Seirlis v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Seirlis & Ors v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QCAT 291

PARTIES:

TERRY SEIRLIS

(first applicant)

TIES GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 130 450 341)

(second applicant)

UKL PTY LTD (ACN 123 360 823)
(third applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

QR162-07; QR164-07

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

31 August 2018

HEARING DATES:

7 December 2015; 8 December 2015; 9 December 2015; 10 December 2015; 11 December 2015; 14 December 2015; 15 December 2015; 29 April 2016

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member McLean Williams

ORDERS:

The Applications to Review are Dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – BUILDERS – STATUTORY INSURANCE SCHEME – applications to review – claims under statutory insurance scheme under QBSA Act for allegedly defective building work – where subject properties sold prior to determination of the claims – where insured a corporate trustee for family trust holding rights of Insured on behalf the trust – where Liquidator of Insured purports to assign interests of the Insured to the Second Applicant – where Third Applicant claims rights of insured as successor trustee in the event that assignment to Second Applicant ineffective – questions as to nature of the right of an Insured under statutory policy of insurance and whether these rights now assignable as a chose in action – whether rights of original Insured may be passed as trust property to Third Applicant in circumstances where insured property previously sold to a third party – questions regarding the assessment of quantum on a claim under the statutory policy if assessed on a theoretical basis where defects not rectified prior to sale – issues relating to assessment of claim calculated on the basis of loss in value upon a sale of the impacted property – sufficiency of evidence in proof of claim

Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 (Qld), Reprint 7, s 68, s 69, s 70, s 86
Queensland Building Services Authority Regulation 1992 (Qld), Reprint 7D
Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Act 2003 (Qld)
Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), Schedule 1, s 41, s 48
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20
Domestic Building Contracts Act 2000 (Qld), s 67
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9, s 477, s 477(2B).
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 82

Seirlis v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QDC 107
Lang v Queensland Building Services Authority [2012] 2 Qd R 457
C & E Pty Ltd v CMC Brisbane Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2004] 2 Qd R 244
Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720
TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Horne (1995) 36 NSWLR 630
United Collieries Ltd v Simpson [1909] AC 383
Fisher v Hebburn Ltd (1960) 105 CLR 188
Insurance Commission (WA) v Container Handlers Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 89
Owners of Strata Plan Number 5290 v CGS & Co Pty Ltd (2011)…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCAT 291
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Terry Seirlis, the First Applicant, along with two other parties, the Second and Third Applicants, sought review of decisions made by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QCCT) in relation to claims under the statutory insurance scheme under the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991. The dispute revolves around allegedly defective building work on properties at 53 Paragon Street Yeronga, which were sold prior to the determination of the claims. The initial insured party, Terry Seirlis Constructions Pty Ltd, had changed its name and role, becoming the corporate trustee for the Terry Seirlis Family Trust. A liquidator of the insured entity purported to assign the insured's interests to the Second Applicant, while the Third Applicant claimed rights as successor trustee. The key legal issues included the nature and assignability of the insured's rights under the statutory policy, the validity of the assignment by the liquidator, and the assessment of quantum on a claim under the statutory policy.

The court found that the claims were time-barred as they were lodged outside the seven-month period allowed by the policy. The expert witness's report was deemed insufficient as it did not adequately explain why the properties were unfit for their intended use or occupation. The report also failed to address the definition of 'practical completion' correctly. The court rejected the valuation evidence of one expert in favor of another but concluded that there was no acceptable evidence to determine the quantum of any claim. The court found that none of the applicants could legitimately claim the rights of the insured under the statutory policy. The assignment by the liquidator was ineffective due to lack of court approval and violated the rule against maintenance and champerty. Consequently, the court dismissed the applications for review.

