Schultz Toomey O'Brien Lawyers Pty Ltd v Jones

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[2016] QCA 308

COURT OF APPEAL

FRASER JA

Appeal No 9155 of 2016
DC No 51 of 2016

SCHULTZ TOOMEY O’BRIEN
LAWYERS PTY LTD  Applicant
ACN 136 676 714

v

IAN MICHAEL JONES  Respondent

BRISBANE

WEDNESDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2016

JUDGMENT

FRASER JA: The respondent to this appeal has applied for orders on two topics. In these reasons, I will discuss the application for the first of those orders, which is an application that the appellant provide security for the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The Court’s power to order security may find a source in the inherent jurisdiction, but it is sufficient in this case to refer to r 772 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), which confers a power on the Court to order security in terms which do not fetter the discretion. The factors, though, which are usually take into account in such an application are listed, albeit not comprehensively, in Natcraft Pty Ltd & Anor v Det Norske Veritas & Anor [2002] QCA 241 at [9] (per Jerrard JA). Most relevantly, in this case, so far as the arguments are concerned, is the factor concerning the appellant’s prospects of success on the appeal.

The appeal arises out of a claim by the respondent for legal costs incurred when it acted for the appellant in family law proceedings against the appellant’s former wife.  The respondent succeeded in obtaining judgment for its costs in the Magistrates Court.  The appellant appealed against that judgment unsuccessfully to the District Court, and the appellant now seeks leave to appeal from the judgment of the District Court to this Court.  The appellant has provided a draft notice of appeal.  The only ground is that the evidence does not support the judgment.  He elaborated upon that ground in argument, making two points at the forefront of his case.  The first is that he had made an offer to compromise the respondent’s claim for costs against him before the proceedings were brought in the Magistrates Court.  He sent an email in which he made this offer, and it was necessarily dependent upon the release of a caveat over property, the sale of which was to provide the appellant with the source of funds he required.  He argues that the Magistrate made a mistake in dealing with that evidence and in holding, in effect, that the respondent’s failure to accept that offer did not result in a failure to compromise proceedings.  The argument is a little more elaborate than that, but that’s sufficient to explain the point.

The Magistrate did not accept the argument, and the appellant reiterated the argument in his appeal in the District Court. The District Court Judge considered the argument and decided that the fact of the unaccepted offer did not have any bearing upon the result of the Magistrates Court. The appellant wishes to renew the argument a second time – or perhaps a third time – in this Court. There is a difficulty in finding that this argument…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 308
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Schultz Toomey O’Brien Lawyers Pty Ltd v Jones involves an application by Schultz Toomey O’Brien Lawyers Pty Ltd (the applicant) for an order that Jones (the respondent) provide security for the applicant’s costs of the appeal. The underlying dispute pertains to legal costs incurred by the applicant when it represented the respondent in family law proceedings against the respondent’s former wife. The applicant successfully obtained a judgment for its costs in the Magistrates Court, which was upheld by the District Court. The respondent is now appealing to the Court of Appeal, seeking leave to do so.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the applicant had a reasonable prospect of success on the appeal. The Court of Appeal considered two main arguments put forward by the respondent. Firstly, the respondent argued that the Magistrate had made an error in not accepting that the respondent’s failure to accept an offer of compromise resulted in a failure to compromise proceedings. Secondly, the respondent argued that the applicant should not have had possession of the ex-wife’s caveat, which prevented the sale of property and thereby delayed the respondent's access to funds. The Court of Appeal found these arguments to be unlikely to succeed, particularly given the respondent's failure to raise them earlier in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal also considered the respondent’s financial position and the risk of the respondent disposing of assets, which could prevent the applicant from recovering its costs if the appeal were to fail. The Court noted the respondent’s past non-compliance with a court order, which heightened the risk of asset disposal. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion to order the respondent to provide security for the applicant’s costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the respondent provide security in the amount of $13,000 by a specified date. Additionally, the Court granted a freezing order to prevent the respondent from disposing of approximately $50,000 of assets, which were part of the net proceeds from the sale of the property in question. These orders were made to ensure that the applicant would be able to recover its costs if the appeal were to be unsuccessful. The costs of both applications were reserved for further determination.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a claim by Schultz Toomey O'Brien Lawyers Pty Ltd (the respondent) for legal costs incurred while acting for Ian Michael Jones (the appellant) in family law proceedings against his former wife. The respondent succeeded in obtaining judgment for its costs in the Magistrates Court. The appellant appealed this decision to the District Court, which dismissed the appeal. The appellant now seeks leave to appeal from the District Court's judgment to the Court of Appeal. The appellant argues that the Magistrate made a mistake in not finding that the respondent's failure to accept an offer to compromise proceedings resulted in a failure to compromise. The appellant also wishes to argue a point regarding the respondent's possession of a caveat over property, which was not raised in the Magistrates Court or the District Court. The appeal is based on the contention that the evidence does not support the judgment.

The case originated in the Magistrates Court, where the respondent was awarded costs against the appellant. The appellant appealed to the District Court, which dismissed the appeal. The appellant has now applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal from the District Court's judgment. The respondent has applied for two orders: the first is for the appellant to provide security for the respondent's costs of the appeal, and the second is for a freezing order preventing the appellant from disposing of approximately $50,000 of assets, being part of the net proceeds of the sale of the property.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the appellant have good prospects of success on the appeal?
2. Should security be ordered for the respondent's costs of the appeal?
3. Should a freezing order be granted to prevent the appellant from disposing of certain assets?

Held
1. The appellant does not have good prospects of success on the appeal.
2. Security should be ordered for the respondent's costs of the appeal.
3. A freezing order should be granted to prevent the appellant from disposing of certain assets.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court considered the respondent's application for security for costs of the appeal and a freezing order. The Court noted that the appellant's prospects of success on the appeal are poor, given that the appeal is based on a factual matter that the Court of Appeal cannot reconsider. The Court also considered the appellant's financial position and his past disobedience of a court order, which justified the respondent's concern that the appellant might dispose of assets to avoid paying costs. Based on these factors, the Court exercised its discretion to order security for the respondent's costs of the appeal in the amount of $13,000. The Court also granted the freezing order to prevent the appellant from disposing of approximately $50,000 of assets, considering the risk that the appellant might do so to avoid paying costs. The Court based its decision on the appellant's past disobedience of a court order and his frank admission that he would comply with his legal obligations.