Shafiei and Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Shafiei and Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry [2025] ARTA 729 (12 June 2025)
Applicant/s:  Mehri Shafiei
Respondent:  Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Tribunal Number:                2023/8836

Tribunal:General Member S. Fenwick
Place:Melbourne
Date:12 June 2025

Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

...............................[SGD].........................................
General Member S. Fenwick
Catchwords
BIOSECURITY – refusal of permit to import goods – live parrots (psitaccine) – country of origin Iran – mandatory risk assessment – whether conditions can reduce biosecurity risk – decision affirmed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth)
Secondary Materials
Biosecurity (Conditionally Non-Prohibited Goods) Determination 2021 (Cth)
Statement of Reasons
BACKGROUND

The Indian ringneck parrot (Psittacula krameri) is a medium sized member of the Psittacidae family. The bird is a popular pet and very long-lived, and is a natural mimic. Agriculture Victoria, however, identifies them as an exotic pest animal species, along with ostriches and several other less well-known bird types.
Ms Shafiei is an Australian permanent resident of Iranian nationality, and previously resident in the city of Isfahan. She is the devoted owner of two adult members of the species, named Shadoon and Shellman, with beautiful green and blue plumage respectively.
Against a background of Ms Shafiei and her wider family seeking to relocate permanently to Australia, she applied on 23 June 2023 for a permit to import her pets. This request was refused on 26 July 2023 and the refusal was affirmed by decision dated 23 October 2023. Ms Shafiei applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in November 2023.
In her permit application, Ms Shafiei stated that she would transport the birds by air via Qatar and New Zealand, where she proposed a period of quarantine. She explained that there are no family members in Iran to care for her ‘cute feathered family members’, which had been with her for six years. The Applicant described them as physically healthy, having visited the vet and in possession of health certificates. Ms Shafiei stated further she intended to seek permission to bring her birds to New Zealand, indicating they would ‘die due to depression and dependency’ if separated from her.
Under s 179 of the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) (the Act), the Director of Biosecurity has discretion to issue an import permit for ‘goods’ (including an animal). The decision must be informed by a risk assessment, the statutory level of protection specified by the Act, and consideration must be given to whether it would be necessary to impose conditions to reduce the level of biosecurity risk. In this case, it was determined that, given the presence of diseases of concern including avian influenza in Iran, the permit should be refused. The prior notice of intention to refuse noted that import permit conditions are in place only for birds exported from New Zealand, but the New Zealand government advise that no live birds may be imported into that country. The internal review decision determined that no conditions can be applied to the import of Psittacula krameria.
The hearing in this matter originally commenced in August 2024, however Ms Shafiei was overseas and it became clear that there was no means of establishing a telecommunications link to Iran. The hearing was adjourned, and it was agreed with the parties that notarised answers to questions posed by the Respondent would enable a reasonable basis for the further conduct of the matter. Ultimately, Ms Shafiei returned to Australia and participated with the assistance of her family and also an interpreter in the Farsi language. Some evidence was also given by the Applicant’s sister.
Together with various email communications with the Tribunal, Ms Shafiei has provided several bundles of material. I describe these as follows:
(a)AB1 – lodged July 2024 and including:
(i)identity cards and health certificates for the birds;
(ii)Psittacine PCR screening Report dated 14 June 2024;
(iii)Pre-arrival Quarantine Protocol dated 12 July 2023;
(iv)Veterinary Health Certificate from the Ministry of Jihad-e-Agriculture, dated 7 November 2023;
(v)Statement of Applicant’s brother, dated 30 June 2024;
(b)AB2 – lodged August 2024 and including:
(i)Central Laboratory of Isfahan Veterinary Directorate PCR test results, dated ‘2023/07/08’;
(ii)further PCR test results, dated 23 June 2024;
(iii)Export Permit, Bureau of Wildlife Conservation and Management, dated 29 July 2023;
(c)AB3 – lodged December 2024 and including:
(i)Vaccination certificates, dated 14 June 2024;
(ii)Animal Health Cards for the birds;
(iii)images of vaccine vials;
(iv)Import Permit for Alexandra’s (Princess) Parrot (Polytelis alexandrae), dated 24 August 2024;
(v)Answers to Targeted Questions, dated 14 November 2024.
