Scougall v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources
[1996] QLAC 121
•13 September 1996
|
IN THE LAND APPEAL COURT
Re:Appeal against a decision of the Land Court - Determination of unimproved value -
City of Brisbane. (AV93-119, AV94-364)
BETWEEN:
RAYMOND J SCOUGALL
Appellant
and
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered at Brisbane this thirteenth day of September 1996
These appeals are brought against decisions of the Land Court concerning the annual valuation of the appellant's land as at 31 March 1992 and 30 June 1993. The Land Court heard the cases together. It dismissed the appeals against those valuations and affirmed the determinations of the respondent Chief Executive.
The grounds of appeal to the Land Court in matter AV93-119 included, in addition to some generally worded grounds, the following:
"3. The capital sum which the fee simple of the subject land (if unimproved) might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require is much less than the unimproved value assessed by the Valuer-General.
...
5. Relativity in regard to other properties in the area is lacking.
6. The valuation is not supported by comparable sales evidence from within the area.
...
8. The Valuer-General has acted capriciously in disregarding the decision handed down by the Office of the Land Court ... in respect of this property."
The grounds of appeal in AV94-364 were in essence the same.
The hearing of these appeals to the Land Appeal Court was by way of a rehearing on the evidence given to the Land Court (Valuation of Land Act 1944 section 64(2)). No new evidence was adduced. Although the appellant is confined in these proceedings to the grounds of appeal set out in the original notice of appeal (see Gibson Investments Pty Ltd v The Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 223 (LAC), Pratt v The Valuer-General (1982) 8 QLCR 145 (LAC)), the notice of appeal to the Land Appeal Court set out numerous differently worded grounds of appeal. No objection was taken to the latter notice, and it is clear that, although many of the grounds take issue with aspects of the decision of the Land Court, those grounds particularise matters contained in the original notice of appeal.
The resolution of these appeals involves consideration of two distinct concepts, namely, the unimproved value of individual blocks of land and the relative value of similar blocks of land. Although the appeals are against annual valuations for 1992 and 1993, the appellant's argument is founded on the amended valuation of the subject land as at 31 March 1990. Mr Scougall objected to the original 1990 valuation of $38,500. A decision disallowing the objection was issued. An appeal against that decision was lodged in the Land Court. Before the Land Court heard the appeal, the acting Valuer General reviewed the valuation and, in accordance with section 21A of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (now section 68(1)), reduced the value to $36,500. The appellant accepted the reduced valuation. On the written application of the parties, the Land Court, in a decision dated 18 August 1992, by consent allowed the appeal and determined the unimproved value of the subject land to be $36,500. No evidence was provided to the Land Court and the basis on which the amended figure was assessed was not disclosed. Apparently no appeals were brought against, and no changes were made to, the valuations of neighbouring blocks with similar features (the "relativity properties").
The 1990 valuation is not in issue in these proceedings. The appeals have been brought
because, in the appellant's submission, the relativity established between the unimproved value
of the subject land and the unimproved values of the relativity properties in 1990 was wrongly disturbed in the 1992 and 1993 valuations.
The extent of the change is illustrated by a comparison of the values of the subject land at 32 Leeson Street, Boondall, and a few of the relativity properties most comparable to the subject land, facing Stanworth Road and Leeson Street. The following table (drawn from a more extensive table provided to this Court) shows that the unimproved value (“uv”) applied to most relativity properties increased by 25-26% from 1990 to 1992, while the unimproved value applied to the subject land increased by 32%. Other properties on the more extensive table showed an increase of 24%.
