Schorel-Hlavka v The Governor General

[2003] HCATrans 395

[2003] HCATrans 395

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M114 of 2001

B e t w e e n -

GERRIT HENDRIK SCHOREL‑HLAVKA

Applicant

and

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNOR OF VICTORIA, THE GOVERNOR OF NEW SOUTH WALES, THE GOVERNOR OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, THE GOVERNOR OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, THE GOVERNOR OF QUEENSLAND AND THE GOVERNOR OF TASMANIA

First Respondents

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Third Respondent

Application to strike out an appeal

GUMMOW J
HAYNE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 3 OCTOBER 2003, AT 4.42 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR G.H. SCHOREL‑HLAVKA appeared in person.

MR P.J. HANKS, QC:   Your Honour, it is our notice of motion.  I appear with MS J.L. BEARD for the third respondent.  (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

GUMMOW J:   Yes, you are the moving party on the motion that appears at 129 of the application book.

MR HANKS:   That is so, your Honour.  I take it that your Honours have some understanding of the background to this matter.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, we do.

MR HANKS:   Thank you, your Honour.  I will put our submissions ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   I am going to take the appearances.

MR HANKS:   Yes, your Honour.

MR SCHOREL‑HLAVKA:   If I may, your Honour, my name is Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka and I am coming here under objection on the basis that I was not served with a notice of motion, and I have indicated that that notice of motion was defective.  It had no hearing date.  I do not believe it is up to the Registrar of the Court supposedly serving it by simply giving a hearing date.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.  What do you say about that, Mr Hanks?

MR HANKS:   My instructions are that the notice of motion was served.  I have not heard any objection to the competency of today’s hearing on that basis, your Honour, to this point.

GUMMOW J:   Could you prove service?

MR HANKS:   My understanding is that the appellant, the respondent to our application, is here today.  He has a copy of the notice of motion.  That would seem to us to be a ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   The first question I suppose is when was the application book prepared and then served?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   In May, your Honour?

GUMMOW J:   You have the application book, do you not?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   I got it in the application book somewhere, and I ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   That is what I am asking you.  Do you have the application book?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   I have the application book, yes.  Your Honour, I did even last night again fax to both to the Court and to the lawyers that I would come under objection, not to recognise that my objection is because I made previous objections also to the Australian Government Solicitors.  I have not been served, and I believe that I am entitled to serve it before a case can be heard before this Court.

GUMMOW J:   The question is you have now got the notice of motion.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   No, I did not appear before the notice of motion, your Honour.  I came here on the directions of the Registrar under objection.

GUMMOW J:   Look, you have the book.  You have this book.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Only the application book, your Honour, and it has not a date as to - and in my address to the Court which I filed ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Yes, I understand what you are saying.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:    ‑ ‑ ‑ I set out all the technicalities regarding the failure of the notice of motion to have a hearing date.  It was apparently filed last year and they simply kept it.

GUMMOW J:   It seems to have been filed on 23 October.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   And no supporting affidavit, nothing with it, and they did the same last year with a chamber summons.  They filed it but they did not serve that either on me, and they have been quite - correspondence by me to them and to the Court copies that I objected to this kind of conducting of litigation where they file material but do not serve it on me.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, very well.  When was the book prepared, Mr Hanks ‑ ‑ ‑

MR HANKS:   Your Honour, what I can say is that the certificate of examination in relation to the book was signed by Mr Schorel‑Hlavka on 19 August 2003.

GUMMOW J:   Where does that appear?

MR HANKS:   I am holding a copy of the certificate of examination here, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   It appears in the last page of the book.

MR HANKS:   Yes.

GUMMOW J:   Last page of volume 2.

