Schultz v The Queen - [1998] HCATrans 292

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A58 of 1997

B e t w e e n -
JAMES MATTHEW SCHULTZ
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
HAYNE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT ADELAIDE ON THURSDAY, 13 AUGUST 1998, AT 2.43 PM

MRS M.E. SHAW, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.J. KOURAKIS, QC, for the applicant. (instructed by Bill Morris & Associates)

MS W.J. ABRAHAM: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS S.V. DAVID, for the respondent. (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (South Australia))

MRS SHAW: Your Honours, the special leave question raised by this application is whether it is consistent with the rights of an accused to a fair trial that, firstly, a judge in his summing up is entitled to advocate for the guilt of an accused and, secondly, whether he is entitled, without notice, to introduce into his summing up matters of theory or argument which are critical to the disposition of an issue raised by the defence. In the Supreme Court of this State the justices have expressed themselves as being in conflict and have described the differing views as being the traditional view and the opposing view.

GLEESON CJ: Where do we see that?

MRS SHAW: We see that set out in the judgment of his Honour Justice Cox in Reg v D (1997) 68 SASR 571, in particular at page 579, No 1 in the extracts of cases. His Honour identifies at page 579 in the last paragraph:

The traditional position, as I understand it, has always been that a trial judge is entitled to comment on the evidence, whether favourably to the prosecution or the defence, as long as the effect of his remarks is not to overbear the jury.
The opposing position -

which appears further down -

is that, if the jury is to decide the facts, the judge should leave them to do it and not try to influence their decision. It is no use saying that the jury is entitled to ignore the judge’s comments when the whole purpose of them is to ensure that the jury takes them into account. Coming from the judge, his remarks are liable to be given considerable weight. There is a danger, therefore, that any such judicial intervention, if it is critical of the defence, will make the trial unfair.

His Honour went on to conclude at page 584 of the extract that the previous decision of this Full Court in Reg v Machin which was a decision of three judges, unanimously, was in effect decided per incuriam. But, the history of Reg v Machin was that indeed his Honour Justice Cox was the trial judge whose summing up was under scrutiny in Reg v Machin and his Honour Justice Cox concluded in the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Schultz v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Schultz v The Queen [1998] HCATrans 292
Case: [1998] HCATrans 292
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Schultz v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Schultz, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence during his trial.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior convictions and prior bad character. This question involved an examination of the rules of evidence, particularly concerning the admissibility of such material and its potential to prejudice the jury against the accused.

The High Court held that the admission of the evidence of prior convictions and bad character was an error. Gleeson CJ and Hayne J reasoned that the evidence was not relevant to any issue in dispute in the trial and was likely to have unfairly prejudiced the jury against the applicant. The Court emphasised that evidence of prior convictions or bad character is generally inadmissible unless it has a specific, relevant probative value that outweighs its prejudicial effect. In this instance, the evidence did not meet that threshold.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders