FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Shah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 967
File number(s): SYG 685 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS Date of judgment: 23 June 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Extension of Time Application – where the application for review was 612 days out of time – where the applicant did not provide an adequate explanation for the delay – where prejudice to the public interest caused by excessive delay weighs against grant of the extension of time – where the proposed ground of judicial review has no reasonable prospect of success – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 48, 65, 359, 477(1), 477(2), 477(3)(a)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) rr 2.03AA(2)(a), 2.03AA(3)
Cases cited: Bechara v Bates [2018] FCA 460
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; 268 CLR 29
Jamal v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 916
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187; [1986] FCA 473
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1
MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110
MZZGC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842
Re Commonwealth of Australia;Ex-Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491
SZSDAvMinister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; 135 ALD 17
SZVBN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 898
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 85 Date of hearing: 6 May 2025 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicant: Oliver Jones Solicitor for the Applicant: Attia Lawyers and Consultants Solicitor for the Respondents: Julian Pinder ORDERS
SYG 685 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MOHD SHAFIQ ASHRAF BIN KAMAL SHAH
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SKAROS
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
2.The application for an extension of time filed on 22 April 2021 pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 967
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles relevant to the exercise of its discretion to extend time, including the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the Minister, and the merits of the applicant's case. The court found that the applicant's application for review was 612 days out of time, and he did not provide an adequate explanation for the delay. Additionally, the court considered that the proposed ground of judicial review had no reasonable prospect of success. The court noted that the delay was excessive and caused prejudice to the public interest, which weighed against the grant of an extension of time.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the applicant's application for an extension of time. The court was not satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for the applicant to seek judicial review. The court held that the delay was lengthy and unexplained, and the applicant had not demonstrated that his case was strong or exceptional enough to warrant an extension of time. The court also found that the proposed ground of judicial review was unlikely to succeed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons that follow, the Court is not satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for time to be extended. CONSIDERATION OF THE EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATION The applicant did not commence proceedings in this Court within the 35-day period prescribed by s 477(1) of the Act. Under s 477(2) of the Act, the Court has the power to extend the 35-day limit if:(a) the applicant has requested the extension of time in writing and provided reasons for why it is necessary in the interest of the administration of justice for time to be extended; and(b) the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for time to be extended. The applicant has sought an order (in writing) that the time for making the application be extended under s 477(2) of the Act. He has also provided reasons (in the Applicant’s Affidavit) as why time should be extended. Relevant principles The principles applicable to an extension of time application are relatively well established. In Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579 (Katoa), the High Court; per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ, observed at [12] that the power to extend time is not focused on the interests of the applicant, but on the broader interests of the administration of justice. As stated in Katoa, there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the ‘subject-matter, scope and purpose’ of the Act. In considering whether to grant an extension of time, however, the Court may look at ‘a myriad of facts and circumstances’, including the length of the applicant’s delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice: per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [12]. Whilst it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of proposed grounds of review at a ‘reasonably impressionistic level’ there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. For example, if the delay is ‘lengthy and unexplained’, the applicant may be required to show that their case is strong or even ‘exceptional’: Katoa [17]–[18]. The applicant, in relying upon MZZGC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842 (MZZGC) at [13], [17] per Mortimer J and SZVBN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 898 (SZVBN) at [44] per Griffiths J, submitted it was possible for the absence of an acceptable explanation for delay to be outweighed by the presence of an arguable case, especially where the decision under review is a migration one with serious consequences for the applicant. While I acknowledge that the decision under review in this case is a migration one, I note that it relates to a temporary work visa, whereas the decisions under review in MZZGC and SZVBN related to protection visa refusals. It was in this context (and the consequences for a protection visa applicant claiming fear of persecution) that the Court in MZZGC said ‘careful consideration’ should be given to the question of an extension of time. This approach was followed in SZVBN. In MZZGC, Mortimer J at [14], nevertheless acknowledged that the length of the delay and any explanation for it was also a significant factor, for which weight would vary considerably depending on the circumstances of each case.