Schapelle Corby and Australian Federal Police
[2012] AATA 713
•15 October 2012
[2012] AATA 713
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2010/2438; 2010/4442
Re
Schapelle Corby
APPLICANT
And
Australian Federal Police
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President PE Hack SC
Date 15 October 2012 Place Brisbane A. In application 2010/2438,
(a) the respondent’s decision of 6 May 2010 is varied by,
(i) on document 1, folio 1, providing access to the applicant to the text of the letter i.e. from, and including, the subject line and the following two paragraphs but excluding the name in the first line of text;
(ii) on document 2, folio 2, providing access to the applicant to the Indonesian text of the letter in the same terms as for folio 1;
(b) the decision is otherwise affirmed;
(c)the decision in paragraph (a) hereof is to come into effect 28 days after the date of this decision.
B. In application 2010/4442,
(a) the respondent's decision of 11 October 2010 is varied by:
(i) excluding documents 1, 36, 38, 44, 84, 88, 95, 147 – 155, 157, 161 and 271 from the result of the search;
(ii) granting access to the applicant to documents 46, 176 and folios 620 – 628 of document 201;
(iii) pursuant to s 42D(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), remitting to the respondent for reconsideration the request for access to documents 164 and folio 459 of document 165;
(b) the decision is otherwise affirmed;
(c)the decision in paragraph (a) (ii) hereof is to come into effect 28 days after the date of this decision.
.......................................................................
Deputy President PE Hack SC
CATCHWORDS
FREEDOM OF IMFORMATION – Request for access to documents – claims for exemption pursuant to ss 22, 33, 33A, 36, 37, 40, 41 and 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) - decisions under review, varied, substituted, remitted for reconsideration and affirmed.
LEGISLATION
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ss 4, 11, 22, 33, 33A, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 45, 60A, 61
CASES
Re Waterford and Department of the Treasury (No 2) (1984) 5 ALD 588
Re Sullivan & Australian Federal Police [2011] AATA 188
Re Mickelberg and Australian Federal Police (1984) 6 ALN 176REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President PE Hack SC
15 October 2012
Introduction
As is well known Ms Schapelle Corby is in gaol in Indonesia. Ms Corby was convicted of importing drugs into that country. She was sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment.
It appears that Ms Corby and some of her supporters have persuaded themselves that she was the victim of a conspiracy that involved the Australian Federal Police (AFP). I am not now concerned whether that be right or not however it helps explain the context of these proceedings, Ms Corby's applications for review of decisions by the AFP on application for access, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (the FOI Act), to documents held by the AFP.
Procedural history
The proceedings have their genesis in a request dated 20 July 2009 (but not received by the AFP until 1 October 2009) made on behalf of Ms Corby by a Mr Allen Wilson. Mr Wilson's request was in these terms,
1.For the period 1st December 2004 through to 31st January 2005, I request a copy of all written communication between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Indonesian National Police (INP) regarding: a) an offer by the AFP to assist the INP, or request made by the AFP for the INP to forensically test any evidence found in Ms Corby's luggage; and b) the reply from the INP to the AFP declining such a request or offer of assistance.
2.For the period 8th October 2004 only, I request a copy of all communication (irrespective of whether it was made by email, text message, fax, telephone or any other means) made by the Australian Federal Police (or reports of any such communication known by the AFP to have occurred) to any person or organisation in Indonesia informing them or detailing that a shipment of drugs was destined for Ngurah Rai Airport, Denpasar, Bali.
3.I also request copies of documents which detail the questions by the AFP to the men arrested under Operation Mocha or statements received by the AFP, whereby the AFP concluded that this syndicate was not responsible for placing drugs in Ms Corby's luggage. If such documents or statements do not exist, how did the AFP conclude that these men were not responsible for putting the drugs in Ms Corby's luggage?
By letter of 20 April 2010 the AFP identified what were said to be 10 documents (comprising 17 folios) that were considered to answer paragraphs 1 and 3 of the request. Additionally, it was determined that no documents answered the description in paragraph 2 of the request. The letter from the AFP to Mr Wilson advised that 10 documents had been identified although there were, in fact, only nine documents; there was no document 8 in the schedule attached to the letter of 20 April 2010. Of those nine documents, two were released in full; the others were the subject of claims for exemption in whole or in part.
The decision evidenced by the letter of 20 April 2010 was affirmed on internal review on 6 May 2010. That decision is the subject matter of application 2010/2438 lodged in the Tribunal on 17 June 2010.
In the meantime, on 13 May 2010, a further request had been made to the AFP by Mr Wilson for access to documents described by him in this way,
1.Please provide all communication by, and documentation involving, former AFP commissioner Michael Keelty, which relates to Schapelle Corby.
2.Please provide full details of all communication, documents and exchanges between former AFP commissioner Michael Keelty and I Made Mangku Pastika of the Indonesian police, for the period 2004 – 2005 inclusive.
A total of 275 documents comprising 885 folios were identified by a decision made on 24 September 2010. Exemptions were claimed in whole or in part over some of them; a good many were released in full.
That decision was affirmed on internal review on 11 October 2010. That decision is the subject matter of application 2010/4442 lodged in the Tribunal on 14 October 2010.
In the course of prehearing stages in the Tribunal, access has been granted to Ms Corby to further documents or parts of documents.
The legislation
There is no controversy about the general operation of the FOI Act. Section 11 of that Act creates a legally enforceable right to obtain access in accordance with the act to documents of an agency other than exempt documents. And where, as here, the agency claims that a document is an exempt document, s 61 of the FOI Act puts the onus on the agency to establish that the decision in relation to the request was justified or that the Tribunal should give a decision adverse to the applicant.
Because the requests for access were made prior to 1 November 2010, these proceedings fall to be determined by reference to the FOI Act as it stood prior to the amendment made by the Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth)[1]. It seems convenient to consider the particular exemptions by reference to the documents in issue in each of the proceedings.
[1] No 51 of 2010.
Application 2010/2438
Nine documents were identified as falling within the scope of Mr Wilson's first request. Documents 5 and 7 have been released in full. Documents 1, 2 and 3 (comprising folios 1 – 4) may be considered together as they have a common subject matter, common exemption claims and common evidence in support of those exemption claims. Exemption is claimed over all of them on the basis of s 33(1)(a) of the FOI Act. Additionally, a claim for exemption under s 33(1)(b) of the FOI Act is made over document 3. Those paragraphs were[2] in these terms:
[2]Because the request was made on 1 October 2009 the legislation is in the form that it was in prior to the amendments made by the Freedom of Information (Removal of Conclusive Certificates and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth)
(1) A document is an exempt document if disclosure of the document under this Act:
(a)would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to:
(i)the security of the Commonwealth;
(ii)the defence of the Commonwealth; or
(iii)the international relations of the Commonwealth; or
(b)would divulge any information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a foreign government, an authority of a foreign government or an international organization to the Government of the Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the Commonwealth or of an authority of the Commonwealth.
I have read the documents in issue and I have had regard to the evidence of Commander Fiona Drennan[3] regarding the relationship between the AFP and the Indonesia National Police (the INP) and her evidence in relation to these documents in particular. The respondent’s statement of facts and contentions[4] describes the content of these documents in these terms,
Folios 1 – 4 contain communications with the AFP and the Indonesia Police Force (INP). An offer was made by the AFP to provide forensic testing assistance as part of the INP's investigations into the Applicant’s arrest, this offer was subsequently refused by the INP.
The AFP contends that the content of these documents reflects the nature and context of relations between Australia and Indonesia and that disclosure has the potential to damage the ongoing relationship between the two countries. In particular it is said that the documents detail the way in which the offer of assistance was communicated, the INP's response to the offer, the language in which it was communicated, the identity and role of the AFP officer who made the offer and the identity and role of the INP officer who responded to the offer of assistance.
[3] Exhibit 7 is a confidential affidavit of that witness; the redacted, and open, affidavit is exhibit 8.
[4]Exhibit 13, paragraph [23].
Ms Drennan's evidence does not satisfy me that disclosure of the entirety of documents 1, 2 and 3 would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to the international relations of the Commonwealth. It must surely be notorious that police forces routinely offer and seek assistance to or from other police forces. The fact and the nature of the offer made here has been disclosed by the AFP as has the fact that the offer was declined. Mr Keelty disclosed the fact of the offer on talkback radio on 23 May 2005[5]. I have had regard, as well, to the last sentence of paragraph 43 of Ms Drennan’s affidavit[6] as well as the documents themselves. In these circumstances I find it impossible to conclude that there is any realistic prospect of damage to Australia's relationship with Indonesia from the disclosure of the contents of these documents.
[5] ` See document 195 at folio 560.
[6] Exhibit 7.
I do however accept that the names and ranks of the officers involved and other contact details ought be redacted but otherwise I reject the claim for exemption under s 33(1)(a) of the FOI Act.
There is a separate claim for exemption under s 33(1)(b) of the FOI Act in relation to document 3. Ms Drennan’s evidence[7] satisfies me that the communication from the INP was one “in confidence”. Police work, by its very nature, requires that inquiries frequently be undertaken on a confidential basis. I am satisfied that the INP would expect that its confidences would be respected by the AFP and that, accordingly, the claim for exemption under s 33(1)(b) is made out in relation to document 3.
[7] Exhibit 7, paragraphs [11] – [15].
I should add that, in advance of the hearing and in compliance with the obligation in s 60A of the FOI Act, copies of the documents in respect of which a claim for exemption was made under s 33 of the Act were made available to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. That official has advised, in terms[8], that she is not qualified to give evidence in respect of these two documents. I am satisfied that the obligation cast upon the Tribunal by s 60A of the FOI Act has been discharged.
[8] Exhibit 4, paragraph [6].
Document 4 is described as a case note. Exemption is claimed over the bulk of the document on the basis of s 37(2)(b) of the FOI Act. That provided,
(2)A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to:
(a)…
(b)disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures; or
(c)…
I have had regard, in particular, to paragraphs 45 and 46 of the affidavit of Ms Drennan. Paragraph 45 is open, paragraph 46 is confidential. I have, as well, read the document in its entirety. I accept that the document describes police methodology and investigative processes. I accept, as well, the vice identified by Ms Drennan in paragraph 45 of her affidavit were material of this nature to be disclosed. I am then satisfied that the claim for exemption over document 4 is made out.
Document 6 is described as "media talking points" comprising folios 9 – 11. Part of the document has been released and from that part it is evident that the document is a background brief prepared in May 2005 as a consequence of the arrest of a number of persons for trafficking cocaine into Australia. It is not at all clear to me how it is regarded as answering the requests made for access. That part which has been released indicates that the investigation into the cocaine importation had detected no link to Ms Corby. Insofar as the balance of the document is claimed to be exempt, reliance was placed by the AFP on s 22(1) of the FOI Act. It provided,
(1)Where:
(a)an agency or Minister decides:
(i)not to grant a request for access to a document on the ground that it is an exempt document; or
(ii)that to grant a request for access to a document would disclose information that would reasonably be regarded as irrelevant to that request; and
(b)it is possible for the agency or Minister to make a copy of the document with such deletions that the copy:
(i)would not be an exempt document; and
(ii)would not disclose such information; and
(c)it is reasonably practicable for the agency or Minister, having regard to the nature and extent of the work involved in deciding on and making those deletions and the resources available for that work, to make such a copy;
the agency or Minister shall, unless it is apparent from the request or as a result of consultation by the agency or Minister with the applicant, that the applicant would not wish to have access to such a copy, make, and grant access to, such a copy.
The present case is one where the disclosure of access to the entirety of the document would disclose information that is entirely irrelevant to the request. The parts that have been redacted have nothing to do with the applicant's affairs; they are on an entirely different topic. The production of document 6 in its redacted form demonstrates that the matters in paragraph (b) are satisfied.
The same is true of document 9. Those parts of the document that had been redacted are entirely irrelevant to the request for access that was made. Document 10 also has redactions; they are also irrelevant and have been properly deleted from that part of the document which is relevant and to which access has been granted.
