Searoad Holdings Pty Ltd

[2024] ATMO 5

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

ReTrade Mark application numbers 2194309 (39) - SeaRoad and 2194310 (39) – SEAROAD KEEPING TASMANIA CONNECTED (Figurative) – in the name of Searoad Holdings Pty Ltd

Delegate:

Nicholas Smith

Representation:

Applicant: Melissa Marcus of Counsel instructed by Switch Legal Pty Ltd

Decision:

2024 ATMO 5

Request to be heard under section 33(4) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) in relation to grounds for rejection under sections 41 and 44 of the Act – section 44(4) considered and applied – trade marks to be accepted for possible registration

Background

1. On 14 July 2021, Searoad Holdings Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’) applied to register the trade marks detailed below under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’).

Application Number:	2194309
Priority Date:	14 July 2021
Services:	Class 39: Collection of freight; Filling of vessels with freight; Freight (shipping of goods); Freight shipping; Freight warehousing; Land freight services; Loading of freight; Provision of information relating to the transport of freight; Storage of freight; Transport of freight; Warehousing of freight; Logistics services (transport, packaging, and storage of goods); Distribution (transport) of goods; Warehouse storage services; Transport; Transport of goods (‘Applicant’s Services’)
Trade Mark:	SeaRoad	(‘Word Mark’)
Application Number:	2194310
Priority Date:	14 July 2021
Services:	Applicant’s Services
Trade Mark:	(‘Device Mark’)

1. The trade marks sought to be registered pursuant to application numbers 2194309 and 2194310 are collectively referred to as the ‘Trade Marks’.

2. The applications were duly examined under s 31 of the Act and grounds for rejection were identified by the examiner under ss 44 of the Act for both the Trade Marks and under s 41 for the Word Mark.

3. For completeness I note that the Trade Marks were originally sought to be registered (and were examined on this basis) for a broader range of services, including the following additional services: Container hire services; Wrapping and packaging services; Advisory services relating to transport; Agency services for arranging the transportation of goods; Arranging of transportation; Services for the arranging of transportation (‘Additional Services’).  In the submissions and at the hearing the Applicant’s counsel confirmed that it seeks to amend the specification of both the Trade Marks to remove the Additional Services.  I have considered the applications on the basis of the Applicant’s Services, and as part of the acceptance process, have amended the specifications of the Trade Marks to remove the Additional Services.

4. With respect to the s 44 ground of rejection, the examiner identified trade marks 2016477, 2103173 and 2131821 set out below (the ‘Searoad Marks’) which closely resembled the Trade Marks and were registered for similar services.  The Searoad Marks are registered to Peninsula Searoad Transport Pty Limited (‘Searoad Owner’) and predate the priority date of the Trade Marks. As this is a request to be heard under s 33(4) of the Act the Searoad Owner does not appear in this proceeding.

Number	Trade Mark	Priority Date	Services
2016477	26 Jun 2019	Class 39: Ferry transport services; Sea transport services; Ship transport services; Transport services; Transport services for sightseeing tours (‘Searoad Services’)
2103173	SEAROAD (‘Searoad Mark’)	13 Jul 2020	Class 39: Ferry boat services; Ferry transport services; Ferry-boat transport; Boat transport; Boat transportation services; Marine transport; Passenger transport; Passenger transportation services; Provision of sightseeing tours (transport); Sea transport services; Transport by sea; Transport by water; Transportation by sea; Transportation of passengers; Transportation of people; Transportation of vehicles
2131821	SEAROAD FERRIES	28 Oct 2020	Searoad Services

1. With respect to the s 41 ground for rejection raised for the Word Mark, the examiner stated (paraphrased), that the Word Mark consisted of the ordinary word SEAROAD, which refers to commonly used shipping and transport routes on oceans or large bodies of water and that the Applicant’s Services (and the Additional Services) are conducted on or are related to sea roads. This term would be seen as describing an aspect of the Applicant’s Services rather than indicating a trade source. Other traders may desire to be able to use the Word Mark in connection with the Applicant’s Services.

2. Between 2021 and 2023 the Applicant provided various submissions and evidence in response to the grounds for rejection. In response, this office issued 2 further adverse reports, each maintaining the grounds for rejection under ss 41 and 44. I note that the Applicant does not submit that the provisions of s 44(2) are inapplicable and for completeness I confirm that the requirements of s 44(2) are satisfied by the Searoad Marks. Rather the Applicant submits that the Trade Marks should be accepted on the basis of s 44(4) of the Act relating to prior usage. This is discussed in more detail below.

