JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: SCARFE, DELEGATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS -v- COFLEXIP STENA OFFSHORE INTERNATIONAL SA & ORS [2000] WASC 191
CORAM: MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD: 1 & 20 JUNE 2000
DELIVERED : 27 JULY 2000
FILE NO/S: CIV 1721 of 1999
BETWEEN: ROBERT WILLIAM SCARFE, DELEGATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS
Plaintiff
AND
COFLEXIP STENA OFFSHORE INTERNATIONAL SA
First DefendantCOFLEXIP SA
Second DefendantCOFLEXIP STENA OFFSHORE ASIA PACIFIC PTY LTD
Third DefendantFLORA JANE DIXON
Fourth DefendantTASSO PAPAELIAS
Fifth DefendantERNST & YOUNG (SUED AS A FIRM)
Sixth Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Supplementary reasons - No point of principle
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Application dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr M J McCusker QC & Mr E Carlose
First Defendant : Mr P C S Van Hattem
Second Defendant : Mr P C S Van Hattem
Third Defendant : Mr P C S Van Hattem
Fourth Defendant : Mr M J Deleuil
Fifth Defendant : Mr M J Delueil
Sixth Defendant : Mr M J Deleuil
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Australian Government Solicitor
First Defendant : Freehills
Second Defendant : Freehills
Third Defendant : Freehills
Fourth Defendant : Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Fifth Defendant : Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Sixth Defendant : Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
E F Hutton & Co v Mofarrij [1989] 1 WLR 488
Scarfe, Delegate of the Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Coflexip Stena Offshore International SA & Ors [2000] WASC 153
Waterhouse v Reid [1938] 1 KB 743
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
MASTER SANDERSON:
Supplementary reasons for judgment
Subsequent to judgment being handed down in this matter on 13 June 2000 (Scarfe, Delegate of the Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Coflexip Stena Offshore International SA & Ors [2000] WASC 153), counsel for the first, second and third defendants raised a number of matters which it was said were not dealt with in my judgment. Having reviewed the judgment and the submissions put, I am satisfied that there is one matter raised by counsel to which I did not deal with in my reasons.
In this action leave was given to serve the first and second defendants by serving their agent within the jurisdiction. From this decision there was an unsuccessful appeal. Counsel argued that leave to amend the statement of claim should not be granted if the effect was to raise a claim which was not included in the writ which was served. In support of this proposition reference was made to Waterhouse v Reid [1938] 1 KB 743 and E F Hutton & Co v Mofarrij [1989] 1 WLR 488.
With respect, I think the principle, correctly stated, is that an amendment to the statement of claim will not be permitted where the relief sought is not claimed in the writ and in respect of which leave to serve notice of the writ outside the jurisdiction would not be granted. Leaving to one side the question of whether this principle applies when service is effected upon an agent within the jurisdiction, there is no basis for saying in this case that leave would not have been granted to serve outside the jurisdiction in relation to claims now raised against the first and second defendants. On that basis, I am satisfied that there is nothing in this point which would prevent the amendment to the statement of claim as sought by the plaintiff.
As to the other matters raised by counsel, I am satisfied that my reasons for decision covered all matters which were live issues between the parties.
- AGLC
- Scarfe, Delegate of the Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Coflexip Stena Offshore International SA [2000] WASC 191
- Case
- [2000] WASC 191
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved the scope of supplementary reasons in administrative law and the circumstances under which they should be granted. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the application for supplementary reasons raised a point of principle that warranted such reasons, and if the application was simply a reiteration of arguments already considered by the tribunal.
In its judgment, the court held that the application for supplementary reasons did not raise any new points of principle or arguments that had not already been considered by the tribunal. The court emphasised that supplementary reasons should only be granted in exceptional circumstances where there is a genuine need to clarify the reasons for a decision to ensure its fairness and transparency. The court found that Coflexip's application did not meet these criteria, as it primarily sought to reargue points already addressed by the tribunal. Consequently, the application for supplementary reasons was dismissed.
The court's decision was grounded in the principle that supplementary reasons should not be used as a means to re-litigate issues that have already been decided. The court reiterated that the grant of supplementary reasons is discretionary and should be exercised sparingly, particularly where the application merely seeks to rehash arguments that have already been considered and rejected by the original decision-maker. The court's judgment underscored the importance of adhering to the principles of administrative law in ensuring that tribunals and courts maintain the integrity and efficiency of the administrative review process.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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