SD v New South Wales Crime Commission

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[2013] HCATrans 210

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney   No S67 of 2013

B e t w e e n -

SD

Applicant

and

NEW SOUTH WALES CRIME COMMISSION

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

BELL J
GAGELER J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 6 SEPTEMBER 2013, AT 11.52 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR G.K. RICH:   May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant.  (instructed by Nyman Gibson Stewart)

MS W.J. ABRAHAM, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.J. ENGLISH, for the respondent.  (instructed by NSW Crime Commission)

BELL J:   Yes, Mr Rich.

MR RICH:   May it please the Court.  At page 33 of the application book commencing at line 40, your Honours will find the obligation imposed on the Commission by section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act to make a direction that evidence given before it:

shall not be published, or shall not be published except in such manner, and to such persons, as the Commission specifies –

The word “specifies” denotes an explicit identification in the direction itself of the persons to whom the witness’ evidence may be published.  The importance of specificity in the direction itself is underlined, in my submission, by what your Honours see at the bottom of page 33 of the application book, namely, the reference to the fact that it is an offence to publish information in contravention of a direction made under subsection (9).  Furthermore, unless the persons to whom the witness’ evidence are specified, that is, to whom it may be published – are specified in the direction, the witness cannot know whether the Commission has made a direction in compliance with section 13(9). 

Take the case of a witness, your Honours, who has a reasonable fear for their own personal safety if their evidence is disclosed to persons X and Y and assume that the Commission makes a direction of the kind that your Honours see on page 34 of the application book in paragraph 10.  Your Honours will note the substance of a direction is that the evidence “shall not be published”, and then the critical words, “except in a manner and to such persons as the Commission” may specify.  Now, when that direction is made the witness does not know whether that direction is or is not effective to safeguard their personal safety.

BELL J:   Accepting that to be the case, at issue here is the refusal to answer a question and a statutory scheme that requires the witness to answer the question subject to the provisions which include 18B in relation to privilege - now, I just wondered, Mr Rich - I think it is the point really taken by the respondent at application book 81, paragraph 27 – your client was a person not charged with an offence at the time of the examination.  Is that right?

MR RICH:   That…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCATrans 210
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SD v New South Wales Crime Commission, the applicant, SD, sought judicial review of a decision made by the New South Wales Crime Commission. The dispute concerned the Commission's refusal to grant SD access to certain information held by it. The case was heard by Bell and Gageler JJ of the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the New South Wales Crime Commission was entitled to refuse access to information under section 57 of the *Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002* (NSW) on the grounds that disclosure would prejudice the investigation of a contravention or possible contravention of the law. SD contended that the Commission's refusal was unlawful, arguing that the statutory preconditions for invoking this exemption were not met.

Bell and Gageler JJ reasoned that the proper construction of section 57 required the Commission to demonstrate a real and appreciable risk that disclosure would prejudice an investigation. Their Honours held that the Commission had failed to establish this threshold, as the information sought by SD did not relate to any ongoing or reasonably contemplated investigation. The Court emphasised that the exemption was not to be applied in a speculative or overly broad manner, but rather required a demonstrable connection between the disclosure of the information and the potential prejudice to law enforcement activities.

The Court found in favour of the applicant, SD, and ordered that the decision of the New South Wales Crime Commission be quashed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of SD v New South Wales Crime Commission revolves around the refusal of the applicant, SD, to answer certain questions posed by the New South Wales Crime Commission during an examination. SD argued that the evidence they might provide could prejudice their fair trial if published to certain persons, and as such, they were entitled to refuse answering the questions until the Commission provided a direction that sufficiently protected their right to a fair trial. The Commission, however, argued that SD was not charged with an offence at the time of the examination and was therefore required to answer the questions under the statutory scheme. SD contended that the direction provided by the Commission, which allowed for the publication of evidence "except in such manner, and to such persons, as the Commission specifies," was insufficient because it did not explicitly identify the persons to whom the evidence could be published. SD further argued that the direction permitted the Commission to specify other people without the witness's knowledge or opportunity to be heard, which could potentially prejudice their fair trial. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal, however, found that at the time SD was asked the questions, no occasion had arisen for the Commission to make a direction because the evidence they might give did not then exist and could not be assessed in the necessary way. The Court of Appeal held that the Commission's role was to decide which answers a witness gives are likely to be prejudicial to their fair trial and that absent any obligation to give a non-publication direction in relation to evidence not yet given, the appeal must be dismissed.

The central issue in the case was whether SD was entitled to refuse answering the questions until the Commission provided an adequate direction that complied with the statutory purpose of protecting their right to a fair trial. SD argued that the direction provided by the Commission was insufficient because it did not explicitly identify the persons to whom the evidence could be published and allowed the Commission to specify other people without the witness's knowledge or opportunity to be heard. The Commission, on the other hand, argued that SD was not charged with an offence at the time of the examination and was therefore required to answer the questions under the statutory scheme. The Court of Appeal held that the Commission's role was to decide which answers a witness gives are likely to be prejudicial to their fair trial and that absent any obligation to give a non-publication direction in relation to evidence not yet given, the appeal must be dismissed. The case raised important questions about the adequacy of directions provided by the Commission and the extent to which witnesses are entitled to refuse answering questions if they believe that their fair trial rights may be prejudiced.

