SAWYER & CLANCY (NO.2)
[2012] FMCAfam 1369
•14 December 2012
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SAWYER & CLANCY (NO.2) | [2012] FMCAfam 1369 |
| FAMILY LAW – Interim arrangements for care of children aged 12,10 & 7 – high conflict between parties – arrangements for children have previously been determined on a final basis in August of 2011 following contested hearing – mother has retained child aged 10 against allegations of abuse – assessment of risk – nature of interim hearing – best interests. |
| Family Law Act 1975, ss.60B; 60CC; 61DA; 65DAA; 68L; 69ZW |
| Sawyer & Sawyer [2010] FMCAfam 329 Sawyer & Sawyer [2011] FMCAfam 780 Clancy & Sawyer [2012] FMCAfam 802 Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 |
| Applicant: | MR SAWYER |
| Respondent: | MS CLANCY |
| File Number: | ADC 427 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Brown FM |
| Hearing date: | 7 December 2012 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 7 December 2012 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 14 December 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Read |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Boril Olds |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Lee |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Franklin Legal |
ORDERS
Pursuant to Section 68L of the Family Law Act 1975 THAT an Independent Children’s Lawyer be appointed URGENTLY to represent the interests of the children [X] born [in] 2000; [Y] born [in] 2002; and [Z] born [in] 2005 and to facilitate such appointment the Parties’ respective solicitors do forward all relevant documents to Mr Graham Russell of the Legal Services Commission of South Australia within seven (7) days of today’s date and that the Independent Children’s Lawyer use his or her best endeavours to be in a position to make submissions to the Court on the adjourned date.
Immediately upon appointment by the said Legal Services Commission of South Australia or otherwise, the Independent Children’s Lawyer file a Notice of Address for Service.
Further consideration of the matter is adjourned to 14 December 2012 at 2:15pm for delivery of expanded reasons for judgment following the orally delivered reasons this day and further directions.
The mother return the child [Y] to the care of the father at 7:00pm this day (7 December 2012) within the foyer of the [omitted] Police Station.
UNTIL FURTHER OR OTHER ORDER THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
An injunction issue and the mother be restrained from removing the children [X] born [in] 2000; [Y] born [in] 2002; and [Z] born [in] 2005 from the father’s care and approaching or coming within 100 metres of the children’s respective schools during school hours or within 100 metres of the father’s home.
The orders of 10 August 2011 whereby the parties are to share parental responsibility for the children and for the children to spend time with the mother are suspended.
If the mother fails to comply with order 4 hereof a recovery order issue forthwith.
Costs of today reserved.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Sawyer & Clancy (No.2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADC 427 of 2010
| MR SAWYER |
Applicant
And
| MS CLANCY |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
On 7 December 2012, following a lengthy and emotional interim hearing, I delivered an ex tempore judgment in respect of arrangements for the care of the parties’ child [Y] born [in] 2002.
Given the controversy of the orders made; the fact that the orders envisaged not only [Y], but also his brother [Z] born [in] 2005 and [X] born [in] 2000 being independently represented in these proceedings; and the fact that I suspended earlier orders for the mother to spend time with the children concerned; it was appropriate that the court provide a more extensive judgment in respect of the matter. This is that judgement.
The parties to the proceedings are Mr Sawyer “the father” and
Ms Clancy “the mother”. They are to be regarded as the parents of the three children concerned.[1] The father commenced the current round of proceedings on 15 November 2012. He sought a recovery order in respect of [Y]; an orders suspending the mother’s time with all three children; and that the mother pay his costs of the application fixed in the sum of $5,000.00.
[1] [X]’s father is Mr R. He has been a party to earlier proceedings in this court regarding final parenting arrangements for the three children concerned. However, to all intents and purposes, all concerned agree that Mr Sawyer has been regarded by [X] as her father for the vast majority of her life.
The father’s application was made returnable on 27 November 2012 following representations from his solicitors as to the urgency of the matter and a request to bring it forward from a later date. The mother was served on 23 November 2012, it having been earlier determined by the court that it was inappropriate that the father’s application be heard on an ex parte basis.
The mother did not have sufficient time to file answering material prior to 27 November 2011. On that basis, her counsel Ms Lee sought to adjourn the proceedings. This application was vehemently opposed by the father’s solicitors.
I was informed by Ms Lee that she had been instructed by the mother that [Y] was then in her client’s care and had been so since 12 November 2012. It was acknowledged that this was not in accordance with earlier orders of the court. However, Ms Lee informed me that her client had instructed her that [Y] was “suicidal” and was strongly resisting returning to his father’s care.
I was further informed by Ms Lee that the mother had sought urgent medical treatment for [Y], which had confirmed the mother’s concerns regarding [Y]’s mental health, particularly the risk of suicide and as a consequence a mental health plan had been created for [Y].
As a result of the mental health plan, Ms Lee told me that [Y] had been referred to a psychologist for treatment. Ms Clancy wished to obtain reports from both the doctor concerned and the psychologist to put before the court in support of her contention that it would be potentially psychologically catastrophic for [Y] to return to the care of his father.
The position of the father was that the mother’s concerns were manufactured. It has long been his position that the mother is intent on sabotaging the earlier orders of the court and is determined to undermine his close and loving relationship with the children.
On the other hand, it has been consistently Ms Clancy’s position that Mr Sawyer is a poor and neglectful parent, who consistently exposes the children to the risk of harm, either in a direct physical sense or psychologically. It is also her case that the father regularly abuses alcohol and has a violent and controlling disposition.
By necessary implication, the underpinning of her case is that
Mr Sawyer has been able to “pull the wool over the eyes” of the court in earlier proceedings regarding his true nature. It is her case that, on the basis of the material available to her, it is self apparent that [Y] cannot be returned to the care of his neglectful and abusive father.
I acceded to Ms Clancy’s application for an adjournment. This was the cause of significant disquiet for Mr Sawyer and those advising him. At the time, I informed the parties that any suggestion a child of ten years of age was suicidal was a matter of the gravest concern for the court and needed to be properly investigated, notwithstanding the ostensible contravention of the court’s earlier order.
In those circumstances, it was my view that I was duty bound to allow the mother to put relevant medical material regarding [Y]’s psychological condition before the court. I did however warn both parties of the dangers of “crying wolf”, particularly at an interim stage.[2]
[2] The reference is to one of Aesop’s Fables. As is well known, in the fable, a shepherd tricks villagers into thinking a wolf is attacking his flock. When a wolf does appear, the villagers do not believe his cries for help and the sheep are taken.
Cases involving serious allegations of child abuse pose problems for the court, particularly at the interim stage. At this stage, the court does not have the resources to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into the veracity of allegations of abuse and evidence from relevant professionals may not be available. The truth or otherwise of allegations of parental misconduct cannot be tested through cross-examination.
Mr Sawyer’s position is that Ms Clancy has an established record of making unfounded allegations of abuse against him and of unilaterally withholding the children in defiance of previous court orders. In these circumstances, he urges the court to disregard the mother’s recent claims of abuse and neglect in respect of [Y].
Otherwise, if the court does not do so, he fears [Y] will be placed in an untenable position psychologically being in the care of a parent who lacks insight because of her irrational level of antipathy for him and so [Y] will be placed at risk of losing his meaningful level of relationship with both him and his siblings.
The mother too urges caution. It is her case essentially that [Y] has made a cry for help, which the court is obliged to regard with the utmost seriousness. It is her position that the evidence, which she has recently obtained, is compelling and indicative of a child at risk.
On the other hand, the father urges the court to adopt caution in respect of any medical material marshalled by the mother. It is his position that Ms Clancy has a history of enlisting professionals against him through the provision of misleading information to such professionals.
Essentially, he asserts that the children concerned, particularly [Y], are at risk of coming to serious psychological harm because of the mother’s determination to change the court’s earlier orders by whatever means are available to her. To use the jargon of the times, he asserts the children are at risk of “systems abuse” through the agency of their mother.
This court’s authority, in respect of children, derives from the Family Law Act 1975. This legislation provides a code for the resolution of disputes between parties, primarily parents, regarding care arrangements for their children, most usually following relationship failure. The lodestone for the resolution of such disputes being the best interests of the children concerned.
This court does not have direct authority to determine whether a child is in need of care to such an extent that he or she should become a guardian of the State Authorities. This welfare jurisdiction remains the responsibility of State Governments, in Australia, rather than the responsibility of the Commonwealth Government.
However, in very many cases, there is an overlap regarding issues going to welfare concerns, in respect of a child and issues in dispute between the parents concerned. So it is with this matter.
On that basis, following the adjournment of the proceedings on 27 November 2012, I ordered that the Department for Education and Child Development (Families SA), the government instrumentality in South Australia responsible for child welfare matters provide information to the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 69ZW of the Family Law Act, regarding any notifications of child abuse received by the Department, in respect of [Y], particularly regarding any notification regarding his alleged suicidal behaviour.
The proceedings were then adjourned, over the father’s strenuous objections, for interim hearing on 7 December 2012.
Background
The parties have been in almost constant litigation over arrangements for their children since February of 2010. At this time, Mr Sawyer commenced proceedings seeking a shared care parenting regime in respect of [Y] and [Z] and, on an interim basis, the return of the two children from [M] to the [T] area of South Australia. This application was opposed by the mother.
The parties married [in] 2003. They separated finally in early 2010. It is common ground between them that they lived for the majority of their marriage at [T].
After the parties separated, the mother and children travelled to New South Wales, ostensibly for a holiday. The mother has family in the area of [M], which is near to [omitted]. She wished to continue to live there with the children.
This interim issue was determined by me on 19 February 2010.[3] I determined that pending final hearing, the children should return to [T] and, if Ms Clancy elected to return to the area as well, live predominantly with her but otherwise with their father.
[3] See Sawyer & Sawyer [2010] FMCAfam 329
At an early stage, this difficult issue of relocation was fixed for final hearing on 15 & 16 July 2010 and a family report ordered. At a later stage, Mr R, [X]’s father, was joined as a party to the proceedings.
[Z] suffers from haemophilia. One of the factors influencing the father in seeking the return of the children to Adelaide was that he was concerned [Z] would not receive appropriate treatment, for his haemophilia, in [M]. For her part, the mother has consistently reiterated her concerns that the father lacks insight into the significance of [Z]’s condition and is incapable of properly attending to it.
Ms Clancy did elect to return to live in the vicinity of [T] pending final hearing. Accordingly, pursuant to the order of 19 February 2010, the children lived with her and spent time with their father on alternate weekends.
Given the tension between the parties, the children were to be exchanged between them at their school or if the school was not in session, the [omitted] Police Station.
Mr U, an experienced psychologist with extensive experience of working in the family law area was tasked with preparing the family report ordered. At this stage, the main focus of the report was the mother’s desire to relocate the children’s place of residence to [M].
Mr U’s report was released on 8 June 2010. He recommended that all three children should spend more time with their father than the current regime allowed. In this context, although he accepted the issue of relocation was one for the court, he cautioned against it.
The children, including [X], were interviewed by Mr U. [Y] and [Z] apparently expressed a desire to live with their father. [X] is reported to have said as follows to Mr U:
“I still love my mum but I can’t get on with her, she is fighting with everybody … I would go and live with dad tomorrow if I could …”[4]
[4] See family report dated 2 June 2010 at page 12
The hearing scheduled for 15 July 2010 did not proceed. Rather, the parties agreed to trial an arrangement whereby the three children concerned lived for six days per fortnight with their father and the remainder of the time with their mother. Necessarily, this arrangement entailed Ms Clancy abandoning her proposal to live with the children in [M], at least on a provisional basis.
In conjunction with this arrangement, the parties negotiated a complex raft of orders dealing with the allocation of parental responsibility between them, particularly in respect of how [Z]’s haemophilia was to be managed. Both parties agreed to undertake a parenting program. Importantly, it was agreed that Mr U would revisit his report prior to a further hearing scheduled for February 2011.
Mr U was also requested to address separately the issue of what relationship [X] should have with her biological father, Mr R. At the time, it was common ground between all concerned that [X] had not interacted directly with her father since the time of her birth and therefore there was no emotional relationship whatsoever between the two, apart from possible curiosity on [X]’s part and a desire on Mr R’s part to engage with his daughter.
The irony of the situation was that Mr R had been living a few kilometres from [X] for the last few years. Mr R historically has a poor view of Ms Clancy, categorising her as a manipulative person, who was intent on preventing [X] from having any relationship with her biological father.
Ms Clancy was concerned as to how any potential reintroduction between [X] and Mr R should be conducted, particularly in terms of any psychological distress the child may encounter. Mr Sawyer was in favour of [X] meeting with Mr R and offered his home as a venue for the re-engagement.
Mr U completed this aspect of his report writing process in August of 2010. He was in favour of [X] meeting with Mr R. In interview with Mr U about this issue, [X] reported that her mother had “screamed and yelled” at her because she had earlier indicated to him her preference to live with Mr Sawyer.
In the lead up to the rescheduled hearing in early 2010, as directed, Mr U revisited the family. At this stage, he was concerned that all three children, but particularly [X] were suffering a deterioration in relationship with their mother. He also noted that all three children continued to express a preference to live predominantly with their father.
At this stage, the mother had not expressly abandoned her aspiration to live in [M]. Mr U recommended against the relocation. He reported as follows:
“Given the three children’s repeatedly expressed views and attitudes, their relatively well established social and education routines and [Z]’s special needs, their mother’s ambition to relocate to [M] to permanently establish a new relationship, appears to be at the expense of the children’s best interests.”[5]
[5] See Sawyer & Sawyer [2011] FMCAfam 780
The hearing for early 2011 did not proceed. Rather it was rescheduled for mid-2011. Unusually, but in response to the mother’s agitation,
Mr U was asked to revisit the family yet again, particularly in the context of the parties’ different views as to the children’s preferences as to their living arrangements.
In the lead up to the final hearing, relations between the parties, already poor, deteriorated further. In this context, both parties recast their applications. Significantly, it became Mr Sawyer’s position that the children should live predominantly with him rather than in a shared care regime. The mother’s preference was for an equal time regime.
The final hearing took place, over four days, in June of 2011. Judgment was delivered on 10 August 2011. I determined that the parties should have equal shared parental responsibility for [X], [Y] and [Z] but that the children should live predominantly with their father and spend time with their mother on alternate weekends, during term times, as well as one overnight in the other week. School holidays were to be essentially shared between the parties.
In essence I determined that the poor relationship between the parties rendered a shared care regime impracticable. However, I accepted that the children had a significant relationship with their mother and needed to spend time regularly with her.
One of the important factors influencing this decision, were the views of the children as reported by Mr U. In the reasons for judgment, I said as follows:
“As time has unfolded over the process of writing and up-dating his family reports for the court, it has been Mr U’s opinion that all of the children have become firmer in their preference to live predominantly with their father. I accept that this is the case but, given the tender years of [Y] and [Z], do not think this is a determinative factor so far as they are concerned.”[6]
[6] Ibid at paragraph 208
I accept that this decision was highly controversial, so far as Ms Clancy was concerned. However, the decision was not subject to any appeal and accordingly, as a final decision, it must be taken as being reflective of the children’s best interests.
Events since the orders of August 2011
One of the themes of the judgment published in August 2011 was my concern of the high level of tension between the parties. At that stage, I considered the parties incapable of “standing at opposite sides of either a football oval or a netball court in unprovocative silence”.[7] It being the case that both parties had accused the other of being violent and abusive at the various of the children’s sporting activities.
[7] Ibid at paragraph 327
Any hope that a finalisation of the parties’ parenting applications might lead to an end of the hostilities between them was misplaced. To the contrary, it seems that there has been an escalation of litigation between them. Litigation which the parties are ill equipped to afford financially.
Mr Sawyer is a [occupation omitted]. He estimates his average weekly income at $520.00 per week. The mother is in receipt of social security payments. At first blush, it appears that the pool of property available to be divided between them is modest.
The father returned to court, in February 2012, with an application for a recovery order in respect of the three children concerned. He alleged that Ms Clancy had failed to return the children to his care, in defiance of the orders of the court made in August 2011.
Mr Sawyer’s application was met by a contravention application and an application seeking a change to the parenting orders of August 2011 on both a final and an interim basis.
In addition, Ms Clancy sought the settlement of matrimonial property issues between the parties. Financial matters had long been a source of tension between the parties. Mr Sawyer continues to live in the former family home, at [T]. Ms Clancy lives in rented accommodation. As I say, the pool of matrimonial property is modest. Mr Sawyer wishes to retain the [T] property.
On both a final and an interim basis, Ms Clancy seeks orders that would see the children living predominantly with her. She has no formal proposals as to the time the children should spend with their father. In respect of property, she seeks a division 60/40 percent in her favour to be funded by the sale of the former matrimonial home. The prospect of losing the home fills Mr Sawyer with dismay.
The rationale for the mother seeking to change the final parenting orders, which were recently made, can be summarised as follows:
·The children had been presented to school in an “unfit” state;
·[Z] had been filthy and had a sore and bruised foot;
·[X] had a suspected broken ankle occasioned by a horse stepping on it. The father had allegedly been “too drunk” to obtain proper medical care for [X].
·[Z] had not received his prophylactic treatment for his haemophilia;
·Later it had been confirmed that [X]’s foot had been fractured;
·Given these circumstances, Ms Clancy had made notifications of child abuse to Families SA and these were being investigated;
·In these circumstances, she had withdrawn the children from their school pending resolution of the Department’s investigations.
As is perhaps self evident, the mother did not discuss these concerns with the father. Rather, it is clear she acted unilaterally. This was highly controversial so far as Mr Sawyer was concerned. For obvious reasons, relations between the parties, already poor, reached a new level of tension.
On 20 February 2012, the mother was at the [T] Primary School collecting some work for [X] to do at home. The father was also in the vicinity of the school in his motor vehicle. The mother alleges that the father drove in a dangerous manner in the direction of her car.
The father denies these allegations. The mother asserts that she has made a complaint to police about the matter and a charge of endangering life has been made against Mr Sawyer. Mr Sawyer asserts that the charge will be withdrawn.
The mother’s contravention application listed thirteen counts, which in the main alleged contravention of order 19 of the orders of August 2011. This order reads as follows:
“The parties comply with any treatment regime recommended for the child [Z] by the Haematology Section of the [omitted] Hospital and that each informs the other of any changes to the treatment regime by entry in the communication book.”
The mother also alleged that the father had contravened another provision of the orders, which required the parties to keep the other informed if any of the children was admitted to hospital.
The mother’s various applications were listed for mention on 29 February 2012. At this stage, Mr Sawyer had not had an opportunity to file answering material in respect of the extensive complaints made against him.
In addition, I was told that Families SA were continuing to investigate the matters. In addition, in order to support her case, the mother was intent on issuing subpoenae to the various authorities, who had apparently been involved with the children during the period of their alleged neglect by the father.
In those circumstances, the proceedings had to be adjourned. Again, this was highly controversial so far as Mr Sawyer was concerned. He felt that the mother was manipulating the situation to her own advantage.
The mother issued subpoena directed to the [omitted] Hospital; the South Australian Police; the South Australian Department of Education; and Families SA. In addition, the court of its own volition, pursuant to section 69ZW of the Act, directed Families SA to provide all notifications of abuse received by it in respect of the children.
Mr Sawyer filed a lengthy affidavit, in response to the mother’s criticisms of him, on 27 March 2012. The matter returned to court on 18 April 2012. On this occasion, I determined that the children should continue to live with Mr Sawyer in accordance with the orders of 12 August 2011. I also determined that Ms Clancy should spend time with the children in accordance with those orders.
Accordingly, I determined that there was not sufficient moment in the mother’s concerns to warrant any interim change to the finally ordered arrangements for the children. I provided orally delivered reasons in support of this decision, which were subsequently transcribed.
Medical records produced to the court indicated that [X]’s foot had not in fact been fractured in the accident in question. I accepted that the injury had occurred as a result of an accident. I was also persuaded that there was no cogent evidence to indicate that [Z] had been at serious risk of medical emergency, due to his father’s neglect. It was also the case that officers from Families SA had interviewed the children concerned but had declined to take any direct action in respect of them.
In those circumstances, I wrote as follows:
“In August of 2011 I determined that [X], [Y] and [Z]’s interests would be best served by living mainly with their father. At that stage I had extensive evidence available to me. The mother, I suspect, will never accept that decision.
A comparatively short time later the mother asserts that the father has neglected the children. An allegation which is hotly contested by the father. At this stage, I am not in a position to indubitably resolve this controversy.
Rather what I must do is, on the basis of the provisional evidence available to me make some assessment of the degree of risk the father’s level of care represents to the children. If I am of the view that the risk he represents to them is one which it would be unacceptable for the court to assume, the children should not be returned to Mr Sawyer’s care.
On the basis of the evidence currently before me, I am not of such a view. I do not think that it would constitute an unwarranted risk, to the children, if they return to their father’s care. I found Mr Sawyer to be the better placed of the two parties, to provide the predominant home for the children, following the hearing last year. In addition, at this stage, there are issues raised which relate to the rule in the case of Rice & Asplund.
In layman’s terms, what that rule is, is that the Court should not engage in endless inquiries into what is best for a child or children following a final determination unless there has been some significant or major change of circumstances so far as the child or children are concerned, it being the case that further proceedings of themselves may represent a danger to the best interests of children.
At this juncture, I have come to the view that it is premature for me to make a ruling in respect of Rice & Asplund. But I am concerned that the mother ostensibly seizes on every possible criticism she can find of Mr Sawyer to launch another round of proceedings. However whether there is moment in her criticisms, must await the determination of her contravention application. Also, steps must be put in place to deal with the mother’s application for property settlement.”[8]
[8] See Clancy & Sawyer [2012] FMCAfam 802 at paragraphs 44-49
In accordance with those reasons, the mother’s contravention application was fixed for hearing on 25 July 2012. The parties were referred to a financial mediation conference, in respect of their competing applications for property settlement, on 16 July 2012. This conference did not assist them to reach any agreement.
The contravention application proceeded to hearing on 25 July 2012. The thirteen counts were put to Mr Sawyer and he formally denied each of the contraventions alleged against him. Thereafter the mother gave evidence in support of her case and was extensively cross examined by counsel for the father.
At the end of the mother’s case, Mrs Read, counsel for the father applied to make a no case submission. Unfortunately, there was no time to hear this submission on the day allocated for the hearing of evidence. Regrettably, up to this stage, the no case submission remains outstanding.
Due to my earlier unavailability, the no case submission was listed for determination on 9 November 2012. On this occasion, the mother’s legal representatives sought to withdraw from the case. On this basis, the mother applied to adjourn the proceedings to prepare her own case. The matter was then adjourned to 7 December 2012. More recently, developments involving the care of the children have overtaken this aspect of the proceedings.
Although I have not as yet heard the submissions of either party, in respect of the no case to answer issue, I have heard the mother’s evidence. On the basis of this evidence, I do not regard the no case to answer submission to have been made on a fanciful basis. The submission is not without reasonable prospects of success.
The current applications
Mr Sawyer filed his application for a recovery order in respect of [Y] on 15 November 2012. Initially, it was listed for hearing in conjunction with the no case to answer aspect of the proceedings but, following submissions from his legal advisors, the date was brought forward to 27 November 2012. As previously indicated, these proceedings were subsequently adjourned, over the strenuous of Mr Sawyer.
The Department responded to the request to supply any notifications of abuse, in respect of [Y], particularly in respect of his reported suicidal intentions, on 27 November 2012. An officer of the Department reported that no concerns had been received “in relation to [Y]’s alleged suicidal feelings”.
This was not however the end of the correspondence concerned. The writer went on to report as follows:
“However, there have been 2 recent investigations resulted in concerns being unsubstantiated.
It should be noted that our records appear to indicate that there have been some concerns that the mother was attempting to use Families SA and SAPOL to further her case in Family Court and make things hard for the father.
Records will also indicate conversations the children have had with Families SA workers regarding their living arrangements.
I hope this information helps until the matter is heard on 7 December and the Court receive the necessary information from Families SA.”
Mr Sawyer filed an affidavit in support of his application. He alleged that the mother had failed to return either one or both of [Y] and [Z] on numerous occasions since 6 August 2012. In conjunction with that he asserted that the mother had made numerous spurious complaints to Families SA that he had abused the children.
He provided a letter addressed to him dated 7 August 2012, which indicated that social workers employed by the Department had investigated the complaints of abuse made against him and found them unconfirmed.
The father’s evidence regrading [X] is that she has elected not to spend time with her mother since May of this year. [X] is currently twelve years of age. As previously indicated, the evidence of Mr U is that she has somewhat of an ambivalent relationship with her mother.
[Y] and [Z], in accordance with the current orders, spent time with their mother between Friday 9 November and the morning of Monday, 12 November. They went to school as normal on Monday and were brought home to the father’s household, by the paternal grandmother, on Monday afternoon.
It is Mr Sawyer’s case that Ms Clancy attended at the roadway outside his home and spoke to [Y]. The child then asked to spend more time with his mother, which Mr Sawyer declined as the child was scheduled to have an overnight period with her the next Wednesday.
Mr Sawyer describes what happened next as follows:
“The next thing [Y] stormed out of his room and ran to his mother’s car which was approximately 70 metres from our home.”[9]
[9] See father’s affidavit filed 15 November 2012 at paragraph 21
Thereafter, the father has had no interaction with the child. It also seems to be the case that he has not attended at school as required. It is in this context that Ms Clancy has alleged that the child is suicidal.
In her answering affidavit, filed on 30 November 2012, Ms Clancy asserts as follows:
·[Y] has told her Mr Sawyer is mentally unstable and is on antidepressant and mood stabilising drugs;
·[Y] is tired of various women coming and going from the father’s household;
·She had seen [Y] on the afternoon of Monday, 12 November 2012, when she indicated to him that he needed his father’s approval to come home with her later than day. She had told him to text her if he got the permission required;
·She was passing the father’s street, later that afternoon, when she saw [Y] running down the road. When she spoke to [Y], he said as follows: “I hate him. I am never going back. I am sick of his shit; all he wants to do is drink and smoke drugs. Just take me home with you.”[10]
·Later that day [Y] stated that he would kill himself if forced to go back to his father. He had also apparently complained of difficulty breathing and chest pains.
[10] See mother’s affidavit field 30 November 2012 at paragraph 20
It was against this background that the mother consulted a general medical practitioner, Dr V on 14 November 2012. Following this consultation, it was arranged for [Y] to consult Mr M, a psychologist, who interviewed [Y] and Ms Clancy on 28 November 2012.
Dr V certified that [Y] was suffering from an illness and would be unable to attend school from 14 November 2012 onwards, “until his social circumstances have been sorted out.” No further diagnosis was provided in the doctor’s certificate.
I have subsequently been provided with what is entitled a “GP mental health care plan”, which Dr V has compiled in respect of [Y]. He is diagnosed as suffering from mixed anxiety and depression. Dr V reported that Mr Sawyer was verbally abusive when drunk and [Y] had run away from his father to live with his mother. Under the heading “risk assessment”, [Y] is reported to have no suicidal intent but to have fleeting suicidal ideation. He was referred for psychological counselling.
Ms Clancy’s solicitor has obtained a report, dated 29 November 2012, from Mr M. In this report, Mr M points out that he had “no collaborating evidence” available to him to confirm the claims by
Ms Clancy regarding Mr Sawyer and his alleged abusive behaviour towards [Y].
In individual session, Dr M described [Y] as having normal mood, with appropriate affect. He spoke of his recent difficulties with his father “without obvious distress”. His account of the day he chose to leave his father and go home with his mother was described by Dr M as being “fairly vague”.
Ms Clancy also complained that, since [Y] had come into her care, she had not been able to spend any time with [Z] pursuant to the orders of August 2011. This was the background to the most recent development between the parties.
Mr Sawyer filed a further affidavit, on 4 December 2012. In this affidavit, he denied having multiple relationships with women and having any difficulties with his relationship with [Y]. He denied the abuse of drugs and alcohol. He does however concede that he has a recent drink driving conviction, in August of 2012, with a reading of ·13.
It is Mr Sawyer’s evidence that [Y] has been a happy and emotionally well adjusted child, whilst in his care. This view is supported by both of [Y]’s paternal grandparents. Whilst Mr Sawyer is not in a position to give evidence about what [Y] may have said to his mother, he doubts the claim [Y] has indicated suicide, given what he knows of the child.
Mr Sawyer has significant concerns about the nature of [Y]’s consultation with Dr V. Firstly, Dr V is not [Y]’s normal medical practitioner. As such, he had no background into the complex family situation surrounding [Y]. Mr Sawyer is concerned that Ms Clancy has been either selective or disingenuous in the history she has provided to both Dr V. The father holds similar concerns in respect of Mr M’s involvement with [Y].
On the afternoon of 7 December 2012, the occasion scheduled for the further interim hearing of the matter, I was provided with further documents prepared on behalf of each of the parties. On the father’s part, he has filed an amended response.
On both a final and interim basis, he seeks orders that the children live with him and spend two hours per fortnight with their mother to be supervised by the [omitted] Children’s Contact Centre. Necessarily, he seeks the discharge of the court’s earlier order made in August 2012.
In an affidavit deposed 5 December 2012, Ms Clancy indicated that [Y] had returned to school, at [T], on 30 November 2012. The mother asserts that the father and the paternal grandfather had attempted to remove [Y] from school on the following Monday 3 December but their efforts had been frustrated by the principal, deputy principal and a school counsellor. As a result of this incident, she asserts that [Y] has been “retraumatised”.
There was a further incident at the school the following Wednesday, 5 December 2012. This incident involved Ms Clancy and Mr S, the children’s paternal grandfather. Mr S has provided an affidavit in respect of the incident.
Ms Clancy’s position is that she was at the school, as a result of a misunderstanding on her part, that she was due to collect [Z]. She then asserts the paternal grandparents over reacted to the situation and behaved violently and provocatively.
Unsurprisingly Mr S Senior has a different version of events. He asserts that [Z] was terrified at the prospect of being apprehended by his mother. Both [Y] and [X] were apparently involved in this incident.
Mr Sawyer asserts that [Z] was injured in the interaction and had fingernail scratches and fingerprints on his arms and bruising as a result of his mother’s conduct. Mr Sawyer also asserts that Ms Clancy was verbally abusive. The impression I am regrettably left with is that there was a physical altercation over the child.
This was the background to the orders made by me on 7 December 2012. Whatever is ultimately found to be the rights and wrongs of what occurred on 3 and 5 December 2012, it is my view that it is totally inappropriate that the children’s school should become a theatre for the apparently unending struggle between the two warring factions for the possession of the children concerned. I am confident that the school authorities would agree with me in this regard.
I formed the view that something urgently had to be done to “break the circuit” of the apparently escalating conflict between the parties. That was the background to the orders made by me on 7 December 2012. As previously indicated, the current reasons are an expansion of the earlier orally delivered reasons for judgment, given the complexity of the matter and the fact that it has now become apparent that the children’s interests need to be protected by the appointment of an independent children’s lawyer.
Regrettably, it also seems to be the case that there will have to be a further final hearing. This is likely to involve yet another family assessment report, which will again canvas the views of the children concerned. I remain gravely concerned regarding this further hearing.
The nature of an interim hearing
Interim hearings have to take place in a shortened form. There is no time available for the cross-examination of the parties concerned. The proper forum for the resolution of disputes of fact is the final hearing.
In addition, at the interim stage, decisions invariably have to be made against a background of urgency and controversy. So it is in this case. As a consequence, the evidence available to the court is often limited and hastily prepared. Again, so it is in this case.
In cases involving arrangements for children, the most significant piece of evidence, which is not usually to hand at the interim stage, is a detailed and independent assessment of the needs of the children concerned and the nature of their relationship with each of their parents. At the final hearing stage, such family reports play a crucial role in the determination of cases.
In this case, the children concerned have previously been assessed by Mr U. He wrote three reports for the court. The mother asserts there has been a change of circumstances regarding the children. Given the ongoing conflict between the parties, it seems probable that there will be a need for a further family report. This report is not currently available to me.
However, notwithstanding the limited and provisional nature of the evidence available to the court, at this interim stage, a decision must be made between the competing claims of the parties concerned. In an ordered society, governed by the rule of law, there must be a mechanism for resolving disputes between citizens, including between those citizens who are parents and fall into disputation about arrangements for their children.
If there was not such a system, chaos would prevail and the strong would take advantage of the weak. In seeking an adjudication from the court, the parties concerned are bound by its decision.
In the current case, there is prima facie evidence to indicate an extreme level of “self help” by the parties concerned. This is unacceptable and must stop. It has the potential to be extremely emotionally detrimental for the children concerned. The dispute between the parties is the parties’ dispute, not the children’s. I am concerned that [X] is becoming enmeshed in this dispute between her parents.
In resolving any parenting dispute, the court is not primarily concerned with the rights of the actual disputants. It must regard the interests of the persons most fundamentally affected by its decision – the children concerned – as the paramount or most important consideration.
Necessarily, the final hearing is a longer one than the interim hearing, enabling the court to make any necessary findings of fact – essentially deciding what evidence it accepts on the balance of probabilities, following its assessment of the truthfulness or reliability of the relevant witnesses.
Given the limited nature of the evidence available at the interim stage and the absence of cross examination, it is very often impossible for the court to resolve disputed issues of fact. Again, notwithstanding this obvious practical difficulty, the court must still remain focussed on the best interests of the children affected by its decision and look to matters which are incontrovertible and assess the nature of the evidence available in respect of issues which are in dispute.
In this case, there are many issues in dispute between the parties. They can be summarised as follows:
·Has the mother attempted to manipulate [Y] emotionally with firstly Dr V and more recently with Mr M;
·Has [Y] a strong desire to live with his mother because of his father’s poor behaviour;
·Has the mother a compromised attitude, in respect of the responsibilities incumbent in being a parent, which has manifested itself through her self help in respect of the retention of the children in the past;
·Is the father a person who has issues to do with drug and alcohol abuse;
·What is [Y]’s current emotional state? If it is compromised, what factors are impacting upon its compromised state;
·What happened at the children’s school on 3rd and 5th December 2012 respectively?
There are however some matters, which can be established from the evidence available to the court, at this stage. These include the following:
·The evidence available to the court in August of 2011 indicated that Mr Sawyer was the better placed parent to provide the majority of care for the three children concerned;
·At this stage, the children’s stronger preference was to live with their father;
·[X]’s relationship with her mother has been interrupted;
·Between early November and early December, the children’s relationship with one another has been disturbed;
·The Department (Families SA) has been involved with the family in the past, as a result of notifications of child abuse. The Department has not found any allegations of abuse to be established. It has indicated its concern that the mother is attempting to manipulate the situation to her own advantage;
·The level of inter-parental conflict is extreme.
The essential difference between an interim and final decision is that interim hearings do not determine long term arrangements for the care of the children concerned, whereas final hearings do. Accordingly, the outcome of an interim hearing is provisional in nature. However, although the nature of the hearing concerned is different, the same legal principles apply at both the interim and final hearing stage.
The legal principles applicable
In making the interim decision (as at the final stage), the best interests of the child or children affected by the decision remain the most important consideration. The matters which the court must take into account in deciding how a child’s best interests are to be served are set out in the Family Law Act [see section 60CC].
Section 60CC creates two classes of considerations which apply to the court’s determination of how a child’s best interests will be determined in proceedings before it – primary considerations and additional considerations. There are two primary considerations, which are set out in section 60CC(2)(a)(b) namely:
(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents; and
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
Prior to recent legislative amendments, these considerations were not formally ranked in regards to one another. They have been referred to, in a number of decisions of the Family Court, as “twin pillars”, the importance of which depends on the circumstance of the case concerned.
However, as a result of the insertion of section 60CC(2A) into the Act the court is now directed:
“in applying the primary considerations… to give greater weight to section 60CC(2)(b), which is the primary consideration relating to the need to protect children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence.”
These factors are stressed in section 60B(1) which sets out the objects of the legislation relating to children and are reiterated as the primary considerations in how a court determines what is in the child's best interests by section 60CC(2).
Other criteria relating to how a court is directed to consider how the best interests of any children concerned may be served, by any order which the court makes, are set out in section 60CC(3). These criteria are categorised as additional considerations.
Pursuant to section 60CC(3)(m) the court is empowered to have regard to any other fact or circumstance, which it considers relevant. This ensures that the infinite variety of individual children’s circumstances may be addressed in any order which the court makes.
There is a presumption that it is in a child's best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for him or her. [section 61DA]. The presumption relates to the allocation of parental responsibility, not to the allocation of time which a child spends with each of his or her parents.
The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in abuse of the child or family violence has occurred. The presumption may also be rebutted if the court finds that it would not be in the best interests of the child for it to apply.
The court has a discretion not to apply the presumption at the interim stage if circumstances exist which make it inappropriate for it to be applied [section 61DA(3)]. This subsection is likely to be pivotal in interim proceedings, particularly in cases where untested or unverifiable allegations of child abuse or family violence arise.
By application of section 65DAA, if the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies in respect of a child, the court is required to consider firstly whether the child concerned should “spend” equal periods of time with both his or her parents, provided such an outcome is both likely to be in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.
If the court rejects equal time, it is then required to consider the child living with each of his or her parents for “substantial and significant” periods of time. Again, this outcome is subject to consideration of the child’s best interests and reasonable practicality.
In the case of Goode & Goode[11], the Full Court of the Family Court has laid out a pathway for the determination of interim hearings such as this one.
[11] Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286
In determining interim parenting matters, after identifying the competing proposals of the parties, the issues in dispute, and any agreed issues, the court should:
·consider the section 60CC matters relevant and, if possible, make any relevant findings of fact;
·decide whether the presumption in section 61DA should be applied or, if it is rebutted because:
Ø there are reasonable grounds to believe abuse or family violence has occurred;
Ø or, in interim proceedings only, if it would not be appropriate to apply the presumption.
·If the presumption is rebutted or found not to apply, then make the orders considered to be in the best interests of the child, again as a result of applying the relevant section 60CC matters;
·If the presumption does apply, decide whether it should be rebutted because it would not be in the child's best interests;
·If the presumption applies, consider first making an order that the children spend equal time with each parent, then second, an order that the child spend substantial and significant time with each parent unless it is contrary to the children's best interests as a result of the consideration of any relevant section 60CC matter, or is impracticable in the terms specified by section 65DAA(5);
·If neither equal time nor substantial and significant time are considered to be in the best interests of the child, then make the orders which are considered to be in the best interests of the child when considering applicable matters in section 60CC.
·Even in this latter situation, it is open to the court to make an order for equal time or substantial and significant time if the court considers it to be in the best interests of the child concerned.
The case, at this stage, is fundamentally centred on the assessment of risk. It is the mother’s case that, for the court to have returned [Y] to the father’s care is a situation which will result in an appreciable risk of particularly [Y] coming to physical or psychological harm, as a result of being exposed to abuse and neglect in Mr Sawyer’s household.
In the context of these proceedings, on the basis of the limited evidence available to me, I must make some assessment of the degree of risk arising to the two children primarily concerned, [Y] and [Z]. If a risk is found to exist, I must shape orders which are commensurate with the degree of risk involved and with due regard to the best interests of the children concerned, including their entitlement to maintain a meaningful level of relationship with each of their parents.
