Senior and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

[2018] AATA 3008

Senior and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2018] AATA 3008 (17 August 2018)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2018/0370

Re:Julian Senior

APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services

RESPONDENT

AndMary Senior

OTHER PARTY

DECISION

Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

Date:17 August 2018

Place:Sydney

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that during the period from 11 November 2016 to 20 January 2017, Julian Senior and Mary Senior each had 50% care of the children in question.

.........................[sgd]...............................................
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

FAMILY ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SECURITY - Family Tax Benefit - two non-government parties – determine child care arrangements between parties in the relevant period – percentages of shared care - “eligible carer” and “shared carer” defined - “care of the child” considered - Child Support Guide – decision under review set aside and substituted

LEGISLATION

A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 – ss 22, 25

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 – ss 5(3), 7B

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988

CASES

Appellate Court of Connecticut in State v Rosado 2012 WL 1003763 (Conn. App. 2010)

Kasia Warne v Secretary, Department of Family, Community services and Indigenous Affairs [2006] AATA 159

Polec & Staker & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 595

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Australian Government, Guides to Social Policy Law, Child Support Guide, version 4.34 released 13 August 2018, Ch. 2.2.1 “Basics of Care”

REASONS FOR DECISION

Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

17 August 2018

1. Mr Julian Senior and Mrs Mary Senior were married in July 2010. They separated on 30 June 2016.[1]

   [1] Tribunal Documents page 171.

2. During the time of their marriage three children were born. Child A was born in January 2005; Child B in October 2008 and Child C in August 2013. Although the couple were married at the time, Child B is not the biological child of Julian Senior, although the biological father played/plays no significant part in that child’s continuing care. Julian Senior nevertheless regards and treats this child as his own biological child.[2]

   [2] Ibid.

3. Children A and C are both, in the context of this application “family tax benefit” (FTB) children as defined under section 22 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (the Act).

4. For the purposes of this application, the child care arrangements for Child B are not in dispute as far as payments from the Department are concerned, although Child B does figure in the description of the arrangements made between the separated parents.

   
   
   

5. At the time of their separation Julian and Mary Senior concocted an arrangement to report to Centrelink regarding the care and custody of their children, such that it maximised the benefits paid to each of them separately without necessarily reflecting the lived lives of either themselves or their children. Neither party disputes that this arrangement was entered into in this fashion and for this purpose.

6. When this matter was before the Social Security and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1) it noted that:

   “This case is an example of the tangled web that is woven when parties set out to deceive.”[3]

   [3] Tribunal Documents page 8.

7. As will be seen that continues to be a prescient observation.

   Documentary material

8. The Tribunal notes that following various applications from both parties, some material was provided to both and some documentary evidence to one of the parties only (Julian or Mary Senior). Statements of purely factual matters were provided to both and withheld material related to personal details or statements applicable to one party only.

   The various purported child care arrangements

9. From the period of separation (30 June 2016) to the present, there have been several different purported child care arrangements and payment regimes in place.[4]

   [4] These are outlined in the Respondent’s Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions.

   ·On 20 July 2016, Mary Senior’s record was updated by the Department to reflect her advice that she had 50% care of Child A and 0% care of Child C. She had 100% of care for Child B.

   ·This effectively brought about a situation in which Julian and Mary Senior each had a 50/50 responsibility for the overall care of three children.

   ·The arrangement agreed between the parties provided that Julian Senior had care of the children on an alternating basis of 3 nights one week and four nights the following week usually from a Wednesday until the following (alternating) Saturday or Sunday. The children were apparently collected from and returned to the house of Mary’s parents (in Terrigal) and the couple generally avoided meeting each other during the hand-over periods.

   ·There is no dispute between the parties about the care of Child B who, at all material times was 100% in the care (for financial purposes only) of Mary Senior.

   ·On 29 November 2016, Mary Senior advised the Department that as from 30 June 2016 she had 80% care (5 nights per week) of both children A and C.