The result of this is that I would, in application 2010/2438,
(a)vary the respondent’s decision of 6 May 2010 by,
(i)on folio 1, providing access to the text of the letter i.e. from, and including, the subject line and the following two paragraphs but excluding the name in the first line of text;
(ii)on folio 2, providing access to the Indonesian text of the letter in the same terms as for folio 1;
(b)otherwise affirm that decision.
The decision, insofar as I am permitting access to documents, will take effect 28 days after the publication of the reasons to permit the respondent to consider its position regarding an appeal. If the respondent determines earlier not to appeal it ought notify the District Registrar and the order will be varied to permit earlier access.
Application 2010/4442
I start by noting that many of the claims for exemption are based on either s 22(1) of the FOI Act or on s 41(1) of that Act. The former section is set out in paragraph 18 above. The latter section was in these terms,
(1)A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person (including a deceased person).
The term "personal information" was (and is) defined in s 4 of the FOI act to mean,
information or an opinion (including information forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.
Consideration of such claims does not lend itself to detailed reasoning provided that, in the case of the latter claims, the deleted information satisfies the description of personal information. It is impossible to describe the contents of the matters claimed to be exempt otherwise than in very broad terms without revealing the information claimed to be exempt. As will appear from the reasons that follow I have upheld claims for exemption on these bases and have done so shortly. In each case I have examined the document in issue and satisfied myself that the matters deleted are truly irrelevant or personal information as the case may be. Detailed reasoning for reaching those conclusions is simply not possible.
As will also appear I have taken the view in a number of instances that the AFP has wrongly, and too generously, interpreted the claim for access with the result that a number of documents have been produced that do not answer the request. Where I have reached that view I propose to vary the decision by removing the particular documents from the results of the search.
Document 1 in this application is one such example. It needs to be considered together with document 38. The former is the agenda, and the latter the speaking notes, for a speech apparently given to the Australia Indonesia Institute by the former Commissioner of the AFP, Mr Keelty, in May 2003. I do not understand how either document was regarded as coming within the scope of the request. Seemingly, it was because of the reference on folio 68 to General Pastika of the INP, in the passage that has been released. If that be so, and assuming that the view was taken that the documents were "communications, documents and exchanges" between Mr Keelty and General Pastika, the temporal integer – "for the period 2004 – 2005 inclusive" – is not satisfied by a speech given in May 2003. Neither document has any connection to Ms Corby or her affairs.
The decision under review ought to be varied by excluding documents 1 and 38 from the results of the search.
Documents 2 to 7 and 9 to 29 (again, curiously, there is no document 8), 37, 41, 255, 257, 259, 260 and 263 have been released to the extent that they make reference to Ms Corby. The balance of the material in the documents relates to quite separate and unrelated events occurring, or forecast to occur, within the Attorney-General's portfolio. They were properly excluded from release in reliance on s 22(1)(a) of the FOI Act. Again the matters referred to do not relate to Ms Corby or her affairs.
Document 30 is an e-mail from, apparently, a ministerial staffer about questions answered by a Minister in the Senate. The question involving Ms Corby has been released, the balance, dealing with questions on other, unrelated, topics has been correctly excluded pursuant to s 22(1)(a) of the FOI Act so that access has been granted only to so much of the document as is relevant.
Document 31 has been released subject to the deletion of an e-mail address and name of an individual who communicated with Mr Keelty in support of Ms Corby. The deletions are made in reliance on s 41(1). The deletions made are of personal information about the writer, viz. name and e-mail address. Disclosure of that information would be unreasonable and thus the exemption claimed is made out.
Document 32 is the draft of a letter from Mr Keelty to Mr Mal Hyde, the Commissioner of the South Australia Police Service at the time. The letter, as sent, is document 110. Part of the letter has been deleted in reliance on s 37(1)(a) of the FOI Act. It provides,
(1)A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to:
(a)prejudice the conduct of an investigation of a breach, or possible breach, of the law, or a failure, or possible failure, to comply with a law relating to taxation or prejudice the enforcement or proper administration of the law in a particular instance;
The explanation for the claim appears in paragraph 47 of the affidavit of Ms Drennan. Part of that affidavit is confidential however I have had regard to that paragraph. It will suffice to say that disclosure of that document would reveal details of an unrelated investigation. In my view the exemption claim is properly made in respect of document 32 and document 110.
The name of an AFP officer has been deleted, properly in my view, in the last line of document 32 in reliance on s 41(1) of the FOI Act.
Document 33 is claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 36(1) of the FOI act. It provides,
(1)Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if it is a document the disclosure of which under this Act:
(a)would disclose matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purposes of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the Government of the Commonwealth; and
(b)would be contrary to the public interest.
The document is a briefing paper prepared for the then Commissioner, Mr Keelty. The document is the subject of paragraphs 6 to 10 of the affidavit of Mr Peter Whowell, the Manager, Government Relations, of the AFP. Mr Whowell has made comment about each of the documents subject of a claim under s 36(1). Much of Mr Whowell's evidence on this document is, necessarily, confidential. But, in any event, it is clear that the document is properly exempt under s 36(1) of the FOI Act. It will suffice to say that the document presented policy options to the Commissioner. Moreover the nature of the subject matter is such as to make it contrary to the public interest for the document to be disclosed. I add only that Ms Corby is not the subject matter of the document.
Document 34 has been disclosed insofar as it responds to the request. The balance is unrelated to the request or to Ms Corby generally; it was properly excluded under s 22(1) of the FOI Act.
Document 36 is in a similar category to documents 1 and 38. I am unable to see how it answers the request made merely by a passing reference to General Pastika in a document dated May 2003. It too should be excluded. The same is true of document 44 other than it appears not to bear any date. I would exclude that document as well.
Document 39 (folios 79 – 83) is a brief to the then Prime Minister (or was intended to inform the preparation of such a brief). So much of it on folios 81 and 82 as relates to Ms Corby has been released. The text of folios 79 and 80 is irrelevant to the request as are passages on folios 82 and 83. What is in issue is a passage on folio 82 over which a claim for exemption, based on s 36(1)(a) of the FOI Act is made. Examination of the document demonstrates that the part which is the subject of the claim describes matters of policy formulation and that, again, the subject matter is of such a nature that it would be would be contrary to the public interest for it to be revealed. The claim for exemption is properly made over that part of document 39.