| Address | Area-m² | 1990uv | 1992uv | Factor increase |
| 32 Leeson Street | 560 | 36500 | 48000 | 1.32 |
| 1 Stanworth Road (Lot 7) | 559 | 38500 | 48000 | 1.25 |
| 3 Stanworth Road | 547 | 38500 | 48000 | 1.25 |
| 5 Stanworth Road | 549 | 38000 | 47500 | 1.25 |
| 7 Stanworth Road | 549 | 38000 | 47500 | 1.25 |
| 9 Stanworth Road | 549 | 38000 | 47500 | 1.25 |
| 39 Leeson Street | 569 | 38500 | 48000 | 1.25 |
| 37 Leeson Street | 549 | 38500 | 48000 | 1.25 |
| 35 Leeson Street | 622 | 39000 | 49000 | 1.26 |
| 2267 Sandgate Road (Lot 8) | 557 | 40500 | 51000 | 1.26 |
In summary, the appellant argued that:
in the original 1990 valuation of land in the area, the wrong unimproved value was applied to the subject land;
the correct value was agreed after objection and was subject of a consent order by the Land Court;
after the adjustment, the 1990 value of the subject land was more correct than the value applied to the immediately surrounding relativity properties;
pursuant to the relevant sections of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (since renumbered sections 28 and 29), the Valuer-General could have altered the values determined in 1990 in respect of the relativity properties, but chose not to;
by operation of the relevant section of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (since renumbered section 33), the altered valuation of the subject land and the valuations of the relativity properties in 1990 were deemed to be correct;
as a consequence, the relativity between the values of the subject land and the relativity properties was set in 1990;
in the 1992 valuation, the original 1990 relativity of values between the subject land and the relativity properties was restored with the subject land and some neighbouring blocks being valued at or about $48,000;
in restoring the previous relativity of values between neighbouring properties, there was an increase from 1990 to 1992 of 32% in the value applied to the subject land and an increase of 24-26% in the value applied to the relativity properties;
there was no concrete evidence to suggest a change in relativity of the subject property should have been contemplated;
because there is evidence that, between 1990 and 1992, there was a 25% increase in the market value of properties such as the subject land and the relativity properties, there was no justification for a 32% increase in the valuation of the subject land in 1992 and the maintenance of that value in 1993.
The law
The legal principles to be applied in this case were not in dispute. They were usefully summarised in Grahn v The Valuer General (1992) 14 QLCR 327. In its reasons for judgment, the Land Appeal Court relied on the decision of the High Court of Australia in Brisbane City Council v The Valuer-General ((1978) 140 CLR 41, 5 QLCR 283) and the decisions of the Land Appeal Court in cases such as Fischer v The Valuer-General ((1983) 9 QLCR 44) and Barnwell v The Valuer-General ((1989) 13 QLCR 13) as authority for the following propositions.
It is desirable that valuations made for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 of comparable lands should bear proper relativity, one to the other, so long as the valuations are soundly based. It is, however, untenable to adopt a value for one parcel on relativity with another which has no sound basis (Barnwell v The Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13, at p. 16 and cases cited in it).
The best basis for assessment of unimproved value is the use of sales of vacant or lightly improved parcels of land (Fischer v The Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 44, at 46; Barnwell v The Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13, at 17).
Section 33 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (formerly section 13(7)) creates a presumption that the value in money terms shown by the Chief Executive (formerly the Valuer-General) in his notice of valuation is correct (Brisbane City Council v The Valuer-General (1978) 140 CLR 41, at 56).
Once it is shown that:
(1)in making the valuation the Chief Executive acted upon a wrong principle, or made a serious error of fact; or
(2)the valuation was made by a method fundamentally erroneous.
the presumption created by section 33 is rebutted (Brisbane City Council v The Valuer- General (1978) 140 CLR 41, at 56-7).
Whilst maintenance of correct relativity is of considerable importance for rating valuations, the use of the principle of relativity should not be preferred to the exclusion of relevant (even if not ideal) sales evidence (Fischer v The Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 44, at 46).
If possible, the Chief Executive should obtain uniformity between different blocks in the same land category or type, but should do so (preferably by reference to sales of comparable land) by correcting inaccuracies rather than by making an inaccurate assessment in order to secure uniform error (Barnwell v The Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13, at 16-17 and cases cited in it).
Resolving the issues
The appellant bears the onus of proving the grounds of appeal (section 45(4)) and, to succeed, must show that, in making the valuation, the respondent acted upon a wrong principle,
or made a serious error of fact, or that the valuation was made by a method fundamentally erroneous.
These appeals are best decided by looking at the relative values of the subject land and neighbouring blocks and then at the valuation applied to the subject block in 1992 and 1993. In making each assessment, it is necessary to note the main features of the subject land.
