Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v AR (a pseudonym)
[2025] VSC 362
•20 June 2025
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2025 0049
| IN THE MATTER of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 | ||
| and | ||
| IN THE MATTER of an application under s 46 of the Act for an Interim Supervision Order | ||
| and | ||
| BETWEEN | ||
| SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY SAFETY | Applicant | |
| and | ||
| AR (A PSEUDONYM) | Respondent | |
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JUDGE: | KAYE JA |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 20 June 2025 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 20 June 2025 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety v AR (a pseudonym) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSC 362 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Serious violent offender – Application for interim supervision order – Application for supervision order pending – Application unopposed by respondent – Whether documents in support would, if proved, justify the granting of supervision order – Whether in public interest to make order – Historical pattern of violent behaviour – Propensity to use weapons – Limited insight into offending – Respondent high risk of committing serious violence offence – Making of interim supervision order justified – Non-publication order – Serious Offenders Act 2018, ss 8, 13, 27, 31, 46, 47, 279.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Ms G. Coghlan KC | Minter Ellison |
| For the Respondent | Mr C Tom | Victoria Legal Aid |
HIS HONOUR:
The applicant, the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety, has applied for an interim supervision order (‘ISO’) pursuant to s 46 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (‘the Act’) against the respondent, AR.[1] The application is not opposed, but the respondent has taken issue with one of the conditions, which the applicant seeks to be applied to the ISO. He has also applied for a non-publication order, as to his identity and location, under s 279 of the Act.
[1]Pseudonym
The respondent was sentenced, by King J of this Court, on 24 April 2013, to 14 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 11 years and 6 months, on one charge of intentionally causing serious injury and one charge of recklessly causing serious injury. Each of those offences is prescribed as a serious violent offence in Schedule 2 of the Act, and, accordingly, the respondent is an eligible offender for the purposes of s 8(1). The sentence is due to expire on 25 June 2025.
On 18 March 2025, the applicant, pursuant to s 13(1) of the Act, filed an application for a supervision order in respect of the respondent. On 8 April 2025, the respondent advised the applicant that he wished to obtain an independent expert report, which would not be completed until the expiration of his custodial sentence. As a result, the supervision order application will not be heard and determined before the respondent’s release from custody. Consequently, on 9 April 2025, the applicant filed an application for an ISO pursuant to s 46(1) of the Act.
The application is based on:
(a)the antecedents of the respondent;
(b)an assessment report by Dr Christina Kozar, consultant forensic psychologist, dated 29 November 2024;
(c)the material relied on by Dr Kozar in that report.
In support of the application, the applicant has filed a draft ISO containing a number of proposed conditions.
The index offence
The offences, for which the respondent was sentenced on 24 April 2013, were committed on 10 April 2012 against the respondent’s former partner, MC, and her daughter DK, who was then nine years of age. They were committed by the respondent in the presence of his two-year-old daughter.
The respondent had met MC in 2008. On various occasions between 2009 and 2011, he engaged in acts of violence against her while under the influence of alcohol, and also while experiencing gambling issues. During that period, MC would contact police on numerous occasions, as the respondent had become intoxicated, yelling at her, pulling her hair, slapping her, and acting inappropriately. In the course of those incidents, the respondent threatened to kill MC, their children, and himself.
On 31 October 2011, an intervention order was taken out against the respondent following an incident, which occurred two days previously, when the respondent, in an intoxicated state, verbally abused MC. Subsequently, on 9 December and 10 December 2011, the respondent breached the intervention order by attending where MC was, in an abusive and intoxicated condition.
On 10 April 2012, the respondent followed MC, who was then his ex-partner, her nine-year-old daughter, DK, and their two-year-old daughter, home from shops and into their home. An argument then ensued in the kitchen, when the respondent became frustrated with the nine-year-old DK, after she objected to comments that he made about her father. He grabbed DK by the arms and threw her into a cupboard. MC then stood in front of the child to protect her. The respondent became extremely angry, unlocked the child safety lock on the kitchen drawer, and withdrew a kitchen knife. He also picked up the detachable handle of a frypan, and struck MC on the top of the head several times. He punched her in the face, and smashed her face into the cupboard and tiled floor. DK attempted to protect her mother. In response, the respondent grabbed her hair, and the hair of MC, in one hand, and hit their heads on the tiled floor. The respondent then punched MC in the face. When she managed to stand up, the respondent stabbed her in the left thigh, which caused a serious laceration. He then stabbed her in the left wrist and above the left knee.
MC started to crawl towards the front door of the house to escape. When she reached the door handle, the respondent stopped her, and stabbed her in the back. Meanwhile, DK had taken a knife from the drawer, and she stabbed him in the back, to try to protect her mother. In response, the respondent held the girl by her right arm, and used a knife to slice her arm, from the elbow to the wrist.
In sentencing the respondent, King J assessed the respondent’s offending as being at the ‘high end’ of the two offences.[2] Her Honour concluded that the respondent was not remorseful, and that the respondent’s prospects of rehabilitation were ‘exceedingly poor’.[3]
[2]R v [AR] [2013] VSC 179, [30].
[3]Ibid [42].
Previous violent offending
The respondent has three separate previous convictions for violent offending. In each case, the victim was his then partner or girlfriend.
In July 1984, the respondent was sentenced, by the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Perth, on one charge of wilful murder. The victim of the offence was the respondent’s then wife, to whom he had been married for about four years. At the time of the offence, the respondent was separated from his wife. On the occasion of the offence, his wife had visited the respondent in the restaurant in Perth in which he was then working. The respondent and his wife started talking in the kitchen area. In the course of an argument, the respondent picked up a ‘meat chopper’ knife, and chased his wife down a hallway with it, while chopping at her with the knife. After she collapsed, he continued to attack her with the knife, while she lay on the ground. In doing so, he severed a number of fingers of her hand, and inflicted significant injuries, including gross head injuries, an enormous gaping wound to the back of her neck, and a large gaping wound across the back of her thigh. He then fled the scene.
At his trial, the respondent pleaded not guilty, relying on a defence of provocation, and a denial that he had intended to kill his wife. He was convicted, and a sentence of death was imposed on him. Subsequently, that sentence was commuted to a sentence of imprisonment for life by the Governor of Council. In August 1995, he was released on parole.
On 9 January 2001, the respondent was found guilty, in the Sale Magistrates’ Court, on one charge of unlawful assault, and fined $500 without conviction. The conviction concerned the conduct of the respondent in punching his ex-girlfriend in the face in anger.
On 8 September 2009, the respondent was sentenced by the Dandenong Magistrates’ Court to one month imprisonment, which was wholly suspended for 12 months, on one charge of recklessly causing injury, and one charge of unlawful assault.
That offending occurred in January 2009 against the respondent’s then partner, MC (who was then pregnant), and her daughter, DK (who was then six years of age). On that occasion, the respondent became angry with MC in the car after he picked her up from the shops. He stopped the car, punched her in the mouth and slapped her across the face. When DK tried to stop the respondent from assaulting her mother, the respondent hit her in the face. At the time of the offending, the respondent’s problems with alcohol had resurfaced, as well as his gambling issues. It was in that context that the assault occurred, and that other assaults also took place in the same period.
Report of Dr Christina Kozar
On 29 November 2024, Dr Kozar, a consultant forensic psychologist, conducted a lengthy, and very thorough, examination of the respondent for the purposes of assessing the risk factors attaching to future violent offending by him.
In the executive summary at the commencement of the report, Dr Kozar noted that the respondent demonstrates a significant number of risk factors relating to future violent offending, and that he constitutes a high risk of committing a schedule 2 violent offence if he is not subject to community supervision, with there being a particular risk of him recontacting his former de facto wife, MC, when in the community. For present purposes, it is not necessary to summarise the whole of Dr Kozar’s report, but it is necessary to set out, in a little detail, the salient aspects of it.