Document 45 lists Parliamentary questions on notice in the Attorney-General's portfolio. Those relating to Ms Corby have been released, the balance are irrelevant. It was proper to exclude the irrelevant in reliance on s 22(1)(a)(ii) of the FOI Act.
Document 46 is claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 36(1)(a) of the FOI Act. It is the subject of paragraphs 11 (confidential), 12 and 13 (open) of Mr Whowell’s affidavit[9]. The document is described in the AFP’s statement of facts and contentions in this way[10],
Folios 178-179 are a draft statement prepared in response to allegations made by Ms Corby’s defence team that the AFP was involved in a cover-up and had not cooperated with it. The final version of this statement was released to the media and comments derived from it are publicly available.
It is contended that the statement, as a draft, contains deliberative material in relation to what may or may not have been included in the final statement.
[9] Exhibit 6.
[10] Exhibit 11, paragraph 50.
Mr Whowell says this of documents of this class in the open part of his affidavit,
12.AFP members regularly prepare draft statements to ensure that information is available to the executive to respond publicly if required, on short notice. In addition, in many cases the draft is not ultimately used by the person for whose benefit it was prepared, for a variety of reasons including for example, that further information has been discovered that negates the document’s purpose or that review and amendments are required. In this sense therefore, draft statements prepared by the AFP reflect the agencies [sic] views at a particular point in time and are really a work in progress. As such, they should not be vulnerable to public exposure as they may be outdated or, by the time of disclosure, not reflect the whole context of a matter. I believe that the information contained in document 46 is an example of such a document, and that its contents should not be disclosed as it contains working thoughts that have not entered the public domain. I further believe that the document, because it is a draft (noting the comments that part of the document need to be cleared by the Ombudsman), could create the impression that the approach outlined is the usual ‘response’ employed by the AFP in such cases.
13.In my view it would be contrary to the public interest to release this information because it would disclose the manner in which the AFP formulate and develop such responses. The manner of formulating responses in these circumstances needs to be fully consultative and exploratory, so that the truth of the matter is uncovered. If this document were to be released it would inhibit that drafting process and prevent a full exploration of the issues. The AFP relies, in part, for its effective operation on its reputation as a trusted and considered agency. It must be regarded as an agency that is able to protect the public and which has the highest standards of integrity in its operations and internal procedures. Any information that might prevent the AFP from engaging in fully considered responses that maintain that public trust would impact upon the AFP's ability to perform its functions to the highest possible standard.
The AFP drew attention to the observations of the Tribunal about the meaning of the expression “deliberative processes” in Re Waterford and Department of the Treasury (No 2)[11] where the Tribunal said,
58… The action of deliberating, in common understanding, involves the weighing up or evaluation of the competing arguments or considerations that may have a bearing upon one’s course of action. In short, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency are its thinking processes – the processes of reflection, for example, upon the wisdom and expediency of a proposal, a particular decision or a course of action. Deliberations on policy matters undoubtedly come within this broad description. Only to the extent that a document may disclose matter in the nature of or relating to deliberative processes does s 36(1)(a) come into play.
…
60It is documents containing opinion, advice, recommendations etc relating to the internal processes of deliberation that are potentially shielded from disclosure – documents that might, perhaps, have been more aptly described in the head note as "Internal Thinking Documents".
[11] (1984) 5 ALD 588, 606.
Had document 46 being concerned with the question whether a public statement ought to be made or not it may well have answered the description “for the purposes of, the deliberative processes” in s 36. Consideration of whether a statement ought to be made or not is the type of deliberative process to which the section speaks. I accept that it would inhibit the formulation of policy if draft policy positions were exposed to the public glare. But I am not satisfied that a draft press release is in the same category. Seemingly, a policy decision had been made to issue a press release; what followed was a fact-checking process, not the process of weighing up policy options or suchlike.
Moreover, and contrary to the view expressed by Mr Whowell, I do not regard it as being contrary to the public interest to release this document and the information that it contains. It is not suggested that it would be contrary to the public interest that any particular part of the content not be released; the objection is that the disclosure of the document would disclose the manner in which the AFP formulate and develop press statements. I find it impossible to accept that any reasonable observer would think other than that an agency would go through the process of drafting, checking and refining press releases that this document demonstrates. It could not be thought to be otherwise. Thus revealing the fact that there is such a process engaged in before a final press release is issued could not, in my view, be contrary to the public interest. I am not satisfied that the release of the document would inhibit the operations of the AFP in any way.
It follows that I would set aside the decision in relation to document 46 and substitute a decision that it be released in full.
Document 47 is an intelligence brief. Document 82 is the email to which the brief was attached. That part of the brief which has been released indicates that it is the product of research of AFP intelligence holdings in relation to allegations of airline baggage handlers using checked baggage to move drugs around Australia. Exemption from release is claimed for document 47 on the basis of one or more of ss 33(1)(a)(iii), 33(1)(b), 37(2)(b), 40(1)(d) or 41(1) of the FOI Act. Section 37(2)(b) is relied upon to support the redaction of part of document 82.
I need only consider the claim under s 37(2)(b) of the FOI Act. Its terms have already been set out[12]. Document 47 is the subject of paragraphs 48 (open) and 49 (confidential) of Ms Drennan’s affidavit. In paragraph 48 she says of document 47,
This is an Intelligence brief relating to drug smuggling allegations concerning baggage handlers. In my view this brief discloses the police methodology in relation to the intelligence portfolio and reveals how the intelligence portfolio processes and assesses intelligence and information generally. Disclosure of this document would, in my opinion disclose the methodology of the intelligence gathering and assessment process. Were this to be known it would prejudice the ability of the AFP to rely on that information in the future as it may allow people to attempt to avoid or manipulate the information that is being gathered such that the process would no longer be of value.
