Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SS (No 3)
[2021] VSC 1
•8 January 2021
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2020 0148
| THE SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY SAFETY | Prosecution |
| v | |
| SS | Accused |
and
S ECR 2020 0237
| THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Prosecution |
| v | |
| SS | Accused |
---
JUDGE: | TINNEY J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 27 November and 22 December 2020 |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 8 January 2021 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SS (No 3) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VSC 1 |
---
CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Nine charges of contravening a condition of a supervision order – Two charges of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail - Breaches of urinalysis and curfew conditions, as well as of direction not to record supervision sessions - Accused found guilty of urinalysis and curfew charges after summary contested hearing, pleaded guilty to other charges - Long criminal history and prior conviction for contravening a condition of a supervision order – Determination in separate hearing that the accused will be required to reside at Rivergum Residential Treatment Centre for two years from conclusion of current sentence – Rehabilitation an important consideration in this case – Specific deterrence – General deterrence – Just punishment – Denunciation – Protection of the community – Aggregate sentence of 5 months’ imprisonment imposed - Serious Offenders Act 2018 ss 169 – Sentencing Act 1991 ss 5, 9, 18.
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Prosecution | Ms S Flynn QC | Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office |
| For the Prosecution (S ECR 2020 0237) | Ms C Parkes | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused (S ECR 2020 0148) | Mr R de Vietri | Victoria Legal Aid |
| For the Accused (S ECR 2020 0237) | Mr B Johnston (Plea) Mr R de Vietri (Sentence) | C. Marshall & Associates |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
SS[1], following a contested summary hearing held before me, you were found guilty of eight charges of breaching a condition of a supervision order (‘SO’), pursuant to s 169(1) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (‘the Act’). These charges were brought by the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety (‘the Secretary’) for whom Ms Flynn QC appeared. Mr de Vietri appeared on your behalf.
[1]Name anonymised to protect identity of the offender.
In addition, at a separate hearing on 22 December 2020, you pleaded guilty to a rolled-up charge of breaching a condition of a SO, and to two charges of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail. These charges were brought by the Crown on behalf of Victoria Police, for whom Ms Parkes appeared. Mr Johnston appeared on your behalf.
I am now called upon to sentence you in respect of all of these charges.
The maximum penalty for offences under s 169(1) is imprisonment for 5 years. Because of the summary disposition of the charges, the maximum penalty which is applicable to you for each charge of breaching a condition of a SO is 2 years’ imprisonment.[2] The maximum penalty for committing an indictable offences whilst on bail is 30 penalty units or 3 months’ imprisonment.[3] The maximum total effective sentence applicable in your case would be 5 years’ imprisonment.[4]
[2]Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 113A.
[3]Bail Act 1977 s 30B.
[4]Ibid s 113B.
You admitted the contents of a criminal record filed by the prosecution. I note that a number of the matters contained within the record are Children’s Court matters beyond the age of ten years. I do not take these matters into account in light of the definition of ‘previous conviction’ contained in s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.
An important aspect of the background of this sentence is the fact that on 27 November 2020, I announced my decision in respect of an application brought by the Secretary for a review of the conditions of the SO to which you are subject. The upshot of my decision, the reasons for which have not yet been published, is that upon the completion of any sentence of imprisonment you receive, you will be required to reside in Rivergum Residential Treatment Centre (‘Rivergum’) for a period of two years subject to an intensive treatment and supervision condition which has been added to the conditions of your SO.
Background
By way of very brief background, you were convicted of murder in 1998 and received a long term of imprisonment. On 23 August 2019, shortly before your term of imprisonment was to expire, I made a SO for six years under the Act.[5] The SO included conditions:
[5]Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SS [2019] VSC 600.
· requiring you to report and receive visits from the Secretary or a nominated person;
· requiring you to attend for assessment for treatment and rehabilitation programs and activities and to participate in such programs or activities as instructed by a supervision officer;
· prohibiting the use of drugs of dependence;
· requiring you to submit to testing for the detection of alcohol or drug use;
· imposing a curfew;
· requiring compliance with electronic monitoring; and
· authorising the Post Sentence Authority (‘PSA’) to give directions to you in relation to the operation of any condition of the SO, and requiring you to comply with any such direction.
