SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS and BENJAMIN KESSIE
[2009] AATA 610
•18 August 2009
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2009] AATA 610
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No 2007/3498
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS First Applicant
Re SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS Second Applicant
And
BENJAMIN KESSIE
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member M D Allen Date18 August 2009
PlaceSydney
Decision The decision under review is set aside and this matter is remitted to the Applicants with the direction that the decision of the authorised review officer of 17 August 2006 is restored. ....................[sgd]..........................
M D Allen
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY: Respondent did not declare his ownership of a dwelling house and the receipt of rents from tenants of that dwelling to Centrelink - Upon overpayment of benefits being raised Respondent claimed he held the property as trustee under a resulting trust for his sister and brother-in-law - credit of Respondent impugned - majority decision of Social Security Appeals Tribunal set aside.
LEGISLATION
Social Security Act 1991: s 8, 1068, 1223, 1237AAD
CASE LAW
Sivritas v Sivritas [2008] VSC 374
American Leadership College v Cole [2003] NSWSC 295
Black Uhlans Incorporated v New South Wales Crime Commission & Ors [2002] NSWSC 1060
OTHER
Jacobs’s Law of Trusts 7th ed. (2006)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member M D Allen 1. By application made the 23rd day of August 2007, the Secretary of the then Department of Workplace Relations sought review of a majority decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) setting aside a prior determination that held that the Respondent had been overpaid Newstart allowance, Parenting Payment and Disability Support Pension in this sum of $26,055.82.
2. As a result of administrative restructuring following the 2007 election, the present Applicants were substituted for the original Applicant in order to correctly reflect departmental responsibilities.
3. The issue in this matter arose as the Respondent at no time revealed to Centrelink, the agency administering to respective social security benefits that he was obtaining, that he was the registered owner of an estate in fee simple situated at 9 Hughes Avenue Richmond NSW and that he was receiving rent monies from the letting of the dwelling house situated on the said premises.
4. Both before the SSAT and before this Tribunal, the Respondent maintained that although the title of the property was in his name, the purchase monies had been provided by his late sister and then brother in law and that he held the property on their behalf.
5. In a well reasoned and perceptive decision, the Presiding Member of the SSAT rejected the now Respondent’s claim and it was doubtless the reasoning in that decision that caused the now Applicants to seek review of the decision that was in fact made by the SSAT.
6. If, as claimed, the Respondent held the estate on behalf of his sister and brother-in-law, with them having provided the purchase monies, then a resulting trust existed.
7. In Jacob’s Law of Trusts in Australia 7th edition (2006), the learned authors state at paragraph 1210:
“A resulting trust will be presumed where on a purchase, the legal title to the real or personal property is vested in someone other than the person who is proved (by parol or other evidence) to have provided the purchase money.”
8. In Black Uhlans Incorporated v New South Wales Crime Commission & Ors [2002] NSWSC 1060 at paragraph 133, Campbell J, after stating that a presumption of a resulting trust arises where one person provides the purchase price of property which is conveyed into the name of another person, quotes Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, revised 2nd edition 1991 at page 249, namely:
“This resulting trust depends for its existence on the actual intent of the creator, expressed in acts other than writing or the spoken word. The conduct of the payor with reference to the price and deed lead the court to infer an intent to have a trust for himself…resulting trusts are “intent enforcing” just as much as are the usual express trusts.”
9. Jacob’s supra at paragraph 1213 states:
“ The presumption in favour of a resulting trust in the case of a voluntary transfer of realty or a transfer to a person other than the purchaser…may be rebutted.
In order to ascertain the true intention of the person who has paid the purchase money...[e]vidence of acts and declarations of the parties before or at the time of the purchase or so immediately after it as to constitute a part of the transaction will be admissible either for or against the actor or declarant. But for subsequent acts and declarations this is not so…
Hence the relevant intention is the intention at the time of acquisitional purchase.”
10. What is known is that the Respondent purchased the property at 9 Hughes Avenue Richmond on the 3rd of July 1998. At the time of purchase he made an application for a first home owners grant and of relief from stamp duty paid on the conveyance
11. Considerable doubt exists as to the instructions given to the solicitor acting for him on the conveyance. Although the Respondent said in evidence that it was the solicitor who advised him to purchase the property in his name as his sister, Comfort, and brother-in-law, Adjei, were not Australian citizens, no evidence was received from that solicitor.
12. Exhibit A6 in this proceedings is an affidavit by the solicitor having carriage of the matter for the Applicants. Annexure A to that affidavit is an unsigned statement by the solicitor who acted for the Respondent upon the purchase of the property, one Kevin Seggie. This statement was served on the Applicant (and the Tribunal) by the Respondents solicitors. Seggie was not called by the Respondent and I therefore conclude that he could not give any evidence which would have advanced the Respondent’s case.
13. In evaluating the Respondents evidence and the material said to eminate from his sister and brother-in-law, I find that they are people whose past conduct has diminished their credit.
14. The Respondent arrived in Australia on 20 December 1984 on a tourist visa. He had left behind in Ghana a wife and four children. As he admits, shortly after arriving in Australia, he went to Flemington Markets and obtained employment on a farm. This employment was, of course, in direct violation of the conditions of his tourist visa.
15. In 1988 he left that farm obtained a job in a factory. He also rented a flat with his sister and brother-in-law. In 1992 he was granted a permanent residence visa apparently on the basis of being in de facto relationship with an Australian resident.
16. The Respondents brother-in-law arrived in Australia in the mid-eighties and his sister in 1988. Both applied for permanent residency on the basis that they were in de facto relationships with Australian residents. These applications were refused as the claims were false and they left Australia, Adjei in July 1993 and Comfort in August 1993.
17. Although both Comfort and Adjei worked in Australia, the Respondent told the SSAT they did not have working visas.
18. The Respondent was overpaid newstart allowance in 2000. He had been paid Newstart allowance whilst studying at the University of Western Sydney but did not declare income he obtained from working at weekends. He claimed that other students had told him he did not have to declare income obtained from working at weekends. I put this claim as being in the same class as his assertions of not properly understanding English.
19. The Respondent was a school teacher in Ghana, whose official language is English. More relevantly, however, he has undertaken tertiary studies in Australia and holds a Masters degree. This is not consistent with a person equipped with only a core working knowledge of the English language. Furthermore, the Respondent apparently took no steps to check with Centrelink regarding the status of income received from weekend work.
20. There were many inconsistencies in the Respondents evidence and these were dealt with in detail in the Applicants submission, which I accept. Suffice it to say having heard and seen the Respondent give evidence and be cross-examined, I was left with the distinct impression that the Respondent is incapable of telling the truth.
21. Examples of his unsatisfactory evidence include:
(i)When applying for finance to purchase a Toyota motor vehicle, the Respondent claimed that he had been employed by Eze Clenz Services Pty Ltd for the previous 18 months and was earning an average of $2,500.00 per month. This was false.
(ii)At the hearing, the Respondent claimed that he signed the loan agreement with these details unwittingly as he had not read the document prior to signing. Given his level of education and the fact that he was signing a finance agreement for $33,651.69, I reject his evidence that he was unaware of the contents of the said document.
(iii)In his statement, being Exhibit R2, the Respondent said in paragraph 39, inter alia:
“…in June 2005 I applied for another loan from ANZ for $5,125-00 which I wanted in order to bring my daughter back from Ghana.”
(iv)Cross-examined, the following passages occur:
“Q – So the only loan is June 2005?
A – Yes
Q – And you say “to bring my daughter back from Ghana”?
A – Yes
Q – Well when you say the purpose of the loan was to bring your daughter back from Ghana…
A – Not back, the girl had never been here
Q – Another one?
A – That’s right, I told you I had two girls. The young one is here and then the elder one – the one here is after the one in Ghana
Q – Right, Ya, Sebwah
A – Yes
Q – So when you say bring the daughter back from Ghana
A – Not back
Q – You were meaning bringing Yaya to Australia from Ghana
A – Yes, from Ghana
Q (by Tribunal) – But you said that she hadn’t been here before
A – No, I say I am here
Q – Yes, but she hadn’t been here before?