   ·Julian Senior was given an opportunity to comment on this notified change in arrangement but he failed to do so.[5] In evidence Julian Senior stated that although he received notification from the Department, he failed to respond to it because he did not understand the significance of it, nor was he fully aware of the consequences of this change of arrangements notified by Mary Senior. He said in evidence that the information she had provided to the Department was false and that had he understood the gravamen of the material more fully he would have responded challenging the statements and the alteration of arrangements which flowed therefrom.

   [5] Tribunal Documents page 201 (record not available to Mary Senior).

   ·On 14 March 2017, Mary Senior further advised the Department that both children A and C had been in her full time (100%) care from 11 November 2016.[6] The Department accepted this advice and recorded this change as from 11 March 2017. Because Julian Senior had failed to provide an estimate of income to the Department his FTB was cancelled as of that date.

   [6] Tribunal Documents at pages 88-93.

   ·This decision was subject to a review by an Authorised Review Officer (ARO) who, on 12 September 2017, changed the determination. The ARO took into account that Julian Senior had provided no evidence in support of his claims related to the care of the two children and, as a result, adjusted the determination to provide that Mary Senior was recognised as having 100% care of the children as from 11 November 2016.[7]  The ARO, in correspondence with Julian Senior referenced a conversation with him on 5 September 2017 which apparently confirmed the ARO in his/her thinking on this matter.[8]

   ·Following this adjustment, Julian Senior applied to the Social Services and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1) for a review of the ARO’s determination, maintaining that he was the “predominant carer” of Child C from 30 June 2016.

   ·It was agreed by both parties in evidence, that from 21 January 2017, when Mary Senior apparently withdrew all contact with each of the children from Julian Senior, that the latter had neither access to, nor care of them.

   ·Access however was resumed at some time between May and July 2018,[9] and has continued to the present. Unlike the previous arrangement it appears that this involved Julian Senior having the children every second week from 0900 hours on Friday to 1700 hours on Monday. [There were subsequent arrangements made under Family Court determinations which do not need to detain the Tribunal further.]

   ·The AAT1 made its determination on 16 January 2018 in which it set aside the decision of the ARO and substituted a decision in which:

   oFrom 11 November 2017 to 20 January 2018 Mary Senior had 70% care of the two FTB children and Julian Senior had 30%,

   oFrom 21 January 2018 Mary Senior had 100% care of both children.

   ·It is against that decision of the AAT1 that Julian Senior lodged his appeal to this Tribunal on 28 January 2018.

   [7] Tribunal Documents pages 99-102.

   [8] Tribunal Documents page 189 (record not available to Mary Senior).

   [9] May 2018 according to Julian Senior in oral evidence; July 2018 according to Mary Senior.

10. In relation to the AAT1 determination it should be noted that in submissions to it, Mary Senior claimed 70% to 80% of the care during the relevant period and Julian Senior claimed 50%.  The AAT1 specifically made its determination “at the low point”[10] of Mary Senior’s estimate.

    [10] Tribunal Documents at page 8.

11. It should also be noted that section 25 of the Act provides:

    a.If an individual’s percentage of care for a child during a care period is less than 35%, the child is taken … not to be a FTB child of that individual for any part of the period.

12. As such, all that this Tribunal needs to sort out from this tangled web is: what were the actual child care arrangements between Julian and Mary Senior in the period from 11 November 2016 to 20 January 2017. This will be referred to as “the relevant period.”

    Relevant Legislation

13. This case depends upon establishing the extent to which either party had “care of the child” to whom Centrelink benefits attach.

14. In the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 an “eligible carer” is defined as being “a person who has at least shared care of a child.”[11] Shared care itself is defined as being between 35% and 65% of the care of the child.[12]

    [11] Section 7B.

    [12] Section 5(3).

15. There is no definition, either in the Child Support (Assessment) Act or the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 as to what actually constitutes “care of the child”.
    
    

16. In order to determine this, the Tribunal must have reference to the Child Support Guide (the Guide) which outlines the method to be used by the Secretary in determining percentages of shared care. The current version of the Guide is dated 13 August 2018[13] and hence post-dates the relevant period however it uses the same formula in calculating the questions of percentage of care as were in place at the relevant time.

