Scot v Islamic Council of Victoria

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IN THE SUPREME OF VICTORIA  Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE
PRACTICE COURT

No. 4979 of 2005

DANIEL SCOT & ORS Plaintiffs
v
ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF VICTORIA & ORS Defendants

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JUDGE:

Hansen J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

29 April 2005

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

29 April 2005

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Scot v Islamic Council of Victoria

MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2005] VSC 156

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Judicial review - Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal - Complaint under Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 - Complaint upheld - Tribunal due to resume hearing case on remedy - Judicial review proceeding commenced to quash decision - Whether pending determination of judicial review the Tribunal should be restrained by injunction from resuming hearing - Delay - Discretion.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the plaintiff Mr D.A. Perkins Khor & Burr
For the first defendant Mr W.B. Zichy-Woinarski QC with Mr H.L. Redd Allens Arthur Robinson
No appearance for the second defendant
For the third defendant Ms R. Orr Victorian Government Solicitor

HIS HONOUR:

  1. It is now almost 5.10 on Friday afternoon and I propose to give reasons on this application, indeed, I must proceed to do so because the issue is whether the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”) should be restrained from resuming the hearing of a proceeding on Monday. 

  1. The case concerns a complaint that was referred to VCAT by the Equal Opportunity Commission on 21 November 2002.  The complaint arises under the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 of Victoria. The parties to the complaint before VCAT are the Islamic Council of Victoria as complainant, which is the first defendant in the proceeding before me, while the respondents before VCAT are the present plaintiffs. In the proceeding before me the second defendant is a Deputy President of VCAT, Judge Higgins, who has heard the complaint thus far, and the third defendant is VCAT.

  1. Following various directions hearings and the provision of particulars of the complaint and the defence, the hearing of the complaint commenced before VCAT constituted by the judge on 15 October 2003. At the outset, counsel for the plaintiffs addressed submissions of a preliminary nature based on paras 62 – 64 of the defence. Paragraph 62 pleaded reliance upon the implied immunity arising under the Constitution as found by the High Court in favour of free speech on political and religious matters, as it is put in para 62. In para 63 it is said that the matters of which complaint has been made are political and religious matters. In para 64 it is contended that the provisions of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act impinge upon and fetter the operation of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 of the Commonwealth, and are accordingly wholly or partly invalid, a question of inconsistency it would seem.

  1. The judge ruled on the submissions on 21 October 2003.  In short, he found adversely to the contentions of the plaintiffs.  On the issue of legislative inconsistency he noted that the…

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Details
Case
[2005] VSC 156
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Scot brought proceedings against the Islamic Council of Victoria under the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, alleging discrimination. The Islamic Council of Victoria lodged a complaint with the Racial Discrimination Commissioner, which was subsequently upheld by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Scot sought a judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the proceedings should be quashed. The matter before the court was whether, pending the determination of the judicial review, the Tribunal should be restrained by injunction from resuming the hearing of the complaint on the matter of remedy.

The court examined whether it should exercise its discretion to grant an injunction pending the outcome of the judicial review. The court considered the balance of convenience and the risk of significant injustice if an injunction were not granted. The court acknowledged the potential for delay in the judicial review proceedings but emphasised the importance of allowing the Tribunal to proceed with its determination of the remedy, as it was an integral part of the original complaint process. The court ultimately decided that it would not exercise its discretion to grant an injunction, as the balance of convenience favoured allowing the Tribunal to resume the hearing.

The court found that the potential for delay in the judicial review proceedings did not outweigh the importance of allowing the Tribunal to proceed with its determination of the remedy. The court noted that the parties had already undergone a lengthy process in lodging and determining the complaint, and it was in the interests of justice for the Tribunal to continue with its consideration of the appropriate remedy. The court concluded that it would not grant the injunction sought by Scot, and the matter would proceed to a full hearing of the judicial review application.

The court ordered that the application for an interlocutory injunction be dismissed. The court determined that the matter would proceed to a full hearing of the judicial review application, allowing the Tribunal to resume its consideration of the appropriate remedy in relation to the upheld complaint.

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