The subject land: The land has an area of 560m², is slightly irregular in shape and has a moderate elevation rising slightly from the front of the block to the north-western corner. It is zoned Residential A. Access is from Leeson Street, a cul de sac street which is full width, bitumen sealed, kerbed and channelled. A single-unit dwelling is constructed on the land. Abutting the land to the south is a pedestrian pathway leading to Sandgate Road. The pathway is used by local residents and students from Nudgee College. Directly west from the subject land lies Lot 8 on RP 161200 ("Lot 8"). It separates the subject from Sandgate Road and a service road which commences at about the point the pathway emerges into the road area. North-west from the subject land lies the intersection of Sandgate Road, Stanworth Road and Beams Road. This intersection is controlled by traffic lights. Between the subject land and this intersection lie Lot 8 and Lot 7 on RP 161200 ("Lot 7"). The unimproved values applied to Lots 7 and 8 in 1990 and 1992 are recorded in the table earlier in these reasons for judgment.
Sandgate Road is a busy road and has, in the area near the subject land, a maximum speed limit of 70 kilometres per hour. Mr Scougall explained that noise from that road and, to a lesser extent, Stanworth Road travels to the subject land between houses built on Lots 7 and 8. Mr Wall suggested that those houses provide some buffer to the traffic noise from the busy roads. Mr Scougall gave evidence that, when traffic travelling along Beams Road turned right into Sandgate Road, lights from vehicles are visible at the subject land.
Relativity: The appellant's case appeared to proceed on the basis that, in a particular year, relativity of values of blocks of land can be adjusted by reference to factors other than the relevant features of the blocks of land in their unimproved state. Once adjusted, the relative values should not be disturbed except for sound reasons.
The appellant is a registered valuer. He held himself out to be a person who is professionally qualified to value land in accordance with recognised valuation principles. No doubt was cast on those qualifications.
From the appellant's evidence and his submissions, it is apparent that the appellant does not think that the subject land in its unimproved state is inferior to at least some of the relativity properties. The transcript of proceedings before the Land Court records an exchange between counsel for the respondent and Mr Scougall concerning the relative values of a block described as Lot 7 and the subject land.
"All right. See, if it were the case that lot 7 was correctly valued at $48,000, what's wrong with the - how could the subject land have an unimproved value of
$45,500?
I'd have to agree that there is a comparison between the two properties, but I would contend that the valuation applied to lot 7 is incorrect."
The learned Land Court member took that evidence to mean that, in Mr Scougall's view, the subject land and Lot 7 could be valued at similar figures and, if that were done, the relevant disabilities (in particular, the noise from the road) would be taken into account. That finding was not challenged on appeal.
Support for that finding is implicit in the following statements in the notice of appeal to this Court:
"1(f)... The Court should have found the 1990 valuation on the subject land to be more correct than the surrounding properties on the basis the subject property was subject to the objection and appeals process and to a consent determination by the Court.
7 That the Court should have found:
(a)The 1990 valuation of the subject land to be more correct than the immediately surrounding 'relativity properties'."
(emphasis added)
The contention that the 1990 valuation of the subject land was "more correct" than the 1990 valuation of other relativity properties suggests that, in the appellant's mind, the other properties were incorrectly valued in 1990. The inference that the values of the other properties were too high was confirmed in submissions before this Court.
Mr Scougall contended that other valuations should have been reduced in accordance with section 28(1)(g) of the Valuation of Land Act (formerly section 13(2)(g)). That section
enables the respondent to alter the valuation of a parcel of land during the period during which a valuation relating to the area is in force where:
"in the opinion of the chief executive, circumstances affecting the valuation of the land are such as to render an alteration necessary or desirable for preserving or attainting uniformity in values between that valuation and subsisting valuations of other comparable parcels of lands".
He agreed that, if the power had been exercised, the values of the other properties would have been reduced to a value which bore the same relativity to the subject land in 1990 before he succeeded in his appeal. In other words, they would have been reduced by about the same amount.
The conclusion which inevitably follows from the appellant's evidence and submissions, as supported by tables and diagrams provided by the respondent, is that the relative values of the subject land and the relativity properties are as stated in 1990 (before the consent order was made by the Land Court) and as stated in 1992 and 1993 valuations.
