SeaRoad Shipping Pty Ltd v Pannell (No 2)
[2025] VSC 448
•30 July 2025
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL LIST
S ECI 2024 06877
| SEAROAD SHIPPING PTY LTD (ACN 123 782 203) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| TROY CAMERON PANNELL (and others according to the attached Schedule) | Defendants |
---
JUDGE: | Watson J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 18 July 2025 & 22 July 2025 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 30 July 2025 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | SeaRoad Shipping Pty Ltd v Pannell & Ors (No 2) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSC 448 |
---
CONTEMPT OF COURT – Breach of freezing orders – First defendant and second defendant failed to file affidavits re assets – First defendant disposed of assets subject to freezing orders – First defendant guilty of contempt of court – Conduct contumacious – Appropriate that sentence of imprisonment imposed.
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr JB Davis KC | HWL Ebsworth Lawyers |
| First Defendant | Appeared in person | |
| For the Second to Fourth Defendants | No appearances |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
Mr Troy Cameron Pannell, the first defendant, is guilty of four instances of contempt of court. Each instance arises from a breach of a freezing order made by the Court. These reasons deal with the appropriate penalty for those contempts.
For the reasons that follow, I have found that:
(a) the contempts were contumacious;
(b) criminal convictions should be recorded;
(c) a sentence of imprisonment should be imposed; and
(d) that the total term of imprisonment should be 11 weeks.
Procedural History
The plaintiff, SeaRoad Shipping Pty Ltd (ACN 123 782 203), by a Further Amended Summons dated 12 May 2025 sought findings of contempt against the first defendant, Mr Pannell, on five charges and the second defendant, Independent Container Surveyor's & Assessor's Pty Ltd (ACN 146 065 465) (ICSA) on one charge.
On 19 December 2024 McDonald J made a freezing order in what might be described as the standard form (19 December 2024 Order). That order had a return date of 3 January 2025. Paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order required each of Mr Pannell and ICSA to swear an affidavit providing information, which may broadly be described as listing their assets, identifying various bank accounts and deposing to the receipt of any funds from the plaintiff within 28 days of the making of the order (Assets Affidavit).
On 3 January 2025 I made an order extending the operation of the freezing order of 19 December 2024 until the hearing and determination of the proceeding or until further order (3 January 2025 Order). On 3 January 2025 I did not make any order in the form of paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order. That is explained by an interchange which occurred at the hearing on 19 December 2024, which made plain that his Honour McDonald J's intention was that paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order would continue in effect, unless an order was made on 3 January 2025 to vary it. No such order was made.
The Assets Affidavits were due on 2 February 2025. No Assets Affidavits have been filed by Mr Pannell or ICSA in compliance with paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order.
The plaintiff filed a summons for contempt in relation to four charges on 8 April 2025. That summons was made returnable before me on 1 May 2025. Mr Pannell was aware of the proceedings on that day but did not attend. In a text message sent the day before to the solicitors for the plaintiff Mr Pannell said he was in northern Victoria for work.
I adjourned the matter to 9 May 2025 and made an order that Mr Pannell attend the hearing in person on that day. Mr Pannell did not attend the hearing on that day. A little over half an hour after the hearing was scheduled to start, Mr Pannell sent an email to the solicitor for the plaintiff, stating that his car had been swiped by a large kangaroo on his way to Court, that he had no working indicator left and that his windscreen had a crack through it. He said he was waiting for roadside assistance and that this was his reason for non-attendance. Attached to the email are photos of a vehicle which appears to have sustained damage to its left front panel and appears to have a crack in the windscreen.
On 9 May 2025 the plaintiff presented its case in relation to the charges of contempt relating to the Assets Affidavits. I then adjourned the hearing until 12 May 2025 and made a further order that Mr Pannell attend the hearing in person on that day.
Mr Pannell did not attend the hearing on 12 May 2025.
On 12 May 2025 I found Mr Pannell guilty of two charges of contempt, one arising from his failure to comply with paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order (Charge 1) and one relating to his failure to cause ICSA to comply (Charge 2). Charge 3 also related to Mr Pannell’s failure to cause ICSA to comply with paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order but was an alternative to the second charge and in circumstances where I had found guilt in relation to Charge 2, was not pressed by the plaintiff to determine that charge. I also found ICSA guilty of contempt for its failure to comply with paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order (Charge 4). I delivered reasons ex-tempore for those findings.[1]
[1]SeaRoad Shipping Pty Ltd v Pannell & Ors [2025] VSC 282.
On 12 May 2025 I made procedural orders in relation to Charges 5 and 6 and adjourned the hearing until 20 May 2025. I issued a warrant for Mr Pannell’s arrest, his production before the Court on 20 May 2025 and his detention in the meantime.
On 20 May 2025 Mr Pannell did not attend the hearing. The Sheriff returned the warrant unexecuted and advised the Court that Mr Pannell was understood to be in South Australia. I adjourned the hearing of Charges 5 and 6 until 20 June 2025 and issued a further warrant for Mr Pannell’s arrest.
The Court was advised by Victoria Police on 6 June 2025 that Mr Pannell had been involved in a single vehicle motor car collision with a tree in country Victoria. He was transported to the Alfred Hospital and treated there until 13 June 2025.
Mr Pannell was discharged from the Alfred Hospital on 13 June 2025 and transported to Austin Health Psychiatric Unit. He was discharged from Austin Health Psychiatric Unit on 14 June 2025. After that discharge, Mr Pannell was processed at the Heidelberg Police Station in relation to separate criminal offences that were alleged to have occurred whilst Mr Pannell was avoiding apprehension. The warrant for his arrest made on 20 May 2025 was executed by Victoria Police on 14 June 2025.
On 18 June 2025 the Court was advised that Mr Pannell had obtained legal representation and that his solicitors had filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Mr Pannell and ICSA. Those solicitors sought an adjournment of the 20 June 2025 hearing which was granted.
On 30 June 2025 the Court made orders by consent as between the plaintiff and Mr Pannell and ICSA adjourning the proceeding until 9:30am on 18 July 2025 for the hearing and determination of Charges 5 and 6 of the Further Amended Summons, subject to Mr Pannell making an application for bail in the interim.
On 7 July 2025 Mr Pannell’s solicitors wrote to my chambers, amongst other things, foreshadowing an application to stay the charges of contempt and advising of an intention to cease to act for ICSA.
On 8 July 2025 I made orders requiring Mr Pannell to file and serve written submissions in support of his stay application by 11 July 2025, with further orders for submissions by the plaintiff in opposition and submissions by Mr Pannell in reply.
On 10 July 2025 Mr Pannell’s solicitors filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act for Mr Pannell and ICSA. My chambers were advised by the barrister who had been briefed to appear that she had given consideration to appearing pro bono briefed directly by Mr Pannell but considered the matter required a solicitor on the record.
On 18 July 2025 Mr Pannell attended Court. At the outset of the hearing I asked if Mr Pannell wished to proceed with the hearing of Charges 5 and 6. He said he did. I asked if he was contesting the Charges. He said he was not contesting Charge 6 but he would contest Charge 5. Mr Pannell was then provided an opportunity to read the affidavit material on which the plaintiff relied for Charge 5. I should note that all the material had previously been served on Mr Pannell and he said his previous lawyers had been through it with him about two weeks previously.
After the adjournment Mr Pannell indicated that he still wished to contest Charge 5. Senior Counsel for the plaintiff then opened his case regarding Charge 5. After that opening, I asked Mr Pannell if he wanted some time to consider his position or whether he wanted to proceed to cross-examining witnesses. Mr Pannell then stated he would no longer contest Charge 5.
On 22 July 2025 I heard from Mr Pannell and the plaintiff regarding an appropriate penalty for the findings of contempt.
Principles regarding Sentencing
The following factors are relevant to a sentence for contempt:
(a) the nature and circumstances of the contempt;
(b) the actual consequences of the contempt;
(c) the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice;
(d) the contemnor’s personal circumstances, antecedents and financial means;
(e) the contemnor’s culpability;
(f) the contemnor’s reasons for his or her conduct;
(g) the need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating the contempt; and
(h) whether the contemnor has exhibited general contrition and made a full and ample apology.[2]
[2]Hera Project Pty Ltd v Bisognin & Anor (No 2) [2019] VSC 625, [30] (‘Hera Project’).
Disobedience of a court order is usually a civil contempt. However, disobedience of a court order may be a criminal contempt where:
(a) the disobedience is contumacious; or
(b) the purpose of the proceedings is punitive in the sense that it seeks to punish a past breach, rather than a remedial or coercive purpose of obtaining compliance with the order.[3]
[3]Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2014) 47 VR 527, 593 [275]–[276] (‘CFMEU v Grocon’).
A wilful breach of an order will be contumacious if:
(a) the contemnor knows the breach is prohibited and has no reasonable belief that it can be excused;
(b) the breach involves perverse obstinate resistance to authority; or
(c) there is a direct intention to disobey the order.[4]
[4]Hera Project [11].
There is no maximum penalty for contempt of court.[5]
[5]R v Sherwani [2017] VSC 147 [9].
In determining the appropriate penalty, I should have regard to relevant provisions of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).[6]
[6]Rich v Attorney-General (Vic) (1999) 103 A Crim R 261; [1999] VSCA 14, [46]–[47].
Finally, I note that, in considering the circumstances of the offending, facts beyond those matters formally admitted in the plea which are adverse to Mr Pannell must be established beyond reasonable doubt.[7] Where I refer to facts below arising in relation to Charges 5 and 6, beyond those facts which are formally admitted in Mr Pannell’s plea, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of those facts.
[7]Hera Project [31].
Circumstances of the contempts
Charges 1 and 2
I have set out the circumstances surrounding Charges 1 and 2 in my earlier reasons.
Paragraph 8 of the orders of 19 December 2024 relevantly required affidavits from Mr Pannell and ICSA:
(a) listing all of their assets in Australia, giving their value, location and details (including any mortgages, charges or other encumbrances to which they are subject) and the extent of their interest in the assets;
(b) in the case of [Mr Pannell], identifying the accounts into which funds received directly or indirectly from the plaintiff or [ICSA] were dispersed and the amounts of the payments;
(c) in the case of the [ICSA], identifying the accounts into which funds received directly or indirectly from the plaintiff were dispersed and the amounts of the payments; and
(d) in the case of [Mr Pannell or ICSA], their receipt of any funds directly or indirectly from the plaintiff.
Mr Pannell knew of the order shortly after it was made and certainly by no later than 3 January 2025.
Mr Pannell and ICSA were required to file Assets Affidavits by 2 February 2025. They did not do so.
On 30 April 2025 Mr Pannell sent a text message to the solicitor for the plaintiff in which he purported to list his assets in the following terms:
My assets that I have are owned by myself and my ex wife – Lynise.
x 2 times properties which are facilitated by bank mortgages in joint accounts.
As for other assets I have there are not many – basically any furniture that is jointly shared in the house of 22 Gordon blvd gisborne Sth.
I have no motor vehicle or any other transport that I own.
I am lucky enough to be supplied a company vehicle, which I basically now live in, as I have no home or address where I currently live.
I did have a horse yes
By hellbent out of Aimee's jewel - but I sold that to a work partner of mine back in November of 2024, because, at the time, I had been unemployed for 4 months, and needed to pay bills.
As I stated in my earlier reasons, I do not regard that text message of Mr Pannell constituted a genuine attempt to comply with paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order.
In relation to Mr Pannell’s own Assets Affidavit, leaving aside the fact that it was not sworn or affirmed, the text message did not list Mr Pannell’s bank accounts or the amounts in them. It did not identify Mr Pannell’s accounts into which funds received from the plaintiff or ICSA had been dispersed and the amounts of the payments. It falsely claimed he had sold the filly in November 2024 (a matter to which I return below).
In relation to ICSA’s Assets Affidavit it provided no information at all.
On 12 May 2025 I found that Mr Pannell had committed the contempts which were the subject of Charges 1 and 2. As at that date no Assets Affidavits had been filed.
No Assets Affidavits were filed prior to the hearing on 18 July 2025. On 18 July 2025 I said to Mr Pannell that he should endeavour to make an Assets Affidavit prior to the hearing on penalty on 22 July 2025.