The contested charges
In the contested hearing, you were found guilty of four charges of breaching Condition 7.6 of the SO by failing to submit to urinalysis testing. These breaches occurred on 17 March 2020,[6] 26 May 2020,[7] 27 May 2020 [8] and 5 June 2020.[9]
[6]Charge 1.
[7]Charge 2.
[8]Charge 3.
[9]Charge 5.
You were also found guilty of four charges of breaching Condition 7.2 by failing to comply with the curfew. These breaches occurred on 3 June 2020,[10] 5 June 2020,[11] 9 June 2020 [12] and 28 June 2020.[13]
[10]Charge 4.
[11]Charge 6.
[12]Charge 8.
[13]Charge 9.
The facts surrounding the contested charges of which you have been found guilty are set out in some detail in the decision of the Court finding you guilty.[14] I will not summarise them in any detail here. Suffice to say that all of the charges arose in the context of your conduct on the SO, which in a number of respects was less than ideal. Although you were able to take some significant steps in the community, including by commencing and maintaining an intimate relationship for some months, carrying out employment through Airtasker, and developing your relationship with your mother, your performance in the supervision and treatment in which you were required to take part was deficient, marked by numerous absences and late attendances, breakdowns in your relationship with those who supervised or treated you, and other unsatisfactory aspects.
[14] Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SS (No 2) [2020] VSC 734.
Before the four proven breaches of the drug testing condition occurred, you pleaded guilty to a charge of contravening the condition of the SO prohibiting the possession or use of drugs of dependence, for which I fined you with conviction on 31 January 2020. Although there were no more positive test results, there were occasions of diluted samples being provided by you. You were reminded in no uncertain terms by the PSA at a meeting on 23 December 2019 of the importance of complying with all of the conditions of the SO, and given a formal warning.
In respect of the curfew breaches of which I found you guilty, these occurred in an even more damning context. Your regular failure to meet the curfew requirement, usually only by a matter of minutes, had become such a concern to the PSA that it was the subject of formal warnings issued at meetings of the PSA on several occasions. At a meeting on 28 April 2020 which you attended, you were asked about the apparent curfew breaches. You gave some explanations, complained about the difficulties you had in complying with the curfew, stated there should be no curfew, and suggested that if the curfew was not modified, you ‘may as well go back to gaol’. Your behaviour became heightened. You were told by the PSA that you needed to comply with the curfew for a period of time before changes would be considered. When the PSA expressed disappointment with your conduct during the meeting and stated their intention of ending it, you responded, ‘Whatever, idiots’. At the meeting of the PSA on 3 June 2020, you were issued with a formal warning for not having participated in treatment and for having breached your curfew on 13 occasions since 28 April 2020. You breached the curfew that very night, the first of such offences of which you were found guilty. As I indicated, the facts of your various curfew breaches are set out in the earlier decision of the Court finding you guilty.
The charges to which you pleaded guilty
On 7 May 2020, directions were issued by the PSA in relation to two of the conditions of the SO. One of the directions was as follows:
SS, whilst participating in supervision sessions with a Community Corrections Officer, must not record such sessions.
This direction was explained to you via telephone on 11 May 2020. Further verbal explanation was provided to you on 10, 11 and 12 June, 9 July, and 13 August 2020.
At the time the directions were issued, your supervision sessions were being conducted remotely due to COVID-19 restrictions.
On 27 August 2020, your mobile telephone containing a SIM card and a further Micro SD ScanDisk memory card were seized by Corrections Victoria (‘CV’) and analysed. It was revealed that you had been recording supervision sessions on a number of occasions.
The charge of breaching a condition of a SO to which you pleaded guilty encompasses 13 occasions between 5 June and 27 August 2020 on which you recorded supervision sessions between yourself and Community Correctional Services Specialist Case Workers and/or Forensic Intervention Services Clinicians.
The remaining charges to which you pleaded guilty were for committing an indictable offence, constituted by your contravention of the SO, whilst on bail. On 9 April 2020, you were released on bail by the Moorabbin Magistrates’ Court in respect of a charge of theft. On 2 July 2020, you were bailed in Dandenong Magistrates’ Court on a charge of contravening a SO.[15]
[15]This charge was laid by Senior Constable Lisa Park and concerned a breach of curfew. The charge did not, in the end, proceed.
You were arrested on the plea charges on 18 September 2020 and interviewed at Springvale Police Station. You admitted having recorded supervision sessions, in the knowledge of the verbal direction not to do so. You claimed that your lawyers had advised you that you were allowed to record the sessions. Whilst that would provide no excuse for your actions, for what it is worth, it strikes me as being an implausible claim. It was a claim which was not repeated before me on the plea hearing.
Time in custody
Following an unsuccessful application for bail, you have remained in custody on the plea charges since 18 September 2020, a period of 112 days, up to and including yesterday, 7 January 2021.
In respect of the contested charges, these were laid by summons. I remanded you in custody for the first time on these charges on 27 November 2020. You have therefore spent 42 days in custody referable to these charges, overlapping, of course, with your custody on the other charges.
Index offending, previous convictions, and personal background
These matters were all the subject of consideration in the decision of the Court making a SO.[16] I will not repeat them here.
[16]Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v SS [2019] VSC 600.
Nature and gravity of offending
Mr de Vietri on your behalf in respect of the contested charges submitted that your offending, whilst serious, was towards the lower end of the range, relative to other offences that have come before the courts. He distinguished your offending from more serious examples of the crime such as absconding, tampering with electronic bracelets and committing violent offences while on a SO. Your offending was persistent, but looked at individually, whilst not trivial, your crimes were of relatively modest order.
Mr Johnston acknowledged that the plea offending occurred over a lengthy period in clear breach of a direction. He emphasised that you did not discriminate between those you recorded, so there was no aspect of stalking-type behaviour. Your reason for recording sessions was so that you could listen to them at a later stage. He submitted that your offending was at the lower end of the scale.
In each case, the prosecution took issue with the characterisation of your offending as being at the lower end of the scale of seriousness. Ms Flynn submitted that for a number of reasons set out in her written and oral submissions, your offending in respect of the contested charges was serious. Amongst the matters upon which she relied were the protracted nature of your offending, the numerous warnings you received prior to and during the offending, the fact of your previous conviction for breaching the SO, the lack of respect that your offending and overall behaviour showed for the SO, and the seriousness of the risk you pose to the community, the prevention of which was the reason for the imposition of the relevant conditions in the first place.
Ms Parkes described your offending as protracted, flagrant and deliberate, carried out in spite of the numerous warnings you received prior to and during your offending behaviour. Your conduct compromised the integrity of the sessions, and occurred in the context of earlier breaches of conditions of the SO. It was submitted that your offending should not be assessed as falling towards the lower end of the scale of seriousness.
In my view, for the reasons advanced by Ms Flynn and Ms Parkes, your offending cannot be viewed as being other than serious. Whilst your individual offences amongst the contested charges, if looked at in isolation, may appear of quite limited criminality, the overall picture was of deliberate, repeated, flagrant breaches of the rules you knew applied to you, and which you knew had been put in place to control your behaviour and reduce the risk you posed. The same could be said for the plea charges. Overall, your offending clearly indicated the concerning lack of respect you seemingly felt for the SO, and the controls it placed over you. Furthermore, all of this occurred in the context of your earlier conviction for breaching a condition of the SO, the clear warning I gave to you on the occasion of the sentence I passed upon you, and the frequent warnings you received from the PSA, CV and the police to modify your behaviour.
Your moral culpability and degree of responsibility
Mr de Vietri submitted that the question of your moral culpability is ‘inextricably entangled’[17] with your personal history, and the personality disorder from which you suffer. He pointed to the report of Dr Darjee,[18] and whilst not putting a submission as high as would enliven the principles in the decision in R v Verdins (‘Verdins’),[19] he submitted that I should take a ‘holistic approach’ to viewing the offending in the context of your unfortunate history, personality disorder and cognitive difficulties.
[17]Transcript 14.
[18]Exhibit 1 in the plea hearing for the contested charges.
[19](2007) 16 VR 269.
Mr Johnston, for his part, submitted that your plea offending was reflective of your personality style, as impacted by your diagnosed personality disorder. Again, he did not put the submission as high as would be required for Verdins to be enlivened.
Ms Flynn submitted that there should be no reduction in moral culpability accorded to you. The report of Dr Darjee, which largely repeated the content of his earlier reports, would not justify any such reduction. That was not to say, acknowledged Ms Flynn, that I should not take your personality disorder and its implications into account in a general sense.
Ms Parkes accepted that your personality disorder and associated behavioural issues are relevant to the assessment of your moral culpability, but she submitted that nonetheless, your moral culpability should be considered to be high.
I do take into account, in assessing your moral culpability, that you suffer from a diagnosed personality disorder, have a particular personality type, and have led a difficult and disrupted life for many years, things that in combination mean that you do not have the skills a normal person may have to lead an organised, well-planned life, avoiding impulsive, problematic and self-destructive behaviour.
Having said that, it is clear to me that you well understood the conditions of the SO, had it within yourself to comply with those conditions should you choose to do so in spite of your personality disorder, and yet you made a conscious decision on many occasions to ignore the conditions, or at the very least to push the envelope or chance your arm. In my view, your moral culpability for your offending is high.
Plea of guilty and remorse
In respect of the plea offending, I take into account your plea of guilty which is of significant utilitarian value, especially in these COVID-19 days. Mr Johnston did not assert that either the plea of guilty, or any other aspect of the case, indicated remorse on your part.
Mr de Vietri, notwithstanding your denial of guilt, relied on remorse in respect of the contested charges. This was based on the proposition that on many occasions you expressed and felt remorse or regret immediately after your offending.
Not surprisingly, Ms Flynn challenged the contention of remorse, making the point that it would be difficult to find remorse where your prompt expressions of remorse or regret were typically followed shortly afterwards by further offending.
In my view, there is no evidence that you are actually remorseful for your offending. This reflects the fact, I daresay, that you still harbour views that the SO should not have been made against you, the particular conditions should not have been imposed, and that you really did nothing much wrong by your conduct in breaching them.
I hasten to add that a lack of remorse, clearly, is not an aggravating feature, but rather, represents the absence of a feature which may have been mitigatory.
Importance of rehabilitation
Mr de Vietri submitted that your rehabilitation should play an important role in sentence in this case. Centrally, the fact that you will spend the next two years in Rivergum, a facility intensively geared towards rehabilitation, is an unusual circumstance of your case, and one that, as he put it, ‘bodes in favour of mitigating the length of the sentence to the minimum necessary to achieve the other sentencing principles’.[20] He submitted that through your rehabilitation, community protection can be achieved. He submitted that further time in prison for you is not going to assist in achieving the important end of rehabilitation. The sooner you get to Rivergum, he submitted, the better.
[20]Transcript 12.
Mr Johnston, made a similar submission, describing this as an unusual and unique case, in view of your impending removal to Rivergum, and reiterating the desirability of a move to Rivergum as soon as possible.
Ms Flynn accepted that I should view your prospects of rehabilitation more favourably than if you would be released immediately back into the community. Ms Parkes submitted that your prospects of rehabilitation are contingent upon your future compliance with the SO. She submitted that your impending detention at Rivergum is a very important factor which bears upon not only your rehabilitation but your risk of reoffending and risk to the community, and is therefore a significant aspect of the sentencing exercise in your case.
I do believe that this is a very unusual case in which your rehabilitation must assume great significance in the mix of considerations going towards the eventual sentence. In your case, there is a particular, intensive regime which will commence upon your release which is geared towards assisting you towards eventual rehabilitation and hence, ensuring the protection of the community, which of course is the central aim of the Act. While you are in Rivergum, the immediate protection of the community will be achieved. More importantly, however, what is hoped is that both the primary and secondary purposes of the Act will be advanced long-term by your residence and treatment in Rivergum, and hopefully, the progress you will make there.
