SELKIRK & SELKIRK

Case [2019] FamCAFC 63


Family Court of Australia

SELKIRK & SELKIRK

[2019] FamCAFC 63

FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – APPEAL – Interim – Where the appellant asserts that the primary judge erred by not admitting certain evidence and relying upon irrelevant considerations – Whether the primary judge properly considered ss 65DAA(1) and (5) – Whether the orders are substantial and significant time pursuant to s 65DAA(3) –Where the appeal is allowed by consent in part but is otherwise dismissed – The appellant to pay the respondent’s costs.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65DAA

Eddington & Eddington (No. 2) (2007) FLC 93-349; [2007] FamCA 1299

Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

Ulster & Viney (2016) FLC 93-722; [2016] FamCAFC 133

Appellant:

Ms B Selkirk

Respondent:

Ms A Selkirk

File Number:

SYC
7972

of
2016

Appeal Number:

EA
135

of
2018

DATE DELIVERED:

10 April 2019

Place Delivered:

Sydney

Place Heard:

Sydney

Judgment of:

Ryan, Aldridge & Watts JJ

Hearing date:

10 April 2019

Lower court jurisdiction:

Family Court of Australia

lower court judgment date:

24 September 2018

LOWER COURT MNC:

[2018] FamCA 852

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE Appellant:

Litigant in person

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mr Longworth

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

SWAAB Attorneys

Orders

(1)      By consent, leave be granted to the appellant to adduce evidence contained in an affidavit sworn by her on 7 April 2019.

(2)      The appeal be allowed in part.

(3)      Set aside the second sentence of Order 3 made 24 September 2018.

(4)      Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.

(5)      The appellant pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $10,836.33 on the condition that the appellant has a property settlement order made in her favour of at least that amount or in the event the property settlement order is less than an amount then the amount of that order.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Selkirk & Selkirk has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

THE FULL COURT OF THE Family Court of Australia at Sydney

Appeal Number: EA 135 of 2018

File Number:  SYC 7972 of 2016

Ms B Selkirk

Appellant

And

Ms A Selkirk

Respondent

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Watts J

1.        The appellant, by a Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed 20 February 2019, appeals interim parenting orders of the primary judge made 24 September 2018.

2.        During the hearing before us, the parties agreed (for reasons discussed under Grounds 6 and 7 below) that the appeal against the second part of Order 3 should be allowed. We agreed and by…

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SELKIRK & SELKIRK [2019] FamCAFC 63
Case
[2019] FamCAFC 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Selkirk & Selkirk involved the appellant, Mrs Selkirk, challenging an interim parenting order made in the Family Court of Australia. The primary dispute centred around the allocation of parenting time and the primary judge's handling of evidence and legal considerations. The Family Court of Australia was the original tribunal, and the appeal was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The legal issues at the heart of the appeal revolved around whether the primary judge had erred in admitting certain evidence and whether they had relied on irrelevant considerations. The appellant argued that the primary judge had not correctly applied sections 65DAA(1) and (5) of the Family Law Act, which relate to the best interests of the child and the importance of substantial and significant parenting time. The appellant also contended that the primary judge had overlooked the importance of maintaining a stable environment for the child.

The court found that the primary judge had indeed erred in certain respects. Specifically, the court held that the primary judge should have considered additional evidence and had not appropriately applied the statutory provisions regarding substantial and significant parenting time. Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part, with the second sentence of Order 3 made on 24 September 2018 being set aside. However, the appeal was dismissed in all other respects. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, subject to certain conditions relating to the property settlement order.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) By consent, leave be granted to the appellant to adduce evidence contained in an affidavit sworn by her on 7 April 2019.

(2) The appeal be allowed in part.

(3) Set aside the second sentence of Order 3 made 24 September 2018.

(4) Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.

(5) The appellant pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $10,836.33 on the condition that the appellant has a property settlement order made in her favour of at least that amount or in the event the property settlement order is less than an amount then the amount of that order.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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