That conclusion also gives effect to the principles stated earlier that valuations of comparable land should bear proper relativity to each other, it is untenable to adopt a value for one parcel on relativity with another which has no sound basis, and it is important to correct inaccuracies rather than make an inaccurate assessment in order to secure uniform error.
In making a ruling about the relative values of the relativity properties we are not determining whether the values applied to each of those properties were correct in any of those years. We merely observe that, on the evidence, the unimproved values applied to the subject land and the relativity properties should have the same relativity to each other as was established in those years.
There is no appeal before this Court in respect of the 1990 valuation. The fact that an agreement was reached between the parties that the subject land should be valued at $36,500 may give some support to the appellant's contention that the subject land was "more correctly" valued than the neighbouring blocks. As there was no evidence before the Land Court about the 1990 valuation, that valuation was never tested and we have no way of knowing on what basis the reduction was agreed. Nor do we have any way of knowing whether the values applied to the relativity properties in 1990 were too high. That has no bearing on these proceedings.
Because we have concluded that the subject land and neighbouring relativity properties should be valued in a way which reflects the relativities in place in 1990 before the valuation of the subject land was amended, the remaining issue is whether the proper value was applied to the subject land in 1992 and 1993.
Valuation of the subject land: Because two appeals have to be determined, it is necessary to decide whether the appeal should be allowed in respect of either or both of the 1992 and 1993 valuations.
Evidence in support of the 1992 and 1993 valuations was given to the Land Court by Mr RD Wall, a registered valuer employed by the Department of Lands. His evidence was that in each year the subject land was valued by reference to the sales of comparable land. He provided information about those sales.
Mr Scougall agreed that when valuing the subject land as at 31 March 1992 one should look at sales that occurred at or about that date or within 12 months prior to that date. He submitted that those sales could be applied in two ways. On a direct comparison with the subject land, they support a valuation of $45,000. Alternatively, they show a general increase in the value of comparable land of 25% in the period 1990-92.
1992 valuation:
Both parties produced lists of sales in support of their 1992 valuation figures. Although there were no properties common to both lists, some properties on one party's list were in the same streets as properties on the other's list. Neither man commented in detail about the sales evidence adduced by the other. There was, however, enough information for a picture to emerge with sufficient clarity to resolve this appeal.
In support of his figure of $45,500, Mr Scougall prepared a valuation report to which was annexed a schedule of five sales (Annexure H). Sales A and B are adjacent rectangular blocks in Boondall Street, each with an area of 640 m². They are located in a quiet locality and are surrounded by superior quality dwellings. Mr Scougall described each as superior to the subject land in terms of size, topography, locality and surrounding development. They were sold early in 1992 for $62,500 and $61,500 respectively. The applied unimproved values were
$59,000 and $58,000 respectively. Mr Wall agreed that Sales A and B were superior to the subject, being in a newer and quieter area. He thought, however, that the subject had superior elevation to those blocks.
Sale C is a rectangular block of 699 m² in Mayfair Place. It was sold in February 1992 for $61,500 and had an applied unimproved value of $57,000. Mr Scougall assessed the subject and sale C land in the same way as for Sale A. Mr Wall knew of the subdivision for the area in which the block was located.
Sale D is an irregularly shaped, level block of 616 m² located in Liaw Close, Boondall, a quiet cul-de-sac. The land is near Boondall State School and to superior quality dwellings. It was sold in October 1991 for $62,000 and had an applied unimproved value of $54,000. Mr Scougall described the land as slightly superior to the subject in size, topography, locality and surrounding development. Although Mr Wall was familiar with the locality, he offered no comment about the Sale D land.
Sale E is an irregularly shaped block of 641 m² in Michelle Place, a quiet cul-de-sac street. The land is above road level and is considered to be superior to the subject in terms of size, topography, locality and surrounding development. It was sold in November 1991 for
$61,000 and had an applied unimproved value of $57,000.
All the properties A to E were described as superior to the subject and were in quiet localities. The unimproved value of each rose by 24-26% from the 1990 valuation to the 1992 valuation. Mr Scougall said that he had been unable to locate any sales of land exposed to traffic noise.