MR HANKS:   The last page of the book.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Your Honour, if I may, page 129 of the appeal book shows that there is a copy of the notice of motion, that is the first time I knew.  I had requested previously both to the Australian Government Solicitors and the Registrar for a copy.  I have also requested a copy of the chamber summons which they since have had discontinued.  They have refused to give me a copy of that.  Now, by the Rules of the Court it must be a day - that is the whole purpose of a notice of motion, to get a date and then - now, what they have done apparently they have just filed it, they did not bother about it and then they think, “Well, if Mr Schorel‑Hlavka doesn’t discontinue the case maybe some day in the next year we might ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Yes, but the question is you now have it.  You have had it for some time.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   But there are Rules of the Court, your Honour, and the thing is this, if the date is incorrect, then the…..is needed for the Court to seek another date.  The rules are accepted and then they are addressed to the Court and are filed, your Honour, which is before your Honour which is a part of a book that I have published.  It set out the legal technicalities of a notice of motion.  There are rules.  Now, if the date is incorrect, the Registrar has the power of course, by consent of both parties, to change the date.  That has never occurred.  The applicant can also seek leave from the Court to get another date hearing.  No leave ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Just pardon us a minute.  Just be quiet for a minute, please.  There is a book you have prepared, hand addressed to the Court?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   That is correct, your Honour.  That is also one of the things that I provided ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Now, page 2 of that?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   And it was also, your Honour ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Just a minute.  Page 2 of that?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Correct, your Honour.  And it is also includes the copy of ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Just listen to me for a minute, please.  Under the heading “END QUOTE”, “The Registrar responded” et cetera, “is listed for hearing for 3 October” et cetera.  Yes, we think you should proceed, Mr Hanks.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   It is under objection, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR HANKS:   I will come quickly to the principal point, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR HANKS: The principal point is this, that in order for this appeal to be competent, assuming that section 383(9) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   We had better look at that.  Yes, 383(9) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

MR HANKS:   Assuming that that provision would authorise an appeal ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   That says:

An appeal lies to the High Court from a judgment or order of the Federal Court exercising jurisdiction under this section.

MR HANKS:   That is so, your Honour.  Now, this is a peculiar provision, your Honour, which dates from 2001, and it dates from the time when jurisdiction under section 383 was transferred from the State Supreme Courts to the Federal Court.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR HANKS:   Previously the right of appeal had laid from a State Supreme Court judge to the Full Court of the Federal Court.  When the jurisdiction, the primary jurisdiction, was transferred to a judge of the Federal Court - and that was given effect by amendments made in 2001 - parliamentary counsel and the Parliament adjusted the appellate provisions so as to provide for an appeal direct to this Court.

GUMMOW J:   Now, the appeal here is, on its face, brought as of right and brought from one judge of the Federal Court.

MR HANKS:   That is so, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   So prima facie we start off with 33 of the Federal Court Act, do we not?

MR HANKS:   That is certainly a submission which we have made in our written outline, your Honour, to the effect that the default position, as one would expect, according to section 33 ‑ ‑ ‑

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   I am sorry to interrupt, your Honour, but I hear that the gentleman is going to a submission, outline of submission.  That was under objection by me ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Look, please do not interrupt while Mr Hanks is addressing us.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Okay.

GUMMOW J:   Yes?

MR HANKS:   The default position so far as section 33 is concerned, your Honour, is that appeals from single judges of the Federal Court are not brought to the High Court direct.  That is, one might say, the default position.  Section 33 contemplates appeals to this Court from the Full Court of the Federal Court but, even in that situation, only by grant of special leave.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR HANKS: However, your Honour, to be frank, as one must, section 33(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act does contemplate the possibility that there may be a different provision, for it says:

Except as otherwise provided by another Act, an appeal shall not be brought to the High Court from a judgment of the Court constituted by a single judge.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.  However, Justice Marshall took the view that although 383 had been invoked, in truth that ran into 353.

MR HANKS:   Yes, your Honour, and that is our primary submission; that his Honour was not exercising jurisdiction under section 383.  His Honour made two orders.  One was an order dismissing the application, and it is our submission that that order dismissing the application was made in the exercise of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction as the superior court of record, on the principle in - I think it is the Residual Assco Case essentially, but the Federal Court, as the superior court of record, has the power to make a decision as to whether or not it has jurisdiction.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR HANKS: His Honour exercised that jurisdiction and made that order. His Honour then made an order for costs, and that was an order exercising the jurisdiction conferred by section 43(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act. No order was made under section 383 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act and, therefore, this appeal is not competent.

GUMMOW J:   Thank you.  Yes?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Your Honours, first of all, I should say I have a hearing‑aid problem.  I have got hearing aids in.  I tried on…..It did not work, but I will try my best.  The issue is this, your Honours, that the appellant first of all was not served in time with the outline of submission, eight days late.  The appellant requested the Registrar for more time because he was only given a limited time.  That was refused by the Registrar of this Court, that it had to be filed, and under objection the appellant then responded. 

