FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Selth v Australasian Barrister Chambers Pty Ltd (No 5) [2019] FCA 362
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Selth v Australasian Barrister Chambers Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 855 File numbers: NSD 975 of 2014
NSD 1019 of 2014Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 15 March 2019 Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 60
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206B
Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 5.22, 39.04, 40.20, 40.21
Cases cited: Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1995) 185 CLR 124
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Date of hearing: 22 February 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Trade Marks Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 22 Counsel for the Applicants in the interlocutory applications: The Applicants did not appear Counsel for the Respondents in the interlocutory applications (the Applicants in the proceedings) Mr R Davies Solicitor for the Respondents in the interlocutory applications (the Applicants in the proceedings) Webb Henderson
ORDERS
NSD 975 of 2014
BETWEEN: PHILIP SELTH IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN BAR ASSOCIATION
First Applicant
ABA AUSTRALIAN BAR ASSOCIATION LTD ACN 605 949 148
Second Applicant
AND: AUSTRALASIAN BARRISTER CHAMBERS PTY LTD ABN 80 133 736 848
First Respondent
DEREK MICHAEL MINUS
Second Respondent
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASSOCIATES PTY LTD ABN 50 090 594 451
Third Respondent
AUSTBAR PTY LTD ACN 608 133 768
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The orders made on 22 February 2019 be set aside pursuant to r 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
2.The interlocutory application filed on 14 January 2019 be dismissed.
3.The applicants in the interlocutory application pay the costs of the respondents to it.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
NSD 1019 of 2014
BETWEEN: THE NEW SOUTH WALES BAR ASSOCIATION ACN 000 033 652
ApplicantAND: DEREK MICHAEL MINUS
First Respondent
AUSTRALASIAN BARRISTER CHAMBERS PTY LTD ABN 80 133 736 848
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The orders made on 22 February 2019 be set aside pursuant to r 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
2.The interlocutory applications filed on 14 and 24 January 2019 be dismissed.
3.The respective applicants in the interlocutory applications pay the costs of the respondent to each of them.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RARES J:
Background
On 28 July 2017, Greenwood J made orders in two proceedings that the unsuccessful respondents pay the applicants’ costs: Selth v Australasian Barrister Chambers Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 855.…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 362
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues in the case were whether Mr Minus had standing to file the interlocutory applications and whether there was any merit in his application to recuse the judge. The court found that Mr Minus was in default for not appearing in the proceedings and had no standing to file the applications either in his own name or as a director of the companies. The companies also failed to appear or file a notice of appearance. The court further held that there was no valid reason to recuse the judge, as Mr Minus failed to articulate any logical connection between the judge's membership in the NSW Bar Association and a potential bias.
The court dismissed the interlocutory applications and set aside the earlier orders made on 22 February 2019. The judge ordered that Mr Minus and the companies pay the costs of the Bar Associations. The court found that the applications had no merit and were made without proper authority. The decision highlights the importance of proper appearance and standing in legal proceedings, as well as the rigorous standards required to demonstrate a valid apprehension of bias in a judicial officer.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The orders made on 22 February 2019 be set aside pursuant to r 39.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
2. The interlocutory applications filed on 14 and 24 January 2019 be dismissed.
3. The respective applicants in the interlocutory applications pay the costs of the respondent to each of them.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Bar Associations asked that the interlocutory applications be dismissed, given that no one appeared today for any of the applicants in the interlocutory applications. Consideration In my opinion, there is no substance in Mr Minus’ application that I recuse myself: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 (see too Selth in a Representative Capacity for the Members of the Australian Bar Association v Australasian Barrister Chambers Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1008 at [14] where Nicholas J rejected a similar application). In Ebner 205 CLR at 344-345 [6]-[8], Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ discussed the principles and said (at [8]) (and see too Isbester 255 CLR at 146 [20]-[23], per Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ): The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an “interest” in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. Mr Minus, as a barrister, is well aware of the above test. He has made no attempt to articulate any reason why, having absolutely no financial interest in either Bar Association, the mere fact of my membership of the NSW Bar Association might cause a reasonable lay observer to think that I might not decide either interlocutory application on its legal and factual merits. Upon his becoming bankrupt, Mr Minus ceased to have any interest in the judgment debts he owed for costs, or challenging the basis for their taxation, to support his subsequent filing of the interlocutory applications: Cummings 185 CLR at 139, per Brennan CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ (see too at 137-138). Counsel for the Bar Associations has pointed out that in Mr Minus’ affidavits sworn on 4 January 2019 in support of the interlocutory applications, he had said that both of his companies “had their Notice [being the notices of estimate of costs] addressed to their physical mailing address”. Mr Minus did not state in his affidavits that he had been made bankrupt on 20 December 2018. While he gave some explanation in his affidavits as to why he, personally, may not have been served with the notices of estimate of costs, his admission that the two companies had been served properly tells against the merits of any challenge to them by his companies in their interlocutory applications for an extension of time.