Selden v Allen - [2022] WASC 83

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   SELDEN -v- ALLEN [2022] WASC 83
CORAM:   MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD:   25 NOVEMBER 2021
DELIVERED          :   11 MARCH 2022
PUBLISHED           :   11 MARCH 2022
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1805 of 2021
BETWEEN:   DAVID PETER SELDEN
Plaintiff
AND
SUZANNE GAYE ALLEN
First Defendant
RIVERSIDE ASSET PTY LTD
Second Defendant
THOMAS MARTHINUS SMALBERGER
Third Defendant

Catchwords:

Trust - Application for appointment of receiver to trust and vesting of trust - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Trustees Act 1962 (WA)

Result:

Application dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	JJ Hockley & JW Fickling
First Defendant	:	M Curwood SC & N Ricciardi
Second Defendant	:	M Curwood SC & N Ricciardi
Third Defendant	:	JC Yeldon

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	D'Angelo Legal
First Defendant	:	Frichot Lawyers
Second Defendant	:	Frichot Lawyers
Third Defendant	:	Fort Knox Legal

Cases referred to in decision:

Allen v Smalberger [2021] WASC 306
Baker v Kettle (No. 3) [2007] FamCA 1653
Cardaci v Filippo Primo Cardaci as executor of the estate of Marco Antonio Cardaci [No 5] [2021] WASC 331
Re Arthur Brady Family Trust [2014] QSC 244
Yunghanns v Candoora No. 19 Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2000] VSC 300
Yunghanns v Candoora No. 19 Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2000] VSC 387

MASTER SANDERSON:

By amended originating summons filed 25 October 2021 the plaintiff sought the following orders:
Whereas on 23 September 2021 orders were made in CIV 1246 of 2021 and the trustees of both the Peter Selden Family Trust ('PSFT') and the Peter Selden Family Trust No 2 ('PSFT2') became Riverside Asset Pty Ltd and as modifications to the vehicle or mechanism for vesting PSFT and PSFT2 were contemplated on page 19-20 filed by the Plaintiff on 29 September 2021 the orders sought are accordingly modified, appended and expanded in further detail herein.
Whereas the drafting of these orders has been further informed by the reason for decision of Warren J in Yunghanns v Candoora No. 19 Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2000] VSC 300 (4 August 2000) and partially set out in Yunghanns v Candoora No. 19 Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2000] VSC 387 at [10], Baker v Kettle (No. 3) [2007] FamCA 1653 and Re Arthur Brady Family Trust [2014] QSC 244.
1.By way of section 79(1) of the Trustees Act 1962 (WA) ('Trustees Act') and the power of the Court more generally in its powers of administration of trusts and the protection of assets of trusts in Western Australia, (a Court nominated receiver or one of the parties identified in the affidavit of Kealeigh Ann Barker filed on 23 September 2001] ('Receiver') be appointed to Riverside Asset Pty Ltd).
2.The Receiver is given the object ('the Object') of protecting, administering and realising the assets and undertaking of the PSFT, paying the debts of the PSFT and bringing forward the vesting day of the PSFT and is empowered to do in Australia all things necessary or convenient to be done or in connection with or incidental to the attainment of the Object;
3.The Receiver be further given the object ('Further Object') of realising the realising the assets, paying the debts of PSFT2 and bringing forward the vesting day of the PSFT2 and is empowered to do in Australia all things necessary or convenient to be done or in connection with or incidental to the attainment of the Further Object.
4.And without limiting the generality the aforementioned paragraph of this order for the purpose of attaining the Object and the Further Object, the Receiver is empowered to:
(a) Exercise all of the rights and powers attaching to or incidental to all the shares held by the First Defendant in the Second Defendant (Riverside Asset Pty Ltd (ACN 644 512 336)); and
(b) Do any or all of the things described in sub-paragraphs (2)(a) to (w) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
5.And without limiting the generality of the aforementioned as to the Object, the Receiver is to specifically empowered and generally directed by the Court as follows as pertains to the PSFT:
(a)To first realise in a timely manner the real property interests of the PSFT by way of sale, being a 25% interest in 64B Clayton Street East Fremantle, Unit 6 10 Fairhaven Terrace Hillarys and Unit 4 163 West Coast Highway Scarborough, all in the State of Western Australia, by appointing real estate agents from Acton as particularised affidavit of Kealeigh Ann Barker filed on 23 September 2021 or otherwise as suitable in the discretion of the Receiver;
(b)To also clear to the greatest extent reasonably possible the assets and liabilities and then deregister, liquidate or vest the entities known as Exran Pty Ltd, the Global Fashion Unit Trust and Gayfere Pty Ltd by way of inter-entity accounting adjustments, distributions or assignments in specie or otherwise considered appropriate by the Receiver to arrive at a net amount owing to the Estate and PSFT2 and pay any creditor external to the aforementioned.
(c)To pay any net amount owing as a result of the aforementioned order to the Estate and PSFT2;
(d)To bring forward the vesting day of the PSFT pursuant to the power expressed in clause 1(1)(i)(B) of Annexure 'A' to the First Deed of Variation dated 6 October 2001 ('the Terms Deed');
(e)To pay the amount of any surplus arising on the vesting in accordance with clause 5(1)(b) of the Terms Deed; and
(f)To seek further directions from the Court if considered reasonable or necessary.
6.And without limiting the generality of the aforementioned as to the Further Object, the Receiver is to specifically empowered and generally directed by the Court as follows as pertains to the PSFT:
(a)To receive any assets due to the PSFT;
(b)To assign any receivable of the PSFT2 from the First Defendant to the Estate in partial or full discharge of the debts of the PSFT2 to the Estate;
(c)To bring forward the vesting day of the PSFT2 pursuant to the definition of 'Vesting Day' defined on page 3 in the deed of the PSFT2 dated 26 April 2006; and
(d)To seek further directions from the Court if considered reasonable or necessary.
7.In furtherance of the above or alternatively pursuant to section 89 of the Trustees Act the Receiver [or in the alternative the Second Defendant, Riverside Asset Pty Ltd] is ordered to, in relation to PSFT:
(a)To bring forward the vesting day of the PSFT to [the date 60 days after the date of these orders] pursuant to the power expressed in clause 1(1)(i)(B) of Annexure 'A' to the First Deed of Variation dated 6 October 2001 ('the Terms Deed').
(b)To realise in a timely manner the real property interests of the PSFT by way of sale, being a 25% interest in 64B Clayton Street East Fremantle, Unit 6 10 Fairhaven Terrace Hillarys and Unit 4 163 West Coast Highway Scarborough, all in the State of Western Australia, by appointing real estate agents from Acton as particularised affidavit of Kealeigh Ann Barker filed on 23 September 2021.
(c)To ascertain and pay any amount owing to the Estate and PSFT and any creditor.
(d)To pay the amount of any surplus arising on the vesting in accordance with clause 5(1)(b) of the Terms Deed.
(e)That the Receiver [or in the alternative the Second Defendant, Riverside Asset Pty Ltd] be restrained from appointing any income inconsistent with the aforementioned, and be specifically restrained from exercising any power contained in clause 5(1)(a) of the Terms Deed.
8.In furtherance of the above or alternatively pursuant to section 89 of the Trustees Act the Receiver [or in the alternative the Second Defendant, Riverside Asset Pty Ltd] is ordered to, in relation to PSFT2:
(a)To bring forward the vesting day of the PSFT to [the date 60 days after the date of these orders] pursuant to the definition of 'Vesting Day' defined on page 3 in the deed of the PSFT2 dated 26 April 2006; and
(b)To assign any receivable of the PSFT2 from the First Defendant to the Estate in partial or full discharge of the debts of the PSFT2 to the Estate.
9.The Receiver be remunerated in accordance with the scale prescribed from time to time by the Insolvency Practitioner's Association of Australia.
10.The First, Second and Third Defendant deliver up copies of all accounting records, business records, documents and securities of the PSFT and the PSFT2 into the possession, custody and power of the Receiver.
11.The First and Second Defendants be retained from exercising any office of PSFT or PSFT2 save with the prior consent of the Receiver or the leave of the Court.
12.In furtherance of the above, or alternatively pursuant to s 77(1) and 77 (2)(b) of the Trustees Act 1962, the Court appoint a new Trustee being a corporation to be further specified and that Trustee
13.There be consequential orders for:
a.The vesting of assets in the PSFT and PSFT2 in the new Trustee pursuant to section 79(2)(a) of the Trustee's Act 1962;
b.there be a receiver appointed by the Court as outlined in the preceeding paragraphs above; and
c.there be orders pursuant to section 89 as outlined at paragraph 7 above.
14.There be general liberty to apply to the Court and to apply for directions.
15.Any further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit.
16.The First Defendant and Second Defendant do pay the reasonable costs of the Plaintiff of the taxed if not agreed or in the alternative be paid jointly by the PSFT and PSFT2.