The Respondent lodged documents under s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), Supplementary T documents, a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 12 July 2024 (RSFIC), and Supplementary Submissions dated 28 February 2025. The following additional material was lodged:
(a)Affidavit of Dr Murli Baker-Gabb, Principal Veterinary Officer at the Respondent agency, dated 19 December 2024; and
(b)Affidavit of Ms Suzanne Maloney, Senior Veterinary Officer at the Respondent agency, dated 19 December 2024.
LEGISLATION
The long title of the Act is ‘An Act relating to diseases and pests that may cause harm to human, animal or plant health or the environment, and for related purposes’. Among its objects is to provide for managing ‘biosecurity risks’ (s 4). This is defined in s 9 of the Act as follows:
(a)  the likelihood of a disease or pest:
(i)  entering Australian territory or a part of Australian territory; or
(ii)  establishing itself or spreading in Australian territory or a part of Australian territory; and
(b)  the potential for any of the following:
(i)  the disease or pest to cause harm to human, animal or plant health;
(ii)  the disease or pest to cause harm to the environment;
(iii)  economic consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread of the disease or pest.
A further preliminary matter is found in s 5 of the Act which provides: ‘[t]he Appropriate Level of Protection (or ALOP) for Australia is a high level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing biosecurity risks to a very low level, but not to zero’.
Chapter 3 of the Act deals with managing biosecurity risk for ‘goods’ which, as noted, includes animals (s 19). Part 3 essentially deals with types of goods and permits to import goods (s 171). A particular regime is established by Division 2 of this part by which permits may be sought in respect of what are defined in s 174(2) as ‘conditionally non-prohibited goods’.
Classes of goods falling within this broad type are identified by reference to a determination made under s 174(1) of the Act, being Biosecurity (Conditionally Non-prohibited Goods) Determination 2021 (the Determination). Relevantly, live animals are so specified in s 11(1)(a) of the Determination. The Determination goes on to provide that live animals must not be imported without a permit, or, if alternative conditions are specified, without compliance with such conditions (s 12(1)). There are at present no alternative conditions in place under the Determination for live birds (see s 14).
Division 3 of Part 3 of the Act makes provision for permits to import conditionally non-prohibited goods. Such goods must not be brought or imported into Australia unless the Director of Biosecurity grants a permit (s 176), following the making of an application (s 177). Grant of a permit is discretionary, and subject to the following mandatory provisions under s 179:
(1A)  Before granting the permit in relation to the goods:
(a)  a risk assessment must be conducted in relation to the goods by a biosecurity worker; and
(b)  the Director of Biosecurity must be satisfied that the ALOP for Australia was applied in the conduct of the risk assessment.
(2)  In deciding whether to grant the permit in relation to the goods, the Director of Biosecurity must consider:
(aa)  the risk assessment that was conducted in relation to the goods; and
(a)  the level of biosecurity riskassociated with the goods; and
(b)  whether it would be necessary to impose conditions on the permit to reduce the level of biosecurity riskassociated with the goods to an acceptable level; and
(c)  any personal information that is required to be provided with the application for the permit under section  531.
The Act imposes criminal and civil penalties for importation in breach of the above regime (s 186).
ISSUES
The sole issue in this matter is whether to exercise the discretion under the Act to issue a permit for the importation of Ms Shafiei’s pet Indian ringneck parrots.
EVIDENCE
Shadoon and Shellman
I have already briefly noted Ms Shafiei’s proposal to travel to New Zealand and import her birds to Australia from that location. I note also from correspondence between the Applicant and Respondent agency (T4) that at some point she appears to have spent some months in Qatar together with her birds. This was not explored in evidence at the hearing nor in submissions.
It is apparent from the nature of documents lodged by Ms Shafiei, she has engaged the services of an Iranian veterinary practice to provide health care for her pets. The documents and a narrative provided by her (T21) indicate that she established a form of domestic quarantine for them in her home, and they were also microchipped and vaccinated. This regime is also attested to in her answers to the questions posed by the Respondent. It is also apparent from her brother’s statement, and confirmed by Ms Shafiei in her evidence, that the birds also spent some time in his residence