Evidence in support of the respondent's 1992 valuation was given by Mr Wall. Although he was not the officer who had made the original valuation, Mr Wall defended it. His written report referred to three sales on which the valuation had been made. Two of the sale blocks were said to be inferior to the subject land and one was superior. In his opinion it was possible to get "a pretty accurate conclusion as to what the property is worth" from the range of properties.
Sales 1 and 2 were adjacent blocks in Sandgate Road. Each had an area of 759 m², was zoned Residential A and was comparable to the other in all material respects. Each was exposed to traffic noise on Sandgate Road. The blocks were sold on 6 July 1991 in a lightly improved state for $41,500 and $45,500 respectively. In analysing the sales, Mr Wall allowed $2,000 each for clearing and fencing. Sale 1 had an analysed unimproved value of $39,500 and Sale 2 had an analysed unimproved value of $43,500. Despite those differences in value, Mr Wall applied
$37,000 to each block (94% and 85% respectively). In his opinion, each of these sale blocks was inferior to the subject land due to the sale land having a frontage to Sandgate Road, traffic noise,
access difficulties, exposure, topography and overall inferior location. Although larger in area than the subject land, the sale blocks did not have an adjoining pedestrian pathway.
Mr Scougall submitted that, because only 85% of the analysed unimproved value of Sale 2 was applied, it could not be relied on as a basic sale. It is correct to say that the application was conservative (especially when compared with Sale 1) but that is no reason to ignore it for the purpose of valuing the subject land.
Sale 3 on which Mr Wall relied was a 741 m² Residential A block in Boondall Street which sold on 6 May 1992 for $63,500. Having allowed $1,000 for clearing the applicable value was $56,000 (or 90% of the analysed unimproved value). Mr Wall described the land as superior to the subject and noted the criteria by which he made that assessment. Like the subject land, the Sale 3 land is at the end of a cul-de-sac and has an adjacent pedestrian pathway. It is near Sales A and B on Mr Scougall's list and does not have the same exposure to traffic noise as the subject land.
Before this Court, Mr Scougall took issue with the use of sale 3 on the basis that the sale took place on 6 May 1992, some 5 weeks after the relevant date of valuation. In his submission, although the sale may have been relevant to the 1993 valuation, evidence about the sale should not be used in these proceedings.
It is undoubtedly the case that, for annual valuation purposes, the best sales evidence concerns sales of comparable blocks of unimproved land which occurred within a year before the date of valuation. Some support for the use of subsequent sales can be drawn from the following passage from Williams J in McCathie v Federal Commissioner of Taxation:
"Values must be calculated in the light of circumstances which existed on the material date, ... but subsequent events can be taken into account in order to determine the proper weight to attach to such circumstances. Subsequent sales are just as admissible in evidence as prior sales, provided that in all the circumstances they are comparable. If between the material date and the date of the subsequent sale supervening events occur which alter the condition previously existing, the subsequent sales would not be comparable and would be useless." ((1944) 69 CLR 1, at 16).
In GA Nichol v the Valuer-General (1961) 28 QCLLR 161 the Land Appeal Court rejected a submission that sales after the effective date of valuation should be ignored. Having quoted the dicta of Williams J in McCathie, the Court noted that his Honour had stated the rationale for the approach as being the tendency of courts "to admit evidence of any events prior
to the date of the trial which will throw any real light on the issues" (69 CLR at 16 and
authorities cited there). In the opinion of the Land Appeal Court, "there appears to be no sound reason why a Court or any of the parties should be denied the assistance of sales of comparable land occurring after the effective date, provided market conditions or other relevant conditions have not materially altered" (at 292).
The statement by Williams J has been applied by other courts. In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Harris (1980) 30 ALR 10, Bowen CJ stated that, if evidence of subsequent events is available which shows that the possibility of an event occurring has become a reality, it is proper for the Court to have regard to the actual events when assessing the position as it was at the relevant date (at 18; see also Deane J at 19). In the same case, Fisher J referred to the limitation on the principle stated by Williams J, namely that subsequent events can only be used to determine the weight to attach to circumstances which existed at the relevant date. The subsequent event cannot create an expectation which was not in existence at the relevant date (at 25 quoting from John Martin (Elizabeth) Limited v Commissioner of Land Tax (1965) SASR 217, at 225).