Further material points to the realistic prospect of rehabilitation in your case. Although in some respects, as your contraventions of conditions of the SO and at times unacceptable behaviour towards supervisors and counsellors attest, your conduct during the period of the SO has been quite unsatisfactory, in other respects, you have taken significant steps towards rehabilitation whilst back in the community. Centrally, you have not reoffended in a violent manner, or shown any moves in that direction. You developed and maintained a significant relationship with a female partner over a number of months, at the conclusion of which you dealt with the disappointment in acceptable fashion. You engaged in paid employment which you organised yourself and at which you seemingly performed well. You lived independently in a house in the community. You worked on improving your relationship with your mother. In these and other ways, you made commendable progress. I take this all into account in your favour.
In all of the circumstances, it seems to me that specific deterrence, general deterrence, just punishment, denunciation and protection of the community, whilst remaining important, should assume less weight than would otherwise be the case, with correspondingly more weight being given to the need to foster your rehabilitation.
COVID-19 considerations
Mr de Vietri and Mr Johnston both submitted that I should take into account in sentencing you the onerous nature of the conditions under which you have been held due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and under which you will be held for an indeterminate time to come. Ms Flynn and Ms Parkes did not dispute this, although Ms Flynn made the point that the current situation may not persist for the entirety of your sentence, in view of the easing of restrictions in the community which was apparent at the time for the plea hearing.
I accept the submissions made on your behalf in respect of COVID-19. For the entirety of your time in custody since your arrest, you have been subject to the quite stringent and onerous conditions introduced by the authorities in an effort, extraordinary successful thus far, to prevent the spread of the virus into the prison system. Furthermore, I note that the air of confidence which, at the time of the two plea hearings, had pervaded the Victorian community, has diminished somewhat in the ensuing weeks due to further outbreaks here and interstate, and I could have no confidence that there will be any easing of the conditions during the remainder of your sentence.
I take these considerations into account in sentencing you.
Current sentencing practices
One of the matters to which I am required to have regard in sentencing you is current sentencing practices. Ms Flynn provided a document entitled Summary of Comparable Cases at the time of the plea hearing in respect of the contested charges, and copies of the decisions of the County Court judges which comprised the summary. I have had regard to those decisions and the sentences in those cases. I note the limitations on so-called comparable cases. No two cases are the same, and that point can be well illustrated by the fact that an important consideration in your case, that is, the fact that you will be residing in Rivergum from the completion of your sentence, was not present in any of the other cases. Also, I note that one of the factors present in all of the decisions to which I was referred, that is, a plea of guilty, was not present in respect of the bulk of the charges upon which you fall to be sentenced.
My understanding of current sentencing practices in this area, which is not confined to the matters mentioned in the preceding paragraph, would suggest that whilst courts have frequently dealt with offenders for a first offence by way of a non-custodial disposition, a second or subsequent offence will usually attract a term of imprisonment.
Totality
Both Mr de Vietri and Mr Johnston pointed out the importance of the principle of totality in this case. Ms Flynn and Ms Parkes acknowledged the applicability of the principle. That principle concerns the requirement when sentencing an offender for a number of offences to ensure that the overall sentence arrived at by cumulation of sentences for individual offences is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved.
In the normal course of events, totality is achieved, and a crushing sentence is avoided, by the imposition of terms of imprisonment for each individual offence, with a greater or lesser degree of concurrency between the individual terms.
In this case, putting to one side the two charges of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail, all of the other charges occurred as part of an ongoing sequence of offending. Section 9 of the Sentencing Act 1991 permits a court to impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment in place of separate terms when sentencing someone for ‘two or more offences which are founded on the same facts, or form, or are part of, a series of offences of the same or a similar character’. The fact that one of the charges before me is a rolled-up charge does not represent a barrier to an aggregate sentence being passed.[21]
[21]Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 9(4A).
At each of the plea hearings, I discussed with counsel the prospect of imposing an aggregate sentence, in circumstances where the prosecution in each case submitted that your offending called for a custodial sentence, and each of the counsel who appeared for you acknowledged that a term of imprisonment would indeed be called for. No one spoke against the proposition that an aggregate sentence would be legally permissible and appropriate. In the circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate to impose an aggregate sentence in respect of all of the charges of contravening a condition of a SO, across the two hearings. I think all of the offences meet the requirements of s 9 of the Sentencing Act 1991, and that is no less the case because the two groups of charges were laid by two different agencies, or because of the different pleas in respect of the two groups of charges.