The final orders of the tribunal were to dismiss the applications for review in matters QR162-07 and QR164-07.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Applications to Review are Dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The purpose of the review is specified in the QCAT Act as being to produce the ‘correct and preferable’ decision, after conducting a fresh hearing, on the merits.[8][8]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’), s 20.Parties to the Proceedings, together with some Factual Background The First Applicant, Mr Terry Seirlis, is a property developer and is the controlling mind of each of the Second and Third Applicants. Mr Seirlis does not claim any personal entitlement to indemnity under either certificate of insurance, yet was responsible for lodging both Applications for Review before the QCCT. Mr Seirlis clearly also has a vested interest in the claimed entitlements of each of the Second and Third Applicants. On 2 April 2001, Terry Seirlis Constructions Pty Ltd[9] in its capacity as the then corporate trustee for the Terry Seirlis Family Trust became the owner of land at 53 Paragon Street Yeronga, more properly described as SP 143758, Parish of Yeerongpilly, County of Stanley. 53 Paragon Street was divided into ten lots, with each lot having its own certificate of title. Among those lots are Lot 2 and Lot 5, which are now the subject of these proceedings (‘the subject lots’).[9]ACN 086 452 840. On 21 September 2001, Terry Seirlis Constructions Pty Ltd entered into a building contract with CMC Brisbane Pty Ltd (‘CMC’), for the construction of ten townhouses. These included freestanding townhouses on the subject lots. On 4 October 2001, the QBSA issued ten separate certificates of insurance pursuant to the statutory insurance scheme established pursuant to Part 5 of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 (‘QBSA Act’).[10] The contract value notified to the QBSA at that time was $402,000.00 in the case of each townhouse, including those on the subject lots.[10]Given that the building contract was dated 21 September 2001, Reprint 7 of the QBSA Act (as in force from 7 July 2000) is the applicable version of the legislation. On 22 July 2003, Terry Seirlis Constructions Pty Ltd changed its name, and became C & E Pty Ltd,[11] (‘C & E’). C & E also became the corporate trustee of the Terry Seirlis Family Trust, and remained as the trustee until 27 October 2005, when that role was taken over by yet another Seirlis entity, TSPD Pty Ltd. [11]ACN 086 482 840. Mr Terry Seirlis was a director of C & E up until 14 July 2010, when he was disqualified by ASIC from further involvement in the management of corporations. Mr Seirlis did however remain as the sole shareholder of C & E, up until C & E was deregistered. On 23 January 2004, C & E submitted an unsigned insurance claim form to the QBSA in relation to defective residential construction work on each of the subject lots. These were later replaced by signed versions, on 10 February 2004. On 30 January 2005, and prior to the insurance claims referred to in the preceding paragraph having been determined, C & E sold the townhouse on Lot 2 to a third party, Mr John Taylor. Mr Taylor has taken no part in these proceedings.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I determine that the claims made by the Applicants pursuant to the policy for category 2 defects were made outside the seven-month time period allowed by clause 2.5(b) of the policy. This affords reason enough to reject the claims.Evidence of Mr Helmond Mr Helmond, an architect and builder, was called by the Applicants as an expert witness in relation to the question of practical completion. Mr Helmold provided a report dated 14 November 2012. In that report, Mr Helmold considered the definition of ‘practical completion’ pursuant to the terms of the contract; the provisions of the policy; and pursuant to section 67 of the DBCA. Ultimately Mr Helmond concluded that practical completion had not been achieved by the subject lots as at 27 September 2003. The Respondent submits that Mr Helmold should not be accepted. In particular, the Respondent submits that Mr Helmold failed to address the question as to why the defects in the town houses on the subject lots made them unfit for their intended use or occupation. I agree that Mr Helmold’s opinion suffers from this key deficiency, as Mr Helmold appears to assume the properties to be uninhabitable by very dint of the list of defects, without sufficient explanation as to why that is so. The Respondent also says that there is another complication that diminishes the weight that can now be attached to Mr Helmold’s opinion. Prior to the preparation of his report, Mr Helmold was requested to take into account both the DBCA and contractual definitions of ‘practical completion’; as well as the definition contained in the statutory policy. The Respondent submits that this has gone on to influence Mr Helmold’s conclusions, as it has caused Mr Helmold to take into account irrelevant considerations. I have now determined that the definition of practical completion in clause 9.1 the statutory policy is to be construed as a ‘stand alone’ definition, one that does not need to import any of the words used in s.67(6) of the DBCA as part of its meaning. Given that Mr Helmold had been asked to assume a meaning of practical completion that is based on an amalgam of sources, including s 67(6) of the DBCA, there is now substance to what the Respondent submits regarding Mr Helmold’s evidence. I conclude therefore that Mr Helmold has been asked to take into account irrelevant considerations, such that his opinion has not been directed at the correct question. The Respondent also points to the fact that, whilst under cross-examination, Mr Helmold conceded that he did not inspect every defect, and could not now remember which defects he had inspected, and those which he had not inspected.