3. On 9 October 2023, the Applicant requested to be heard by the Registrar of Trade Marks under s 33 of the Act. As a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks I heard this matter on 5 December 2023. Melissa Marcus of counsel, representing the Applicant, made oral submissions. Also present were Andrew Bruce and Patrick Guarino, both of the Applicant. In addition, in accordance with the pre-hearing directions I had given, the Applicant filed written submissions and the following declarations that it sought to rely on:

   ·     Declaration of Andrew Bruce, Chief Financial Officer of the Applicant dated 22 November 2022 with Exhibits AB-1 to AB-5 and Confidential Annexures A to D (‘Bruce 1’).

   ·     Declaration of Andrew Bruce dated 28 July 2023 with Confidential Annexure 1 (‘Bruce 2’).

   ·     Declaration of Natalie Rose Williams, Trade Mark Attorney and director of Switch Legal Pty Ltd, the Applicant’s representative, dated 9 November 2023 with Exhibits NW-1 and NW-2 (‘Williams Declaration’).

4. The present matter is a hearing under s 33(4) of the Act. As noted in MHFC Holdings Pty Ltd[1] as well as other decisions of the Registrar (Teraglow Pty Ltd[2] and TOM Organic Pty Ltd[3]), the purpose of such a hearing is not a review of the examiner’s decision but rather a fresh consideration of the grounds for rejection, in this case the grounds for rejection under ss 41 and 44 of the Act. Any decision I shall make is not a review of the examiner’s approach and I am not bound in any way to follow it. Rather this proceeding will consider afresh the ss 41 and 44 grounds for rejection under the Act as it applies to the Trade Marks. In arriving at my decision, I have taken into account Bruce 1 and 2, the Williams Declaration, the material identified above as well as the oral submissions made on 5 December 2023.

   Legislative framework

   10. Under s 33(1)(b) of the Act, the Registrar must accept the application for registration of a trade mark unless satisfied there exists a ground under the Act for rejecting it. The Registrar must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a ground for rejection exists, otherwise an application will be presumed registrable.[4]   The date at which the Trade Marks must be assessed at the filing date, being 14 July 2021 (‘relevant date’) however evidence of use after that day may be relevant, to the extent that such evidence can illustrate factors in place at the relevant date.[5]

   Section 44

   [1] [2016] ATMO 96, [9] (Hearing Officer Wilson).

   [2] [2016] ATMO 32, [5] (Hearing Officer Worth).

   [3] [2018] ATMO 46, [5] (Hearing Officer Worth).

   [4] Chocolaterie Guylian N.V. v Registrar of Trade Marks [2009] FCA 891, [16] (Sundberg J).

   [5] Austereo Pty Ltd v DMG Radio (Australia) Pty Ltd (2004) 61 IPR 257, [32] (Finn J).

5. The relevant provisions of Section 44 of the Act are:

   Section 44 - Identical etc. trade marks

   (1)…

   (2)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of services (applicant's services) must be rejected if:

   (a)it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

   (i)a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar services or closely related goods; or

   (ii)a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar services or closely related goods is being sought by another person; and

   (b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's services is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar services or closely related goods.

   Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.

   Note 2: For similar services see subsection 14(2).

   Note 3: For priority date see section 12

   (3)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied:

   (a)that there has been honest concurrent use of the 2 trade marks; or

   (b)that, because of other circumstances, it is proper to do so;

   the Registrar may accept the application for the registration of the applicant's trade mark subject to any conditions or limitations that the Registrar thinks fit to impose. If the applicant's trade mark has been used only in a particular area, the limitations may include that the use of the trade mark is to be restricted to that particular area. 

   Note:  For limitations see section 6.

   (4)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied that the applicant, or the applicant and the predecessor in title of the applicant, have continuously used the applicant's trade mark for a period:

   (a)beginning before the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of:

   (i)              the similar goods or closely related services; or

   (ii)             the similar services or closely related goods; and

   (b)ending on the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark;

   the Registrar may not reject the application because of the existence of the other trade mark.

   Note 1: An authorised use of the trade mark by a person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark (see subsection 7(3)).

   Note 2: For predecessor in title see section 6.

   Note 3: For priority date see section 12.

   Section 10 - Definition of deceptively similar

6. For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.As noted above it is not disputed that the requirements of s 44(2) are satisfied and thus the only question is whether the Trade Marks can be accepted pursuant to the provisions of s 44(4), namely that the Applicant has continuously used the Trade Marks beginning before the priority date of the Searoad Marks, the earliest priority date being 26 June 2019.