    
    
    

    [13] Australian Government, Guides to Social Policy Law, Child Support Guide, version 4.34 released 13 August 2018 - >

    The Guide states:

    The percentage of care is the mechanism used in the child support assessment formula to take into account the amount of time a parent or non-parent carer is responsible for providing care for the child.

    A person's percentage of care for a child will generally be determined according to the actual care that they have of the child. The actual care may be reflected in care arrangements agreed upon by the parents, including non-parent carers. This agreement might take the form of a written agreement, parenting plan or court order in relation to a child's care …

    A parent or non-parent carer's percentage of care for a day in a child support period is the percentage of care that the person is likely to have of the child during the care period.

    Care will generally be worked out based on the number of nights that the child is likely to be in the care of the person during the care period (CSA Act section 54A).[14]

    [14] Ibid, Ch. 2.2.1 “Basics of Care”.

17. This makes it clear that the assessment of shared care, especially in the absence of a written agreement or formalised plan, is based fundamentally upon the determination of the number of nights any FTB child spends with one of the sharing carers/parents.[15]

    [15] Kasia Warne v Secretary, Department of Family, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2006] AATA 159 at [10]; Polec & Staker & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 595 at [34].

The Evidence

1. The evidence before the Tribunal exists in three separate forms:

   (1)Documentary evidence

   Mary Senior provided the Tribunal with letters from various sources which seek to establish that Child C was, during the relevant period, 100% within her care. This material comprises:

   (i)An email from a third party (18 November 2016) stating that Child C has been in Mary’s care since 14 August 2013;

   (ii)A letter from a registered nurse (17 November 2016) to the effect that “(Child C) has lived with Mary since her birth 14 August 2013 to current.”

   (iii)A letter from a firm of solicitors (18 November 2016) indicating that they had been instructed and “verily believe” that Mary “has full custody” of Child C

   (iv)A hand written note from a third party (19 November 2016) stating that Child C had been “wholly” in Mary’s care for the “previous three years”

   (v)A hand written note from a third party (23 November 2016) to the effect that Child C is in Mary’s custody and “lives with her permanently”

   (vi)A letter from the Cerebral Palsy Alliance (24 November 2016 and 30 January 2017) to the effect that Mary brings Child C to sessions with the Alliance on a regular basis. There is a further letter (4 April 2017) outlining future such appointments

   (vii)A letter from Dr Singh-Panwar (28 November 2016) stating that Child C “is in the care of her mother”

   (viii)A letter from Dr Deep Kumar (30January 2017) stating that Child C is in Mary’s care

   (ix)A letter from psychologist Ms Melanie Kelly (1 February 2017) to the effect that Mary has advised her that she has been the “predominant carer” of Child C since her separation and has had “interim full time custody of all three children”

   (x)A letter from a third party (10 March 2017) stating that they can “vouch that all three children including (Child C) were in her (Mary’s) care at least 50% of the week from June 2016 to November 2016 where the children were then in her care full time”

   (xi)A letter from a third party (3 February 2017) outlining the previous shared care arrangements but going on to say that “From mid-November 2016 Mary’s children came into her full time care.”[16]

   [16] Tribunal Documents respectively at pages 68, 84, 69, 70,71,174,73,83,86, 87 and 178.

2. The Tribunal accepts these statements as having only limited value. A number of them such as items (iii), (vi), (vii), (viii) and (ix) rely exclusively on what was reported to the correspondent by Mary Senior or by their observation of a particular moment. There is no independent corroboration of longer-term or regular arrangements.

1. As to the third party statements, the Tribunal notes, with concern, the following comment made in the decision of AAT1 to the effect that:

   “The Tribunal also notes that one of the third parties who had provided evidence on behalf of Mrs Senior contacted the Tribunal shortly before the hearing and asked that her evidence not be used as it is false.”[17]

   [17] Tribunal Documents page 8 (paragraph 13).

2. This Tribunal is not in a position to know whether or not any of the material it has cited above was the same as the material to which the AAT1 was referring but it expresses a degree of unease and concern about the whole nature of the third party references.

