Sex Discrimination Amendment Act 1997 (TAS)

In the matter of the Sex Discrimination Amendment Act 1997, the plaintiff, [Plaintiff's Name], brought an action against the defendant, [Defendant's Name], in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The plaintiff sought to challenge the constitutional validity of the Sex Discrimination Amendment Act 1997, which amended the Sex Discrimination Act 1994 to allow for the chairperson of the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Tribunal to determine which members of the Tribunal would constitute the Tribunal in a particular inquiry or review. The plaintiff argued that the amendment was beyond the Commonwealth's legislative power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the amendment to the Sex Discrimination Act 1994, which allowed for the chairperson of the Tribunal to determine the composition of the Tribunal in a particular inquiry or review, was within the Commonwealth's legislative power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. The court was required to consider whether the amendment was a law with respect to "foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth" and whether it was "necessary for the efficient execution of the Commonwealth's powers." The court was also required to consider whether the amendment was a law "with respect to… persons of any race for whom it is expedient to make special laws."

The court found that the amendment was within the Commonwealth's legislative power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. The court held that the amendment was a law with respect to "foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth" because it related to the operation of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, which was established under the Sex Discrimination Act 1994, a law with respect to corporations. The court further held that the amendment was necessary for the efficient execution of the Commonwealth's powers because it allowed for the efficient administration of the Sex Discrimination Act 1994. Finally, the court held that the amendment was not a law "with respect to… persons of any race for whom it is expedient to make special laws" because it did not discriminate against any particular race or impose special laws on any particular race. The court therefore found the amendment to be constitutional.

The court made no orders as the plaintiff did not succeed in their action.