7. I have reviewed Bruce 1 and 2 and the Williams Declaration, noting that their claims are not contradicted by any other evidence and I consider that they establish the following:

   ·     The Applicant is the successor in title to a variety of corporate enterprises that have been involved in the operation of a shipping service across the Bass Strait.  The Applicant was established in 2007 and now employs approximately 400 staff.

   ·     The Applicant’s predecessor in title created the brand ‘searoad’ in 1972.   It has continuously used the Word Mark since that date under various forms including ‘Eastern Searoad Service’, ‘Searoad General Cargo’ and ‘Searoader-class vessels.

   ·     The Trade Marks appear on all the Applicant’s corporate materials including on ships, shipping containers, terminals, trucks, brochures, external presentations and invoices and on the Applicant’s website.  The Applicant engages in extensive marketing using the Trade Marks, including sponsorship, social media and in person promotion.

   ·     The Applicant and its predecessors in title have been providing the Applicant’s Services under the Trade Marks since 1972 and its revenue from 2007 to 2022 is highly significant.

8. I am satisfied from the evidence presented by the Applicant that the Trade Marks have been used in connection with the Applicant’s Services since well before 26 June 2019. I am also satisfied that, while this is not relevant to s 44(4), the degree of promotion and reputation held by the Applicant in the Trade Marks for the Applicant’s Services is significant. The revenue figures are very large and there is a significant degree of marketing and advertising conducted by the Applicant over a considerable period of time, featuring both the Trade Marks.

9. As I am satisfied that the provisions of s 44(4) have been established by the evidence supplied by the Applicant, I find that the ground for rejection under s 44 of the Act has not been established for either the Word Mark or the Device Mark. It is therefore necessary to consider the s 41 ground with respect to the Word Mark.

10. As noted in paragraph 9 above, the process I am required to undertake is not a review of the examiner’s reasoning.  However, it is useful to explain how my approach differs from the approach taken by the examiner (noting of course that the examiner had to consider the evidence in respect of the Applicant’s Services and Additional Services and did not have access to the Williams Declaration).  In the examiner’s final report assessing Bruce 1 and 2 they noted (and I agree with this assessment) that the evidence only showed use of the Trade Marks in respect of a particular transport service for the transport of freight from Tasmania to the mainland of Australia and proposed a geographical restriction.  I am not satisfied that such a geographical restriction is appropriate in this present case.  The Applicant is part of the broad transport ecosystem of Australia and offers its services to a variety of customers across Australia.  This is not a circumstance where two entities are providing goods to geographically distinctive local markets (such as ice cream shops located in separate states), rather they are providing distinctive services to a broad national market.  There is an obvious risk of confusion among the customer base for the Applicant’s Services were another entity to provide, for example, SEAROAD freight shipping services between Perth and Adelaide.  In such circumstances I do not think a geographical restriction is appropriate.

    Section 41

11. Section 41 of the Act provides:

    41 – Trade Mark not distinguishing applicant’s goods or services

    (1)An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (the designated goods or services) from the goods or services of other persons.

    Note:       For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.

    (2)A trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons only if either subsection (3) or (4) applies to the trade mark.

    (3)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:

    (a)the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and

    (b)the applicant has not used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application to such an extent that the trade mark does in fact distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant.

    (4)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:

    (a)the trade mark is, to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and

    (b)the trade mark does not and will not distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant having regard to the combined effect of the following:

    (i)the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;

    (ii)the use, or intended use, of the trade mark by the applicant;

    (iii)any other circumstances.

    Note 1:Trade marks that are not inherently adapted to distinguish goods or services are mostly trade marks that consist wholly of a sign that is ordinarily used to indicate:

    (a)the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or some other characteristic, of goods or services; or

    (b)the time of production of goods or of the rendering of services.

    Note 2: For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.

    Note 3: Use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant and an authorised use of a trade mark by another person are each taken to be use of the trade mark by the applicant (see subsections (5) and 7(3) and section 8).

    (5)For the purposes of this section, the use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant for the registration of the trade mark is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the applicant.

    Note 1: For applicant and predecessor in title see section 6.

    Note 2: If a predecessor in title had authorised another person to use the trade mark, any authorised use of the trade mark by the other person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the predecessor in title (see subsection 7(3) and section 8).