Ms Drennan's description of the document is accurate and, in my view, her opinion as to the potential damage that release of the document might cause, is sound. As the Tribunal observed in Re Mickelberg and Australian Federal Police[13] it is one thing for observers to be able to make deductions about police methods and procedures from matters in the public domain but “it is quite another thing to have spelt out publicly from the agencies [sic] own documents or in the proceedings of the Tribunal…what those methods and procedures are.”
[12] See paragraph 17 above.
[13] (1984) 6 ALN 176; see also, and more recently, Re Sullivan and Australian Federal Police [2011] AATA 188.
I would then uphold the claimed exemption over document 47. Document 82 requires no separate consideration. It too is exempt.
Document 48 is an e-mail of 24 May 2004 to Mr Keelty which makes reference to General Pastika. Insofar as the document deals with that official it has been released; the deletions, made in reliance on s 22(1) of the FOI Act, of irrelevant content was proper as was the deletion, in reliance on s 41(1) of the FOI Act, of personal information – names and telephone numbers.
Documents 49 and 50 are papers from an Executive Management Retreat undertaken by the AFP in May 2005. Again, those parts which mention Ms Corby’s name have been released: the balance is irrelevant and has nothing to do with Ms Corby. The deletion of irrelevant material was appropriate.
Documents 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 67, 69, 74, 77, 80, 81, 83, 85, 87, 90, 93, 96, 248, 249 and 251[14] are emails to Mr Keelty from third parties. Each mention Ms Corby. In each case the sender’s e-mail address, and in some cases the sender’s name, address or other personal details, have been deleted, correctly in my view, in reliance on s 41(1) of the FOI Act. The balance of the document has been released.
[14] Document 251 is, in fact, a copy of document 77.
Documents 54, 57, 78 and 97 are emails dated 2 October 2005 involving Mr Keelty. Document 54 is described, wrongly, as a "Medial statement" in the respondent’s schedule of documents. The error is understandable given the hundreds of documents involved. Exemption is claimed on the basis of s 33(1)(a)(iii) or (b) of the FOI Act i.e. documents that may cause damage to the international relations of the Commonwealth or information communicated in confidence to an authority of the Commonwealth. It is a sufficient answer to say that having regard to the terms of the documents that claim is made good. For what use it may be, I note that the documents have nothing to do with Ms Corby. It is a matter of notoriety that a number of persons were killed in terrorist bomb attacks in Bali on the evening of 1 October 2005.
Documents 66 (folios 220-226) and 72 has been released in full save for the deletion of a personal detail (a telephone number) on folio 220 and on folio 237. The deletions were properly made.
Document 70 (folios 231 – 234) is an e-mail and an attached document. The attached document has been released in full but irrelevant details from the e-mail have been deleted in reliance on s 22(1)(a)(ii) of the FOI Act. Those deletions were properly made.
Document 75 is an e-mail from a third party. The text of the e-mail has been released in full; the address and the e-mail address of the sender and the e-mail addresses of the recipients have been deleted. The address and the e-mail address of the sender was regarded, properly, as being personal information and the e-mail addresses of the recipients were regarded, again properly, as being irrelevant to the request.
Document 79 is an e-mail enclosing details of articles published about drug use at a particular time. The names of the sender and the addressees, other than Mr Keelty, have been deleted, properly in my view.
I assume that document 84 has been identified because it makes reference to General Pastika. It does not, however, answer the description in the request for “communication, documents and exchanges between” Mr Keelty and that person and it otherwise has nothing to do with Ms Corby or her affairs. As the document does not answer the search request the decision ought be varied by deleting this document from the results of the search.
Document 86 is an e-mail from Mr Keelty to all AFP staff. That part which relates to Ms Corby has been released; the balance which is entirely irrelevant to the request (it relates to internal staff movements) has been properly deleted.
Documents 88 and 95 are emails to Mr Keelty. They do not relate to Ms Corby in any way. They mention General Pastika in passing but are not “communication, documents and exchanges between” Mr Keelty and him. They do not come within the scope of the request and thus the decision ought be varied to exclude them from the results of the search.
Document 107 is described as an AFP "Case Note". Exemption is claimed over part of that document on the basis of s 33(1)(a)(iii), s 36(1)(a), s 37(2)(b) and s 42(1) of the FOI Act. That latter section is in these terms,
(1)A document is an exempt document if it is of such a nature that it would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege.
(2)A document of the kind referred to in subsection 9(1) is not an exempt document by virtue of subsection (1) of this section by reason only of the inclusion in the document of matter that is used or to be used for the purpose of the making of decisions or recommendations referred to in subsection 9(1).
A passage on folio 301 is claimed to be exempt in reliance on s 33(1)(a)(iii) i.e. on the basis that disclosure would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to the international relations of the Commonwealth. This passage is the subject of paragraphs 20 and 21 (both confidential) in Ms Drennan’s affidavit. It is enough for me to say that I accept that there is a need for Australia, through the AFP, to have a close and cooperative relationship with the INP. Whilst the views expressed by Ms Drennan are cautious I do not regard them as being over-cautious or unwarranted. Thus I accept the views expressed in her affidavit and uphold that claim for exemption.
As appears from the part of document 107 that has been disclosed, the document concerns proceedings taken against Ms Corby pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). Passages from folios 300, 301 and 302 are claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 42(1) of the FOI Act. Having read the passages in issue I am satisfied that disclosure of them would reveal the substance of legal advice obtained by the AFP from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. As such they would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege and thus exempt by virtue of s 42(1) of the FOI Act. I uphold those claims for exemption.
Other passages on folio 301 are claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 37(2)(b) of the FOI Act. That paragraph makes exempt documents which, if disclosed would, or could reasonably be expected to disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures. The passages are the subject of paragraph 57 (confidential) of the affidavit of Ms Drennan. I accept her evidence. It is self-evident that the content of the passages claimed to be exempt deal with investigative methods; disclosure of those methods is likely to prejudice the effectiveness of those methods. The claimed exemption is made out.
It follows that I would uphold that claim for exemption over document 107.