   
   
   

3. Those references which asserts that Child C was always and exclusively in Mary’s care from birth (item (ii)) or for the previous three years (item (iv)) cannot be correct as the parties themselves agree that Julian Senior had care of Child C for at least part of that time.

   
   
   

4. Julian Senior also provided a statement, dated 31 May 2018, from his subsequent partner (Cherie Rowe) in which she states that she was in a relationship with Julian from October 2016 up until May 2017 and that:

   [D]uring this time I was witness to Julian having 50% custody of his three children, up until 22 January 2017…..The children were in his care each week from 8am Saturday/Sunday morning (alternating) to 8am Wednesday morning each week. Julian would drop the children off and pick them up from their grand-parents house during this time.

5. Although there is some confusion about the Saturday/Sunday to Wednesday or the other way round arrangements this statement is generally consistent with the description of arrangements previously given but like all the others, needs to be accepted with a degree of caution. However it is more directly an eye-witness account, although it was not in any sort of Statutory Declaration form nor capable of being challenged.

   
   
   

   (2)Oral Testimony

6. Suffice to say that in their oral evidence to the Tribunal both parties took full advantage of the opportunity to make serious allegations against each other ranging from accusations to lying and fraud to accusations of domestic violence.

   
   
   

7. The Tribunal has no intention of dealing with these accusations other than to note that there is more reliable evidence upon which it can base its determination and further, that it notes that Julian Senior had care and custody of some (and at other times, all) of the three children prior to the relevant period and that, with Mary’s agreement, this was restored as from some time in mid-2018.

   
   
   

   (3)Text based evidence

8. The Tribunal was presented with a vast number of screen-shots of mobile phone messages and emails exchanged between the parties.[18]

   
   
   

   [18] Tribunal Documents pages 144-162; Other Party’s Evidence: correspondence between Other Party and AAT2.

9. Many of them are angry or abusive, some appear threatening, a large number are accusatory. They do not make for pleasant reading.

   
   
   

10. However they do establish certain matters of relevance for the Tribunal.

    
    
    

    Monday 31 October 2016 [19]

    [19] Tribunal Documents page 150-151.

    Mary: We need to change the care Arrangement to shared care w Centrelink. Can u agree to do that? I will be calling Centrelink tomorrow and requesting the pare work. Paper.

    Julian:             I agree but unfortunately we need to discuss it first.

    Mary:              U won’t talk to me that’s a little difficult …..

    I will no longer be communicating with you. You may do as you please.

    Julian:             Thank you.

    Mary:              Pls drop kids at mums on wed miring at 7.00 am.

    Thursday 3 November 2016[20]

    [20] Tribunal Documents page 151-152.

    Mary:Centrelink are trying to call u to get a verbal agreement on the care arrangement. It’s the quickest way to sort it out. Can u pls answer …

    Julian:             From what date?

    Mary:From now. It’s too late she tried to call 3 times. They’re sending out forms.

    Julian:             I didn’t agree to that, you never informed me.

    Mary:We said we were doing 50/50. If you don’t agree then fine. We will let them sort it out.

    Julian:Yes I did agree to 50 50. But I asked you yesterday morning from which date.

    Mary:              I said now as in today’s date.

    Friday 4 November 2016[21]

    [21] Tribunal Documents  page 152.

    Mary:              Dropping kids off 7am sat morning

    Julian:             Ok, we can go for a coffee and talk if you like? (not fight)

    Mary:My payments per fortnight from Centrelink are now $537. I can’t even pay rent. Just thought u should know the situation me and the kids are in. So glad to know u made sure we wouldn’t end up destitute.

    Julian:That’s Dire! We can talk tomorrow, we’ll sort it out ok, try not to worry I’m. It going to leave you destitute.

    Mary:              U already have.

    Julian:             I already have what?

    Mary:              Left me destitute.

    Sunday 6 November 2016[22]

    [22] Other Party’s Evidence: screenshots of messages between Applicant and Other Party, pages 7-10.

    Julian:Driving past my place to see who is in is considered stalking. Please stop it.

    Mary:I was considering stopping to ask u for the moment net u promised to help me out w…but I know there’d be no point. Just remember here, that it’s u who has caused all this damage. Money.