In her answers to targeted questions, the Applicant describes the quarantine as being in a separate space, with no access to open space, but ventilated; with a total duration of over two years. I note Ms Shafiei states that the birds were under her supervision since they were chicks and, as confirmed in her oral evidence, they were under regular veterinary supervision.
While not explored in evidence at the hearing, I note that the identity documents provided for the birds, and other Iranian documents lodged, indicate that they are of different ages: Shadoon being born in 2016; Shellman in 2019. This contrasts somewhat to information provided in the import application.
I note the original health certificates for the birds were issued by the veterinary practice, and indicate administration of ‘Newcastle vaccination’. The later Animal Health Cards indicate vaccination for ‘Newcastle & Influenza’ on 18 September 2014. The photographs provided by Ms Shafiei appear to show vials of vaccine for Newcastle virus and Avian influenza. I understood her to say in evidence that she took one of the photographs and another was provided by the clinic.
Ms Shafiei’s written and oral evidence refer to the birds being vaccinated twice for Newcastle disease and also twice for AVN and HPAI; one of the incidents of vaccination appears to have involved a ‘dual’ vaccine.
The Psittacine PCR Screening Report from June 2024 was provided by Ms Shafiei’s vet. The document reads largely as a description of screening services or method in respect of Avian polyoma virus, Chlamydia psittacine and Psittacine beak and feather disease, referring to various sample types (cloacal, blood, or faeces). It also states ‘Nondetected’ and in a slightly different font with slightly different formatting to the balance of the text, at the bottom of the document: ‘Influenza H5, H7 &Poly A were not detected’.
As noted, there are what appear to be two sets of test results (2023 and 2024) from the Central Laboratory of Isfahan, which record negative results for the same viruses. The appearance of these documents is somewhat unusual in that the earlier documents are on a form of letterhead and the latter are not, and other textual anomalies include misaligned signature blocks.
Agency risk assessment
Ms Maloney confirms in her Affidavit that she was the officer that conducted the risk assessment in respect of Ms Shafiei’s pets [9]. The risk assessment (T31) takes the form of a table setting out several criteria, accompanied by a statement by way of assessment, and leading to what appears to be a ‘Yes, No’ outcome under a column headed ‘Can ALOP be met?’. It appears that in all material respects Ms Maloney answered ‘No’ to each criteria considered.
I briefly summarise some aspects of the risk assessment:
(a)import conditions exist only for the import of live pigeons from certain countries, and psittacine birds from New Zealand;
(b)the New Zealand policy cannot be applied as it takes account of the ‘unique and very high health status’ of birds in New Zealand, and is also framed by the fact that New Zealand does not allow the importation of birds;
(c)a draft risk review for psittacine birds from countries other than New Zealand has been in progress since 2018;
(d)the last official notification from Iran in 2020 was that ‘HPAI in poultry, LPAI, IBDV and Newcastle disease’ were present, the status of these diseases is therefore unknown and the background risk must therefore be considered high;
(e)the status of relevant diseases for psittacine birds is also unknown, and therefore presents an unacceptably high risk, and Iran is not an approved country for live animal imports;
(f)it is not possible to import the birds via New Zealand and they cannot be legally imported into New Zealand;
(g)‘[v]accination complicates the interpretation of any diagnostic testing … making it not possible to manage risk to a level commensurate with ALOP’;
(h)the diagnostic testing submitted does not mitigate the risk of avian influenza to ALOP;
(i)live avians present a high biosecurity risk and it would be necessary to impose conditions to reduce the risk to ALOP;
(j)there are no existing permit conditions that reduce the risk to ALOP for a live bird from Iran; and
(k)the draft psittacine review indicates the complexity to assess and manage risks for live psittacines from countries other than New Zealand.
In her affidavit, Ms Maloney states that the country reporting referred to in the risk assessment is drawn from the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), and the lack of timely reporting from Iran means the Respondent agency does not have current information about the animal health status in Iran [14]-[17]. She adds that the available information demonstrates it is not possible to conclude Iran is free of avian influenza, there are ongoing outbreaks of Newcastle disease, and there is widespread vaccination for both diseases. Ms Maloney states that these, and other diseases noted, are of biosecurity concern and ‘generally readily contagious’ [18].
