FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Seo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 963
ORDERS
ADG 60 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: KYEONGSEON SEO
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
2 OCTOBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GERRARD:
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of South Korea. She first arrived in Australia on 18…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 963
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's refusal to adjourn the hearing was unreasonable and whether the Tribunal failed to consider the medical report in making its decision. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs submitted that the Tribunal's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and had an evident and intelligible justification, and that the Tribunal had considered the medical report in making its decision. The court found that the Tribunal's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and that the Tribunal had considered the medical report. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error and dismissed the application for judicial review.
In conclusion, the court found that the Tribunal's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and that the Tribunal had considered the medical report in making its decision. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error and dismissed the application for judicial review. No further orders were made.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In reply to the Minister’s submissions, the applicant told the Court that the injury she had suffered significantly impacted her ability to think and this meant she was not capable of fully representing herself at the Tribunal hearing. She also said that she could not enrol in a course because of her financial circumstances and that, even when she had tried to enrol in a course, she was rejected.CONSIDERATION As outlined above, there are two grounds of review advanced in these proceedings. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant’s grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158, [2015] FCA 1392). Having regard to what the applicant has said in her application and her submissions before the Court, it appears that the applicant’s principal complaint is that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in refusing to adjourn the hearing as requested and that the Tribunal also failed to have regard to the report of Dr Lam-Po-Tang.Ground One In written submissions, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s refusal of the adjournment had an evident and intelligible justification (relying upon Li at [76]). In this respect, the Minister drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the Tribunal expressly recorded that the applicant had applied for the adjournment on the basis that she would be receiving treatment until 28 February 2020, and that it had received and considered the medical evidence. The Minister submitted that it is apparent from the Tribunal’s decision record that it refused the adjournment on the basis that, in its view, the medical evidence did not justify an adjournment. The Minister submitted that there was nothing unreasonable about that conclusion, especially given the medical evidence did not state that the applicant could not attend the Tribunal hearing. Accordingly, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s refusal to adjourn the hearing in the circumstances was within its “decisional freedom” (relying upon Li at [28]; Singh at 445, [44]), and not an arbitrary, capricious or plainly unjust act. In support of this, the Minister referred to the High Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541, [2018] HCA 30 (SZVFW) where the test for unreasonableness has been described as “necessarily stringent” (per Kiefel CJ at 551, [11]), “extremely confined” (per Gageler J, as his Honour then was, at 564, [52]), or as requiring something in the “realm of the extraordinary” (per Gageler J, as his Honour then was, at 570, [70]). It is well accepted that a discretionary statutory power, such as the Tribunal’s power to adjourn a matter, must be exercised reasonably (see Li at [29], [63] and [88]; SZVFW at 564-5, [53] and 575, [89]; Djokovic at 27, [29]-[30]). An unreasonable exercise of a statutory power is one which lacks an evident and intelligible justification (Li at [76]). The intelligible justification must lie within the reasons the decision-maker gave for the exercise of the power (Singh at 446-7, [47]).