In the present case this Court can only have regard to later sales evidence to confirm the circumstances which applied at the relevant valuation date. In some annual valuation cases, the date of sale may be so far after the relevant date of valuation, and so close to the next date of valuation, that evidence about the sale should be disregarded or given very little weight. In Eastwell Pty Ltd v The Valuer-General (1987) 11 QLCR 169, the appellant submitted that only one sale presented by the Valuer-General in that case could be used as a basis for valuation because the other sale was an after date sale. The Court considered that the sale in issue had occurred "a mere 26 days after the relevant date" and there was no suggestion that there was any change in the market place in "that short space of time". It held that the valuer quite properly had had regard to the later sale (see (1987) 11 QLCR at 173, 176-177).
In light of the authorities just mentioned, and the reasonable proximity of the date of sale and the relevant valuation date, there is no reason to ignore the evidence about Sale 3.
In summary, Mr Scougall urged that sales 2 and 3 be disregarded. For reasons given above, we have not done so but have considered them in light of the qualifications noted.
When presented with that sales evidence in proceedings before the Land Court, Mr Scougall argued that, given the features of those blocks, the sales supported his valuation of the subject land. He also submitted that the valuation of the subject land had been made without
sufficient regard being given to the traffic noise audible in the land, the detrimental influence of the adjoining laneway and the intermittent shafts of light from the headlights of vehicles turning right from Beams Road into Sandgate Road. The light passes between the houses on two neighbouring blocks. Those factors should have led to the reduction in the valuation of the land from $48,000 to $45,500. He also contended that the valuations of other blocks in the vicinity of the subject land (such as Lot 7 and other blocks in Leeson Street) were "valued too highly" and that insufficient weight had been given to the detrimental effect of traffic noise when valuing a number of properties along Sandgate Road. Mr Wall said that an allowance had been made for such factors as traffic noise and pedestrian traffic noise. He suggested that the amount of the allowance was generous and that a value of $50,000 or $51,000 may have been more appropriate. All the adjoining properties (including Lot 8) and those on the other side of the pedestrian pathway are valued at $51,000 or $52,000.
Mr Scougall's other submission was that the sales appended to his valuation report supported an increase in value of 1.25 in the relevant period which, when applied to a base value of $36,500, should have resulted in the subject land being valued at $45,500. Passages in his evidence suggest that the application of a percentage increase to the 1990 figure was his primary means of reaching the $45,500 figure. The conclusion of his valuation report states:
"Basis of Valuation
Valuation is based on the application of a general market increase for the area of 25% as supported by the sales evidence shown at ANNEXURE H."
In his oral evidence to the Land Court, Mr Scougall said that the Department of Lands accepted that the property had an unimproved value of $36,500 in 1990.
"The general market increase in the area in - over the ensuing valuation period indicates that the market increased 25 per cent, and that is supported by the sales that are annexed at H and D in my valuation report. So if the 36,500 was a correct figure ... and the general market increased 25 per cent over the ensuing valuation period, I believe that the value of 45,500 is the correct unimproved value for the subject property."
As the learned member of the Land Court observed, there is no support in the authorities for the factorisation approach taken by Mr Scougall. Indeed, the authorities point against it, showing that each revaluation must be done with regard to sales evidence. These are not matters of mere mathematical calculation or progression.
The evidence in this case makes that point clearly enough. Although the values applied to most of the properties near the subject land rose by between 24 and 26% from 1990 to 1992, the increase was not uniform. Indeed Sales 1 and 2 listed by Mr Wall, which were significantly inferior to the subject, rose by 51% in the same period. Those figures suggest that the values of properties with some different features were moving at different rates in that period.
In considering the sales evidence provided by both parties we have had regard to relevant factual matters (including the relative features of the subject land and neighbouring properties) and to relevant legal matters (in particular, the statutory presumption that valuations are correct unless proved otherwise, the onus which is cast on the appellant, and the principles established by previous decisions of the Land Court).
The amount in dispute in these proceedings ($2,500) is relatively small, comprising about 5% of the value applied to the subject land by the respondent. It may be argued that little turns on the decision about such a relatively modest amount and that, given the imprecision of land valuation, it is not possible to ascertain with confidence which valuation is likely to be correct. We have concluded that the appellant has not shown that the respondent acted upon a wrong principle, or made a serious error of fact or that the method employed in making the valuation was fundamentally erroneous. Further, we are satisfied on the evidence that the valuation was appropriate having regard to the sales evidence and the values assigned to the relativity properties. Consequently, the appeal in AV93-119 must be dismissed.
1993 valuation:
Mr Wall was the officer responsible for the 1993 valuation. His revaluation of the area was part of a computer assisted valuation program which looked at sub-market areas. He described the techniques which he adopted, including checking the relativity of values to fine tune valuations. Mr Wall prepared a valuation report in support of the valuation of $48,000 which, he said, was made having regard to the three sales described in schedules attached to the report. One was in Sandgate Road, one in Boondall Street (opposite Sales A and B on Mr Scougall's list) and the third in Liaw Close (near Sale D on Mr Scougall's list). The blocks were all Residential A zoned land. Their features were summarised and Mr Wall made an assessment of whether and why each was inferior or superior to the subject land.
The appellant produced no sales evidence for the 1993 valuation apparently because, in Mr Scougall's terms, the 1993 valuation did not increase and the appeal was "basically a covering appeal to cover the decision in the 1992 valuation".
Mr Scougall agreed that (having regard to factors such as traffic noise, access to the land, quality of dwellings on neighbouring land) the subject land was superior to sales blocks on Sandgate Road, though he thought the subject was "slightly" rather than "considerably" superior. In the absence of either probative evidence in support of the appellant's valuation of
$45,500 or any cogent argument against the evidence or methodology relied on by the respondent, the appeal in AV94-364 must be dismissed.
Costs
At the hearing, Mr Quinn for the respondent made written and oral submissions in support of the respondent's application for costs in the event that the appeal was dismissed. He argued that, although the appeal was advanced by a professional valuer, it was made without proper foundation and in a manner involving frivolous and vexatious submissions.
Historically, the Land Court and Land Appeal Court have been reluctant to award costs in annual valuation matters except in extraordinary circumstances.
In Bowden v The Valuer-General (1980-81) 7 QLCR 138 the Land Appeal Court said:
"Easy access to the Land Court to air grievances and have valuations reviewed is, as we have already stressed, most desirable in revenue cases, and such access should be available without fear of costs being awarded to either party except in special cases." (at 147)
Decisions by the Land Appeal Court in cases such as Santos Ltd v The Valuer-General (1989) 12 QLCR 231 and Hymix Industries Pty Ltd v The Valuer-General (1990) 13 QLCR 173 support the conclusion of the former President of the Land Court that:
"the attitude which the Court should take in the exercise of its discretion is primarily one of restraint which, speaking broadly, may be exercised against the Valuer-General if satisfied that he has acted arbitrarily or capriciously and against the owner if satisfied that he has acted in a frivolous or vexatious manner." (Queensland Landmark Developments Limited v Valuer-General (1992) 14 QLCR 168 at 171)
In our view, the present case is not one in which an order for costs should be made against the appellant. The appeal may have been unsuccessful, but it was not obviously frivolous or vexatious. The appellant had an understandable sense of grievance at what seemed to be anomalous consecutive valuations. Having succeeded in 1990 in obtaining a more correct valuation of his property, he was concerned that the relief obtained one year should not be lost in the next. As a qualified valuer, he should have appreciated that he had little prospect of success. This is not, however, an occasion to hold such qualifications against a person acting on his own behalf.
Orders
The appeal in matter AV93-119 is dismissed and the value of the subject land as determined by the Land Court in the sum of $48,000 is affirmed.
The appeal in matter AV94-364 is dismissed and the value of the subject land as determined by the Land Court in the sum of $48,000 is affirmed.
HELMAN J JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
GJ NEATE MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
SA FORGIE MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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