Ms Maloney concludes that the introduction of birds from Iran has the potential to impact public health, the local economy, and native fauna [20]. She notes that avian influenza and Newcastle disease would be ‘catastrophic’ if they entered the commercial poultry sector [21].
Ms Maloney further explains that the Respondent agency has developed standard import conditions that are usually imposed on permits to allow import of domestic psittacine birds from New Zealand [25]. These are based upon available information from New Zealand and the level of biosecurity risk has been assessed as ‘very low’ [26]. Ms Maloney describes aspects of the WOAH reporting from New Zealand including that it prohibits live bird import, prohibits vaccination against avian influenza and Newcastle disease, and conducts surveillance for these among poultry and wild birds [29]-[34]. In short, the standards applied to imports from New Zealand are specific to its particular circumstances and not appropriate to be applied to imports from other countries [35]. Despite there being a draft risk review of psittacine bird imports more widely, in her opinion the draft permit conditions would not be sufficient to reduce the biosecurity risk to ALOP, in part because Iran has not been assessed as a ‘Competent Authority’ [41].
A copy of the standard import conditions from New Zealand is annexed to Ms Maloney’s affidavit (SM2). Pre-export conditions include 45 days quarantine in an approved facility immediately prior to export, in facilities approved by the New Zealand Government veterinary authority, and completely isolated from insect vectors including mosquitoes. A zoosanitary certificate must also be completed by a New Zealand Government veterinary officer including certification that no outbreaks of Newcastle disease and avian influenza have occurred in the previous six months, that the birds passed an examination during export quarantine by that officer, and were again examined by a qualified vet within 96 hours of export.
Dr Baker-Gabb states in his affidavit that risk analysis or development of standard permit conditions involve identifying a specific commodity, associated hazards, and whether biosecurity measures should be imposed as permit conditions [7]. He then provides information about the nature and significance of a Competent Authority [8]-[16]. He initially states that the draft risk review of psittacine bird imports notes the need to consider the country of export. Dr Baker-Gabb then states that if a country wishes to be added to the list of approved countries for certain goods, or classes of goods, an assessment is undertaken to determine whether Australia’s biosecurity requirements and any associated conditions can be met. He describes in some detail the range of considerations involved including auditing veterinary services, infrastructure, animal health status and quality systems.
In summary, Dr Baker-Gabb states that neither has such an assessment been conducted for Iran, nor is it likely to be considered a Competent Authority. This is due to factors including lack of knowledge about animal health and veterinary services, and a wider concern about document fraud for companion animal importation, which ‘is a major issue, even from approved countries’.
With respect to the draft risk review for psittacine birds, Dr Baker-Gabb states that even when finalised, a program of implementation measures aimed at managing the biosecurity risk would be expected to take at least 12 to 18 months [20]. He also states his opinion that standard conditions developed for New Zealand are not appropriate for birds from other countries, due to the risk of introduction of exotic diseases [34].
I note some additional background found in the 2020 draft risk review ‘Import risk review for psittacine birds from all countries’ (T29):
(a)conditions for live psittacine import were finalised in 1989 and between 1990 and 1995 approximately 4,800 birds were imported;
(b)the conditions were suspended in 1995 due to concerns over the unacceptable risk of introduction of certain exotic species;
(c)presently the only psittacine birds that can be imported are pets from New Zealand whose owners are moving permanently to Australia;
(d)the review was announced in May 2016 in response to ongoing requests from bird owners and other stakeholders;
(e)the policy in respect of New Zealand requires pre-export inspection and quarantine, a New Zealand Government veterinary certificate, and post-entry inspection in Australia;
(f)the review proposed a combination of risk management measures that will reduce the biosecurity risk to achieve ALOP including sourcing from approved countries, pre-export and post-entry quarantine, veterinary inspection, and testing for diseases of biosecurity concern; and
(g)proposed pre-export conditions include that for an approved country, premises be identified by the veterinary authority as a quarantine facility, and that a bird has not been vaccinated for avian influenza in the past.

