FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Ali (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 1650
File number(s): SYG 3057 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 10 October 2025 Catchwords: CONSUMER LAW – application for orders requiring delivery of a vehicle subject to a security interest registered under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) – evidence that the vehicle was transferred to the second respondent, a non-party to the security agreement – orders made requiring delivery of the vehicle and keys by the second respondent according to a specified procedure – opportunity for the second respondent to seek discharge or variation of the orders within a specified period Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) r 22.04
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 140
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Sch 1
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) ss 10, 19, 20 & 123
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 93
Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 257
Cases cited: Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Ali [2025] FedCFamC2G 1264
Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Mei [2025] FedCFamC2G 1045
Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd v Howard [2024] FedCFamC2G 1047
Division: General Number of paragraphs: 31 Date of hearing: 30 September 2025 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms C Simonidis of Agility Law Group Pty Ltd First Respondent: No appearance Second Respondent: No appearance ORDERS
SYG 3057 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: SECURE FUNDING PTY LTD ABN 25 081 982 872
Applicant
AND: JABER ABDULLAH AL ALI
First Respondent
AMY VUONG
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
10 OCTOBER 2025
PENAL NOTICE
Endorsement pursuant to r 33.06 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)
TO THE SECOND RESPONDENT AMY VUONG:
IF YOU NEGLECT OR REFUSE TO DO ANY OF THE ACTS ORDER 2 OF THESE ORDERS REQUIRES YOU TO DO WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED BY ORDER 2 FOR THE DOING OF THOSE ACTS,
YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY, OR PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT UNLESS YOU HAVE APPLIED TO DISCHARGE OR VARY ORDER 2 AND ORDER 2 HAS, BEFORE THE TIME FOR COMPLIANCE HAS EXPIRED, BEEN ACCORDINGLY DISCHARGED
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Subject to orders 4 and 5, pursuant to s 140 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), the second respondent (AMY VUONG) deliver to the applicant the following vehicle (Vehicle) together with all keys relating to the Vehicle (Keys) by the means specified in order 2:
2019 Toyota Hilux Utility
VIN Number: MR0HA3CD100442013
Engine Number: 1GDA334717
Registration Number: EYA35A
State of Registration: New South Wales
2.AMY VUONG must deliver the Vehicle and the Keys to…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1650
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether Secure Funding had a right to seize the vehicle from Ms Vuong, given that she was not a party to the security agreement. The court considered the provisions of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) and relevant case law, particularly the decision of Judge Manousaridis in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Mei. The court found that Secure Funding had a right to seize the vehicle from Ms Vuong, as it had a security interest that had attached to the vehicle and was perfected by registration. The court also considered the adequacy of alternative remedies, such as an order for possession or damages, and found them to be inadequate. Finally, the court considered the appropriate timeframes for compliance with and challenging the orders, extending them to account for the limited notice that Ms Vuong had of the orders proposed.
The court made orders requiring Ms Vuong to deliver the vehicle and keys to Secure Funding according to a specified procedure. The orders also provided Ms Vuong with an opportunity to seek discharge or variation of the orders within a specified period. The court extended the timeframes for compliance and any application to set aside the orders, following a discussion with Secure Funding at the hearing. The court found that Secure Funding had a right to seize the vehicle from Ms Vuong and that the orders made were appropriate remedies for Secure Funding's loss of security.
The court made orders requiring Ms Vuong to deliver the vehicle and keys to Secure Funding and providing her with an opportunity to seek discharge or variation of the orders. The orders were made in accordance with the provisions of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) and relevant case law, and the court extended the timeframes for compliance and any application to set aside the orders to account for the limited notice that Ms Vuong had of the orders proposed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Difficulties were experienced in serving both respondents. Those difficulties culminated in a substituted service application being made. Orders permitting substituted service were made on 6 August 2025: Secure Funding Pty Ltd v Ali [2025] FedCFamC2G 1264.CONSIDERATION As observed above, Secure Funding largely sought orders similar to the orders made in the case of Mei. I am persuaded that it is appropriate to make orders that are substantially in the form that were made in that case. Similarly to in Mei, I am satisfied that Secure Funding has a right to seize the Vehicle against a non-party to the security agreement to whom the Vehicle has been transferred (Ms Vuong). The Agreement is a “security agreement” within the meaning of s 10 of the PPSA, for similar reasons to those given in Mei. Secure Funding gave value for the security interest, in the form of monies advanced, to Mr Ali, who had rights in the Vehicle, with the result that the security interest attached to the Vehicle. The security interest covered the Vehicle, with the Agreement meeting the requirements of s 20(2) of the PPSA. Secure Funding registered its interest on the PPSR on 20 March 2023. Mr Ali defaulted under the Agreement and failed to remedy this within the requisite period. In result, Secure Funding acquired the right under s 123(1) of the PPSA to seize the Vehicle from Mr Ali or from any other person who had taken possession after registration of the interest: see Mei at [45]. In a similar manner to in Mei, the evidence before the Court demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Vuong possesses the Vehicle. The 257 Certificate evidences transfer of registration to Ms Vuong on 22 July 2024, after registration of the security interest. Ms Vuong has not relied upon any evidence refuting her possession of the Vehicle, or otherwise engaged with the proceeding: see Mei at [46]. An order for possession requiring knowledge of the location of the Vehicle would provide an inadequate remedy, in circumstances where the location of the Vehicle is unknown: Mei at [48]. Damages would be an inadequate remedy, which would deprive Secure Funding the security for which it contracted: Mei at [49]. Having regard to the above, I am persuaded to make the orders sought by Secure Funding that are substantially in accordance with those made by Judge Manousaridis in Mei. However, the timeframes for compliance and any application to set aside the orders made will be extended. This follows from a discussion with Secure Funding at hearing, in which Secure Funding acknowledged that (for whatever reason) the orders proposed and the written submissions relied upon at hearing had not been served upon the respondents. In these circumstances, Secure Funding proposed a 2 week period for compliance (rather than a 3 day period) as being acceptable. A 3 day period for any application to set aside the orders was proposed. However, given the 2 week period proposed for compliance and the relatively limited notice Ms Vuong had of the orders proposed, I consider that a 10 day period would be more appropriate. In considering this, I have taken into account the order made at the hearing last week requiring the material to be served upon the respondents forthwith.