On 22 July 2025 Mr Pannell handed up a hand written document which he had signed and which he said was a listing of all his assets. The document is not an affidavit. I accept that it was prepared whilst Mr Pannell was in custody and so there are limitations on his ability to obtain and verify information. The document lists one bank account. It omits to list a joint bank account he has with the Commonwealth Bank with his ex-wife, Ms Lynise Woodgate, which was listed in her affidavit complying with paragraph 8 of the 19 December 2024 Order. The document still provides no information as to the accounts into which funds received directly or indirectly from the plaintiff or ICSA were dispersed and the amounts of the payments.
There is no information at all in the document handed up regarding ICSA. I accept that it may not have been clear to Mr Pannell that my request was for an affidavit detailing the affairs of ICSA but, nonetheless, the order is clear and nearly six months after an affidavit from ICSA was due none has been provided.
Charge 5
Charge 5 of the Further Amended Summons (omitting particulars) is in the following terms:
In breach of paragraph 6(a) of order made by the Honourable Justice Watson in this proceeding on 3 January 2025 (3 January 25 Freezing Order), which order was served on Mr Pannell and of which he had knowledge, Mr Pannell:
(a) disposed of and/or dealt with and/or diminished the value of an asset of his which was in Australia, being a filly which was the offspring of the sire, Hellbent, and the Dam, Aimee’s Jewell, by selling that filly through Yarraman Park in March 2025;
(b) so disposed of and/or dealt with and/or diminished the value of that asset while the total unencumbered value (within the meaning of paragraph 4(d) of the 3 January 25 Freezing Order) of his and ICSA’s Australian assets (within the meaning of paragraph 6(a) of that order) did not exceed the relevant amount (within the meaning of paragraph 6(a) of that order).
Paragraph 6 of the 3 January 2025 Order, relevantly, restrained Mr Pannell from disposing of any his assets up to the unencumbered value of $8,731,012.96.
Charge 5 relates to the sale of a filly which was the offspring of the sire, Hellbent, and the Dam, Aimee’s Jewell (the filly). Mr Pannell sold the filly on 2 March 2025 in breach of the 3 January 2025 Order.
Mr Pannell was aware of the order, knew his assets were frozen and that he did not have assets of more than $8.7 million.
Prior to the sale, the filly had been agisted at a stud called Yarraman Park. On 26 February 2025 Mr Pannell contacted Mr Matthew Scown, the general manager of Yarraman Park. They exchanged text messages including about setting a reserve price for the filly at the auction. On 27 February 2025 Mr Pannell had a discussion in person with Mr Scown regarding the sale. On 2 March 2025 he had a further conversation with Mr Scown in which he set a reserve price of $80,000.
The filly sold at auction on 2 March 2025 for $150,000. Mr Pannell then met with the new owners of the filly. Documents from Yarraman Park evidence Mr Pannell having reached an agreement with the new owner to retain a 10% share in the filly. A Recipient Created Tax Invoice dated 2 March 2025 records a sale price of $150,000 with a deduction of $15,000 for the retained 10% and various deductions for fees and commissions associated with the auction and outstanding fees to Yarraman Park with a balance to be remitted of $93,727.71.
The document Mr Pannell submitted as a list of his assets on 22 July 2025 does not list the 10% retained share of the filly as an asset of Mr Pannell’s – it is not apparent whether this is an omission or whether Mr Pannell has, since 2 March 2025, disposed of that share.
On 15 April 2025 Mr Pannell sent an email to Yarraman Park directing them to pay the $93,727.71 into the account of his partner, Ms Maree Wilke.
On 16 April 2025 a Yarraman Park representative spoke with Ms Wilke on the phone to confirm her bank details for the transfer of sale proceeds. Ms Wilke received the funds of $93,727.71 in one of her bank accounts on that day.
Later that day Mr Pannell texted Ms Wilke his bank account details. These details were different to the account details Mr Pannell had used on prior occasions when he had asked Ms Wilke to transfer him money. In that text he asks Ms Wilke to transfer $10,000. She did so. Ms Wilke transferred a further $72,000 to Mr Pannell over the course of the next few days. These steps are inconsistent with any suggestion the proceeds of the sale of the filly were Ms Wilke’s.
Ms Wilke understood that Mr Pannell intended to use the sale proceeds to pay outstanding debts and legal fees.