With respect, this is a most unusual form of originating summons. It appears to be part submission and part pleading. While counsel for the first and second defendants drew attention to the unusual nature of the form of the summons, he was prepared to deal with it on its merits. Reduced to its essentials, the amended originating process appears to have two elements. First, the plaintiff seeks the appointment of a receiver. That is covered by pars 1 through to 6 of the amended originating summons. Second, the plaintiff seeks to have the trust vest, in part at least, pursuant to s 89 of the Trustees Act1962 (WA). That relief is detailed in pars 7 through to 14. Paragraphs 15 and 16 are the usual catch all provisions that do not raise any specific issue. So the questions for determination then are two. First, should a receiver be appointed to the PSFT and the PSFT2? Further, and in the alternative, should there be an order vesting the assets of the PSFT and PSFT2?
All parties agreed that this court has power to appoint a receiver to trust assets. Both counsel referred to the decision of Warren J in Yunghanns v Candoora No. 19 Pty Ltd (No. 2).[1] Her Honour's relevant statement of principle is as follows:
First, the courts will appoint a receiver of trust property (on an interlocutory and/or permanent basis) where that property is in jeopardy through misconduct, waste, improper disposition, breach of the trustee's duty or the unsuitable character of the trustee. Second, the case in favour of appointment of a receiver must be a strong one but in assessing the risk to the trust the courts will apply a qualitative judgment. Third, a receiver will be appointed to preserve the benefit of a person who has an interest in trust property.
[1] Yunghanns v Candoora No. 19 Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2000] VSC 300 [84].
Her Honour decided that a case had been made out for the appointment of a receiver. The background facts are illuminating. Peter Yunghanns had two children from his first marriage, David Yunghanns and Sarah Mahon. Peter Yunghanns, David and Sarah were in bitter protracted litigation over various issues. At the time of the litigation David Yunghanns was 37 years of age and Sarah Mahon was 35 years of age. Peter was the father of an infant son, William, born on 25 March 2000. A discretionary family trust known as the Yunghanns Children Trust had as its trustee a company called Candora which was controlled by David and Sarah. It had considerable assets.
The discretionary trust was expressly established 'for the benefit of the children of Peter Nicholas Yunghanns, living at the date of the making of the deed or born thereafter and prior to the vesting day'. David and Sarah did not recognise Peter's paternity of William and as such did not recognise William as a beneficiary of the trust. In proceedings for an interlocutory injunction, before the hearing of an application of appointment of a receiver, Gillard J made the observation that in the litigation between Peter and his two adult children, each side was seeking to gain control of a substantial business empire to the exclusion of the other. On the balance of convenience, the unborn child would suffer a greater wrong if the injunction was refused than the trustee would suffer if the injunction was granted.
By the time the application for the appointment of a receiver was heard, William had been born. A significant issue in the exercise of the discretion was the issue of the paternity and the denial by David and Sarah of Peter's paternity. Appropriate undertakings concerning the exclusion of William were not given. Very significant legal costs for the related litigation incurred by David and Sarah were paid from the trust which led to the finding they had treated the payment of their legal costs on the basis that they were the 'sole beneficiaries of the trust'.
Her Honour made the following findings. First, the controllers of the trustee had made significant payments towards their own legal fees in contested litigation before any entitlement of the parties to the trust had been determined and before any adjudication as to the liability of the costs in the litigation. Second, there was a failure by the trustee to provide any records. Third, her Honour found that David and Sarah were treating the trust funds as if they were their own. That was a consequence of them not recognising William as a beneficiary.
Her Honour noted that each of these factors on their own would be insufficient to support a strong case for the appointment of a receiver. However, she found the combined effect of the three factual findings led to a conclusion the trust was in jeopardy such that actual or potential entitlement of an infant in the trust property was at risk. Any fair reading of the decision leads to two conclusions. First, for a receiver to be appointed to assets of the trust, there needs to be strong evidence the assets of the trust are or will be depleted to the disadvantage of actual or potential beneficiaries. Second, it must be clear that the trustee, in acting in a particular way, is actually causing detriment to the assets of the trust. In the Yunghanns' case, money was being paid out for legal fees. There was no basis upon which it could be recovered and David and Sarah gave no undertaking to indemnify the trust if it was established William was a beneficiary. So the actions of the trustee were clearly causing actual detriment to the beneficiaries.