For completeness, I note that in her affidavit, Ms Maloney refers to her application of the various risk matrices set out in the draft risk review [11]. These matrices form part of a more comprehensive assessment of biosecurity hazards and nearly a dozen diseases are highlighted for specific attention. Each is thoroughly considered and an overall risk estimate is achieved by combining separate risk estimates for the likelihood of entry and of the effect of establishment and spread of a particular hazard.
In her evidence, Ms Maloney confirmed her concern about the outbreaks of avian influenza in Iran and described it as highly transmissible and highly pathogenic (meaning disease causing). She also stated her understanding that Iran had conducted vaccination against the disease at a level approaching 100 million doses. While this was effective at managing the domestic flock and so can improve food security, it complicates matters for trading partners. This is because vaccination greatly complicates testing.
After further evidence about other disease types, Ms Maloney confirmed that vaccination makes it hard to determine the actual status of a virus in a flock. She considered that all import requirements mean that any vaccinated bird would not be permitted to enter Australia. I confirmed with her that this meant that these vaccinated birds would therefore under no circumstances be permitted to be imported, and she responded ‘yes’.
When asked about the domestic quarantine regime established by Ms Shafiei, Ms Maloney stated that due to the contagious nature of relevant diseases, even the best care would not be satisfactory to bring the level of risk to very low. She reiterated here that the second vaccination of these birds made the biosecurity risk higher because standard conditions for all live imports for all species is that the individuals and the flock they come from never be vaccinated.
Ms Maloney confirmed the written evidence that a ‘back door’ importation through New Zealand was not acceptable. She stated that the Respondent agency receives 100-120 requests per year similar to that made by Ms Shafiei, which also have not received import approval.
Ms Maloney was also specifically asked about what appears to be a vial of combined Newcastle disease and Influenza A vaccine, as provided by Ms Shafiei. Consistent with her affidavit [43], she confirmed that there is no vaccine approved for psittacines for Newcastle disease, therefore it would be difficult to determine the impact of the vaccination.
With respect to the various test reports provide for the Applicant’s birds, Ms Maloney stated that a PCR test provides a point-in-time result. She stated that any testing results would need to be a series over a period of time, and the report provided by Ms Shafiei’s vet did not in any event conform to the relevant international standard, which evidence is consistent with her affidavit [48]. She expressed less concern about the reports that appear to be from a government source.
It was put to Ms Maloney in cross-examination that Australia is not free of Newcastle virus. She agreed, and used this example to demonstrate the importance of monitoring, but also described the outbreak as very controlled and having limited biosecurity implications. Ms Maloney added that this does not affect the need to maintain strict import controls. When asked why the draft standards for psittacines cannot be adopted, Ms Maloney responded that a lot of diseases are difficult to manage, and science is not settled on the best means of mitigation. For this reason, establishing controls for this single importation request was difficult.
I consider Dr Baker-Gabb’s evidence to have been consistent with his affidavit. I note that Ms Shafiei asked him by way of cross-examination, effectively, why an exception could not be made for her two birds through the application of conditions. He responded with the analogy of a ‘single spark’ in the sense that Australia has a remarkable range of psittacine birds and that disease could lead to the extinction of a species, or have consequences for the poultry industry.
SUBMISSIONS
I think it is tolerably clear from the various pieces of correspondence, written materials, and Ms Shafiei’s evidence that it is her position that she has taken appropriate precautions to moderate the biosecurity risk in respect of Shadoon and Shellman. These comprise: a period or periods of domestic quarantine in her own residence and – it appears – in at least one other family residence; lifelong veterinary care and additional supervision through testing; and, the application on two occasions of sets of vaccination for diseases commonly associated with birds (avian influenza and Newcastle virus).
It is also tolerably clear that Ms Shafiei has also sought to ameliorate the risk by importing the pets by planning transit through New Zealand, as opposed to direct importation from Iran. I understood from the various correspondence at different times, and questions put to witnesses, that it remains her aspiration that conditions can be established to manage the biosecurity risk.
I note that Ms Shafiei has provided information and evidence with respect to her own emotional state. I understand from the materials and evidence that she returned to Iran for a period to care for her pets and that this was at least in part due to her experiencing depression over separation from Shadoon and Shellman.
The Respondent made comprehensive oral and written submissions. It was submitted at the hearing that the Tribunal must be satisfied that ALOP is applied to the circumstances of this importation. The Tribunal must consider the risk assessment, whether it is necessary to impose conditions to reduce it to an acceptable level, and may also have regard to any other relevant consideration. In respect of the risk assessment, its weight was a matter for the Tribunal, but it was contended that it was prepared by a senior qualified officer, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, should be afforded significant weight.
Submissions were also made with respect to avian influenza and Newcastle disease. The former carries grave implications for the Australian poultry industry and the latter is highly contagious. Reference was also made in submissions to the evidence with respect to vaccination including, critically it was put, that Iran does not prohibit vaccination against these and other diseases. Here a clarification was provided that Ms Maloney’s evidence in respect of not approving the importation of vaccinated birds applied in those cases where there are standard conditions, being pigeons, and psittacines from New Zealand. That is, there is currently no policy in respect of vaccination in any other context.