On 29 April 2025 the plaintiff’s legal representatives contacted Ms Wilke seeking the provision of documents and an undertaking not to dispose of funds and not to assist Mr Pannell in the breach of the freezing orders made against him. They also notified Ms Wilke of their proposal to issue a summons seeking freezing and production orders against her personally.
Following receipt of this correspondence, Ms Wilke met with Mr Pannell in person and expressed concern regarding her possible liability. She says Mr Pannell assured her that she need not worry as she had purchased the filly last year. Ms Wilke told him that she did not have proof and was concerned about having to prove this to others. Ms Wilke gives evidence that, in fact, she did not buy the filly from Mr Pannell in November 2024. She had never received any documents recording the registration of a sale or transfer with Racing Australia or any other authority about the filly. She had paid Mr Pannell an amount of $6,000 from her account in November but that had been to assist him in paying agistment fees for the filly.
The following day, on 30 April 2025, Mr Pannell provided a document to Ms Wilke titled ‘unnamed horse transfer ownership’ dated 10 November 2024. This was the first time she had seen the document. Ms Wilke did not sign the document, nor had she seen the original. Mr Pannell said that he signed it on her behalf and registered the transfer in November 2024. Ms Wilke says she asked Mr Pannell how she could buy a horse like that for $6,000. Mr Pannell said words to the effect ‘I can sell it for $1 or whatever is the agreed price’.
Ms Wilke says she then said to Mr Pannell that he had told her he could sell the filly because the filly was not listed as an asset and that he had not asked her about putting the sale proceeds in her account. Ms Wilke says she told Mr Pannell she was not feeling comfortable. She says Mr Pannell said to her words to the effect ‘if they wanted to stop me from selling her, they would have seen her in the catalogue and stopped the sale’.
Ms Wilke then says that Mr Pannell proceeded to provide a list of things to say in response to the plaintiff’s legal representatives which covered the following:
• annual leave currently -
• Having your car serviced today / and you are unable to get around.
• Already have things to do in the next few days so that you can go back to work next Monday.
• State that you purchased the horse from me in November last year. You have a confirmed “unnamed horse transfer of ownership document” signed / dated and witnessed in November of last year.
• You have a transaction of funds to my account for the purchase of the filly outright
• You will seek advice on the attached, but you are not signing any document without the proper advice and that you are not able to obtain that this week, as you need to get things sorted out before your return to work next Monday
On 30 April 2025 Ms Wilke sent an email to SeaRoad’s lawyers as follows:
Good afternoon,
Thank you for the txt, as if I didn’t get that I would not have looked at emails, as I’m presently on long service leave.
I was at my second evening job and could not fully access the email, to be able to comprehend and digest the content thereof. I’ve only got back to a computer now, as been having my car serviced, waiting for it to be done today in preparation for return to normal fulltime on Monday and was unable to get around. Further to this I have the other second job and appointments booked over next couple of days, also to get out of way before my return.
In early November of last year, I purchased the horse from Troy Pannell and have a copy of the “unnamed horse transfer of ownership document”, signed/dated and witnessed in early November last year. I have the transfer of funds on my statement to Troy’s account to secure the outright purchase of the filly and lodgement fee.
As you can imagine, I’ve never been served these types of legal documents “ever” before in my life and am quite stunned & confused. I feel it’s in my best interests to seek further independent legal advice, on the attached and before I sign anything that is legal. During my wait today, I tried to make some very initial inquiries through legal aid, and they are going to send me some referrals.
Regards
Maree Wilke
It follows as a consequence of Mr Pannell’s plea to Charge 5 that he accepts he owned the filly when it was sold. At the hearing before me on penalty Mr Pannell submitted that he had believed he had a contract for the sale of the filly but he had changed his plea because having heard senior counsel for the plaintiff’s opening, he had realised he could not prove the transfer of ownership.
On the basis of the evidence before me, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that:
(a) at all times Mr Pannell owned the filly;
(b) at no stage did Ms Wilke own the filly;
(c) there was no transfer or attempted transfer of ownership of the filly to Ms Wilke in November 2024 or at any stage prior to the filly being sold on 2 March 2025; and
(d) the actions of Mr Pannell in April 2025 were an attempt to create a false narrative regarding the ownership of the filly in order to avoid sanction for a breach of the 3 January 2025 Order.