That part of document 108 that has been released shows that it is a memorandum from the AFP to the “Indonesia Desk”. A passage on folio 304 has been deleted on the basis of s 22(1)(a)(ii) of the FOI Act. I am satisfied that the passage is irrelevant to the request. Much of the content of the document is claimed to be exempt on the basis of either or both of ss 33(1)(a) or (b) of the FOI Act. Ms Drennan deals with these passages in paragraphs 22 and 23 of her affidavit. Both of those paragraphs are confidential however I accept the evidence contained within them. It is possible to say, without disclosing the content of the passages, that they reflect confidential communications between the AFP and the INP. For the reasons already given in relation to similar documents the claim for exemption is made out.
Document 109 is a letter from Mr Keelty to a third party. The text of the letter has been released; what has been deleted is the personal information of the recipient. The deletions were properly made in reliance on s 41(1) of the FOI Act.
Document 111 is a memorandum to the team leader of the AFP Bali office. A passage on folio 310 is claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 33(1)(a)(iii) of the Act. I have read paragraphs 24 (open) and 25 (confidential) of Ms Drennan's affidavit. It is not possible to do more than say that the contents of the document over which exemption is claimed together with paragraph 25 make out the claim for exemption. To go beyond that would reveal the contents of the document or the confidential part of Ms Drennan's affidavit.
Document 112 is a case note dealing with unauthorised disclosure of information regarding Ms Corby. Exemption is claimed on the basis of s 41(1) of the FOI Act in relation to the personal details of the maker of the telephone call dealt with in the note. That exemption is made out. Much of the content of the note is claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 40(1)(d) of the FOI Act. That section makes exempt documents, disclosure of which,
…would, or could reasonably be expected to;
(c) …
(d)have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of an agency; or
(d)…
However, by virtue of s 40(2), the section does not apply to a document in respect of matter in the document the disclosure of which would, on balance, be in the public interest.
It is possible to say, without disclosing the content of the passage over which exemption is claimed, that it deals with an interaction between the AFP and another agency of the Commonwealth. Ms Drennan's affidavit, in paragraph 54 says of this passage,
In my view the disclosure of this information may inhibit the frank manner in which such interactions proceed between agencies and the AFP may not be able to receive confidential communications of mutual agency concern. To impinge this ability would, in my view, have a substantial adverse impact on the AFP's operations in the performance of its core functions of providing assistance to government regulatory agencies. This is not ins [sic] the public interest.
Having regard to the contents of the passage in issue I accept Ms Drennan's evidence on the point. I uphold the claim for exemption.
Documents 113 to 121 are communications from persons to Mr Keelty, seemingly about comments made by him regarding Ms Corby’s case. In each case the text of the correspondence has been released, but personal information of the writer has been deleted. Additionally, documents 122 and 123, both addressed to the National Security Hotline, have had deleted certain reference details and an email address. I am satisfied that the deletions are warranted.
Documents 124 to 134, 136 to 137 and 139 to 141[15] are letters or emails to Mr Keelty from private individuals. Again, the text of the correspondence has been released; what has been redacted in each case is personal information. The exemption is made out.
[15] Document 135 is a similar letter but it bears no identifying details and has apparently been released in full.
Document 143 is a case note incorporating an e-mail to Mr Keelty from a private individual. Again that individual’s personal information has been correctly deleted.
Document 146 is a lengthy diatribe from a somewhat unbalanced private individual addressed to Mr Keelty in which the author makes a series of wild but irrelevant accusations about events in public life in Australia. The only relevant reference to Ms Corby, appearing on folio 409, has been released; the balance has been properly redacted in reliance on s 22(1) of the FOI Act.
Document 147 is described as "Review of Risk". It is an assessment of the likely risk from a threat made to Mr Keelty. Exemption is claimed in respect of the former on the basis of one or more of ss 37(2)(b), 40(1)(d) and 41(1) of the FOI Act. I do not find it necessary to reach a concluded view on whether those exemptions are made good. Whilst the document is a document "involving" Mr Keelty it is not a document that “relates to” Ms Corby. In my view it ought be excluded from the results of the search.
Documents 148 to 155 are in a similar category. They all relate to an investigation undertaken into a threat made against Mr Keelty. Large parts of the documents have been released. They show that the terms of the threat were,
Keelty should shut his mouth re Corby or will end up like Winchester.
That is the only reference to Ms Corby. Again, I am unable to see how any of these documents could be described as a document which relates to Ms Corby. They too will be excluded from the results of the search.
Document 156 has been released in part. A telephone number on folio 440 has been deleted in reliance on s 41(1) of the FOI Act. Deletions have also been made on folios 439 and 440 of irrelevant matters. A further deletion has been made on folio 440 in reliance on s 33(1)(a)(iii) of the FOI Act. I think, strictly speaking, the material that has been deleted is entirely irrelevant – the document does not evidence “communications, documents and exchanges” between Mr Keelty and General Pastika – nonetheless, that part which has been redacted in reliance on s 33(1)(a) of the FOI Act is undoubtedly exempt under that section. Disclosure of that part would disclose matters involving international relations of the Commonwealth and disclosure of it might potentially cause damage to those relationships.
Document 157 deals with a proposed visit to Bali by Mr Keelty in February 2004. It is not a document that relates to Ms Corby nor is it “a communication, document and exchanges” between Mr Keelty and General Pastika. It ought not to have been included in the results of the search. I will vary the decision by excluding it from the results of the search.
Document 158 is a Ministerial Brief regarding a request by Ms Corby's Indonesian defence lawyer that a named member of the AFP give evidence in criminal proceedings against her. A part of the document (on folio 444) is claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 41(1) of the FOI Act. Reference to that part makes it plain that disclosure of it would involve disclosure of personal information about another party. Moreover it would in my view be an unreasonable disclosure having regard to the matters contained within that paragraph. The balance of folio 444, as the respondent’s statement of facts and contentions notes, reveals recommendations made to the Minister in response to the request. As such, it comes within the terms of s 36(1) of the FOI Act, that is, it is a recommendation recorded in the course of the deliberative processes of the AFP. I have had regard to paragraph 24 and following of Mr Whowell’s affidavit. I agree with him that disclosure of the content of the recommendation would be contrary to the public interest. It is of no consequence, in light of that conclusion, but I would not have regarded the final paragraph on folio 444 as being irrelevant. Nonetheless I consider that it falls within the scope of s 36(1) of the FOI Act and is exempt on that basis.