A – She hadn’t been here, she had never been here
Q (Ms.Eastman) – This is in the letter Mr Kessie see, this is what I am trying to explore with you Mr Kessie the letter says”
“ Dad you say I must come back but I will not come there again.”
You are saying she has never been here?
A – Yes, never been here, never never been here.”
22. Given the deliberate flouting of their visa conditions and the lies told by Comfort and Adjei in attempting to gain residency, I do not regard the Respondent’s sister and brother-in-law as witnesses of credit. In addition, following cross-examination, I have considerable doubt as to the genuineness of the Respondents own alleged de facto relationship.
The source of the purchase monies
23. The Respondent said that the purchase monies for the property at Richmond came primarily from monies deposited into his care by Comfort and Adjei when they departed Australia. Some $17,000.00 was provided by the brother of Adjei, one Felix Boakye Yiadom. In Exhibit R2 the Respondent said:
“… As Comfort and Adjei expected to return they did not sell their belongings but left them with me…
16. Before they left Australia Comfort and Adjei had been planning to buy a house to live in. Comfort wanted a four bedroom brick home as she wanted to bring out her three children and her mother…Comfort asked me to keep looking for a suitable property around the Parramatta / Auburn – Lidcombe / Harris Park area which they could buy and come back to live in.”
24. At paragraph 17 of Exhibit R2, the Respondent said:
“ Comfort and Adjei left me with $125,000.00 in cash to buy a property…it was about $45,000.00 in US currency. The remainder was in Australian currency.”
25. The evidence regarding just how much money was left to the Respondent and in what denominations was totally inconsistent.
26. The Respondent was uncertain when he was given the money. He said two or three weeks, then he said it was about three days before Adjei left. It is known that Adjei departed Australia in July 1993. If the funds were handed over in July or before then, the Respondents evidence is inconsistent with a document, which is at T4 page 89 of the documents prepared for the Tribunal pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, which is headed “Temporally [sic] Receipt” which reads, inter alia:
“This is to declare that we the undersigned
(1) Samsom Kwaki Adjei
SK Adjei
(2) Comfort Mensah
Have today August 6 1993 left the sum of A$95,000 with Mr Benjamin Kessie…”
Questioned as to the source of the money, the Respondent said:
“ I don’t know when they removed that money from the bank.”
27. Mr Yiadom originally denied that the money had come from a bank but then qualified that by saying he was not aware.
28. In a letter written by the Respondents brother-in-law and bearing the date January 11 2006, he said:
“For the confidence and trust we had and still have in him, we just went to the Bank and took out all the money we did not want to bring home with us, and I entrusted it to Ben’s care.”
29. The Respondent said that the money was handed over at a meeting and that Adjei, Comfort and he counted the money. He did not mention the presence of Mr Yiadom. Mr Yiadom, on the other hand, said that he was at the meeting and he counted the money which was in notes of $50 and $100 denominations. The Respondent said the notes were in $100 denominations.
30. Before the SSAT, the Respondent did not give evidence that any part of the $125,000.00 comprised $45,000.00 USD from Adjei’s earnings in Libya during the 1980’s. The SSAT in its reasons for decision stated that the $125,000.00 was money that “had not been declared as earnings as Comfort and Adjei did not have working visas.”
31. The Respondent said that after changing $45,000.00 USD together with the sum of $90,000.00 AUD, the total was $125,000.00. He said that he changed the American dollars at American Express over a three month period. He had no records to prove that he had changed the money and could not remember the amounts changed on each occasion. In cross-examination, the Respondent seemed to suggest that some of the money may have been changed at the Commonwealth Bank then later changed his evidence that he transferred $45,000.00 USD, claiming to have changed only $30,000.00 USD.
32. In the period July – August 1993 the American dollar was worth more than the Australian dollar and the average rate of exchange during that period was that the Australian dollar bought $0.6804 United States dollars. On that exchange rate, $45,000.00 USD would have realised up in the order of $66,137.57 AUD. This combined with $90,000.00 AUD is, of course, far more than $125,000.00 the Respondent said he got from his sister and brother-in-law.