Charge 6
Charge 6 of the Further Amended Summons (omitting particulars) is in the following terms:
In breach of paragraph 6(a) of the 3 January 25 Freezing Order, which order was served on Mr Pannell and of which he had knowledge, Mr Pannell:
(a) disposed of and/or dealt with and/or diminished the value of an asset of his which was in Australia, being $10,000, by handing that sum in physical cash to Maree Hazel Wilke on 1 May 2025;
(b) so disposed of and/or dealt with and/or diminished the value of that asset while the total unencumbered value (within the meaning of paragraph 4(d) of the 3 January 25 Freezing Order) of his and ICSA’s Australian assets (within the meaning of paragraph 6(a) of that order) did not exceed the relevant amount (within the meaning of paragraph 6(a) of that order).
Charge 6 relates to the disposal of $10,000 in cash to Ms Wilke. On 1 May 2025 I made a freezing order against Ms Wilke. Ms Wilke says she expressed her concerns regarding that order to Mr Pannell that night and that the following day Mr Pannell gave her $10,000 in cash for her legal fees. Ms Wilke has subsequently paid that money into Court.
It follows as a consequence of his plea to Charge 6 that Mr Pannell accepts that the $10,000 he gave to Ms Wilke on 2 May 2025 was his money. Nonetheless, in his submissions at the penalty hearing on 22 July 2025, Mr Pannell typified the payment as payment of money Ms Wilke had given him. On the basis of the evidence before me, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the cash was Mr Pannell’s and was not a return of Ms Wilke’s own money.
Gravity of the contempts
I am satisfied that Mr Pannell’s contempts were serious and involved a contumacious disregard for the Court’s orders.
The failure to swear the Assets Affidavits is serious. Those affidavits are a necessary step under any freezing order process. Like any order of the court, the order for the provision of the affidavits should be obeyed. Mr Pannell made no real attempt to comply with the Court’s order regarding the Assets Affidavits at any stage prior to 22 July 2025. His attempt to comply with the order on 22 July 2025 fell well short of what was required. In particular, it should be noted that:
(a) the failure to swear an affidavit on his own behalf identifying the filly as an asset created the circumstances where the filly could be sold without the plaintiff intervening to restrain the sale; and
(b) the failure to provide an Assets Affidavit for ICSA means that nearly six months after the affidavit was due the plaintiff still has no clarity regarding that entity’s assets.
I regard the circumstances and surrounding conduct in relation to Charge 5 as particularly serious. Mr Pannell, over the course of several days, was involved in the process of the sale of the filly. He knew it should not be sold. After the sale, Mr Pannell then took a series of steps which were designed to create a false narrative around the ownership of the horse and hide where the proceeds from the sale had gone. He maintained that false narrative up until the end of the opening of the plaintiff’s case on 18 July 2025, then pleaded to Charge 5 and then returned to that narrative at the penalty hearing on 22 July 2025.
Finally, the disposition of the $10,000 to Ms Wilke for her legal fees was a clear breach of the order. I am prepared to accept that in part, Mr Pannell may have been motivated by a desire to help his partner out of a mess that he had created but that does not alter the fact that Mr Pannell knew he was not to dispose of assets and deliberately did so and, as counsel for the plaintiff submitted, his actions are just as consistent with a hoping that the payment to Ms Wilke would ensure that she maintained the false narrative regarding ownership of the filly.
In all, these are serious contempts spanning several months and demonstrating a deliberate disregard for the orders of the Court.
Actual Consequences of Contempt
The failure to swear the Assets Affidavits means that nearly six months after they were due, the plaintiff still does not have a complete picture of Mr Pannell’s assets and has no information regarding ICSA’s assets. As I note above, the failure to complete the Assets Affidavits assisted Mr Pannell in selling the filly in breach of the 3 January 2025 Order.
The sale of the filly has created a situation where an asset subject to the freezing order has been dissipated or largely dissipated depending on whether Mr Pannell still retains a 10% share. I accept that the value of the filly being $150,000 is a sum which is substantially less than some cases where freezing orders have been breached but it is nonetheless a substantial sum. The same applies even if one focuses on the net proceeds of the sale rather than the total asset value.