Dr Kozar noted that, during his present term of imprisonment, the respondent has participated in an alcohol abuse program, as well as criminogenic programs. The respondent presented as polite and motivated, but he also demonstrated a lack of empathy, and he did not take responsibility for his behaviour. Mr Whatley, a clinician who reported on the respondent’s participation in the program, had noted that the respondent demonstrated limited insight in relation to his motivation to commit the index offences. Significant distortions were evident in the respondent’s account of his offending. Mr Whatley had identified high risk situations, that include arguments, alcohol abuse, and responding angrily when feeling embarrassed or disrespected.
For the purposes of her report, Dr Kozar undertook a number of psychological tests. They include the following.
The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (‘PCL-R’), which is a standardised rating scale that measures traits of psychopathy, was administered to the respondent. The test recorded higher scores, that suggested an increased risk for re-offending, and, in particular, a high score on ‘Factor 1’ (particularly irresponsibility, failure to accept responsibility, lack of remorse, callousness/lack of empathy, and pathological lying).
Dr Kozar then administered the HCR-20 (Structured Professional Judgment: Historical-Clinical-Risk Management) test. In short, the results of that testing were as follows.
First, the respondent demonstrated a significant number of historical factors relating to violent offending, which included: a history of violence, as well as other antisocial activities; relationship problems; substance abuse; traumatic events; violent attitudes; and mental disorder.
Secondly, the clinical risk factors assessed for the respondent suggested there is definite evidence of recent problems with insight, and partial evidence of problems with instability.
Thirdly, for the test entitled ‘Risk Management Factors’, there is definite evidence in relation to the respondent’s future risk due to a lack of professional services and plans, problems with his living situation, problems with personal support, difficulties with stress or coping, and a lack of treatment compliance.
In conclusion in relation to the HCR-20 test, Dr Kozar found as follows:
The configuration of items on the HCR-20 indicates that [the respondent] currently poses a high risk of violent reoffending. This assessment is made particularly considering the significant number of historical risk factors and problems in relation to the likely difficulties [the respondent] will experience when released in the community in conjunction with limited prosocial personal supports and a lack of appropriate professional supports. This means that [the respondent] is considered to be at significantly higher risk (twice as likely) of committing further violence comparable to the average violent offender and would require a high level of supervision and resources to contain this particular risk.
The next test by Dr Kozar was the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment Guide (‘SARA’). That test is a set of structured professional guidelines, designed specifically for assessing the risk of spousal violence. The test identified that the critical items for the respondent, concerning that risk, are: having committed a serious assault; having used weapons; previous substance abuse; his minimisation of instances of family violence; exposure to family violence in his early years; and his violation of a no-contact order.
In conclusion, Dr Kozar expressed the clinical opinion that the respondent, overall, poses a high risk of violent re-offending, as well as a high risk of committing a serious violent offence. Dr Kozar considered that that conclusion derives from the limited protective factors that are relevant to re-offending. Other risk factors include: the respondent’s history of severe violence; his pro-violence attitudes; his minimisation of his use of violence; his highly problematic substance use; his previous disregard for conditions of an intervention order; and a lack of meaningful prosocial supports for the respondent in the community. Dr Kozar stated:
In particular, there is a high risk that he will be in contact with his former partner and commit serious violence, particularly due to a propensity to use weapons and if he re-engages in alcohol abuse and gambling. Any prospective partner is also at high risk of [the respondent] engaging in serious violence within this context.
Dr Kozar thus considered that the risk of the respondent engaging in further severe violence is high, as he is likely to revert to alcohol and gambling to regulate his emotional experiences, and he will continue to feel victimised by others, and to hold strong beliefs justifying the use of violence to punish and control others, and have a propensity to use weapons.