[44] This in turn focused attention on the schedule of defects referred to in paragraph 2.1(a)(iv) of Mr Helmold’s report. In relation to that schedule, Mr Helmold said, during his evidence:(a)Initially that he was unsure whether he had relied upon the document in the preparation of his report;[45](b)Later said that he ‘probably would have’ relied on the document;[46] (c)Then as to whether he had checked on whether the schedule had been relied upon by him, said ‘I did not turn my mind to it’;[47](d)Later agreed that the matter set out in the schedule concerning the subject lots formed the basis of the opinion expressed in his report;[48](e)Said variously in relation to the preparation of the schedule ‘I did not prepare that’, ‘I don’t think I did’, ‘I-I-I don’t think I-I don’t know. I can’t remember’, ‘I may have. I may have’;[49](f)When first asked whether he had assisted in the preparation of the schedule said: ‘I don’t think so. I’m not sure, but I don’t think so’,[50] but later said that he had ‘probably’ assisted in the preparation of the schedule, but he was not sure who had prepared it, yet thought it might have been the architect, Mr Dawson.[51] [44]Transcript, Day 2, page 45, lines 45-47, and Transcript, Day 2, page 45, lines 1-5.[45]Transcript, Day 2, page 40, lines 10-15.[46]Transcript, Day 2, page 40, line 17.[47]Transcript, Day 2, page 40, line 35.[48]Transcript, Day 2, page 41, lines 35-40.[49]Transcript, Day 2, page 42, lines 9-23.[50]Transcript, Day 2, page 38, lines 30-35.[51]Transcript, Day 2, page 47, lines 34-38.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ultimately, I prefer the valuation evidence of Mr Cox over that of Mr Johnston in regards pristine value. However, pristine value is not the matter in issue. Evidence is required to show that the alleged loss in value (if any) has been produced by the defects that are claimed to exist in the subject lots. The only basis upon which Mr Cox could take this into account would be for Mr Cox to have had access to sufficiently reliable evidence of the extent of the defects and/or the cost of rectifying these. Such evidence is not available, such that it is very difficult to accept Mr Cox’s opinion in relation to the value of the subject lots in an impacted condition as being any more than a guess.Conclusion & Orders: For reasons expressed elsewhere in these reasons, none of the Applicants can lay any legitimate claim to the rights of an Insured under the statutory policy of insurance. Even if they could, their claims should still be refused, under clause 5.1 of the policy. In relation to the question of quantum, the Tribunal ultimately arrives at a point at which there is just no acceptable evidence that can be used to determine the quantum of any claim, irrespective of whether it is to be assessed under clause 2.2(a), or clause 2.2(c) of the policy. The order of the Tribunal is that the Applications for Review in matters QR162-07 and QR164-07 are dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Although in paragraph 6(b) of their Reply the Applicants assert that the rights of C & E as the Insured under the statutory policy of insurance were ‘property of the company’, the initial presumption must always be that these rights were held by C & E, on trust. There would really need to be some kind of evidence before the Tribunal to displace the presumption of trust and to enable an assessment of the state of accounts as between the corporate trustee and the trust, in order to show that trust property had lost the mantle of trust, and had been “called in” by the liquidator, to make good the corporate trustee’s right of indemnity from trust property, in the manner that I have described in the immediately preceding paragraph. In the absence of such evidence (and here there isn’t any), the Tribunal has not been given any basis from which to conclude that the liquidator was permitted to have access to trust assets. (iv) No court approval under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act for the assignment As a fourth matter further negating the putative right of Ties Group to take the benefit of the Insured under the statutory policy, it is to be observed that, at the relevant time, s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act provided:(2B) [where liquidator may enter agreement] Except with the approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or of a resolution of creditors, a liquidator of a company must not enter into an agreement on the company’s behalf (for example, but without limitation, a lease or a charge) if:(a) without limiting paragraph (b), the terms of the agreement may end; or(b) obligations of a party to the agreement may, according to the terms of the agreement, be discharged by performance;more than 3 months after the agreement is entered into, even if the term may end, or the obligations may be discharged, within those three months. The deed of assignment between Mr Combis and Ties Group gives rise (in part) to a contingent assignment fee, not fully payable until such time as Ties Group makes a successful recovery on the claims. As such, the deed represents an agreement that gives rise to obligations to be discharged by performance more than three months after the date of the deed. Given that C & E has long since been deregistered, nor could the purported assignor now receive the remaining contingent portion of the consideration under the deed, even in the theoretical event that it could be recovered. Exhibit 14 in these proceedings is a letter from Mr Combis dated 8 December 2015. This records that none of the approvals contemplated in s 477(2B) were obtained in respect of the purported assignment of the rights under the statutory policy of insurance to Ties Group. I conclude therefore that the deed of assignment is also of no effect by reason of no consent having been obtained pursuant to s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act.(v) Maintenance and champerty As one final matter also defeating the entitlement of Ties Group (a matter which I do note to have been raised by the Respondent over the objection of the Applicants, who complain that to raise it now is unfair, because the Respondent failed to plead the point), it is to be observed that a bare right of action cannot be assigned without offending the rule against maintenance and champerty.