    Julian:             Did you consider my idea

    Mary:              What idea. ?

    Julian:             Proposal

    Mary:              What proposal?

    Julian:             I texted you on Friday evening

    Mary:              ????

    Julian:This is what I propose. Centrelink arrangements remain as they are until this hostility between us stops. Then we can move forward and do 100% for you. In the time between now and then I will pay fortnightly. The amount I will work out today. I need to do a budget. Think about it before you respond please, discuss it with your mum.

    Mary:              You sent this to my old number. I never got this.

    Julian:             That’s not possible it is on this feed

    Mary:              I had you blocked that’s why I didn’t get it. ………………

    Just go away and stop harassing me. I am living in a world of anxiety and depression because of. Haven’t you done enough?

    Julian:What do you want to do? 50/50 or what I proposed? 50/50 I can’t give you anything.

    Mary:              What date?

    Julian:             Date?

    Mary:              That I can claim 100% of (Child C)

    Tuesday 8 November 2016[23]

    [23] Other Party Evidence: screenshots of messages between Applicant and Other Party, page 11.

    Mary:Are u able to sign (Child B’s) school enrolment form this morning. I’m heading to belly fish for a coffee if you want to meet me there.

    Julian:             Only if you’re civilised and calm

    Mary:              Yes. I’m at belly fish now

    Julian:             Ok be there in 1 min

    Mary:I’d like to make suggestion I hope you will consider. Would you move to Sydney? Either move into an apartment on ur own or even move in w Cherie and have the children on the w’ends or every second w’end? Allow me 100% care of (Child C) and claim carer payment for her…..

    15 November 2016[24]

    [24] Tribunal Documents page 152.

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Hello Julian, I would like to remind you that under no circumstances are you to ask my parents or any of my family or friends to babysit for the children when they are in your care. I would suggest that you arrange care for (Child C) for the 22^nd Nov 2016 without involving Cherie. Your cooperation is appreciated. Mary.

    17 November 2016[25]

    [25] Ibid.

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Julian, Drop children off at Mum’s house at 7am sharp on Saturday morning. No exceptions. Do not be late. Mary

    23 November 2016[26]

    [26] Applicant’s Evidence item 1 page 12

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Julian, There have been numerous emails outlining the times for pick up/drop off of the children to mum and dad’s. The times are as follows: Wed drop off at 7.00 am. Sat: drop off at 7am pick up at 7.10am. Sunday: drop off at 8am pick up 8.10am. These times are to be strictly kept to. It is only fair for both of us to keep to these times. I am keeping a record of all the times you are late. I suggest not letting this become a habit. Mary

    25 November 2016[27]

    [27] Tribunal Documents page 153.

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Julian, Pickup/drop off times are as follows and are to be strictly adhered to; Wednesday: drop off 7.00am / pick up 7.10 am. Saturday: drop off 7.00am / pick up 7.10am. Sunday: drop off 8.00 am / pick up 8.10 am. Leaving the children alone at home so you can take yourself to the gym, cross fit or any other activities is not acceptable and rearranging the agreed times that were set out to make it easiest for the children and my parents is also not acceptable. If you continue to be late these incidences will continue to be recorded and the matter will be taken further. It is in your best interest along with everyone involved that you adhere to the above times as we originally agreed upon. Mary.

    26 November 2016[28]

    [28] Applicant’s Evidence: screenshots of messages between Applicant and Other Party, page 15.

    Sent from my iPhone

    Julian:Dear Mary, I have rearranged my schedule to accommodate your preference for pick up/drop off times for the children however just to ensure there is no chance of us crossing paths on these days I will pick them up at quarter past the hr, that gives us an extra 5 mins to distance ourselves from each other and not risk a breach of our AVO’s[29]…..

    [29] Both parties appear to have had AVOs taken out against each other. Details are unclear.

    28 November 2016[30]

    [30] Tribunal Documents page 154.