Against that background, the relevant facts can be summarised as follows. (This summary is largely drawn from pars 7 through to 44 of the written submissions of counsel for the first and second defendants. None of these matters of fact were in dispute).
As at the date of his death, Peter Selden (the deceased) was the controller of both discretary trustes - the PSFT and PSFT2. The PSFT owned a one‑quarter share in a block in Fremantle, a unit in Scarborough and a unit in Hillarys. It also owned approximately 75% of shares in a company called Gayfere Pty Ltd. Peter personally owned the remaining shares. The PSFT owed money to Peter and entities related to him. The PSFT2 had cash at bank derived from the sale of a shoe retail business conducted by Peter and the first defendant together. It owed money to Peter and Gayfere Pty Ltd.
On 5 May 2015, the deceased signed, in the presence of his solicitors, a memorandum of wishes with respect to the administration of the trusts. A copy of that memorandum is attached to an affidavit sworn by the first defendant in other proceedings (CIV 1246 of 2021). That affidavit was filed on 30 March 2021. There is no dispute between the parties the memorandum of wishes was signed. There is a difference between them as to the force and effect the memorandum should have. It is appropriate at this point to determine the correct approach to this memorandum. In the memorandum, the deceased stated his express wish that the trustees of the two trusts would allocate to the first defendant the properties held in the PSFT, and with respect to the PSFT2, give to Susan full control and ownership in a business known as Pepper Shoes including all stock and money at bank.
The authorities in relation to a memorandum of wishes divide such statements into three classes. There are those which are legally binding, those which are legally significant and those which are morally binding only: see Cardaci v Filippo Primo Cardaci as executor of the estate of Marco Antonio Cardaci [No 5].[2] Both parties agree the memorandum of wishes on its face is clearly not one imposing a binding or legal obligation. The plaintiff says it is morally binding only. The first and second defendants say it should be construed as legally significant.
[2] Cardaci v Filippo Primo Cardaci as executor of the estate of Marco Antonio Cardaci [No 5] [2021] WASC 331 [325].
In the end, probably not much turns on the different position taken by the parties. It is worthy of note however that the document, on its face, contains an express wish that the trustees allocate the assets of the trusts to the first defendant. It is the first and second defendants' position the trustee is bound to give consideration to the memorandum of wishes. That submission can be accepted without in any way limiting the right of the plaintiff to seek the due administration of the trusts and if the trusts are not being properly administered, to have the court appoint a receiver.
The first defendant commenced a relationship with the deceased in or around 2009. They commenced living together in July 2010 and were, until the deceased's death in February 2019, in a defacto relationship. They established a business together which formed the assets of PSFT2. PSFT2 was established on 26 April 2006. It was not used for any purpose other than operating the Pepper Shoes business. Pepper Shoes was the first defendant's idea and was run by her and the deceased as co‑owners. They made all the decisions about the business together.
In 2018 the deceased and the first defendant accepted an offer for the sale of the Pepper Shoes business which at that stage included three stores. Settlement of the sale occurred in the early part of 2019. The sale price was $325,000. That sum was paid to the then trustee of the PSFT2, a company known as Exran Pty Ltd.
It is the plaintiff's position that as at the date of the death of the deceased, PSFT2 owed the deceased $750,608.15. A demand for that money was made on 24 May 2020. After the deceased's death but before the demand for payment to the deceased's estate was made, the first defendant caused Exran Pty Ltd to distribute $185,000 from PSFT2 to her personally. The evidence establishes (and it is not in dispute) the first defendant spent the money distributed to her on medical expenses she had personally incurred, expenses incurred for the PSFT legal fees and living expenses. The trustee of the PSFT2 is now the second defendant. It has distributed to the first defendant a further amount of $80,000 during the period 25 January 2021 to 31 May 2021.
The second defendant has also paid to the executor of the deceased's estate just over $296,000. Accordingly, the PSFT2 is indebted to the deceased's estate in an amount of $454,014.15. The PSFT2 has no other funds. The balance owing to the deceased's estate could be paid if a distribution is made by PSFT to PSFT2 of a sufficient amount to enable PSFT2 to make the payment.

The first defendant makes the point there is no evidence that any of the deceased's adult children have received distributions from PSFT2. Further, the funds held in PSFT2 arose from the sale of the business conducted by the deceased and the first defendant. In fact, the first defendant says the evidence is that the first defendant had a larger role in the day‑to‑day operation of the business than the deceased. That seems to be supported by the evidence: See the affidavit of the first defendant filed 14 October 2021 at pars 70 to 72.
In earlier proceedings, I determined that at the date of the death of the deceased, the first defendant was appointor of the PSFT2: See Allen v Smalberger.[3] The first defendant exercised the power of appointment to appoint the second defendant as the trustee and appointor of the PSFT2. She is the sole shareholder of the second defendant. Her brother‑in‑law, Victor Turco, is the sole director of the second defendant. In her affidavit referred to above, the first defendant makes clear that the payments that have been made to her from PSFT will be accounted for as a loan or distribution. Further, she intends to repay the money she has received if required to do so.
[3] Allen v Smalberger [2021] WASC 306.
Distilling the plaintiff's complaints out of the affidavit material and the submissions filed in support of the application is somewhat difficult. However, it does appear the payments made to the first defendant from the PSFT are the main cause for complaint - albeit that they indicate a wider concern about the administration of the trust. On the face of it at least, the payments made by the first defendant to herself constitute a breach of trust. The real question is whether the breach of trust is so significant that it would justify the appointment of a receiver. The first and second defendants say there was no breach of trust and if there was, it is not such as to constitute a reason to appoint a receiver. Their arguments are put in this way.
The PSFT2 is a discretionary trust. It has a wide definition of 'General Beneficiaries' which includes the first defendant. By cl 8(1) of the trust instrument, the trustee in its absolute discretion may transfer any part of the trust fund to any beneficiary. Further, the trustee may in its absolute discretion pay any capital or income to the credit of any beneficiary. Clause 12 of the trust instrument permits conflicts of interest by the trustee. Accordingly, any payments by Exran or Riverside to the first defendant are expressly authorised by the terms of the trust deed. So much can be accepted. The first and second defendants contend the payment to the first defendant from funds held by PSFT2 did not constitute a breach of trust. They submit that is the case for two reasons. First, the plaintiff characterises the deceased's estate as an 'absolutely entitled beneficiary' in respect of the unpaid present entitlement owing to it from the PSFT2. The first and second defendants say there is no evidence as to how the trusts' debt to the deceased arose or whether those funds are owed to the deceased's estate in its capacity as a beneficiary of the PSFT2 or in some other capacity. Second, they say the court has determined that pursuant to the deceased's will, the deceased validly appointed the first defendant as controller of both PSFT and PSFT2. Under the terms of PSFT, PSFT2 is an eligible beneficiary. The trustee of the PSFT may thus make distributions to PSFT2.
The first and second defendant submit it is inappropriate and artificial to regard either PSFT or PSFT2 in isolation. Rather the trusts ought to be conceived of as a group with scope for funds to pass between them at the discretion of the trustee. If this approach is adopted, the second defendant's payments to the first defendant did not prejudice the estate's ability to recover its unpaid present entitlement nor did the making of those payments amount to a breach of trust. The PSFT has an interest in the three properties mentioned above. On sale of those properties, PSFT should have cash of between $1.45 million and $1.65 million. It can then distribute that cash to the PSFT2 enabling PSFT2 to pay the balance of the unpaid present entitlement owing to the deceased's estate.
For present purposes, I am prepared to assume the payment made to the first defendant from PSFT2 was in breach of trust. The payment was made when the estate of the deceased had an unpaid present entitlement which could not be met from the assets available in PSFT2. It is of no consequence the trustee had the power to make the distribution. In doing so it preferred the interests of the first defendant to the interests of the deceased's estate. It may well be the trust instrument authorises the trustee to act when it is in a position of conflict. But to my mind, to make a distribution in the face of an unpaid present entitlement to the deceased's estate constitutes not just the trustee being in a position of conflict but actually preferring the interests of the first defendant to another beneficiary of the estate.