Legislative provisions
As I have noted, the respondent is defined as an ‘eligible offender’ for the purposes of s 8(1) of the Act.
Section 13 of the Act provides that the applicant may apply to the court for a supervision order in respect of an eligible offender. Section 14(1)(b) provides that the court may make a supervision order in respect of an eligible offender if the court is satisfied that that offender poses, or after release from custody will pose, an unacceptable risk of committing (inter alia) a serious violence offence if the supervision order is not made and the offender is in the community.
Section 46(1) provides that the applicant may apply to the court for an ISO in respect of an eligible offender who is the subject of an application under s 13 for a supervision order.
Section 47(1) specifies the preconditions for the making of an ISO in the following terms:
(1)On an application under section 46, the court may make an interim supervision order in respect of an eligible offender if—
(a)the court is satisfied that—
(i)an application under section 13 or 22 in respect of the offender has been commenced but not determined; and
(ii)either—
(A)the offender is no longer, or will not be, remanded in custody or serving a custodial sentence when the application under section 13 is determined; or
(B)the previous supervision order has expired or will have expired before the application under section 22 is determined; and
(b)it appears to the court that the documents in support of the application under section 13 or 22 would, if proved, justify the making or renewal of a supervision order; and
(c)the court is satisfied that it is in the public interest to make an interim supervision order.
The application for an Interim Supervision Order
In the present case, as I have noted, the respondent does not oppose the application for an ISO. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that it is appropriate that such an order be made at this point. In essence, I am persuaded that each of the three preconditions, prescribed by s 47(1) of the Act, are satisfied.
In respect of the first condition, the applicant has made an application under s 13 for a supervision order, and it is apparent that the respondent’s custodial sentence will have been completed before that application may be heard and determined.
The second condition, specified by s 47(1)(b), requires the court to be satisfied that the documents in support of the application for a supervision order would, if proved, justify the making of a supervision order.
On the substantive application for a supervision order, the applicant will need to persuade the Court that the respondent would, after his release from custody, pose an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if a supervision order is not made.[4] The resolution of that issue will involve an assessment of the degree of likelihood of the respondent offending, and the seriousness of the consequences if that risk should eventuate, in the absence of a supervision order being imposed in respect of him.[5] The evaluative task in determining that question necessarily involves a balancing of the nature of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence against the fundamental value, which society accords to individual liberty.[6]
[4]Section 14(1)(b) of the Act.
[5]Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2013) 41 VR 360, 363 [6], 391 [117] (Redlich, Osborn and Priest JJA).
[6]Ibid, 387 [103], 390 [113].
On the present application, for an ISO, the applicant does not need to demonstrate that the respondent poses, or would pose, an ‘unacceptable risk’ of committing a serious violence offence. Rather, the Court is required to be satisfied that the supporting documents, if proved, would justify the making of a supervision order, taking into account the applicable test.
In the present case, Dr Kozar has assessed that the respondent poses a high risk of committing a serious violence offence if a supervision order is not made. Dr Kozar has expressed the view that that risk is, in particular, likely to arise in a situation in which the respondent, reverting to alcohol use, seeks out his previous partner, or seeks an intimate relationship with another female. As Dr Kozar has stated, there is a significant risk that the respondent would resort to the pattern of behaviour in which he previously engaged in his relationships, and in which he readily resorted to the use of violence, including using weapons, in circumstances in which he comes into conflict with a partner in a relationship. The views expressed by Dr Kozar, if accepted, would clearly justify the making of a supervision order in the present case.
The third precondition for the making of an ISO is that prescribed by s 47(1)(c) of the Act, namely, that it is in the public interest that such an order be made. The public interest test, referred to in s 47(1)(c) of the Act, is informed, in part, by the primary purpose of the Act defined in s 1(a), namely, to provide for the enhanced protection of the community by requiring that offenders, who have served custodial sentences for certain serious sex offences or certain serious violence offences, and who present an unacceptable risk to the community, be subject to ongoing detention or supervision.
For the reasons that I have just explained, it is in the public interest that an ISO be made, in order to ensure the safety and protection of the community, pending the hearing and determination of the substantive supervision order application.
Conditions on Interim Supervision Order
In addition to the core conditions, prescribed by s 31 of the Act, the applicant has also sought that the ISO contain 12 additional conditions, pursuant to ss 34, 35, 38 and 50 of the Act. With the exception of one condition, the respondent does not oppose the imposition of those conditions.
Section 27 of the Act prescribes the purposes of conditions of a supervision order in the following terms:
Purposes of conditions of supervision order
(1)The primary purpose of the conditions of a supervision order is to reduce the risk of the offender re-offending by committing a serious sex offence or a serious violence offence or both or an offence referred to in Schedule 3.
(2)The secondary purpose of the conditions of a supervision order is to provide for the reasonable concerns of the victim or victims of the offender in relation to their own safety and welfare.
(3)In order to reduce the risk of the offender re‑offending, the conditions may—
(a)promote the rehabilitation and treatment of the offender; and
(b)address types of behaviour that may increase the risk of the offender—
(i)committing a serious sex offence or a serious violence offence or both or an offence referred to in Schedule 3; or
(ii)engaging in any behaviour or conduct that threatens the safety of any person (including the offender).
(4)The court must ensure that any conditions of a supervision order (other than the core conditions)—
(a)constitute the minimum interference with the offender's liberty, privacy or freedom of movement that is necessary in the circumstances to ensure the purposes of the conditions; and
(b)are reasonably related to the gravity of the risk of the offender re-offending.
In a comprehensive outline of submissions, the applicant has provided an explanation of the reason for each of the additional conditions sought. Based on the matters relied on by the applicant, I am satisfied that each of the conditions are important and necessary to reduce the risk of the respondent committing a serious violence offence. Further, some of the conditions — in particular, that relating to the privacy of the victims — are necessary to provide for the reasonable concerns of those victims in relation to their safety and welfare.
The first condition (condition 5.1) provides that the respondent is to be required to reside, each night, at a particular residence, which, for the purposes of these reasons, I shall refer to as the ‘LD residence’.
That residence is a privately owned supported residential service, which is staffed 24 hours per day, seven days each week. The residence provides supported accommodation for complex individuals with disability and support needs, and is only occupied by adult males. It has been assessed, by Corrections Victoria and an Environmental Scan dated 19 May 2025, as suitable for the respondent, taking into account his risk of re-offending and available risk mitigation strategies, and on the basis that the respondent will be subject to other conditions, which I shall discuss, concerning his electronic monitoring, curfew and accompaniment.
In view of the assessment by Dr Kozar, of the high risk that the applicant might commit a serious violence offence if he is not adequately supported and supervised, the condition is appropriate. It is also appropriate that it be expressed in terms that the respondent reside at the LD residence or where otherwise directed by the Post Sentence Authority, in order that that Authority may be able to adequately respond to any changes in the respondent’s circumstances.
The second condition (condition 5.2) is that the respondent must not leave, or be absent from, the residence, except in the company of a person approved by the general manager of Community Correctional Services, or unless otherwise directed by the Post Sentence Authority.
The third condition (condition 5.3) requires that the respondent be present at the LD residence between 10:00 pm and 6:00 am, unless otherwise directed by the Post Sentence Authority.
Those conditions are each prerequisites to the respondent’s residence at the LD residence. They are necessary, in view of the assessment by Dr Kozar, that the respondent poses a high risk of committing a serious violence offence. I am satisfied that the proposed conditions, with respect to accompaniment and curfew, are necessary to provide a close level of supervision and support, again to ensure that quick interventions may be applied in any circumstances, which might precipitate the kind of dangerous conduct in which the respondent has previously engaged in the community.
