Seo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Seo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 963

File number(s): ADG 60 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD
Date of judgment: 2 October 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Student visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether denial of adjournment unreasonable – whether the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 cll 500.211, 500.211(a), 500.212, 500.212(a)

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21, [2022] FCAFC 3

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

Khaling v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 573

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437, [2014] FCAFC 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99, [2013] FCA 317

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158, [2015] FCA 1392

SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294, [2005] HCA 24

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 50
Date of last submission/s: 25 July 2024
Date of hearing: 11 September 2024
Place: Adelaide
Applicant: Self-represented with the assistance of a Korean interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Alex Chan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

ADG 60 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

KYEONGSEON SEO

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GERRARD

DATE OF ORDER:

2 OCTOBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE GERRARD:

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant is a citizen of South Korea. She first arrived in Australia on 18…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 963
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Seo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Ms. Seo, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) in relation to her student visa application. The Tribunal had upheld the delegate's decision to refuse her visa, finding that she did not meet the enrolment requirement for a student visa at the time of the decision. Ms. Seo's application for judicial review contained two grounds, the first being that the Tribunal's refusal to adjourn the hearing was unreasonable and denied her procedural fairness, and the second being that the Tribunal failed to take into account a medical report submitted by her.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's refusal to adjourn the hearing was unreasonable and whether the Tribunal failed to consider the medical report in making its decision. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs submitted that the Tribunal's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and had an evident and intelligible justification, and that the Tribunal had considered the medical report in making its decision. The court found that the Tribunal's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and that the Tribunal had considered the medical report. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error and dismissed the application for judicial review.

In conclusion, the court found that the Tribunal's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and that the Tribunal had considered the medical report in making its decision. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error and dismissed the application for judicial review. No further orders were made.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 6 February 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in some detail. The Tribunal’s decision in this matter is 4 pages long and spans 24 paragraphs (CB 131-134). The Tribunal began by identifying the visa decision under review, noting that the applicant had applied for that visa on 8 August 2017 (at [1]-[2]). The Tribunal observed that, at the time of application, the visa class contained two subclasses: Subclass 500 (Student) and Subclass 590 (Student Guardian). However, it noted that the applicant had applied for the visa to study in Australia and did not make any claims to meet the criteria for the Subclass 590 (Student Guardian) visa (at [2]). The Tribunal explained that a delegate of the Minister had refused to grant the applicant the visa because the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant satisfied the requirements of cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations (at [3]). The Tribunal outlined that the applicant had requested an adjournment of the hearing until after 28 February 2020 on the basis of a medical issue. It confirmed that the request had been considered, and not supported, by the Tribunal (at [6]-[9]). The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant had appeared at a hearing before it on 10 January 2020 to give evidence and present arguments (at [12]). The Tribunal found that, whilst the issue before the delegate was whether the applicant was a genuine temporary applicant for entry and stay as a student, the issue before the Tribunal was whether she met the enrolment requirement in cl 500.211(a) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations (at [16]-[19]). That requirement was that, at the time of the decision, the applicant must be enrolled in a course of study. The Tribunal asked the applicant at the hearing to provide documented evidence of her current enrolment. The applicant advised the Tribunal that she was not currently enrolled in any course of study (at [21]). As a result of the applicant’s evidence at the hearing that she was not currently enrolled in a course of study, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet cl 500.211 at the time of its decision (at [22]). The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision (at [24]).APPLICATION TO THIS COURT The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 6 February 2020 contains two grounds of review as follows (without alteration):1.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Migration & Refugee Division (“the Tribunal”) made on 10 January 2020 was affected by jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal denied the Applicant procedural fairness by unreasonably refusing to adjourn the hearing before the Tribunal scheduled for January 2020.2.The decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error in that it was unreasonable and failed to take into account the report of consultant psychiatrist Dr John Lam-Po-Tang dated 2 January 2020 which stated that the client was suffering from an adjustment disorder with anxiety according to the DSM5 Criteria and recommed further treatment. A member Steven Griffiths did not read this medical report and said sorry to me.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In reply to the Minister’s submissions, the applicant told the Court that the injury she had suffered significantly impacted her ability to think and this meant she was not capable of fully representing herself at the Tribunal hearing. She also said that she could not enrol in a course because of her financial circumstances and that, even when she had tried to enrol in a course, she was rejected.CONSIDERATION As outlined above, there are two grounds of review advanced in these proceedings. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant’s grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158, [2015] FCA 1392). Having regard to what the applicant has said in her application and her submissions before the Court, it appears that the applicant’s principal complaint is that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in refusing to adjourn the hearing as requested and that the Tribunal also failed to have regard to the report of Dr Lam-Po-Tang.Ground One In written submissions, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s refusal of the adjournment had an evident and intelligible justification (relying upon Li at [76]). In this respect, the Minister drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the Tribunal expressly recorded that the applicant had applied for the adjournment on the basis that she would be receiving treatment until 28 February 2020, and that it had received and considered the medical evidence. The Minister submitted that it is apparent from the Tribunal’s decision record that it refused the adjournment on the basis that, in its view, the medical evidence did not justify an adjournment. The Minister submitted that there was nothing unreasonable about that conclusion, especially given the medical evidence did not state that the applicant could not attend the Tribunal hearing. Accordingly, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s refusal to adjourn the hearing in the circumstances was within its “decisional freedom” (relying upon Li at [28]; Singh at 445, [44]), and not an arbitrary, capricious or plainly unjust act. In support of this, the Minister referred to the High Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541, [2018] HCA 30 (SZVFW) where the test for unreasonableness has been described as “necessarily stringent” (per Kiefel CJ at 551, [11]), “extremely confined” (per Gageler J, as his Honour then was, at 564, [52]), or as requiring something in the “realm of the extraordinary” (per Gageler J, as his Honour then was, at 570, [70]). It is well accepted that a discretionary statutory power, such as the Tribunal’s power to adjourn a matter, must be exercised reasonably (see Li at [29], [63] and [88]; SZVFW at 564-5, [53] and 575, [89]; Djokovic at 27, [29]-[30]). An unreasonable exercise of a statutory power is one which lacks an evident and intelligible justification (Li at [76]). The intelligible justification must lie within the reasons the decision-maker gave for the exercise of the power (Singh at 446-7, [47]).