He has made…..correspondence to this Court, and the appellant believes that the other party should have sought leave to serve out of time for eight days, because eight days is a massive amount of time ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   We would be assisted if you would direct yourself to the substance of the matter.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Okay, well, I have to do that, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   To the substance of the matter, which is quite technical but important.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA: Your Honour, the appeal - the appeal is from a case that was before his Honour Justice Marshall. What we have to do is first go to the originality of it. The appellant went originally to the High Court to seek to institute application for mandamus and prohibition. When the appellant turned up here with the documentation to file in the High Court the Deputy Registrar pointed out that there was a recent change in the law, the Electoral Act, section 383, and, therefore it was better to go to the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant therefore then went down there, had a talk, they did not have the application. They asked the appellant to draft up this form to ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   This is very shortly before the election.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA: But the issue - no, it is relevant. The issue is that the appellant sought mandamus and prohibition. He then applied also under section 383, but original the right for a mandamus lies by the High Court. The appellant then came before Justice Finkelstein on 2 November. His Honour had to determine whether or not the appellant had a right to proceed within the Federal Court. His Honour then gave certain directions to serve documents and to seek arrangements for service for the Governors on the Australian Government Solicitors. That is all recorded in the material.

So the appellant went before - then the case was adjourned till 7 November.  So on 7 November the appellant came before his Honour Justice Marshall on two ways.  One was the application for mandamus and prohibition, which clearly the Federal Court has jurisdiction, and the second part was the appellant sought application under the Australian Electoral Act 1918, which also provided, because of Justice Finkelstein having provided it.

Now, when the case came before Justice Finkelstein first of all the Australian Government Solicitor, Mr Hanks, was not particularly truthful as was recorded in the material, but secondly, also ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Would you say that again?

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   He was not particularly truthful in ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   We are not going to sit here and listen to that.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Okay.  Your Honour, I said it is set out in my material.  The issue is also, sir, that Mr Hanks QC, he was indicating to the Court that because of section 353 it says “and not otherwise” that therefore the Court had no jurisdiction.  That is of course an error, because in Sue v Hill the High Court has made clear that “and not otherwise” refers to, in fact, an application to Parliament.  It has nothing to do with 383 because 383 was, in fact, a recent change of legislation in 2001 just prior to the appellant going to the Federal Court.

Now, another thing is that there are ample statements, for instance by Dawson J in Abbott, that the Court of Disputed Returns can only deal with one kind of challenging of poll.  The appellant, however, is not only seeking to challenge one poll, but all of it which clearly is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Disputed Returns.  It can only be dealt with by the High Court or by the Federal Court.

The appellant is also challenging the validity of the proclamation which was proclaimed, and the evidence before the Court.  That is also beyond the power of the Court of Disputed Returns because the Court of Disputed Returns can only hear a matter that is resulting from writ not from proclamation.  Another thing is that if the writ is invalid, the Court of Disputed Returns cannot invoke jurisdiction if there are no writs or if the writs are invalid.  There are numerous other ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   This is all about a general election that was held 23 months ago.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Exactly.  No, but that is not relevant, your Honour.  The relevance is not only the general election.  The relevance is that the breaches the appellant complained of are still valid as today as they were then.  Now, one of the issues for instance, which the appellant has set out in his material, is for instance who can vote and who cannot vote, which the appellant has published a book on “Inspector‑Rikati on Citizenship” and it shows that no one can apply for Australian citizenship to become a voter. 

The Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is unconstitutional because the only way you can get citizenship by the framers - and they made it very clear - is by having State citizenship. So that is the only way you can get an elector.

Your Honour, there are numerous issues to be argued, and the High Court, in fact, on 1 September before Justice Kirby had a case about the Australian Citizenship Act, therefore that relates to being a voter or not.  Your Honour, there are numerous issues which I want to canvass, but of course cannot canvass in 10 minutes, but which are relevant to the case.  Now, one of the issues ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   The only relevance at the moment is this objection of competency.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   No, the relevancy is that ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   No, it is Mr Hanks’ motion.  He says your appeal is not competent.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   No, no, I am saying that it is competent.  What I said is that I originally sought, and I still am, in part of my material seeking orders for a mandamus and for prohibition.  The High Court is the Court of appeal, the framers - and I pointed it out, made it very clear to framers - that an appeal lies to the High Court of a court that is exercising federal jurisdiction or - you know, an appeal lies to the High Court.

GUMMOW J:   No, subject to such exceptions and qualifications as the Parliament prescribes ‑ ‑ ‑

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   Your Honour, that may be your perception.