The fourth condition (condition 5.4) is that the respondent attend for treatment or rehabilitation programs or activities, and participate in such programs or activities as instructed by a supervision officer.
That condition will assist the respondent to address both offence-specific (violent offending) and offence-related (such as substance abuse) treatments needs. In that respect, Dr Kozar has expressed the view that the respondent has so far only had a limited response to treatment, and that it is necessary that he undergo appropriate treatment, and develop the requisite functional skills and strategies, in order to reduce his risk of re-offending.
The fifth proposed condition (condition 5.5) is that the respondent must not consume alcohol, except in accordance with written directions of the Post Sentence Authority.
The sixth proposed condition (condition 5.6) is that the respondent must submit to breath testing, urinalysis or other test procedures approved by the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Police, as the case may be, for the detection of alcohol, at the direction of an officer or police officer who has reasonable grounds to suspect that he has breached condition 5.5 of the draft order.
Condition 5.5 is necessary, in view of the respondent’s extensive past history of alcohol use and abuse. In the lead-up to the index offence, and also to the violent offending, for which the respondent was sentenced in September 2009, he was under the influence of alcohol. Dr Kozar has expressed the view that excessive alcohol use is a factor that might increase the respondent’s risk of re-offending, with alcohol and intoxication being particularly likely to act as a disinhibiting factor.
Condition 5.6 is necessary to enable the detection of any contravention, by the respondent, of condition 5.5, and to ensure appropriate management and intervention, should the respondent engage in alcohol consumption.
The seventh proposed condition (condition 5.7) provides that the respondent not engage in any form of gambling, except in accordance with the written directions of the Post Sentence Authority.
That condition addresses the concern, by Dr Kozar, that the respondent’s gambling is as problematic as before the index offending. As Dr Kozar noted, the index offending occurred within a context of both significant alcohol abuse, and gambling, and in circumstances in which he had limited contact with his daughter, due to an intervention order. Dr Kozar identified the respondent’s gambling and alcohol use as dysfunctional strategies he had engaged in, in an attempt to regulate his negative emotional states. Based on those considerations, I am satisfied that the respondent’s propensity to gamble should be monitored and restricted, in order to reduce the risk that he might relapse into addictive behaviours.
The eighth proposed condition (condition 5.8) prohibits the respondent from knowingly having contact with victims of his previous violent offending and their families, except for contact in accordance with the written directions of the Post Sentence Authority.
I am satisfied that that condition is consistent with s 27(2) of the Act, and is appropriate and important, in order to provide for the reasonable concerns of the victims of the respondent’s offending in relation to their own safety and welfare.
The ninth proposed condition (condition 5.9) is that the respondent be subject to monitoring of his whereabouts (including electronic monitoring) at all times, and that he be subject to electronic alcohol monitoring, unless otherwise directed by the Post Sentence Authority. Specifically, the applicant initially sought two forms of monitoring, namely:
(a)monitoring, including electronic monitoring, as to his whereabouts;
(b)electronic alcohol monitoring.
The respondent does not resist the application of the first kind of monitoring. I accept that that monitoring is necessary, in order to ensure the respondent’s compliance with residence and curfew conditions, and, in particular, to ensure that he will not be in contact with his former partner.
The second condition, in its original form, was opposed. The applicant sought it because of the respondent’s significant history of alcohol abuse, which has been a relevant feature of his previous offending. The monitoring would require the respondent to wear ankle bracelets on both legs. It, thus, would constitute a quite significant imposition on his freedom and privacy. As counsel for the respondent pointed out, the respondent will be subject to a number of other additional conditions, that are directed to protect against the risk of him consuming alcohol.
In response, the applicant has accepted that the requirement for electronic alcohol monitoring should only be imposed for circumstances in which the respondent is not residing at a supported residential service (such as LD residence).