As for the Bail Act offences, it was submitted by the defence, and accepted by the prosecution, that these could be appropriately met with fines.
Pre-sentence detention
As indicated earlier, you have spent a period of time in custody referable to the plea charges, upon which you were remanded and have remained in custody since your arrest, and a lesser period referable to the contested charges.
If I sentence you to a term of imprisonment in respect of the plea charges, I am required by law to make a declaration as to the period to be reckoned as already served under the sentence as a result of your pre-sentence detention.[22] As for the contested charges, a declaration of a lesser period would be required.
[22]Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 18(1) and (4).
In the circumstances in which I propose to pass an aggregate sentence on all of the contravention charges, I will simply make the one declaration of pre-sentence detention which will apply to the overall sentence.
Final analysis
Mr de Vietri submitted that the applicable sentencing principles could be satisfied with the imposition of what he called a ‘short, sharp term of imprisonment’.[23] Mr Johnston made a similar submission, urging me to sentence you in a manner in respect of all matters which would allow you to be immediately transferred to Rivergum.
[23]Transcript 26.
Section 5 of the Sentencing Act 1991 sets out the only purposes for which sentences may be imposed. All of them have application in your case.
The sentence I impose must be sufficient to punish you in a manner which is just in all of the circumstances. It must be sufficient to bring it very clearly home to you that you must not, in future, take the cavalier attitude to compliance with the conditions of the SO which you unfortunately displayed in the past. Furthermore and importantly, it must send a very clear message to others on SOs that compliance with the conditions of such orders is mandatory, and that contravention of conditions will be met with strong punishment. As was said by Williams J in Acting Secretary to the Department of Justice v McKane:[24]
It is essential to the effectiveness of the statutory scheme that offenders subject to supervision orders be aware of the significance of their obligations under the conditions of those orders and the seriousness with which breaches will be viewed by the courts.[25]
[24][2012] VSC 459.
[25]Ibid [25].
In addition, the sentence must manifest the denunciation by the Court of the type of conduct in which you have frequently engaged while on the SO, as evidenced by the charges of which you have been found guilty.
Another purpose to be achieved by this sentence is the protection of the community, which of course is at the heart of the Act itself.
Finally, the establishment of conditions within which your rehabilitation may be facilitated is another sentencing purpose in this case, and an important one as I have already noted.
Were it not for your impending move to Rivergum, and the desirability of allowing the intensive treatment which will be available to you there to commence to take its course as soon as is possible, the strong need for specific and general deterrence, just punishment, and protection of the community in your case would have required the imposition of a significantly longer term of imprisonment than that which I will impose.
I intend to impose an aggregate term of imprisonment and to make a declaration of pre-sentence detention which will have the effect of you being able to be transferred to Rivergum in the near future. You should be under no illusions that future breaches by you of the SO will be dealt with in such lenient fashion. You should fully understand in future that compliance with the conditions of a SO is not some optional exercise to be followed when convenient for you in the course of a busy life. It will be an absolute imperative, of more importance than anything else to you if you truly yearn for a normal life in the community. Without suggesting that I would pre-judge such matters, future contraventions by you will almost inevitably lead to charges and the likelihood of longer and longer terms of imprisonment. I remind you again, as I did when I sentenced you on 31 January 2020, that the maximum penalty for contravening a condition of a SO is five years’ imprisonment. You would do well to remember that fact.
Sentence
SS, for the nine charges of contravening a condition of a SO of which you have been found guilty, I sentence you to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 5 months.
On the two charges of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail, you are convicted and fined an aggregate sum of $500.
I grant a stay of 4 months for the payment of the fine.
I declare a period of 112 days up to and including yesterday, 7 January 2021, as being a period already served under this sentence. I direct that the fact of the making of that declaration and its details be noted in the records of the Court.
I indicate pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 that, but for your plea of guilty on the rolled-up contravention charge, I would have sentenced you on all of the contravention charges to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 6 months.
---
3