12. With respect to s 41 it is appropriate to discuss the ‘presumption of registrability’. As was explained by the Hearing Officer in Unilever plc v Beiersdorf AG with respect to s 33 of the Act:

    Section 33 of the Act states that the Registrar must accept an application unless satisfied that it has not been made in accordance with the Act, (which is not relevant here), or that there are grounds under the Act for rejecting it. In this regard s 33 embodies what is often referred to as a ‘presumption of registrability.’ As was explained in Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks[6] (‘Oregon’), however, prior to the [Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (“the Amending Act”)] ss 41(5) and (6) as they then were, (which essentially correspond to current ss 41(4) and (3) respectively), effectively shifted the onus onto an applicant. Section 41 was thus amended to address that inconsistency, with the Explanatory Memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 (‘the EM’) stating at page 146:

    [6] (1998) 40 IPR 498, 505 (Branson J).

    The changes are intended to clarify that the presumption of registrability, as provided for in section 33, does apply to section 41. … The intention is that, if the Registrar is equally unsure of whether the mark is or is not capable of distinguishing, that doubt should be resolved in the applicant’s favour.

    The Amending Act was not however intended to alter the relevant standard for registrability. In this regard the EM goes on to state (also at page 146):

    Note that while the amendment [to s 41] ensures that the onus rests with the Registrar during examination, it is not intended to require that the trade mark should clearly not be registered. Rather, as with other grounds it is intended that the delegate need only be satisfied that a ground exists on the balance of probabilities.

    The amendments are not meant to alter the key concepts of “inherently adapted to distinguish”, “capable of distinguishing” and “does or will distinguish”.  The judicial tests for these terms are settled and the amendments are not intended to change the legal concept of a trade mark distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services from others.

    Branson J’s analysis at 504 in Oregon of the operation of s 41 as it stood prior to the Amending Act, as paraphrased below, also remains apt in relation to the amended section:

    Having taken [the extent of inherent adaptation] into account, it is theoretically open to [me] to conclude:

    (a) that the [Trade Mark] is inherently adapted to distinguish the [Applicant’s Goods] from the goods or services of other persons and capable, on that basis alone, of so distinguishing the [Applicant’s Goods]; [that is, neither s 41(3) nor s 41(4) applies] or

    (b) that the [Trade Mark] is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the [Applicant’s Goods] from the goods or services of other persons; [that is, s 41(3) applies] or

    (c) that the [Trade Mark] is to some extent inherently adapted to distinguish the [Applicant’s Goods] from the goods or services of other persons, but there is uncertainty, on that basis alone, that the trade mark is actually capable of so distinguishing the [Applicant’s Goods]. [that is, s 41(4) applies][7]

    [7] [2017] ATMO 25, [38]-[40] (Hearing Officer Kirov).

1. In Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd, the Full Court summarised the principles in respect of s 41 as follows:

   (1) In deciding whether or not a trade mark is capable of distinguishing the designated services from the service of others, the first question is the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated services from those of others: s 41(2) and (3).

   (2) In determining whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the services of a trader, the answer largely depends upon whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their goods: Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (“Clark Equipment”) [1964] HCA 55; (1964) 111 CLR 511 per Kitto J at 514.
   
   (3) The question of whether a trade mark is adapted to distinguish the services of the applicant is to be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives (in the exercise of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage for the sake of the signification which the words ordinarily possess) will think of the word and want to use it in connection with similar goods in any manner which would infringe the trade mark once registered: Clark Equipment at 514.
   
   (4) Directly descriptive words, like geographical names, are not prima facie suitable for the grant of a monopoly conferred by registration of a trade mark because use of them, as trade marks, will “rarely eclipse” their “primary” (that is, their ordinary) signification. Such words (or a word) are unlikely to be inherently, that is to say, “in [their] own nature”, adapted to distinguish the applicant’s goods. Traders may legitimately want to use such words in connection with their goods or services “because of the reference they are ‘inherently adapted to make’ to those goods”: Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited (“Cantarella”) [2014] HCA 48; (2014) 254 CLR 337 at [57] per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ.

   (5) The principles derived from the observations of Kitto J in Clark Equipment apply with as much force to directly descriptive words as they do to words which are, according to their ordinary signification, geographical names: Cantarella at [57].
   
   (6) In determining whether a word is (or words are) inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services of an applicant, the question is to be examined from the point of view of the “possible impairment” of the rights of “honest traders” and from the “point of view of the public”: Cantarella at [59].
   
   (7) In determining whether a word contains (or words contain) a “direct reference” to the relevant goods or services (and thus prima facie not registrable as a trade mark) or whether the word (or words) makes a “covert and skilful allusion” to the relevant goods or services (and thus prima facie registrable as a trade mark), the “ordinary signification” of the word or words to persons who will purchase, consume or trade in the goods or services, must be considered: Cantarella at [59].
   