It is now necessary to consider the position of PSFT. It too is a discretionary trust. The 'primary beneficiaries' of the trust are the children and/or adopted children of the marriage between the deceased and his former wife, Margaret Anne Selden. The general beneficiaries of that trust include the 'primary beneficiaries'. The deceased was also a general beneficiary of the PSFT. In 2001 the PSFT was varied (2001 variation). The 2001 variation provided that the term 'general beneficiaries' includes the trustees of any trust under which any general beneficiary has an interest. It also provides the term 'general beneficiaries' includes corporations and the trustees of trusts from time to time that come within the definition of general beneficiaries notwithstanding that such corporations or trustees may not be in existence or have come into the defined category as at the date of the deed.
The 'general beneficiaries' of the PSFT2 include the appointor as at the date of the trust deed of that trust - 26 April 2006. The deceased was the appointor of PSFT2 at the date of the trust deed. The 'general beneficiaries' of the PSFT2 also include the children of the initial appointor of PSFT2. Accordingly, the children of the deceased are general beneficiaries of the PSFT2. It follows then general beneficiaries of PSFT 'have an interest' in the PSFT2 for the purposes of the 2001 variation such that PSFT2 falls within the definition of 'general beneficiaries' under PSFT. The trust instrument for PSFT2 provides that defactos, widows and widowers of the initial appointor of the PSFT2 are general beneficiaries. That means the first defendant is a general beneficiary of PSFT2.
In his affidavit sworn 14 October 2021, Victor Turco deposes that he intends to sell the properties in PSFT. After the sale of the properties he deposes he will prepare and lodge tax returns to verify tax losses and the status of capital gains carrying forward. He also says he will consider all unpaid present entitlements and payout by a round robin of cheques on a pro rata basis if funds are insufficient to pay in full.
The plaintiff, both in affidavit material and in submissions, went to some lengths to traduce the character of Mr Turco. I will not rehearse all of the material contained in the various affidavits and submissions. I cannot see its relevance. Mr Turco is director (not a shareholder) of the second defendant. His task is mechanical. He intends to realise the available assets of the PSFT. He has no direct interest in those assets. He is not a beneficiary of either trust. Moreover, it is in the interests of his sister‑in‑law, the first defendant, to realise the maximum return for each of the properties. There is no reason why Mr Turco should sacrifice any of the properties, nor is there any suggestion he might acquire the properties for himself or a related party at a discounted price. The second defendant is acting in the position of trustee (albeit acting through Mr Turco) and is subject to the supervision of the court. Accordingly, insofar as the plaintiff's claim is based upon detriment which might flow to either or both trusts consequent upon Mr Turco having an involvement in the sale process of the properties in PSFT, that submission should be rejected.
In his written submissions, counsel for the first and second defendants sets out, by reference to the affidavit position, the financial position of PSFT (see pars 35 to 41). Counsel concludes that after payment of all debts and expenses and sale of the real estate, the PSFT will have sufficient surplus funds to distribute to PSFT2, which in turn will allow PSFT2 to satisfy its unpaid present entitlement to the estate. That being so, I am satisfied that the assets of neither trust are at risk and that the facts in this case do not warrant the appointment of a receiver.
While I would not make orders for the appointment of a receiver to either trust, I would be prepared to consider making orders which ensure that the realisation process for assets of the PSFT are undertaken and undertaken expeditiously. This was not a matter which was canvassed during the hearing of the action and the making of such orders may not be necessary and may not be practical. But on publication of these reasons the parties should give that issue further consideration and if necessary the matter can be relisted so the point can be argued. The parties should also confer with respect to costs. The matter will be relisted in chambers after the publication of these reasons for further consideration of the appropriate directions.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
MM
Court Officer
11 MARCH 2022