It was further contended that the evidence with respect to domestic quarantine and the various tests said to have been performed was not reliable. In addition, no conditions could be imposed that would reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Indeed, given the evidence concerning the nature and timeframe for development of standard conditions, it was not feasible that ad hoc conditions be developed for a single import; primarily due to the lack of information about conditions in Iran. The evidence also indicates the New Zealand standard conditions cannot be applied, nor the draft psittacine standard. Thus, the absence of standards that might be applied also tells significantly against the issue of a permit.
Finally, the Respondent submitted that any compassionate factors that arise in this particular case are not a matter that go to the mitigation of risk or overcome the absence of conditions. In response, Ms Shafiei proposed that Australian contact Iran to address the information gaps, or consider importation via Europe.
CONSIDERATION
The Act provides not only for a compulsory risk assessment, but this assessment speaks to a highly specific standard. ALOP, in short must be achievable and this standard of biosecurity risk is ‘very low’. It is clear from the purpose of the Act that the context is that of identifying diseases that may enter and cause harm to human or animal life, the environment or the economy.
While I have referred in some limited detail only to surrounding circumstances and information, it is evident that a policy decision was made some time ago to prohibit the import of psittacines, and that a considerable amount of effort has been invested in considering the future of this import trade. I note that the draft risk review referred to in this matter is many hundreds of pages long, has been on foot for many years, and on the evidence would take a good deal of additional time in preparation to be implemented in practice.
In exercising the discretionary power in s 179(2) of the Act I must consider the risk assessment and the level of risk associated with the import of Shadoon and Shellman. The written and oral evidence are consistent, and in this case there has been a high biosecurity risk identified. The risk arises from both known and unknown factors. The unknown factors concern the lack of official and reliable sources of information about the status and management of avian diseases in Iran. The known factors include the existence of vaccination programs in that country, and the vaccinated status of Ms Shafiei’s pets, and the domestic quarantine arrangement used.
Some nuance was added to Ms Maloney’s evidence in closing submissions, however in my view this does not change the critical importance for a decision in this matter of the efforts made to vaccinate the family pets. It appears from the material I have summarised above, and the evidence provided, that vaccination alone in this case presents an almost insurmountable obstacle to approving importation. I accept the evidence that vaccination poses a complicating factor to determining bird health, and in addition that an apparently unapproved vaccine has been administered.
This factor alone appears to remove any possibility that conditions might be imposed to reduce the level of risk. I consider that in addition, further uncertainty arises from the range of documents provided by Ms Shafiei. I do not consider it necessary to make a substantive finding about their authenticity, but I have some reservations based upon their appearance. This includes the potentially anomalous descriptions of the pet’s age in the context of the narrative about their care provided by the Applicant. That aside, I accept the evidence that testing reports do not reflect accepted international standards, and are of limited value in reducing the level of risk.
I have set out above some extracts from the draft risk review for psittacines and the extant New Zealand standards. These further demonstrate to me the unhelpful contribution made by vaccinating the pet birds. They also reinforce the written and oral evidence concerning the kinds of administrative infrastructure that surrounds the safe and well managed importation of live animals in Australia. That is, they show the critical role of authorised counterpart agencies in other countries as part of an overall risk management approach. These elements are clearly not in place in respect of Iran. Moreover, I accept the evidence that transit through New Zealand does not contribute to the reduction of risk. What is more, it appears to me from all the evidence that it is simply not likely that such a path could be pursued.
In short, I do not accept that the standard conditions for New Zealand psittacine imports can be applied. Further, as explored during the hearing, I do not consider it feasible to attempt to create ad hoc conditions for a single importation. The evidence overall demonstrates that this would not be reasonable and, indeed, would result in an unnecessary diversion of public resources. This is due to the considerable efforts that have been expended to develop even a draft framework for psittacine import more generally, and what I have described as the administrative infrastructure that accompanies approved imports.
Finally, I accept the Respondent’s contention that – given the scope and purpose of the Act – it is not reasonable to take account of the sentimental importance of the pets to Ms Shafiei. This would most certainly not have sufficient weight in any event to counteract the substantial weight that I must give to the risk assessment, and the inability to impose conditions in the case of this particular import request.
CONCLUSION
I think it is important to observe that Ms Shafiei presents as a sincere and loving pet owner. I fully accept that she has cared for Shadoon and Shallman, and indeed appears to have been so concerned about them that she spent additional time in Iran to be with them during the life of this application.
Unfortunately, the steps taken – largely it seems with a view to facilitating their import to Australia – including, in particular, vaccination have not contributed to reducing the high level of biosecurity risk arising from the importation of psittacines from Iran. As noted at the outset, publicly available information from the Victorian government indicates that this exotic species is identified as a pest, as unpleasant as this reality may seem to the Applicant.
DECISION
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

I certify that the preceding 60 (sixty) paragraphs are a true copy of the written reasons for the decision herein of General Member S. Fenwick

...............................[SGD].................................
Associate
Dated: 12 June 2025

Date of hearing: 5 August 2024; 8 and 9 May 2025

Applicant:

Advocate for the Respondent

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Self-represented

Mia Donald

Sparke Helmore Lawyers

[2025] ARTA 729

12 June 2025

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Natural Justice & Procedural Fairness

Biosecurity