the purposes of waiving the requirement in r 2.03AA(2)(a), as provided for by r 2.03AA(3). In considering the claims and evidence, the Tribunal provided a background to the matter, relevantly detailing the initial request by the Department for information on 14 September 2018 and the subsequent correspondence and actions taken by the applicant to meet the request. At the hearing, the applicant was invited to respond to the Tribunal's observation that nine months had lapsed, and he had still not provided a statement from a relevant authority in Malaysia about whether or not he has a criminal history. The Tribunal recorded the applicant’s oral evidence that his application of 6 October 2018 was no longer valid as he had submitted incorrect information in the form of photographs and that he was required to submit a new application, which would take approximately one to two months as advised in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia email of 14 June 2019. The applicant informed the Tribunal that he did not follow up on this application because he had a lawyer processing his visa application who should have advised him that there was a problem. The applicant also told the Tribunal that he had not submitted a new application. The Tribunal recorded that on 22 July 2019, following the hearing, the applicant provided an email dated 4 February 2019 to his former migration agent and the agent’s response. The Tribunal noted that in this correspondence, there was no reference to the requirement to provide a certificate of good conduct from the Malaysian government or enquiry into the status of the 6 October 2018 application. In consideration of the evidence before it, the Tribunal found that the applicant had not provided a statement from an appropriate authority and therefore did not meet r 2.03AA(2)(a). The Tribunal accordingly considered whether it would not be reasonable for the applicant to provide the statement, and whether the requirement to provide it, should be waived under r 2.03AA(3). The Tribunal accepted that the applicant relied on his former migration agent to advise him of the necessary requirements and information required by the Department for the processing of his visa application. The Tribunal further accepted that the applicant initially made an application to the relevant Malaysian authority on 6 October 2018. The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not disclose to the Tribunal, until the hearing of 22 July 2019, that his application of 6 October 2018 was invalid and that he had not made a subsequent application. The Tribunal also noted that the applicant was granted extensions of time to procure the certificate before the hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For the reasons that follow, the Court is not satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for time to be extended. CONSIDERATION OF THE EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATION The applicant did not commence proceedings in this Court within the 35-day period prescribed by s 477(1) of the Act. Under s 477(2) of the Act, the Court has the power to extend the 35-day limit if:(a) the applicant has requested the extension of time in writing and provided reasons for why it is necessary in the interest of the administration of justice for time to be extended; and(b) the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for time to be extended. The applicant has sought an order (in writing) that the time for making the application be extended under s 477(2) of the Act. He has also provided reasons (in the Applicant’s Affidavit) as why time should be extended. Relevant principles The principles applicable to an extension of time application are relatively well established. In Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579 (Katoa), the High Court; per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ, observed at [12] that the power to extend time is not focused on the interests of the applicant, but on the broader interests of the administration of justice. As stated in Katoa, there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the ‘subject-matter, scope and purpose’ of the Act. In considering whether to grant an extension of time, however, the Court may look at ‘a myriad of facts and circumstances’, including the length of the applicant’s delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice: per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [12]. Whilst it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of proposed grounds of review at a ‘reasonably impressionistic level’ there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. For example, if the delay is ‘lengthy and unexplained’, the applicant may be required to show that their case is strong or even ‘exceptional’: Katoa [17]–[18]. The applicant, in relying upon MZZGC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842 (MZZGC) at [13], [17] per Mortimer J and SZVBN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 898 (SZVBN) at [44] per Griffiths J, submitted it was possible for the absence of an acceptable explanation for delay to be outweighed by the presence of an arguable case, especially where the decision under review is a migration one with serious consequences for the applicant. While I acknowledge that the decision under review in this case is a migration one, I note that it relates to a temporary work visa, whereas the decisions under review in MZZGC and SZVBN related to protection visa refusals. It was in this context (and the consequences for a protection visa applicant claiming fear of persecution) that the Court in MZZGC said ‘careful consideration’ should be given to the question of an extension of time. This approach was followed in SZVBN. In MZZGC, Mortimer J at [14], nevertheless acknowledged that the length of the delay and any explanation for it was also a significant factor, for which weight would vary considerably depending on the circumstances of each case.