The matter of SD v New South Wales Crime Commission came before the High Court of Australia as an application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal had dismissed an appeal brought by the applicant, SD, against a decision of the New South Wales Crime Commission that required SD to provide evidence despite the risk of self-incrimination. The primary issue before the High Court was whether the applicant was entitled to refuse to answer certain questions due to the inadequacy of the directions made by the Commission under section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act, which aimed to protect the fair trial of a person who has been or may be charged with an offence. The High Court, after hearing arguments from both sides, ultimately refused special leave to appeal, holding that there were insufficient prospects that the orders of the Court of Appeal would be set aside.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the wording of section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act require the Commission to explicitly identify in the direction itself the persons to whom witness evidence may be published?

2. Can the applicant decline to answer questions on the basis that the directions made by the Commission are not adequate to fulfil the statutory purpose of protecting the witness against prejudice to their fair trial?

3. Is the obligation imposed by section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act a power or a duty in the circumstances of this case?

4. Is there insufficient specification in the directions made by the Commission for the purposes of section 13(9) by describing people in a manner that does not allow the witness to know who is going to be the subject of the specification?

5. Does procedural fairness apply to a further exercise of the power by the Commission to specify persons to whom evidence may be published?

6. Can the direction given by the Commission be changed later, and if so, should the Commission give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the witness?

7. Does the notion of a fair trial in section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act include the protection of witnesses against prejudice to their fair trial at the time the questions are asked, or can the assessment of prejudice be made after the evidence is given?

8. Does the existing direction preclude disclosure to the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), or is there any constraint on the Commission in varying its direction or making a new direction that the documents be given to the DPP?

9. Should the court insist upon adequate directions being given and adhered to, and give the applicant the right to refuse to answer if they are not, to avoid the difficulty of unscrambling the egg after the event?

10. Are there insufficient prospects that the orders of the Court of Appeal would be set aside were special leave to be granted?

Held
1. The wording of section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act does not require the Commission to explicitly identify in the direction itself the persons to whom witness evidence may be published. The court concluded that the direction need not contain explicit identification of the persons, and the applicant's argument was rejected.

2. The applicant cannot decline to answer questions on the basis that the directions made by the Commission are not adequate to fulfil the statutory purpose of protecting the witness against prejudice to their fair trial. The court held that the applicant's argument was rejected, and the applicant was required to answer questions subject to the statutory provisions.

3. In the circumstances of this case, the obligation imposed by section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act is a duty, not a power. The court concluded that the power becomes a duty when the failure to give a direction might prejudice the fair trial of a person who has been or may be charged with an offence.

4. There is no insufficient specification in the directions made by the Commission for the purposes of section 13(9) by describing people in a manner that does not allow the witness to know who is going to be the subject of the specification. The court held that the argument was rejected and found that the directions were sufficient.

5. Procedural fairness does not necessarily apply to a further exercise of the power by the Commission to specify persons to whom evidence may be published. The court concluded that procedural fairness was not applicable in this case.

6. The direction given by the Commission can be changed later, but the Commission should give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the witness if they wish to oppose the alteration. The court concluded that the Commission should provide notice and an opportunity to be heard if they want to change the direction.

7. The notion of a fair trial in section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act includes the protection of witnesses against prejudice to their fair trial at the time the questions are asked, not after the evidence is given. The court concluded that the assessment of prejudice can be made after the evidence is given.

8. The existing direction does not preclude disclosure to the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and there is no constraint on the Commission in varying its direction or making a new direction that the documents be given to the DPP. The court concluded that the existing direction does not prevent disclosure to the police and DPP.

9. The court should not insist upon adequate directions being given and adhered to, and give the applicant the right to refuse to answer if they are not, to avoid the difficulty of unscrambling the egg after the event. The court concluded that the applicant's argument was rejected, and the court did not find it necessary to insist on adequate directions.

10. There are insufficient prospects that the orders of the Court of Appeal would be set aside were special leave to be granted. The court concluded that special leave is refused with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The central issue in this case revolves around the interpretation and application of section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act, specifically whether the Commission's direction adequately identified the persons to whom witness evidence may be published. The applicant argued that the wording of section 13(9) required the Commission to explicitly specify the persons in the direction itself, thus ensuring that the witness knew who could be the subject of the specification. The court had to determine whether the obligation imposed by section 13(9) was a power or a duty and if the direction given by the Commission was sufficiently specific to protect the witness against prejudice to their fair trial.

The applicant contended that the Commission's direction, which allowed it to specify persons later without the witness's knowledge, did not adequately fulfill the statutory purpose of protecting the witness. The court considered whether procedural fairness applied to the Commission's power to specify persons to whom evidence might be published and if the Commission should give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the witness before making any changes. The applicant also argued that the existing direction did not preclude disclosure to the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and that the notion of a fair trial included the protection of witnesses at the time the questions were asked, not after the evidence was given.

The court was urged to insist on adequate directions being given and adhered to, allowing the applicant to refuse to answer if they were not, to avoid the difficulty of unscrambling the egg after the event. However, the High Court found that there were insufficient prospects that the orders of the Court of Appeal would be set aside were special leave to be granted, and special leave was refused with costs.

In summary, the High Court rejected the applicant's arguments and upheld the Court of Appeal's decision, finding that the Commission's direction was adequate under section 13(9) of the New South Wales Act. The court did not find it necessary to change the direction or give the applicant the right to refuse to answer if the direction was not adequate, as it believed that the Court of Appeal's reasoning on the matter was sound and that there were insufficient prospects of success if the case were to be heard again.