SGCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SGCB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

[2003] FCA 909

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth)

NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 not followed
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 followed
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003 195 ALR 24 followed
Applicant NAOB of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 33 noted
Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168 noted
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82 followed
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; (2002) 190 ALR 601 followed
SCAN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 168 referred to
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 19 referred to
SGDB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 74 referred to
WAAC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 193 referred to
NAMO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 266 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 187 ALR 117 followed
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S190 of 2002 [2002] HCA 39 noted
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 198 ALR 59 noted

SGCB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 230 OF 2002

MANSFIELD J
28 AUGUST 2003
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 230 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SGCB
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 AUGUST 2003

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal is allowed.

2.The appeal of the appellant to the Federal Magistrates Court is remitted to that Court for rehearing or further hearing according to law.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 230 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SGCB
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

28 AUGUST 2003

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a Federal Magistrate given on 20 September 2002. By determination of the Chief Justice under s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) the appeal is to be heard by a single judge.

  2. The appellant is an Afghani national born in 1978.  He is…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 909
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SGCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the appellant sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) that he was not a refugee. The Federal Magistrate dismissed the application, and the appellant subsequently appealed to the Federal Court. The central issue before the court was whether the Federal Magistrate had erred in considering the scope and effect of section 474 of the Migration Act, which is a privative clause. The Federal Magistrate had interpreted section 474 narrowly, considering only limited grounds for review, based on a previous Full Court decision. However, subsequent to the Magistrate's decision, the High Court issued a ruling that broadened the scope of what constitutes jurisdictional error under the Act, particularly regarding decisions that do not comply with natural justice principles.

The court found that the Federal Magistrate had misapplied the effect of section 474 by not considering the broader scope of jurisdictional errors as clarified by the High Court. This misapplication led to an inadequate examination of the appellant's claims, particularly those related to natural justice and potential jurisdictional errors. The court concluded that the Magistrate's error was not merely an alternative basis for dismissal but a fundamental misdirection that precluded a proper consideration of the appellant's case.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for rehearing or further hearing in light of the correct interpretation of section 474 and the broader scope of jurisdictional errors as established by the High Court. This ensures that the appellant's application will be reviewed with the appropriate legal standards in mind, potentially altering the outcome of his case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The appeal of the appellant to the Federal Magistrates Court is remitted to that Court for rehearing or further hearing according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
Finally, the Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims cumulatively, that is whether he faced a real chance of persecution by a combination of his ethnicity and his family’s connections to the communist regime and his connections to Bamian. It found there was no real chance that he would be persecuted for a ‘cumulation’ of these reasons so that his fear of persecution was not well-founded.THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION The appellant appeared in person at the hearing of his application for prerogative relief before the Federal Magistrate. It is not surprising that he did not understand the limited grounds upon which the Magistrate’s Court might interfere and set aside a decision of the Tribunal. It appears from the Federal Magistrate’s recital of the course of the hearing that the appellant largely sought to re-argue matters of fact. Significantly, for the purposes of considering the present appeal, the appellant had shortly prior to the hearing of the application in the Federal Magistrates Court provided to the Court certain documentation including a photocopy of a newspaper article which ‘purportedly sets out facts about members of his family who are accused of plotting as part of an Islamic association to set off a bomb in Kabul’. The article was said to be dated 13 March 2002 and was said to have been received by the appellant on 4 September 2002. The appellant asserted that he had received that information, and that it provided proof of what he had alleged and given evidence about to the Tribunal (based on the telephone conversation of 13 May 2002) about the arrest of his father and brother and so substantiating independently that which he had asserted at the time. At the time of the Federal Magistrate’s consideration of the application, the decision of the Full Court of this Court in NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 (NAAV)had been given. NAAV upheld the validity of s 474 of the Act, that is the privative clause provision. The learned Magistrate described the interpretation and scope of s 474 as decided in NAAV as follows:‘The effect of the clause is to protect from judicial review decisions of the RRT which might otherwise be found to be invalid by reason of jurisdictional error.’The learned Magistrate, in the light of the Full Court decision in NAAV, described ‘on a generous view’ the grounds of review remaining open to the appellant as being that the decision exceeded the constitutional limits upon legislative power imposed by the Constitution, that the decision was not made in good faith, that the decision was not reasonably capable of reference to the power under which it was made, and that the decision was not made by reference to the subject matter, scope and objects of the Act. Those matters are what fall within the so called Hickman principles: see R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 614-617. The learned Federal Magistrate did not consider that any of those grounds was made out on the material available on the hearing of the application. There is no complaint on that score on this appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