I consider that that qualification to the proposed conditions is appropriate. As counsel for the respondent has pointed out, the respondent will be subject to a suite of additional conditions that should sufficiently protect against the risk of him consuming alcohol, and thus, against the risk of him perpetrating a serious violence offence under the influence of alcohol, while he is in residence at LD residence or other comparable accommodation.
The tenth proposed condition (condition 5.10) requires the respondent to comply with the directions of the Post Sentence Authority to produce electronic devices, and, in particular, any computer and his mobile telephone, for auditing, upon request of a supervision officer, a specified officer or police officer.
I am satisfied that that condition is necessary to limit the respondent’s ability to use technological devices to engage in behaviour, which may increase his risk of re-offending, and also which may contravene the conditions of the ISO, such as contact with his victims and gambling.
The eleventh proposed condition (condition 5.11) prohibits the respondent from contravening the Control of Weapons Act 1990 (Vic). Condition 5.12 precludes the respondent from obtaining, possessing, carrying or using any knife, except for the purposes of preparing, cooking and eating food, or in accordance with the written directions of the Post Sentence Authority.
Clearly, those conditions are important in the context of the present case. The respondent’s previous offending involved the use of knives. Dr Kozar considers that there is a high risk that the respondent will seek to be in contact with his former partner upon his release, and there is, thus, a risk that he will commit a serious violence offence, particularly due to his propensity to use weapons in doing so. Dr Kozar notes that the respondent continues to hold strong beliefs, justifying the use of violence to punish and control others, and that he has a propensity to use weapons for that purpose.
Based on those considerations, I consider that proposed conditions 5.11 and 5.12 are necessary.
Finally, condition 6.1 of the proposed draft order seeks to empower the Post Sentence Authority to give the respondent directions, relating to the operation of any condition of the order.
That condition is an important means of ensuring that the Authority is able to attend to the day-to-day management of offenders, subject to its supervision, and to tailor the operation of the conditions in a way that constitutes the minimum interference with the respondent’s liberty and privacy.
For the above reasons, I am, therefore, satisfied that the conditions, sought to be relied on by the applicant, are necessary, and will constitute conditions of the ISO.
Non-publication
Finally, the respondent applies for a non-publication order, pursuant to s 279 of the Act, in order to prevent the identification of his identity and location.
Section 279 of the Act provides that the Court may make such an order, if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. Section 280 sets out a number of matters, to which the Court should have regard when making an order under s 279.
In support of the application, the respondent relies on the following matters.
First, in her report, Dr Kozar expressed the view that factors, which might increase the respondent’s risk of violent re-offending, include situations which might trigger feelings of inadequacy, feeling disrespected or rejected, or that he might lose control in relationships.
Secondly, it is submitted that it is imperative, for the ongoing protection of the community, as well as the respondent’s rights, that he is able to reside in therapeutic supported accommodation, which might be jeopardised if the identity of his accommodation were published.
Thirdly, conversely, it is submitted there would be no benefit to the protection of the community if his identity or accommodation were published, as the respondent is required to be accompanied when present in the community.
Fourthly, and allied to that consideration, it is submitted that the protection of the victims, and of the community in general, is best achieved by the successful rehabilitation of the respondent, which might be compromised, should his identity or the accommodation be publicly identified.
In the circumstances of the case, I consider that the matters relied on by the respondent do justify a non-publication order, in order to prevent the identification of his identity and the location at which he will reside. The requirement, that the respondent be accompanied at all times in which he is not present in the supported accommodation sufficiently protects the community, and the publication of his identity is not necessary for that purpose. On the other hand, I am persuaded that the publication of the respondent’s identity or his location might adversely affect his rehabilitation and thus compound the risks which the ISO is designed to address.
Accordingly, I shall make an order, pursuant to s 279 of the Act, that any information that might enable the respondent or his location to be identified not be published until the application for a supervision order is heard and determined, or further order of the court.
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