33. The Respondent explained this discrepancy by stating that the sum exchanged was in fact $30,000.00 USD, because he transferred $15,000.00 USD to Adjei in Amsterdam. The Respondents evidence regarding the transfer of this money was extremely vague. As pointed out by the Applicants in submissions, there was no reference by the Respondent when before the SSAT or in his statement, Exhibit R2, to having transferred $15,000.00 USD to Adjei in Amsterdam. The Respondent could not recall when he sent the money – he said some time in 1993, 1994 or 1995. The Respondent also changed his evidence with respect to Adjei leaving Australia for Ghana. He said Adjei had left Australia and travelled to Amsterdam. He claimed to have sent $15,000.00 USD in cash in a parcel. Mr Yiadom said he was aware $15,000.00 USD had been sent to his brother but he could not say when the money was sent.
34. When one looks at the transcript of proceedings at pages 70 and 71, the Respondent seems to be totally confused as to whether he sent the $15,000.00 USD to his brother-in-law in Ghana or to Amsterdam.
35. Mr Yiadom does not assist the Respondent. Having confidently said $90,000.00 AUD was handed to him and the Respondent, he then changed his evidence when he was asked whether he had received any letters from his brother confirming how much money had been left. He then said it was $95,000.00. Later, he appeared to revert to the figure $90,000.00 AUD.
36. Mr Yiadom gave highly inconsistent evidence about how the sum of $125,000.00 AUD was made up. He originally said that it comprised $90,000.00 AUD plus $35,000.00 AUD, being the Australian dollar value of the $30,000.00 USD or $40,000.00 USD that was exchanged. This is inconsistent with the exchange rate for the Australian dollar as opposed to the American dollar at the time.
37. In Exhibit R2, the Respondent said that Comfort and Adjei left him with $125,000.00 AUD in cash, part of that being $45,000.00 USD. Although in evidence the Respondent said that when he was handed the money there was $90,000.00 AUD, the hand written document entitled “Temporally [sic] Receipt”, which is dated 12 September 1993, alleged to have been written by Adjei in Ghana, but also signed by the Respondent and Mr Yiadom, Adjei says the sum of $95,000.00 AUD was received by the Respondent and Mr Yiadom jointly on 6 August 1993.
38. This document is quite puzzling. If genuine, the money was given to the Respondent and Mr Yiadom after Adjei had left Australia in July 1993. It is also inconsistent with a statutory declaration from Adjei, dated June 2006, which declared that issuing receipts was not customary in Ghana. I note that in the document no mention is made of any American currency. All in all I am not satisfied as to the genuineness of this particular document.
39. The Respondent tried to explain the discrepancy between $90,000.00 AUD and $95,000.00 AUD. When shown the document at T4 page 89 he said that he had sent $5,000.00 AUD to his sister Comfort in Ghana. That would have been in 1995 he further said. This is the first time the mention of a transfer of $5,000.00 AUD to Comfort had been made. As pointed out by the Applicant’s counsel, it is implausible that the Respondent posted $5,000.00 AUD to Ghana when earlier evidence was that Ghanaian banks would not accept Australian dollars. At transcript, page 78, the following exchange occurred:
“Q - I gathered from what you were saying earlier, though, that you said you kept American currency with you because you were sending American currency to Ghana
A – Yes to the husband
Q – So American to the husband?
A – Yes
Q – But it didn’t matter sending Australian to the wife?
A – But at that time I think they – no, the wife - was going to use this currency in South Africa…”
Evidence of Intention
40. As pointed out in American Leadership College v Cole [2003] NSWSC 295:
“In cases where it is relevant to prove a persons intention, proof of what the person said is useful…But this is so of contemporary statements, that is, statements made at or about the time of the acts to which the intention is relevant. Statements made today by a person about his or her intentions in relation to the person’s acts of more than 20 years ago are of no evidentiary value when the statements are made in furtherance of the person’s attempt to show the past events in a light that would be advantageous to him or her today. I therefore attach minimal weight to the statements of Dr Coll and the defendant and proceed to examine the evidence of contemporary facts that are indicative of the intentions of the transferees of the Elizabeth Bay unit at the time of the acquisition in 1975/6.” (citations omitted)
Cf. the passage at paragraph 1213 of Jacob’s cited above.
41. There is a dearth of evidence as to what the intentions of Comfort and Adjei were at the time it is alleged they handed the money to the Respondent.
42. In his statement, the Respondent says Comfort asked him to keep looking for suitable property around the Parramatta / Auburn / Lidcombe / Harris Park areas. By 1998 however it was, or should have been, clear that Comfort and Adjei would not be granted permission to return to Australia.
43. No evidence was adduced as to what was said at the time the money was alleged to have been handed over. Thus there is no contemporaneous evidence as to the type of house or how the purchase was to be affected. Mr Yiadom said in his oral evidence that the intention to buy a house was discussed at that time but gave no other details.
44. My Yiadom’s only involvement in the purchase of the property appears to be the provision of a small part of the purchase price. Although both Mr Yiadom and the Respondent stated that the transfer of the property and the balance proceeds of rental monies in the Westpac account occurred when the Respondent decided to return to Ghana, this occurred after Centrelink had been made aware of the Respondents ownership of the property.
45. Apparently, according to his evidence, although the Respondent was quite familiar with opening bank accounts, he elected to keep the money Comfort and Adjei gave him with him rather than in a bank.
46. By 1998, the applications by Comfort and Adjei to return to Australia had been refused for a second time. Yet it is only after this second rejection that the Respondent took steps to purchase a property. Although he says he told the real estate agent, Mr Thompson, and the solicitor, Mr Seggie, and his conveyancing clerk, Ms Berry, that he was purchasing the property for Comfort and Adjei, he did not disclose that their last attempt to obtain a visa had been denied.
47. Annexed to Exhibit R2 is a copy of a letter purporting to have been written by the Respondent to his sister and dated 16 September 2003. The first time this letter was produced was at this hearing. The Respondents explanation as to how he came into possession of the document was unconvincing and I find that it was contrived for the purposes of this hearing.
48. Other letters produced by the Respondent are also of doubtful provenance. For example, the letter said to be written by the Respondent’s brother-in-law and dated 16 September 1998 uses the expression “my husband and me”. I also consider that the Presiding Member of the SSAT was perceptive in noting that the authenticity of a letter dated 25 June 1998, purporting to be from the solicitor Mr Seggie, was highly questionable for the reasons she sets out.
49. In his oral evidence the estate agent Mr Thompson, said that the Respondents purchase of the property was for his sister. However later in cross-examination he said it was for the Respondent’s sister and brother-in-law. In his statement, Exhibit R5, Mr Thompson said that the Respondent said he was to:
“buy a house for his sister with her money so that she could live in it when she came back to Australia.”
He makes no reference either in his first statement or his second statement to the property being purchased for Adjei or jointly for Adjei and Comfort. He says nothing about Mr Yiadom’s involvement at the initial purchase stage.
50. At transcript page 187, the following exchange took place:
“Q – And you’ve said in the 2006 letter:
“He paid the rent he collected straight to his sister overseas”
A – Well, that’s what he told me
Q – That’s what he told you?
A – Yes
Q – That all of the rent money went overseas straight away?
A – That’s what he said
Q – And then you said in this letter:
“Eventually his sister came to Australia, but had the misfortune of having her application to stay declined.”
Do you remember putting that in your 2006 letter?
A – Yes, I do
Q – …What did you know about the sister coming to Australia, but having her application declined?
A – Well, Ben told me that
Q – And it was your understanding that this was after the purchase of the Hughes Street property?
A – Yes”
I consider from this passage of evidence that Mr Thompson is, whilst telling the truth to the best of his recollection, confused about the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the property by the Respondent.
51. Ms Berry, the solicitors clerk who actually handled the conveyance, gave evidence of this being a matter that occurred in 1998 and in relation to which she did not have access to her files. She did however say that she clearly remembered that she had a conversation with the Respondent about funds being brought in from overseas.
52. I have no reason not to accept Ms Berry’s evidence as to the conversation, but the only inference to be drawn from it is that the Respondent was dissembling as to the source of the purchase monies.
53. The Respondent claimed that he had never lived in the property at 9 Hughes Avenue, however on 18 April 2000 the solicitor acting for him on the purchase wrote to him at that address. The Respondent stated his sister wished him to live in the house. He declined, deciding to rent the property out. An account was opened at Westpac bank into which the rent monies were paid. At no time were these rental payments disclosed to Centrelink.
54. The Respondent claimed that Mr Yiadom was paid monies from the rental account to reimburse him in respect of a loan he had given to Adjei. The Respondent also admitted that the rental monies were later used for the purchase of a Toyota motor vehicle by him.
55. The Respondent claimed that he maintained receipt books for both the rent and for the business he conducted selling African costumes. The Respondent’s evidence about receipt books was not plausible. He had identical receipt books for the repairs to the property and for the sale of African costumes. He said to the Tribunal that he bought the books at the same time, even though receipts started to be recorded at different times not in chronological order. He then said he sent the original books to Ghana in 2005. The use of receipt books for family members appears to be at odds with the evidence of Mr Yiadom and statements by Adjei that it was not the tradition or the culture to keep receipts. I consider that the receipt books were concocted by the Respondent to assist his claim.
56. On 21 October 2005, the Richmond property was transferred to Mr Yiadom. Mr Yiadom denied paying any consideration for the transfer or indeed seeing the transfer form. This is at odds with the transfer form as it shows consideration of $295,000.00, which was the valuation obtained by the Respondents conveyancer.
57. Cross-examined, the Respondent had stated:
“ Anything that is for my sister is mine.”
And later said:
“ what is for my sister is for me.”
I am satisfied that these expressions correctly set out the Respondent’s mind set and the way in which the Respondent and his sister and brother-in-law regarded any monies that may have been left in Australia upon the departure of the sister and brother-in-law.
58. I am satisfied that as at 1998, when the property was purchased, the Respondent well knew that his sister and brother-in-law would not be given permission to re-enter Australia given the circumstances of their departure. He then proceeded to treat any monies which they had deposited into his care as his own.
59. In stating this, I do not for one moment accept that the amount of $125,000.00 AUD nominated by the Respondent was the correct amount, if any, he received from his sister and brother-in-law. I am satisfied that the Respondent had accumulated considerable sums himself both by working and from social security benefits.
60. In Sivritas v Sivritas [2008] VSC 374 at paragraphs 118-122, Kyrou J said:
“ 118. The onus of establishing the payment(s) giving rise to a presumption of resulting trust lies on the person who is asserting the existence of a resulting trust.
119. When a presumption of resulting trust arises, it performs a similar function to the civil onus of proof. A presumption of resulting trust can be rebutted by evidence of contrary intention. Where a presumption of resulting trust as equitable tenants in common arises following unequal contributions to a purchase price, that presumption can be rebutted by evidence of a shared intention or agreement to the contrary. The presumption can be rebutted by, among other things, evidence of intention to make a gift of the property.
120. The strength of any presumption of resulting trust will vary from case to case, as will the weight of evidence required to rebut the presumption.
121. A contrary intention can be expressed before or at the time of the transaction, or so immediately after the time of the transaction that it forms part of the transaction. Evidence of subsequent acts will only be admissible as admissions against interest.
122. A person’s intentions can be found or inferred from his or her contemporaneous words and conduct. From a consideration of a person’s words and conduct, certain inferences may be drawn, having regard to the surrounding circumstances and context in which they were uttered or performed.”
61. Here the Respondent has failed totally to satisfy me that a resulting trust arose upon the purchase by him of the property at 9 Hughes Avenue Richmond, consequently the decision under review is set aside and the decision of the authorised review officer is restored.
62. As I am satisfied that the Respondent in this matter wilfully omitted to provide information to Centrelink, no grounds exist to waive recovery of the amounts owing as an overpayment of social security benefits.
I certify that the 62 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member M D Allen
Signed: ..........................[sgd]......................................................
M.Corcoran, AssociateDates of Hearing 5 & 6 February, 17 July 2009
Date of Decision 18 August 2009
Counsel for the Applicant Ms K Eastman
Solicitor for the Applicant Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Respondent Mr J F Gormly
Solicitor for the Respondent Welfare Rights Centre
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