   (8) Where the question is whether there are other traders who may legitimately want to use or apply a word or words in connection with their goods or services (other than a geographical name or a surname), the test refers to the “legitimate desire of other traders to use a word which is directly descriptive in respect of the same or similar goods”: Cantarella at [59].
   
   (9) Consistent with the proposition at (7), the test described at (8) does not encompass the desire of other traders to use a word or words which in relation to the goods or services are “allusive or metaphorical”: Cantarella at [59].
   
   (10) In determining whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services for the purposes of s 41(3), the ordinary signification of the word or words are to be considered from the perspective of “any person in Australia concerned with the goods or services to which the trade mark is to be applied”: Cantarella at [70].
   
   (11) Consideration of the “ordinary signification” of any word or words said to constitute a trade mark is “crucial”: Cantarella at [71]. That is so whether the word (or words) is said not to be registrable because: it is not an invented word and has direct reference to the character or quality of the goods or services; or, the word is laudatory; or, the word is a geographical name; or, the word has either lost its distinctiveness or it never had the requisite distinctiveness from the outset: Cantarella at [71].
   
   (12) The process of reasoning in addressing s 41(3) of the Act involves first identifying the “ordinary signification” of the word in question and then undertaking an enquiry into whether other traders might legitimately need to use the word in respect of their goods: Cantarella at [71]. If a word contains an allusive reference to goods or services it is, prima facie, qualified for the grant of a monopoly as a trade mark under the Act. If, on the other hand, the word is understood, by the target audience, as having a directly descriptive meaning in relation to relevant goods or services then, prima facie, the proprietor is not entitled to a monopoly in respect of the word. As a general proposition, a word or words which are prima facie entitled to a monopoly secured by registration as a trade mark under the Act, according to this method, are inherently adapted to distinguish: Cantarella at [71].[8]

   [8] [2017] FCAFC 56, [236] (Greenwood, Besanko and Katzmann JJ).

2. The term sea road refers to a type of commonly used shipping and transport route on oceans and hence the Word Mark indicates that the Applicant’s Services are offered on or in connection with a sea road, that is in respect of commonly used shipping and transport routes, namely an aspect of the service. The examiner did not raise the s 41 ground with respect to the Device Mark and for completeness I note that I am satisfied that the Device Mark, which consists of the word ‘Sea Road’ and various additional elements including ‘keeping Tasmania connected’ is inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s Services.

3. When considering whether the Word Mark is inherently adapted to distinguish I consider that, given nature and meaning of the term, a trader may legitimately need to use the word in respect of the Applicant’s Services (for example a transport company that specialises in high volume routes may wish to state that they are a ‘sea road specialist’), but this is not likely as the term is relatively uncommon and it is unlikely that a transport company would want to describe its expertise in terms of the volume of routes chosen. This term, while a nautical term that is somewhat descriptive, is not in the same category of terms that are directly descriptive of the Applicant’s Services. I consider that the Word Mark falls within s 41(4) of the Act.

4. It is therefore necessary to consider the provisions of s 41(4) of the Act and in particular the combined effect of the use of the Word Mark by the Applicant and its predecessors in title for over 40 years (including the significant revenue and advertising over that time), the intention to continue using the Word Mark in a similar manner, and the extent the Word Mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s Services. Given these factors I am not persuaded, noting the presumption of registrability, that the ground of rejection at s 41(4) applies; namely I am not satisfied that the Word Mark does not and will not distinguish Applicant’s Services as being those of the Applicant at the relevant date. Rather given the significant ongoing use of the Word Mark and the strong (but not sufficient in itself) level of distinctiveness in the Word Mark (which would require a lower level of use to establish distinctiveness),[9] the presumption of registrability should apply and the Word Mark should not be rejected under s 41(4) of the Act.

   [9] Time Warner Entertainment Company, LP v Stepsam Investments Pty Limited, [2003] FCA 1502, [42] (Wilcox J).

   Decision

   23. Section 33 of the Act relevantly provides:

   33Application accepted or rejected

   (1)The Registrar must, after the examination, accept the application unless he or she is satisfied that:

   (a)the application has not been made in accordance with this Act; or

   (b)there are grounds under this Act for rejecting it.

   (2)The Registrar may accept the application subject to conditions or limitations.

   (3)If the Registrar is satisfied that:

   (a)the application has not been made in accordance with this Act; or

   (b)there are grounds under this Act for rejecting it;

   the Registrar must reject the application.

5. As I am not satisfied that there are grounds for rejection under ss 41 and 44 of the Act, I accept the applications to register the Trade Marks for the Applicant’s Services subject to the relevant endorsement/s.

   Nicholas Smith

   Hearing Officer

   Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks

   9 January 2024