Document 159 is a Ministerial Brief. The small portion of the document that has any relevance to Ms Corby's case has been released; the balance, properly in my view, has been deleted in reliance on s 22(1) of the FOI Act.
Document 161 is a Ministerial Brief about threats to the Indonesian mission in Australia. The reference to Ms Corby is peripheral and the document does not, in my view, constitute a communication by or involving Mr Keelty which relates to Ms Corby. I would vary the decision by excluding document 161 from the results of the search.
Document 162 is claimed to be exempt on the basis of one or more of ss 33(1)(a), 33(1)(b) or 37(2)(b) of the Act. That part which has been released shows that it is a Ministerial Brief from the AFP's National Manager, Intelligence.
Ms Drennan deals with the claims under s 33 of the Act in paragraphs 36 and 37 of her affidavit. Those paragraphs are partly confidential and partly open. Having regard to the contents of the document, I find it impossible to accept that its disclosure could or might have the consequences spoken of by Ms Drennan. Moreover, the belief spoken of in paragraph 37 of her affidavit is simply not made out merely because she states it to be the case. There is a complete absence of any other information that might sustain that belief. Thus, were it otherwise necessary to do so, I would not be satisfied that the claims under s 33 of the Act had been made out.
Having read document 162 I am satisfied that the claim made on the basis of s 37(2)(b) of the Act is on a more sound footing. Ms Drennan details the basis of the claim in paragraph 62 (partly confidential) of her affidavit. As Ms Drennan says, information concerning intelligence is inherently confidential; disclosure of such information, or public confirmation of the fact or content of intelligence holdings could be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of the AFP's methods or procedures. I would then uphold a claim for exemption based on s 37(2)(b).
Document 163 refers to Australians in custody overseas. Insofar as the document refers to Ms Corby it has been disclosed; insofar as it refers to other persons it has been redacted in reliance on either or both of ss 22(1) or 41(1) of the FOI Act. The deletions were correctly made; the material deleted is either irrelevant or personal information.
Document 164 is a Ministerial Brief from the AFP's National Manager, Border & International Network. It is claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 33A(1) of the Act. That section provided:
(1)Subject to subsection (5), a document is an exempt document if disclosure of the document under this Act:
(a)would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to relations between the Commonwealth and a State; or
(b)would divulge information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of the Government of a State or an authority of a State, to the Government of the Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the Commonwealth or of an authority of the Commonwealth.
…
(5)This section does not apply to a document in respect of matter in the document the disclosure of which under this Act would, on balance, be in the public interest.
So far as I am able to see there is no reference in either Mr Whowell’s affidavit or Ms Drennan's affidavit to document 164. It would appear to have been overlooked. I am not prepared to determine the matter without any evidence nor to determine it purely on the basis of such inferences as are able to be drawn by reference to the contents of the document itself. In these circumstances it seems to me that the most appropriate procedure is to remit for further consideration that part of the decision concerned with document 164 pursuant to s 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). If, on further consideration, the respondent remains of the same view regarding access the matter can be dealt with by a further, short, hearing if that be necessary. If, on the other hand, I have overlooked evidence about this document the document can be the subject of a further decision once I have considered that evidence.
Document 165 is described as "Talking Points", seemingly for an appearance before a Senate committee. It concerns Ms Corby and other, entirely unrelated persons. Insofar as it details the affairs of others it was correctly redacted in reliance on s 22(1)(a(ii) of the Act. There is a passage on folio 459 in respect of which an exemption under s33A(1) of the Act is made. But that claim is not the subject of any evidence. Again, it seems to me to be appropriate to remit for further consideration that part of the decision concerned with folio 459 for reconsideration pursuant to s 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
Documents 169 (folios 466 – 468) and 171 (folios 471 - 492) are also described as "Talking Points" for what I infer was an appearance before the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. Much more than Ms Corby’s matter was discussed in the documents. Insofar as the documents refer to Ms Corby’s case the material has been released in full; deletions have been made, properly, of other, irrelevant material unrelated to Ms Corby.
Document 173 (folios 495 - 498) is a Ministerial Brief dated 25 March 2005 relating to the prosecution of Ms Corby in Indonesia. Three paragraphs on folios 496 and 497 have been deleted in reliance on ss 41(1) and 45(1) of the FOI Act. That latter section is in these terms,
(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would found an action, by a person (other than an agency or the Commonwealth), for breach of confidence.
The content of two of the paragraphs certainly makes good the claim for exemption under s 45(1) of the FOI Act. The other paragraph does contain personal information and release of it, in my opinion, would be unreasonable. The claims for exemptions are made out.
Document 176 (folios 508 – 510) is a further Ministerial Briefing regarding the prosecution of Ms Corby. A deletion has been made on folio 508 in reliance on s 33(1)(a)(iii) of the FOI Act. Consistently with my views on documents 1, 2 and 3 in Application 2010/2438[16] I am not satisfied that release of the information contained could possibly damage our relationship with Indonesia. Accordingly the decision will be varied to provide access to the deleted section on folio 508.
[16] See paragraphs 11 - 13 above.
Document 192 contains a minor deletion of irrelevant detail.
Document 200 (folios 613 – 619) has been released in full except for a passage on folio 615 which is claimed to be exempt on the basis of s 36(1)(a) of the FOI Act. I have had regard to the matter that has been deleted. That passage is in an entirely different category to the balance of the document. In its context it records opinions that have been expressed as part of the deliberative processes of the AFP. I am satisfied that disclosure of that part of the document is exempt under s 36(1) of the FOI Act.