The disposal of the cash to Ms Wilke has fortunately had no adverse consequence for the plaintiff but that is because Ms Wilke did the right thing and paid the money into Court.
Mr Pannell’s apology, remorse and plea
At the hearing on penalty, Mr Pannell apologised to the Court and the plaintiff. I accept that the apology was genuine. The apology was for the delay in the proceedings occasioned by his non-attendance at previous hearings rather than the contempts. Nonetheless, I do take into account that Mr Pannell’s expression of remorse as to the delay occasioned to the proceedings was genuine.
Mr Pannell accepted that he had not previously understood the seriousness of breaching court orders but that he now did and in future would comply.
Mr Pannell has pleaded guilty to both Charges 5 and 6 and is entitled to some form of discount regarding his penalty for that fact. The guilty pleas came relatively late in the piece and so the discount for the plea will be less than what would otherwise have been the case.
I have referred above to the fact that Mr Pannell submitted that he had believed he had a contract for the sale of the filly but he had changed his plea because having heard senior counsel for the plaintiff’s opening, he had realised he could not prove the transfer of ownership and Mr Pannell’s suggestion that the money he had given Ms Wilke was her own money. Both these statements are inconsistent with the evidence. They also undercut to some extent the suggestion of any contrition or remorse in relation to those contempts, although as I note above, in any event, Mr Pannell’s apology and expression of remorse was limited to delays in the proceeding caused by his non-attendance.
Mr Pannell’s circumstances
In his submissions on penalty, Mr Pannell referred to his mental health. Mr Pannell did not suggest he was suffering mental health issues when the contempts were committed. He told me that in May, around the time he hit the kangaroo on the way to Court, he had planned to take his own life and had left letters for his family. As I note above, on 6 June 2025 Mr Pannell was involved in a single car accident with a tree. In the course of his subsequent hospitalisation, he described having suicidal ideation. Mr Pannell was, for a short time, a patient in the Austin Health Psychiatric Unit. He was discharged from the unit on 14 June 2025. Mr Pannell has been in custody since that time and says that he is receiving counselling two to three times a week. Whilst Mr Pannell’s mental health issues do not bear on the circumstances of his offending, they may be taken into account in determining an appropriate sentence. I do not, however, have any evidence that Mr Pannell’s mental state will be worsened by imprisonment and it does appear he is receiving treatment for those issues whilst in custody.
Mr Pannell also referred to wanting to be more present for his children. I took this to be a submission as to the hardship which will be imposed by a term of imprisonment. I accept that Mr Pannell will miss his children whilst serving any term of imprisonment but, on the evidence, there is no basis to regard Mr Pannell’s circumstances as exceptional in this regard and, as a result, I do not regard this matter as mitigating his sentence.[8]
[8]Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Sentencing Manual (4th ed, 2023) 161 [7.6].
Notwithstanding that he did not refer to it in these terms, I accept that the text message exchanges with Ms Wilke which are in evidence show that during the period when the contempts were committed Mr Pannell was under significant stress. His personal finances were spiralling out of control. His mother has Parkinson’s disease and during this period she was hospitalised.
Mr Pannell has no prior convictions for contempt of court. He has no convictions for prior offences. I have taken these matters into account in my sentence.
The day after Mr Pannell’s penalty hearing he was sentenced in the Magistrates’ Court for other offences. That offending occurred after the contempts were committed and so they cannot be used to increase any head sentence but only ‘to negate, reduce or qualify an inference as to … later conduct which would … operate in mitigation of sentence’.[9] Having regard to the mitigating factors I have taken into account, the subsequent offences do not have any role to play in my sentence.
[9]R v Rumpf [1988] VR 466, 475.
Sentence
All contempts ‘share a common characteristic in that they all involve an interference with the due administration of justice.’[10] Disobedience of court orders affects the administration of justice. Here, as I have stated, the disobedience was contumacious.
[10]CFMEU v Grocon 561 [129].
Mr Pannell asked me to consider a community work order, a suspended sentence or a term of imprisonment limited to the time he has been in custody. I have considered those options but ultimately, have formed the view that they are not appropriate to the circumstances of this case.