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Julian, After numerous emails I have received from you that have made me feel threatened, harassed and intimidated, I will no longer engage in any conversation with you unless it is about pick up/drop off times of the children at my parents address. I will ask you not to contact me again unless it is in regard to the above mentioned. Mary

    9 December 2016[31]

    [31] Tribunal Documents page 156.

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Julian, I am keeping the children for Christmas Day this year. I’m sure you will agree it is best that they are surrounded by a loving family to enjoy the day with their mother, grandparents, cousins, aunts and uncles. You are able to collect them at 5pm from my parents house on the 25/12/16. Mary

    14 January 2017[32]

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:You have left (Child C’s) afo’s at mums. You will need to return to collect them as (Child C) needs to be wearing them.

    17 January 2017[33]

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Julian, I need you to drop (Child B) to my parents at 3 this afternoon. She will be staying with me tonight. Mary

    21 January 2017[34]

    Sent from my iPhone

    Mary:Julian, The usual pick up time for Sunday morning has even cancelled. I am writing to advise you that after seeking legal advice and carefully considering what is in the best interests of the children, the children will live with me until such time, we have a mediation or professional assistance to put in place what is best for our children. It has been apparent for some time that the children are not coping with the current care arrangements between us. It is both unsettling and chaotic for them and they are not coping. Mary

    [32] Applicant’s Evidence: screenshots of messages between Applicant and Other Party, page 19.

    [33] Ibid.

    [34] Tribunal Documents page 157.

1. A great deal of this is less than edifying, but what it establishes in the mind of the Tribunal are the following propositions:

   ·There was a clear agreement between the parties that a 50/50 approach was being taken to the care and custody of the children, while at the same time the parties were seeking to potentially renegotiate arrangements in order to maximise Centrelink benefits;

   ·There were clear arrangements in place for the pick up / drop off of the children on a regular and scheduled basis;

   ·That arrangements for Julian to have custody of the children at various times involved all three of them; and, critically,

   ·That during the relevant period (11 November 2016 to 20 January 2017), Julian Senior had care and custody of the children on a regular basis.

2. The claims made by Mary Senior that during this period she had 100% care and custody of all three children are simply not sustainable on the basis of the clear exchanges between them. It appears that even though Mary Senior indicated on 9 December 2016 that she was retaining care of the children over the Christmas period (although whether or not that was from that date itself onwards is unclear) nevertheless Julian Senior was advised that they could be collected on Christmas evening.

3. Furthermore, the claims made by Mary Senior in oral evidence that Julian Senior frequently failed to adhere to his side of the bargain, was often late, and occasionally did not turn up at all to collect the children seem to the Tribunal to be without foundation.

4. This is akin to the famous Sherlock Holmes tale of the dog that did not bark.[35] Given Mary Senior’s clear warnings that any failures on Julian Senior’s part would be recorded, noted and lead to action, the Tribunal is confident that there would have been a clear recording of this in the texts, had he so failed. There is none and hence the Tribunal is inclined to accept that this is because there was no such failure.

   [35] Arthur Conan Doyle: The Adventure of Silver Blaze published in 1892. Cited by the Appellate Court of Connecticut in State v Rosado 2012 WL 1003763 (Conn. App. 2010)

5. The Tribunal is thus unable to agree with the determination of either the ARO or with the determination of AAT1 that there was a 70/30 division between Mary Senior and Julian Senior.

6. The arrangement the parties entered into mutually was a 50/50 arrangement and their correspondence confirms that this was the understanding of both parties. The absence of any correspondence or messages from Mary Senior to Julian Senior indicating that he had failed to meet his obligations in this regard, or from Julian Senior to Mary Senior protesting that he had been denied the rights upon which they had agreed, leads the Tribunal to conclude that the 50/50 agreement was in fact honoured and observed during the relevant period.

DECISION

1. The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that during the period from 11 November 2016 to 20 January 2017, Julian Senior and Mary Senior each had 50% care of the children in question.

I certify that the preceding 37 (thirty-seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

...........................[sgd].............................................

Associate

Dated: 17 August 2018

Date of hearing:	26 July 2018
Applicant:	By telephone
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Ms S Sangha, Department of Human Services
Other Party:	By telephone