PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
JUDGE ROBERTSON
P & E Application No 3098 of 2006
| SECURED LIFESTYLE PTY LTD | Appellant |
| and | |
| BURDEKIN SHIRE COUNCIL | Respondent |
and
MONTROSA PTY LTD Co-respondent
and
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY Co-respondent
TOWNSVILLE
..DATE 24/09/2007
ORDER
HIS HONOUR: The co-respondent/applicant, Montrosa Pty Ltd, is seeking orders pursuant to rule 69 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, that Hillward Proprietary Limited as trustee for the R D Ahern Family Trust be permitted to join the appeal as a co-respondent by election and that Montrosa be permitted to withdraw as a party to the appeal.
The appeal is a submitter appeal against a decision of the Burdekin Shire Council dated the 18th of September 2006 to approve a development application by Montrosa to enable reconfiguration of a lot and development of a retirement village on land at 26 Chippendale Street, Ayr. Montrosa made the development application in November 2005. At that time it was not the registered proprietor of the land, but the application was made with the consent of the then owners, Mr and Mrs Cremin. On the 31st of January 2007 Montrosa contracted with the Cremins to purchase the land. In February 2007 Montrosa contracted to sell the land to Hillward, with settlement of both contracts to be contemporaneous. Hillward is now the registered proprietor of the land.
Montrosa's application focuses on whether or not Hillward can, on the material before the Court, be regarded as an "applicant" as that term is defined in schedule 10 of the Integrated Planning Act. Relevantly, the definition in schedule 10 of an applicant is "(b) for a development application mentioned in chapter 4, includes the person in whom the benefit of the application vests". The application is opposed by the submitter appellant. Council's submission was initially at the time of the filing of its written outline that there was insufficient evidence upon which the Court could hold that Hillward could come within that definition, however since the filing of the most recent affidavit of Robert Dennis Ahern, a director of Hillward, on the 21st of September 2007, council's position is to, as it were, support the application.
Rule 69 comes into play because of rule 3 of the Planning and Environment Court rules. The appellant has made a submission that because the application "is beyond the relevant statutory limitation period", rule 69 subrule (2) is applicable and the application does not meet the statutory test contained therein. This is a reference to the order sought by Montrosa that the time to file the notice of election as co-respondent by Hillward be extended until today. Clearly, the time prescribed for the filing of a notice of election, as prescribed by the IPA, has passed but in the absence of any authority I hold that this statutory time limit is not a "limitation period" as referred to in rule 69 (2). The limitation period referred to therein is clearly, in my view,…
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- Case
- [2007] QPEC 79
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning focused on whether Hillward could be regarded as an "applicant" under the Integrated Planning Act. The definition of an applicant includes the person in whom the benefit of the application vests. The court examined the contractual agreements between Montrosa and Hillward, particularly clauses 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3, to determine if these clauses sufficiently demonstrated that the benefit of the application had vested in Hillward. The court referred to the precedent set in Sushames v. Pine River Shire Council, which held that an owner who gave consent for a development application is not an applicant. However, in this case, the contractual terms between Montrosa and Hillward were deemed sufficient to establish that Hillward had vested the benefit of the application. Consequently, the court allowed Hillward to join the appeal as a co-respondent.
The outcome of the case was that the court granted Montrosa's application to allow Hillward to join the appeal as a co-respondent. This decision was based on the contractual provisions between Montrosa and Hillward, which sufficiently demonstrated that Hillward stood to benefit from the development application. The court's order was initialled, dated, and lodged with the case papers.
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