I am satisfied that there is a need for general deterrence and denunciation in the sentence I pass, in order to deter others from similarly breaching the Court’s orders. There is, in my view, also a need for specific deterrence. Whilst Mr Pannell has expressed remorse as to delays in the proceeding and I have accepted that expression as genuine, Mr Pannell has shown little insight into the seriousness of his contempts.
Mr Pannell’s culpability is high. I accept there are some mitigating circumstances surrounding his conduct and I have taken those into account. I accept that the amount of money involved in Charges 5 and 6, whilst substantial, is not at the upper end of the scale when it comes to breaches of freezing orders. However, Mr Pannell’s attempt to create a false narrative regarding the sale of the filly is particularly serious and an aggravating circumstance.
I am satisfied a fine would not be an appropriate penalty for Charges 5 and 6. It would not reflect the seriousness of the contempts. The sentence for Charge 6 should, however, reflect the fact that the circumstances surrounding that charge are not as serious as for Charge 5. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied a fine is not an appropriate sentence for Charges 1 and 2. I have explained the importance of the provision of Assets Affidavits and the consequences of Mr Pannell’s failure to do so.
I am required to impose a sentence of imprisonment as a sanction of last resort. In this case, I am satisfied that a sentence of imprisonment must be imposed.
I have had regard to sentences imposed in other cases of contempt. In R v Murray[11] Riordan J pointed to the difficulties in relying on sentences imposed in other cases:
…‘because the circumstances are incidentally variable as is the impact of different contempts upon the court process’. Further, ‘[i]n fact, as in theory, each case is different and so it is always possible that a sentence may properly rise above or fall below the greatest and lowest sentences previously imposed.’ Comparable cases establishing a range do not fix ‘the boundaries within which future judges must, or even ought, to sentence’, but may serve as a ‘yardstick’ useful to ‘illustrate (although not define) the possible range of sentences available.’[12]
(citations omitted)
[11][2018] VSC 133.
[12]Ibid [47].
Nonetheless, in formulating my sentence I have had particular regard to:
(a) CC Containers Pty Ltd v Lee (No 10)[13] where a sentence of two months’ imprisonment was imposed where amounts totalling more than $340,000 were withdrawn from bank and other accounts over a nine month period in breach of a freezing order. The Court regarded the contempts as very serious and would have imposed a longer sentence but for mitigating factors; and
(b) Zhang v Fortune Holding Group Pty Ltd[14] where the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of four weeks’ imprisonment for breaches of a freezing order by withdrawing approximately $25,000 from bank accounts.
[13][2015] VSC 757.
[14][2018] VSCA 70 (Beach JA, Coghlan JA).
As a result of all those matters, I find convictions should be recorded and I would sentence Mr Pannell:
(a) on Charge 5 to 11 weeks imprisonment;
(b) on Charge 6 to six weeks imprisonment;
(c) on Charge 1 to two weeks imprisonment; and
(d) on Charge 2 to two weeks imprisonment.
All terms of imprisonment on those charges should be served concurrently.
I declare that the period to be reckoned as already served under the sentence is 54 days, as from 6 June 2025 to today.
Had Mr Pannell not pleaded guilty, I would have imposed a sentence of three months’ imprisonment.
I do not see any utility in imposing any sentence on ICSA. I could only impose a fine. Imposition of a fine would reduce the assets of ICSA otherwise available to the plaintiff in the substantive proceeding. The plaintiff did not press for a sentence in relation to ICSA. In circumstances where Mr Pannell is the sole director and shareholder of ICSA, I am satisfied that principles of general deterrence, specific deterrence and denunciation can be appropriately satisfied by the imposition of the sentence I have decided on Mr Pannell.
---
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
SEAROAD SHIPPING PTY LTD
(ACN 68 123 782 203)Plaintiff - and - TROY CAMERON PANNELL First Defendant - and - INDEPENDENT CONTAINER SURVEYOR'S & ASSESSOR'S PTY LTD (ACN 146 065 465) Second Defendant - and - LYNISE ANN WOODGATE Third Defendant - and - LST HOSPITALITY PTY LTD (ACN 627 111 942) Fourth Defendant
2
0