Document 201 (folios 620 - 629) seem to me to comprise two documents. Folios 620 to 623 are described as “Consular Branch – Talking Points”. No part of them are claimed to be exempt. Folios 624 to 629 are “Talking Points” prepared in advance of Mr Keelty taking part in an interview with Mr Alan Jones on his talkback radio programme. These pages are all said to be exempt on the basis of s 36(1)(a) of the FOI Act (in the case of folios 624 - 628) or on the basis of s 22(1)(a)(ii) of that Act in relation to folio 629.
The claim in relation to folio 629 may be dealt with briefly. The matters on that page are irrelevant to the request – they merely recite other, unrelated drug seizures made by the AFP, presumably on the basis that Mr Keelty was prepared to talk about those matters if the opportunity to do so arose in the course of his interview with Mr Jones. Thus, so far as folio 629 is concerned, I am satisfied that it is exempt.
I am not satisfied that folios 624 - 628 are exempt by virtue of s 36(1)(a) of the FOI Act. To be so, they must not only answer the description in s 36(1)(a) of the Act, but disclosure must also be contrary to the public interest.
I note, at the outset, that the transcript of the interview with Mr Jones has been disclosed in full[17]. The question then is whether the document prepared in advance of that interview to brief Mr Keelty about answers he ought, or ought not, make, answers the substantive description in s 36(1) of the Act. I do not consider that it does. It does not present policy options, it merely presents matters of fact which the interviewee might wish to raise in the course of the interview. I can readily understand why it may be necessary for a police force to have a good relationship with the media in order to elicit public assistance in the prevention or detection of criminal activity. The material presented in this document is not of that nature, rather it seems to be that the AFP was seeking to engage in public debate and to present, through the medium of talkback radio, its point of view. I am not satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest that the document not be disclosed.
[17] See document 196.
I will set aside the decision is so far as it refers to document 201 and substitute a decision that, other than folio 629, no part of document 201 is exempt.
Document 252 is identical to document 78 dealt with in paragraph 48 above. I reach the same conclusion in relation to document 252, namely that it is entirely exempt.
Document 253 is a letter to a private individual from the Chief of Staff to Mr Keelty. The name and address of that individual has been deleted on the basis of s 41(1) of the FOI Act. I uphold the claimed exemption over that personal information.
Document 256 (folios 804 – 835) is an extract from Mr Keelty's diary for 2005. Two entries detailing contact with General Pastika have been disclosed; the balance has been excluded on the basis of s 22(1)(a)(ii) of the FOI Act. The balance is entirely irrelevant to the request made and was properly excluded.
Document 261 is very similar to document 34. Insofar as it responds to the request or relates to Ms Corby generally it has been released; the balance was properly excluded as being irrelevant.
Document 262 is a draft minute. Exemption is claimed over all of the document on the basis of ss 36(1)(a) or 37(2)(b) of the Act. I need not decide whether the former claim is made out; the latter certainly is. Ms Drennan deals with the document in paragraph 63 of her affidavit. Her description of the document is accurate. I have earlier commented upon the nature of intelligence holdings; I will not repeat my earlier remarks. The claim for exemption under s 37(2)(b) of the Act is made good.
Document 264 has been released subject to the deletion of an irrelevant matter on folio 849. I am satisfied that the deletion is warranted.
Document 265 (folios 851 - 858) is a briefing paper about aviation. Part of folio 852 and all of folios 853, 854, 855, 856, 857 and 858 have been deleted on the grounds that they detail irrelevant matters. They were properly deleted on that basis in my view.
Document 266 is a file note prepared, apparently, by Mr Keelty. Exemption over the text of the note is claimed on the basis of s 33(1)(a)(iii) of the FOI Act. It is enough to say, having regard to the contents of the note, that the exemption is made good. It, incidentally, has nothing to do with Ms Corby.
Document 271 is described as a visit summary. I am at a loss to understand how it was regarded as falling within the terms of the request made for access. The document is not a communication by or involving Mr Keelty, it does not relate to Ms Corby and it is not a communication, document or an exchange between Mr Keelty and General Pastika. In those circumstances I would vary the decision under review by excluding document 271 from the results of the search.
I should add that document 271 was that in respect of which the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security provided evidence in response to the Tribunal’s request made pursuant to s 60A of the FOI Act. As the conclusion that the document was outside the scope of the request was evident on examination, it became unnecessary to request that the Inspector-General “appear personally” to give evidence in relation to that document or to determine the content of that expression. I am, however, grateful for the cooperation of the Inspector-General, Dr Thom, and her officers in the discharge of her statutory function.
Document 272 is a list of e-mails received from members of the public. The names of the senders have been deleted, correctly in my view, in accordance with s 41(1) of the FOI Act as containing personal information.
Document 274 is a document listing issues to be raised with the Commissioner, presumably by his staff. Insofar as it is relevant it has been disclosed. The balance, which concerns entirely unrelated matters, has been excluded pursuant to s 22(1)(a)(ii) of the FOI Act. It was proper to exclude that material.
The remaining documents have been released in full. No further comment is necessary in relation to those documents.
The result of this is that I would vary the decision under review in the following respects:
(i) exclude access to documents 1, 36, 38, 44, 84, 88, 95, 147 – 155, 157, 161 and 271;
(ii) allow access to documents 46, 176 and folios 620 – 628 of document 201;
(iii)remit to the respondent for reconsideration the request for access to documents 164 and folio 459 of document 165.
Again, I will specify a date 28 days after the publication of these reasons for the date of operation of so much of the decision as grants access to documents. The decision will otherwise be affirmed.
I should finally deal with the complaint made on behalf of Ms Corby that the searches undertaken by the AFP were inadequate. The complaint made is that searches were not undertaken using the single word “Corby", rather searches were undertaken on the basis of variations of the spelling of Ms Corby's first name. Ms Jacqueline Matan is the civilian employee of the AFP with responsibility for undertaking the searches in relation to Ms Corby's request. Her affidavit, together with her oral evidence, satisfies me that the searches undertaken were appropriate and reasonable.
I certify that the preceding 107 (one hundred and seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President P E Hack SC.
...........................................................................
Associate
Dated 15 October 2012
Date(s) of hearing 2 - 4 August 2012 Advocate for the Applicant Ms M Corby Solicitors for the Respondent Clayton Utz
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