SCAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SCAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 598

SCAS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 67 OF 2002

von DOUSSA J
ADELAIDE
10 MAY 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 67 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

SCAS
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MAY 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Application dismissed.

2.Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 67 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

SCAS
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE:

10 MAY 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) given on 14 February 2002.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.

    Background Facts

  2. The applicant arrived in Australia in April 2001.  He claimed to be a citizen of Afghanistan.  On 23 July 2001 he lodged an application for a protection visa.  His entitlement to this visa relevantly turned on whether the applicant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol, as defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).  Australia has protection obligations to people who are refugees within the meaning of the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol.  The applicant’s claim to fall within the definition of refugee in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention appears to have rested upon allegations that he was at risk of persecution by the Taliban for reasons of his race and religion (being a Hazara and a Shia Muslim), and further on the ground that he and his family were members of a particular social group (namely “rich” people, his father being the owner of a taxi).

  3. In his visa application the applicant said he was born in Aaghil Balna, Hitcha, Jaghuri, Ghazni, Afghanistan in 1986.  He said that from 1992 until 1996 he lived in Bedak, Sang-e-Masha, Jaghur, Ghazni, and during that period he completed four years of education.  He said that he left Afghanistan following harassment by the Taliban who had assumed control of Jaghuri three years prior to his departure.  As his father was considered a rich man by the Taliban they had extorted money from him.  He said his family was harassed by the Taliban because they had no weapons to donate.  He said that approximately fourteen months before his departure from Afghanistan he was beaten by the Taliban because he did not donate weapons.  He said he was taken away and only released…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 598
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a national of Afghanistan, applied for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (the respondent) to refuse to grant him a protection visa. The applicant claimed to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol. His claim was based on his alleged persecution by the Taliban for reasons of his race and religion, and his membership of a particular social group. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's language analysis indicated that he had spent most of his life in Quetta, Pakistan, rather than in Afghanistan as he claimed. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's explanation that he had adopted the accent of relatives from Quetta, and dismissed his claim as not credible. The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision on the grounds that it was based on an error of law, and that the Tribunal had failed to give proper consideration to his submissions. The court found that the Tribunal was not required to consider only the applicant's own account of his background, and that the Tribunal was entitled to rely on linguistic analysis in reaching its decision. The court also found that the Tribunal had sufficiently informed the applicant of the relevance of the linguistic analysis to the review, and that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the applicant's claims. The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

This case provides guidance on the proper approach to be taken by the Tribunal in considering an applicant's claim for a protection visa, and the extent to which linguistic analysis may be relied upon in making a decision. The court found that the Tribunal was entitled to consider all probative material before it, including the results of linguistic analysis, in reaching its decision. The court also found that the Tribunal was not required to accept the applicant's own account of his background as conclusive, and that the Tribunal was entitled to reject the applicant's explanation for his accent if it was not plausible. Finally, the court found that the Tribunal had sufficiently informed the applicant of the relevance of the linguistic analysis to the review, and that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the applicant's claims. This case is therefore likely to be of interest to practitioners involved in the administration of the Migration Act and the Refugees Convention.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application dismissed.

2. Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) given on 14 February 2002. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.Background Facts The applicant arrived in Australia in April 2001. He claimed to be a citizen of Afghanistan. On 23 July 2001 he lodged an application for a protection visa. His entitlement to this visa relevantly turned on whether the applicant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol, as defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). Australia has protection obligations to people who are refugees within the meaning of the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol. The applicant’s claim to fall within the definition of refugee in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention appears to have rested upon allegations that he was at risk of persecution by the Taliban for reasons of his race and religion (being a Hazara and a Shia Muslim), and further on the ground that he and his family were members of a particular social group (namely “rich” people, his father being the owner of a taxi). In his visa application the applicant said he was born in Aaghil Balna, Hitcha, Jaghuri, Ghazni, Afghanistan in 1986. He said that from 1992 until 1996 he lived in Bedak, Sang-e-Masha, Jaghur, Ghazni, and during that period he completed four years of education. He said that he left Afghanistan following harassment by the Taliban who had assumed control of Jaghuri three years prior to his departure. As his father was considered a rich man by the Taliban they had extorted money from him. He said his family was harassed by the Taliban because they had no weapons to donate. He said that approximately fourteen months before his departure from Afghanistan he was beaten by the Taliban because he did not donate weapons. He said he was taken away and only released when his father came to get him. He was permitted to leave but his father was kept for fifteen days until he paid a fee for his release. The applicant said his father was beaten by the Taliban whilst in detention. He also said that two years before he departed Afghanistan his uncle was arrested by the Taliban for having two pistols. His uncle was accused of involvement with Hezb-e Wahdat party, and that he subsequently disappeared. The applicant said that about three months before he left Afghanistan his father complained to the village elders regarding extortion by the Taliban. Following this complaint he said his father was again detained by the Taliban and only released following further payments to them. The applicant said that about eight months before he left Afghanistan he and his father were detained by the Taliban, held for two days, and harassed regarding their religion. The village elders secured their release by paying a fee to the Taliban.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the present case the Tribunal was required to make a finding regarding the assertion that the applicant had always lived in Afghanistan. Frequently the assertions of an asylum seeker that he or she was of a particular nationality and came from a particular country would not be the subject of conflicting evidence, and accordingly would be accepted as a matter of course by a delegate and the Tribunal. In the present case, however, there was evidence which cast serious doubt upon the applicant’s account of his personal history. If he came not from Afghanistan but from Pakistan, his claim that he would suffer risk of persecution for the reasons he gave would lack foundation, and could not be accepted. The Tribunal was required therefore to make a finding about the applicant’s claimed personal history. It is apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons for decision that it appeared to have no doubt that its findings were correct, and having reached the conclusion which it did about his history no room remained for inferring that the applicant had a “well founded fear of being persecuted” for a Convention reason. Ground 2 – Evidence of Dr Mousavi was inherently unreliable Counsel contended that Dr Mousavi’s evidence was inherently unreliable for a number of reasons. First it was said that the “contents of tape A” was not identified. In my opinion there is no substance in this complaint. It is clear from the transcript of the Tribunal hearing itself that the tape related to that hearing. The Tribunal arranged for the analysis and there is no reason to think that there could have been any confusion as to the tape which was analysed. The opinion of Dr Mousavi itself also supports the view that his analysis related to a recording of the hearing. Next it was said that only a portion of the tape of the hearing before the Tribunal was provided, and it is unclear what portion that was. Again, I do not think there is any substance to this complaint. It rests solely on the sentence in the letter instructing Dr Mousavi which reads:“The RRT will provide an audio tape (‘tape A’) containing a sample of an applicant’s speech believed to be in a Dari dialect.”It is not a proper interpretation of this sentence to read the word “sample” as meaning only a portion of the taped hearing. Counsel also contended that because the terms of Dr Mousavi’s contract required him to destroy the tape at the completion of his analysis, it is now not possible to identify what conversation he analysed, and the applicant cannot be assured of knowing precisely what parts of the hearing were provided. I reject this submission as there is no reason to doubt that the tape contained a recording of the whole hearing, and is identical to the tape which was provided to the applicant, and later transcribed for the purposes of the hearing before this Court. That tape is presumably still available to the applicant. It was also argued that doubt as to the value of Dr Mousavi’s evidence arises from the fact that Dr Mousavi in his report makes mention of certain words spoken in English whereas the letter of instruction to Dr Mousavi says that:“The applicant clearly identifies himself at the beginning of the hearing and speaks only in a language other than English.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

In its reasons for these conclusions, the Tribunal noted the submissions of the applicant’s adviser as to his background and communication difficulties, and the psychologist’s comments, but said:“Nevertheless, irrespective of the reasons for the applicant’s poor performance during interviews, the Tribunal finds that the applicant was only able to provide general and vague details of his circumstances in Afghanistan. For this reason the Tribunal relies on language analysis to determine the applicant’s background. Two language analysis independently found that the applicant speaks like a person who either spent his entire life or most of his life in Quetta, Pakistan. The analysis commissioned by the Department found with considerable certainty that the applicant’s language originates from Quetta, Pakistan. However, the Tribunal does not rely on that language analysis and prefers to rely on the language analysis of Dr Mousavi, a known expert on Afghanistan and Hazaras. He found that the applicant has a distinct Quetta accent. Dr Mousavi, advised that the applicant may have been born in Afghanistan but his language indicates that he spent most of his life in Quetta. The Tribunal accepts Dr Mousavi’s conclusion that the applicant’s language indicates a person who spent most of his life in Quetta, Pakistan.The applicant claims that he adopted the accent of relatives from Quetta. He also claims that his language was further influenced by accents he heard while attending school in Sang-e-Mashah. He also submitted a letter from a witness who claims to have known the applicant in Afghanistan. The Tribunal does not accept any of these claims. The Tribunal does not consider it plausible that the applicant lived in Afghanistan throughout his life and yet speaks like a person from another country. Dr Mousavi found little trace in the applicant’s speech of the Hazaragi spoken in Afghanistan. The Tribunal has formed the view that if indeed the applicant was raised and educated in Afghanistan, as he claims, his language would reflect that background. The Tribunal does not consider it plausible that contact with relatives from Pakistan, and random exposure to Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras in Sang-e-Mashah, could influence the applicant to such an extent as to abandon his primary language and adopt another. The Tribunal also does not accept as credible the witness’s evidence that the applicant lived in Jaghuri before travelling to Australia. It is the Tribunal’s view that if indeed the applicant lived in Jaghuri his language would reflect that background. Accordingly, the information provided by the witness is not accepted by the Tribunal.”Applicant’s submissions on review and decisions thereon Counsel for the applicant contended that the Tribunal’s reasons reflected error of law in a number of respects which are reviewable on an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 notwithstanding the privative clause provisions of Part 8 of the Act, as the errors of law constituted jurisdictional errors: see Boakye-Danquah v MIMIA [2002] FCA 438 per Wilcox J and Kwan v MIMA [2002] FCA 498 per Finkelstein J. It will only be necessary to consider these decisions and the scope of the privative clause provisions if the grounds of review advanced demonstrate error of law that would otherwise constitute a ground for review of an administrative decision.Ground 1 – the Tribunal failed to consider the possibility that it was wrongGround 9 – the Tribunal erred in assessing whether the applicant’s fears of persecution were well founded

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There is no principle of law that requires that linguistic analysis, or analysis of any other kind, should only be used if the Tribunal cannot otherwise make a decision on the applicant’s claims. On the contrary, the obligation of the Tribunal is to have regard to all probative material before it. Part of that probative material will include the results of linguistic analysis where it is undertaken. Ground 8 – Breach of s 424A of the Migration Act It was submitted that the Tribunal failed to sufficiently comply with s 424A when it served notice on the applicant, through his adviser, seeking comment on the report received from Dr Mousavi. Section 424A relevantly provides:“(1) Subject to subsection (3), the Tribunal must:(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review; and(c)invite the applicant to comment on it.”Subsection 3 is not presently relevant. The submission is that the Tribunal erred in the explanation it gave to the applicant about why the information contained in Dr Mousavi’s report was relevant to the review, and thereby failed to comply with s 424A(1)(b). The relevant text of the notice to the applicant is set out in par 20 above. The applicant was informed that the information in the report was relevant because Dr Mousavi’s conclusion, which was essentially the same as the earlier report, “contradicts your claim that you lived in Afghanistan throughout your life and raises doubts regarding the credibility of your claims”. It is submitted that this explanation does not make clear that Dr Mousavi’s conclusion could be used by the Tribunal to find that the applicant was not even from the country he claimed to be from at all. Rather, it was suggested that the notice would lead the applicant to assume that, besides his credit, the conclusion questioned whether he had spent the whole as opposed to some only of his life in the village. Counsel contended that the letter never properly put to the applicant the possibility that the Tribunal would find that the applicant was born in Pakistan. I have already observed that the Tribunal did not in fact make a finding that the applicant was born in Pakistan. It did however on the basis of Dr Mousavi’s report conclude that it could not be satisfied that the applicant is a citizen of Afghanistan or that he ever lived there. In my opinion the letter forwarded by the Tribunal pursuant to s 424A to the applicant did sufficiently identify the relevance of the report received from Dr Mousavi. Moreover, the notice elicited a submission from the applicant’s adviser which repeated the applicant’s earlier assertion that he came from the Jaghuri district of the Ghazni province in Afghanistan and that he had never, with the exception of four years of schooling as a child, been outside that area. The response conveyed the applicant’s instruction that his manner of speaking was the same as that of his cousins and was influenced by the long period he had spent in their company. The letter made the following submission:“Hence, it is quite possible that his manner of speaking was influenced by his cousin’s dialect, but it does not conclusively point to his having lived in Quetta for all or most of his life.”The letter also reported that the applicant said that, at the age of five, he was sent to school in Sang-e-Masha, which was his only venture outside his local area and was there exposed to a variety of dialects at a very early age. That response does not indicate that those advising the applicant were under any misapprehension as to the relevance which the Tribunal attached to Dr Mousavi’s opinion.Ground 10 – No bona fide exercise of power