GUMMOW J:   And one such is section 33 of the Federal Court Act.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA: No. Your Honour, what I may say is at the time - I have studied the Hansard from the framers, what they said, extensively. Section 383 did never exist before the Constitution was created. They created the Constitution, and Mr Barton himself said, who was the second Prime Minister, that an appeal lies to the High Court for that. Now, your Honour ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   No.  No, it does not ‑ ‑ ‑

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   You may disagree, your Honour, I am only going on what the framers said.

GUMMOW J:   No, I am asking you to look at the text.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA: Okay, your Honour. But the thing is you have the power to make a decision. I do not, but I can only submit to this Court what I have read and what I produce. The issue is, your Honour, the order of costs, for example, was made by Marshall J subsequent to the directions of Justice Finkelstein for me to serve documents. That was within the powers of the Federal Court. When I then serve documents, as directed by the Federal Court, those orders of course are final orders, and I am entitled to be appealed within section 383(9) to the High Court.

An appeal lies there for that, not to the Full Court because there are orders made within section 383(9), because if Justice Finkelstein would not have directed me to serve the documents I could not have proceeded. It would have been the end of it, no orders of course would have existed. Where Justice Marshall made the error with is Justice Marshall misunderstood and, as I said, he was deceived in that way by the evidence - or by the statements made to the court, and which I have outlined in the material, is that Justice Marshall was mistaken that this was a case that fell under section 353, “and not otherwise”.

His Honour was misled by Mr Peter Hanks saying that “and not otherwise” means you cannot go to the Federal Court.  That was not the intention of section 353 as the High Court in Sue v Hill made very clear.  It has to deal with what Mr…..said, I think it is in 1908 or 1903.  Therefore, your Honour, in my view there is jurisdiction because - first of all there was jurisdiction by the Federal Court to hear the matter, both as to an application for mandamus.  The Federal Court had the jurisdiction.

I also did seek, and it was part of my material before his Honour Justice Marshall, that if the court had a problem with it then I sought a case stated to the High Court or I seek the case to be transferred to the High Court.  His Honour did not at all consider those two items, which I believe also was a defect in the decision of his Honour.

Now, the right of appeal is not only to orders made but is also - a right of appeal exists if there is an order not made which the court ought to have made.  Now, I am saying that the court should have made an order in regard of my request to have a case stated to the High Court if the court held it had no jurisdiction.  Your Honour, I spent a lot of time preparing this material, and it goes in.  That is why I have published the two.  I do not believe that a jurisdiction can be ignored from the Federal Court because a judge happened to say so by mistake, and then a person who put a perfectly legitimate case before the court will be ousted.

I ask your Honour also to consider this, that the Deputy Registrar from this Court knows very well that the first approach was to file in this Court.  If the Deputy Registrar may be wrong because of the judgment of Marshall J then the appellant should not be suffering of that.  The appellant followed the advice of the Deputy Registrar, not as legal advice, but if the Deputy Registrar would not have advised the appellant to go to the Federal Court the appellant obviously would have filed this case right in this Court, but because the Deputy Registrar - and in her understanding she seemed to be perfectly clear in doing that.

So the question then is if the Federal Court has no jurisdiction as his Honour ruled on that basis, who has jurisdiction, because the Court of Disputed Returns simply cannot entertain a dispute over a general election which I did?  I disputed every writ in the country.  Now, the Court of Disputed Returns has no jurisdiction, you know that ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Now, you disputed every writ, but the election was held.

MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA:   That made no difference because I am not only disputing the election, I am disputing if the material was before the Court the Electoral Commissioner - and if you may be aware of my case, I contested the Electoral Commission closing its offices for most days of - I contested the false and misleading material they were publishing it - and still publicising now.  So the injunctions that I sought then are as alive today as they were then.

Now, the election…..how - I may advise your Honours that your Honour yourself in 1976 handed down a judgment where it was also indicated that if it was found that the writs were defective then simply a new election could be held.  Your Honours have handed down.  I have put it in my material.  So it is very clear that this Court can say, “Well, whether the election held is not relevant because it is a nullity.”  If the election was a nullity then the election result is a nullity.  That is as simple as that.  Otherwise it would be open for any government to abuse the laws.

The government is bound to act within the legislation of the Parliament.  It has no power to go beyond.  What I indicated was - and I wish to refer your Honour to the judgment of Justice Gummow in the Kelly Case on 23 June.  His Honour then referred to the issue as to well - and proclamation does not have to be published beforehand et cetera.  Your Honour, I have also indicated it must be.

So the election in itself is a nullity if the writ and the proclamation were invalid.  The appellant has provided to this Court evidence that the writs were not either published until 9 October - sorry, the proclamation was not publicly gazetted until 9 October on the first place in Canberra.  The writs were issued on 8^th, therefore the writs were invalid, and his Honour Justice Dawson himself made clear if there is a defect in the writ then the whole thing is a nullity.

Now, we cannot say therefore, “Well, they held the election and therefore we can ignore the legal technicalities” because then we have no elections any more at all.  Why do we have laws for?  The laws are there, your Honour, to comply with, and if it would be allowed now by this Court to have defective writs, to have defective proclamation, then what stops a government next time to have an election for one hour and say, forget about the laws.

Your Honour, as I said this appeal here is as relevant today, and if your Honour were to check out what I was for, it is also dealing with the Australian Electoral Commission misleading the public, the government and the Commonwealth as to its details.  Now, I will give you example, your Honour.  The State of Victoria has a Senate Elections Act that requires not less than 11 days.  The actual time allowed was nine whole days.  It is a State’s right, and therefore the period of time was one and a half days short.  The writ was therefore invalid.

Now, your Honour can say, “Yes, but there was an election held.”  It means nothing, your Honour.  If I see a car and I drive the car that does not make it legally my car because I happen to steal it.  The court will say, “Sorry, it’s not your car, whether you drive it or not.”  That is the same with the government, your Honour.  I thought the case before the election - I attended to this Court before the election.  The fact that Justice Marshall did not hear the case is not my doing.  My right of appeal is to have the case heard and to consider as to what was occurring on 7 November when I had my case before Justice Marshall.  If this Court finds that in the overwhelming material I have filed the proclamation was not published and was invalid, the writs were invalid, then as the Court has ruled in the past, if the writs are invalid then the election simply is a nullity and never did exist.

Your Honour, again as I said, in my view - and I know that your Honour disagrees with it - I have a right of appeal to the High Court not subject to any conditions because the framers made clear a right of appeal.  The moment this Court were to say that you have not a right of appeal then this Court will deny the legal right, the constitutional right that citizens have coming to this Court.  It would be a sheer waste of time to come to this Court because this Court would not say, “Who cares, we just put conditions on.”

It is different if I want to appeal, let us say from a Magistrate Court or whatever, or if I want appeal from a judgment of a Full Court, but in this case the mandamus were sought to be filed in this Court, and I see that this

Court recognised that by the circumstances that were occurring that I initially sought leave of this - or sought to file in this Court, and on advice of the Registrar then filed in the Federal Court and Justice Finkelstein recognised it was a jurisdiction there - I served accordingly - that therefore, on that basis there was jurisdiction and that Justice Marshall was mistaken in the legal application of section 353.  Your Honour, I set it out.  Thank you very much.

GUMMOW J:   Thank you.  We do not need to hear you in reply, Mr Hanks.

The third respondent, the Australian Electoral Commission, seeks an order that this purported appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Court of Australia, Justice Marshall, delivered shortly before the last general election on 10 November 2001, be struck out as incompetent. Section 33(2) and (3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) relevantly states:

(2)  Except as otherwise provided by another Act, an appeal shall not be brought to the High Court from a judgment of the Court constituted by a single judge . . . 

(3)  Except as otherwise provided by another Act, an appeal shall not be brought from a judgment of a Full Court of the Court unless the High Court gives special leave to appeal.

This appeal is brought directly to this Court on the apparent footing that section 383(9) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 enables the appellant to bypass the Full Court of the Federal Court and the necessity for a grant of special leave from this Court. Section 383(9) states:

An appeal lies to the High Court from a judgment or order of the Federal Court exercising jurisdiction under this section.

However, the Federal Court was not exercising jurisdiction here conferred by section 383 of the Electoral Act. Rather, the nature of the proceeding dismissed by Justice Marshall attracted the operation and the limitations found in section 353(1) of the Electoral Act respecting the disputation of the validity of any election or return by petition addressed to the Court of Disputed Returns and not otherwise. It follows that even if, which we do not decide, section 383(9) on its true construction would grant a direct appeal to this Court, it has no application here. The result is that section 33(2) of the Federal Court Act applies and the appeal to this Court is not competent.

The order sought in paragraph 1 of the third respondent’s motion filed 23 October 2002 is made.  The notice of appeal is struck out and the respondent to the motion, the appellant in the purported appeal, is to pay the cost of the third respondent of that motion.

AT 5.13 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED