Schuelein v The Queen [2016] NTCCA 7
PARTIES: SCHUELEIN, Joseph
v
THE QUEEN
TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:CA 8 of 2016 (21531453)
DELIVERED: 23 December 2016
HEARING DATE: 21 October 2016
JUDGMENT OF: SOUTHWOOD, BLOKLAND and HILEY JJ
APPEALED FROM: KELLY J
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal against sentence – whether the sentencing Judge failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s rehabilitation – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances – sentence within range and not plainly unjust – period of actual imprisonment ordered unlikely to undo rehabilitation – ground of appeal dismissed by Southwood and Hiley JJ, Blokland J dissenting – appeal dismissed
CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal against sentence – whether the sentencing Judge made an unavailable conclusion of fact – principles in De Simoni v The Queen do not arise – ground of appeal dismissed unanimously – appeal dismissed
CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal against sentence – error in statutory maximum penalty – error found not to amount to a miscarriage of justice – ground of appeal dismissed unanimously – appeal dismissed
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) s 5, s 6, s 37
Sentencing Act (NT) s 5
McDonald v The Queen (1992) 110 FLR 232, applied
R v RAAD (2006) 15 VR 338, followed
Daniels v The Queen (2007) 20 NTLR 147; Fisher v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 19; Liddy v R [2005] NTCCA 4; R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383; R v Pogson; R v Lapham; and R v Martin 2012) 82 NSWLR 60; R v Syrch and Burns (2006) 18 NTLR 160; The Queen v Cavanagh – Novelli [2014] NTCCA 21; The Queen v Indrikson [2014] NTCCA 10; Truong v The Queen [2015] NTCCA 5; Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108, referred to
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant:I Read SC
Respondent: D Dalrymple
Solicitors:
Applicant:Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission
Respondent: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment category classification: B
Number of pages: 33
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINSchuelein v The Queen [2016] NTCCA 7
No. CA 8 of 2016 (21531453)
BETWEEN:
JOSEPH SCHUELEIN
Applicant
AND:
THE QUEEN
Respondent
CORAM: SOUTHWOOD, BLOKLAND and HILEY JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 23 December 2016)
SOUTHWOOD and HILEY JJ:
On 23 May 2016 the applicant pleaded guilty to two counts on an indictment dated 18 May 2016. Count 1 pleaded that contrary to s 5(1) and (2)(b)(iii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) on 25 June 2015 at Katherine the applicant supplied 4,848.79 grams of cannabis which is a commercial quantity of the dangerous drug. Count 2 pleaded that contrary to s 6(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act on 25 June 2015 at Katherine the applicant received $40,000 obtained indirectly from the commission of an offence…
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- AGLC
- Schuelein v The Queen [2016] NTCCA 7
- Case
- [2016] NTCCA 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court was required to determine whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the applicant's rehabilitation efforts, rendering the sentence manifestly excessive. Additionally, the Court considered whether the sentencing judge made an unavailable conclusion of fact that improperly elevated the objective seriousness of the offending, and whether an error regarding the statutory maximum penalty for one of the offences constituted a miscarriage of justice.
The Court dismissed the ground relating to rehabilitation, finding that while the applicant had made efforts towards rehabilitation, the period of actual imprisonment imposed was unlikely to negate these advancements. Regarding the alleged unavailable conclusion of fact, the Court held that the sentencing judge had merely rejected a submission in mitigation and had not made a finding of fact that amounted to an aggravating circumstance, thus the principles in *R v De Simoni* were not engaged. The Court also found that while the sentencing judge initially misstated the statutory maximum penalty for one count, this error was corrected immediately after sentencing and did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In a case such as this where the offender has made significant efforts prior to being sentenced to facilitate rehabilitation, such efforts are usually, within the appropriate limits having regard to the overall gravity, taken into account or recognised in the sentence in a meaningful way. Upon being sentenced, the applicant was required to return to prison for a significant period after engaging substantially in meaningful rehabilitation. Sentencing considerations of the learned sentencing Judge The learned sentencing Judge set out the charges and the agreed facts. Those have already been summarised and will not be repeated here. When setting out the charges, the learned sentencing Judge stated the maximum penalty for count 1 was 25 years, when it is 14 years. This was corrected after the sentence was pronounced and after counsel for the applicant drew her Honour’s attention to the mistake. As will be seen below, in my view, this was unlikely to have had a specific bearing on the sentence actually passed. The sentencing Judge noted the subjective factors that have been outlined, including the applicant’s efforts at rehabilitation and education. Her Honour did not accept the submission that the applicant did not realise he was causing damage, specifically pointing out that the applicant realised he was getting money from Sands, putting him in fear and causing severe financial damage to members of his family. This observation primarily related to the facts relevant to count 2. Her Honour also correctly in my view made it clear that the applicant would be dealt with as a principal. She noted that the conduct comprised in count 2 reflected badly on the applicant and set out the reasons for the need for general deterrence and the significant social harms in Aboriginal communities that occur as a result of cannabis supply, however acknowledged that the applicant was not charged with an aggravated form of offending involving an allegation of supply intended for Aboriginal communities. The prominence of general deterrence was also acknowledged:The courts have said many times that general deterrence is the most important thing to consider in these sorts of drug offences. I must impose a sentence that will discourage other people from doing what you have done. I also have to impose a sentence that will discourage you from doing something like this again. In relation to rehabilitation, her Honour said:I also however need to consider rehabilitation. I accept for the purposes of this sentencing exercise that you were a drug dependent individual. However, the Crown does not accept that your drug dependency was causally related to your offending and neither do I. This was clearly an ongoing commercial drug dealing business generating large amounts of money. Later in the sentencing remarks her Honour stated: And I think the seriousness of your offending warrants a period of actual imprisonment which is substantially longer than that. I do take into account that you have a job. I do take into account that you have made substantial efforts to get off the drug yourself but, as I say, I do not consider that was causally related to your offending in any event.