Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department & Bashir

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department & Bashir [2021] FamCAFC 137

Appeal from: Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney General's Department & Bashir & Anor [2020] FCCA 2041
Appeal number(s): EAA 123 of 2020
File number(s): SYC 2122 of 2019
Judgment of: STRICKLAND, ALDRIDGE & TREE JJ
Date of judgment: 30 July 2021
Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL – CHILD SUPPORT – Appeal from orders dismissing the appellant’s application under s 106A of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (“CSA Act”) – Where the primary judge held the Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the s 106A application because the first respondent was not a resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction – Where s 99(1) of the CSA Act confers jurisdiction on the Court to entertain a s 106A application – Whether the primary judge misconstrued the requirements to be met before making a declaration under s 106A – Error established – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal allowed and matter remitted for rehearing – Costs ordered in favour of the appellant in the sum claimed.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – NOTICE OF CONTENTION – Where the second respondent conceded appealable error but contended the primary orders should be upheld nonetheless – Whether s 99(1) of the CSA Act confers jurisdiction on the Court in relation to all “matters” in dispute between the parties under the CSA Act – Whether the word “matters” in s 99(1) of the CSA Act extends to all of the relevant justiciable controversy between the parties arising out of a common substratum of facts – Where the child support legislation clearly establishes and regulates the child support regime – No legislative intention to confer jurisdiction on the Court in relation to all matters in dispute under the CSA Act – Notice of Contention dismissed.

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44, 44AAA

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ss 23, 25, 29A, 29B, 30, 99(1), 100(1), 102A(1), 106A, 111

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth)

Pts VII, VIIA, VIII, ss 81, 90

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act ss 75, 76, 77

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 596A

Explanatory Memorandum, Child Support Legislation Amendment (Reform of the Child Support Scheme – New Formula and Other Measures) Bill 2006 (Cth)

Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, Child Support (Assessment) Bill 1989 (Cth)

Cases cited:

CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakeley (2016) 259 CLR 339; [2016] HCA 2

Child Support Registrar & Crowley and Anor (2015) FLC 98-066; [2015] FamCAFC 76

Child Support Registrar & Scullin and Anor (SSAT Appeal) (2015) FLC 98-068; [2015] FamCAFC 200

Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 [2016] FamCAFC 34

Nandi & Listberg [2011] FamCA 861

Division: Appeal Division
Number of paragraphs: 53
Date of last submissions: 18 June 2021
Date of hearing: 28 May 2021
Place: Heard in Sydney, delivered in Cairns
Counsel for the Appellant and First Respondent: Mr Kaplan with Ms Roberts
Solicitor for the Appellant and First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department & Bash... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] FamCAFC 137
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the Court involved the Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department, who was the appellant, and Ms Bashir, the first respondent. The appellant sought to appeal the dismissal of an application for a declaration under section 106A of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ("CSA Act"). The application was dismissed by the primary judge on the basis that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the application because the first respondent was not a resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction. The second respondent, Mr Norman, conceded that the appealable error was established but contended that the primary orders should be upheld nonetheless.

The central legal issue in the case was whether section 99(1) of the CSA Act conferred jurisdiction on the Court to entertain a section 106A application. Additionally, the Court had to determine whether the primary judge misconstrued the requirements to be met before making a declaration under section 106A. Furthermore, the Court had to examine whether section 99(1) of the CSA Act conferred jurisdiction on the Court in relation to all "matters" in dispute between the parties under the CSA Act.

The Court held that leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal should be allowed. The Court found that the primary judge misconstrued the requirements to be met before making a declaration under section 106A of the CSA Act. The Court held that section 99(1) of the CSA Act conferred jurisdiction on the Court to entertain a section 106A application. The Court held that the word "matters" in section 99(1) of the CSA Act did not extend to all of the relevant justiciable controversy between the parties arising out of a common substratum of facts. The Court held that there was no legislative intention to confer jurisdiction on the Court in relation to all matters in dispute under the CSA Act. The Court dismissed the second respondent's Notice of Contention and remitted the appellant’s Initiating Application filed 3 April 2019 for rehearing before a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia other than the primary judge. The Court ordered that the second respondent pay the appellant’s costs in the sum of $12,891.84.

Orders

Orders of the court

EAA 123 of 2020

SYC 2122 of 2019

APPEAL DIVISION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SECRETARY, COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

Appellant

AND:

MS BASHIR

First Respondent

MR NORMAN

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

STRICKLAND, ALDRIDGE & TREE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 JULY 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Leave to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The second respondent’s Notice of Contention filed 9 September 2020 be dismissed.

4. The orders made by the primary judge in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 July 2020 be set aside.

5. The appellant’s Initiating Application filed 3 April 2019 be remitted for rehearing before a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia other than the primary judge.

6. The second respondent pay the appellant’s costs in the sum of $12,891.84.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, leave to appeal should be granted, and the appeal should be allowed.BACKGROUND The primary judge in her reasons for judgment set out the relevant background to the matter and it is convenient for us to recite those reasons as background to the appeal:4.The first respondent was born in Country H in 1982, and is currently 38 years old. She is the holder of a green card entitling her to reside in the United States (USA) from 2013 until 2023.5.In 2012, the respondents met in City J, in the USA. At the time, the first respondent was engaged to another person.6.In 2012, the respondents engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse. The following morning, the first respondent took contraceptive pills, commonly known as the morning after pill.7.In 2012, the first respondent married her now ex-husband. Later that month, she discovered she was pregnant.8.[The child] was born in 2013. The first respondent’s ex-husband appears on the child’s birth certificate as the father.9.In November 2013, the first respondent notified the second respondent that he was the father of the child. The second respondent has maintained throughout these proceedings that the likelihood of pregnancy occurring in the circumstances of this matter is remote.10.On 21 October 2016, the first respondent and her ex-husband entered into an agreement on their divorce. The judgment in the divorce sets out the following: The parties mutually agree [the first respondent’s ex-husband] is not the biological father of [the child], the wife’s son born in 2013. [The first respondent’s ex-husband] represents and agrees that he has obtained two DNA tests comparing [the child’s] genetic markers to his own and both have conclusively confirmed his non-parentage. … [the first respondent] represents and agrees [the first respondent’s ex-husband] is not the father.” The divorce was finalised on 24 January 2017.11.In December 2016, the second respondent complains that the first respondent sought his former wife’s details from his brother.12.On 11 January 2017, the first respondent completed an Application for Child Support Assessment.13.On 20 November 2017, the Department of Human Services (DHS) received a Child Support Enforcement request from the Child Support Enforcement Division of the City J Department of Revenue dated 11 August 2017. That agency requested DHS to establish the parentage of [the child], and obtain and enforce the Orders for current and retrospective child support on behalf of the first respondent.14.On 26 April 2018, DHS refused the application on the basis there was no evidence to indicate the second respondent is the father of the child.15.On 4 May 2018, [the appellant] received a request from DHS to establish parentage of the child. The [appellant] sought legal advice. 16.On 13 June 2018, the first respondent was notified that her application for child support was unsuccessful.17.On 15 March 2019, the first respondent executed a Power of Attorney appointing the [appellant] as her legal representative for the purposes of making an application for a declaration under section 106A(2) of the [CSA Act].18.On 4 April 2019, the [appellant] commenced these proceedings. The application was commenced approximately seven months outside the prescribed statutory time limit in accordance with Rule 25A.06 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Rules”).(Emphasis in the original)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.