SELLERS & BURNS

Case [2019] FamCAFC 111


FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SELLERS & BURNS [2019] FamCAFC 111

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROCEDURAL – DISQUALIFICATION – Where the husband appeals from the primary judge’s refusal to recuse himself from further proceedings between the husband and wife – Consideration of the test in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 (“Ebner”) – Whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided – Where the primary judge made comments during the enforcement application reflective of a formed opinion – Where it is contended that the primary judge’s response to the application to recuse himself was sarcastic – Whether directions made by the primary judge in response to the request for adjournment were dismissive and intimidating –Where the comments leading to the adjournment being granted raised the required apprehension – Error established – Where an injunction granted to restrain the husband’s solicitor and all employees of that firm was in excess of the injunction sought – Whether this gives rise to an  apprehension of bias adverse to the husband –No error made out – Whether the primary judge erred in the application of the two step test in Ebner – Where the primary judge erred in isolating the matters complained of as opposed to the cumulative effect – Where error is established in relation to step one – Consideration of the logical connection – Where no error established in this part – Whether his Honour, in restricting his attention to the enforcement application, prevented  a consideration of the effect on the fair-minded lay observer in relation to all hearings involving the parties – Where his Honour erred in his approach to determining the issue of recusal – Error established – Orders set aside – Primary judge disqualified from hearing further proceedings between the parties.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – COSTS – Costs certificates sought and granted.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 94(2)
Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ss 6, 9
AJH Lawyers Pty Ltd v Careri & Ors (2011) 34 VR 236; [2011] VSCA 425
British American Tobacco Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; [2011] HCA 2
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70; [1990] HCA 31
Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28
Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88
R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248; [1976] HCA 39
APPELLANT: Mr Sellers
RESPONDENT: Ms Burns
FILE NUMBER: PAC 5854 of 2016
APPEAL NUMBER: EA 118 of 2018
DATE DELIVERED: 28 June 2019
PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney
PLACE HEARD: Sydney
JUDGMENT OF: Alstergren CJ, Ainslie-Wallace & Kent…

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AGLC
SELLERS & BURNS [2019] FamCAFC 111
Case
[2019] FamCAFC 111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Sellers & Burns, the husband appealed against the orders of the primary judge, Foster J, made on 15 August 2018. The central issue in the appeal was the primary judge's refusal to recuse himself from further proceedings between the husband and wife. The husband argued that the primary judge had displayed a lack of impartiality, which was evident in his comments and responses during the proceedings. The husband contended that the primary judge's comments during the enforcement application reflected a formed opinion, and his response to the application to recuse himself was perceived as sarcastic. Additionally, the husband argued that the directions made by the primary judge in response to the request for adjournment were dismissive and intimidating, raising concerns about impartiality.

The court was required to determine whether the primary judge's conduct met the threshold for recusal as established in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy. The court considered whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question to be decided. The court also examined whether the primary judge erred in his application of the two-step test in Ebner by isolating the matters complained of instead of considering their cumulative effect. Furthermore, the court considered whether the primary judge's error in restricting his attention to the enforcement application prevented a consideration of the effect on the fair-minded lay observer in relation to all hearings involving the parties.

The court found that the primary judge's comments and conduct established an error in the recusal process. The court noted that the primary judge's response to the application to recuse himself was indeed perceived as sarcastic, and his directions in response to the adjournment request were dismissive and intimidating. The court concluded that the primary judge's approach to determining the issue of recusal was erroneous, as he failed to consider the cumulative effect of the matters complained of. The court set aside the orders made by the primary judge and disqualified him from hearing any further application in the proceedings. The court also granted costs certificates to both parties, allowing the Attorney-General to authorise payments to cover the costs incurred in relation to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The appeal against the orders of Foster J made on 15 August 2018 is allowed.

2.

That Foster J be disqualified from hearing any further application in the proceedings PAC 5854 of 2016.

3.

There be no order as to costs.

4.

The Court grants to the appellant a costs certificate pursuant to s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred by him in relation to the appeal.

5.

The Court grants to the respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by her in relation to the appeal.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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