He was not satisfied or persuaded that there was any reviewable ground in support of the application, and it was dismissed with costs.CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL Subsequent to the decision of the learned Magistrate, the High Court in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2002) 195 ALR 24 (Plaintiff S157/2002) on 4 February 2003 gave judgment in a matter concerning the scope of operation of s 474 of the Act. The High Court disagreed with the views of the Full Court in NAAV. In Applicant NAOB of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 33 at [11], the Full Court of this Court said:‘In summary, the High Court held that s 474 insofar as it rendered final and conclusive a privative clause decision and protected it from challenge, only did so in respect of “decisions made under … [the] Act”. Thus, decisions which involve a failure to exercise jurisdiction or involve an excess of the jurisdiction conferred by the Act are not, as a matter of statutory construction, decisions made under the Act and are therefore not privative clause decisions protected by s 474. Put shortly, s 474 does not apply to decisions which involve jurisdictional error, and does not apply, in particular, to decisions which do not comply with the principles of natural justice.’See also the discussion by the Full Court in Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168 at [45]-[51] (Lobo). On the hearing of this appeal, consequently, it is clear that the learned Magistrate hearing the application misdirected himself as to the role and effect of s 474 of the Act in relation to the application. He took too narrow a view as to what may constitute jurisdictional error under the Act for the purposes of determining whether the appellant had made out a ground for setting aside the Tribunal’s decision and for the issue of prerogative relief. So much was accepted by counsel for the respondent. However, counsel for the respondent contended that an examination of the reasons for decision of the learned Magistrate indicates that there was in fact no causative legal error in his consideration of the claim, and that the appellant was seeking merely to attempt to re-agitate the merits of the application which, on any view of s 474, could not constitute reviewable error. It was submitted that the perceived constraints of the privative clause in the Magistrate’s decision arose only as an alternative basis for dismissing the application, and that there is no legal error of a causative nature arising from the understandable misconception on the part of the learned Magistrate as to the effect of s 474 of the Act. It was then submitted that, in any event, this Court should now determine the issues on the appeal to decide whether there is jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, rather than the matter being remitted to the learned Magistrate for further hearing and determination. I do not accept the first of those contentions. The passage in the Magistrate’s reasons is quoted in [18-19] above, and the reasons immediately preceding that passage. As I have indicated, they describe what the learned Magistrate identified as the grounds of review open to an applicant in the light of s 474 as interpreted by NAAV. His Honour identified six grounds. Having addressed four of them, his Honour then, in the passage referred to and relied upon by the respondent, was considering whether there was what he described as ‘inviolable conditions or jurisdictional preconditions to the exercise of power’. In that regard, his Honour identified as ‘the only relevant jurisdictional precondition’ potentially available the obligation under s 65 of the Act for the decision maker to be satisfied that a visa should be refused. Section 65 directs the decision-maker, if satisfied that the criteria for the grant of a visa are met, to grant the visa and if not satisfied that the criteria for the grant of a visa are met, to refuse the visa. The Magistrate’s identification of s 65 as the only relevant jurisdictional pre-condition indicates that other matters which, upon a proper construction of the Act including s 474, might require compliance by the Tribunal before it could properly exercise its jurisdiction may not have been addressed. The learned Magistrate has not sought to consider whether there is some other error which, in the light of Plaintiff S157/2002, might be seen to be a jurisdictional error. In my judgment the passage referred to by the respondent does not expose a consideration of the sorts of issues which, in the light of Plaintiff S157/2002, might give rise to jurisdictional error. It is confined to considering jurisdictional error by reference to the level of satisfaction which s 65 dictates. As the Magistrate’s reasons indicate, he required something ‘more fundamental to the exercise of power’ to be absent before he would be satisfied of relevant jurisdictional error.