The High Court has stipulated that the test to be applied to the assessment of such risks is the “unacceptable risk test”. The test being expressed by saying that a court will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of coming to some form of emotional or physical harm as a result of abuse.
If the court does make a finding that an unacceptable risk of abuse exists, it is then necessary to consider what, if any, parenting orders should be made, particularly orders for the child concerned to spend time with a parent and what conditions should attach to such orders.
Again, this exercise involves an estimation of the magnitude of the risks involved and how those risks can be best managed, in all the circumstances of the particular case. Because the potential consequences of severing a worthwhile relationship, between the child and one of his or her parents is potentially so detrimental to the child concerned, the termination of such a relationship is in most cases the last resort.
However, once again, I must bear in mind the interim nature of these proceedings and the fact that any decision made at this interim stage is capable of reversal or amendment at the final hearing stage, or indeed on further interim hearing, when more evidence is likely to be to hand.
But, nonetheless, notwithstanding the provisional nature of any interim order, I must keep in the balance the potential detriments, to a child, of having a potentially meaningful parental relationship significantly curtailed.
Conclusions
Notwithstanding the finding made in August of 2011 that the parties should have equal shared parental responsibility for [X], [Y] and [Z], on the basis of the evidence currently available to me, I am satisfied that it is not reasonable for the presumption to be applied at this interim stage.
Clearly, in the current emotionally fraught circumstances, the parties are incapable of exercising any form of parental responsibility for the children concerned in tandem with one another. The evidence indicates that they are incapable of consulting and their facility to communicate can properly be described as compromised.
Without assigning direct responsibility for this unfortunate situation, it is clear to me that the parties’ parenting relationship is currently marked by dysfunction and a competition between them for the favours of the children concerned. This is likely to have adverse emotional consequences for the children concerned. In these circumstances, it seems to me to be likely that [Y], in particular, is in a position of some psychological vulnerability.
In my view, the evidence currently does not indicate clearly that this vulnerability is a result only of the father’s allegedly compromised parenting. It seems equally open to me to conclude that this vulnerability stems, at least in part, from his exposure to the apparently unending struggle between his parents, in which struggle the greater protagonist appears to be Ms Clancy.
The evidence also indicates that there was some form of physical struggle over [Z] at his school. Again Ms Clancy was involved in this altercation. I am gravely concerned at the possible psychological implications for [Z] of being the focus of this serious level of disputation. In my view, it is incumbent on the court to put in place measure to protect him from such eventualities occurring in future.
In these circumstances, I need not directly turn to consider the children either spending equal periods of time or substantial and significant periods of time with each of their parents. In any event, I am satisfied, on the basis of the evidence available to me, that neither such outcome is likely to be in the best interests of the children concerned or reasonably practicable to put into operation. I now turn to consider the relevant section 60CC factors applicable.
Both parties assert that the children are at risk of suffering psychological harm, as a result of exposure to the abusive and neglectful parenting of the other parent. Pursuant to section 60CC(2)A this consideration must be given precedence over considerations relating to the benefits the children are likely to derive from having a meaningful level of relationship with each of their parents.
In August of 2011, following a hearing of four days, I determined that Mr Sawyer was the better placed parent to provide for these children’s parenting, including their emotional needs. The only evidence available to countermand this historical assessment comes from the mother herself. She is not likely to be either an objective or dispassionate witness.
The mother’s assertions of abuse and neglect have been reported to official sources but have not been actioned by those authorities. I am concerned that the mother may have influenced both Dr V and Mr M. At any event, their evidence, at this stage, has not been subject to any detailed scrutiny. I note that what was initially reported to me regarding the concerns of both Dr V and Mr M has not been borne out by the written reports provided by each.
In this context, the father asserts that he has spoken to Dr V, who has indicated to him that he did not intend to convey the impression that [Y] was suicidal nor did he wish the child to be withdrawn from school for a period approaching three weeks.
I acknowledge, given the second hand nature of this evidence, that I must approach it with caution. However, the clear import of
Mr Sawyer’s evidence is that he believes the mother has attempted to manipulate both Dr V and Mr M to advance her own purposes in her struggle for advantage over him in respect of the children.
I do not dismiss these concerns. Even at this preliminary stage, there is evidence to indicate that Ms Clancy was selective in the accounts she gave to both Dr V and Mr M. By way of example, no reference was apparently made by her to either professional in respect of the existence of siblings for [Y] or that care arrangements for him had been earlier determined by the court after a lengthy hearing.
It is Mr Sawyer’s position that Ms Clancy is irrationally intent on frustrating the court’s earlier decision. As such, he asserts that Ms Clancy’s behaviour is likely to subject the children to a significant risk of coming to emotional harm. He points to what he sees as her unnecessary involvement of experts to examine the children in an attempt to substantiate her complaints of abuse against him.
He further points to what he sees as the mother’s apparently unending struggle to reverse the court’s decision of August 2011 and her refusal to abide by the resulting orders as being liable to leave the children in a state of constant uncertainty and emotional flux, which has the potential to be psychologically damaging to them.
On the other hand, Ms Clancy’s position is that she is only doing what a concerned parent would do, in the face of significant complaints from one of her children. This dichotomy in evidence places the court in an invidious position.
It must attempt to differentiate between the parties’ competing assertions of fact in a context where it is not possible for it to reach concluded findings of fact about these contradictory accounts. However, the consequences of each such allegations of parental failure advanced, if subsequently substantiated, has the potential to be highly significant for the children concerned, if it is allowed to continue.
On balance, given the nature of the evidence available to me, I have come to the conclusion that it would not represent an unacceptable risk to [Y]’s emotional wellbeing, if he is returned to the care of his father. This is a comparatively longstanding arrangement following the orders of the court made in August of 2011.
In my view, there is evidence available to me, to indicate that
Ms Clancy has a propensity to exercise self help in regards to what she sees as the injustice of these orders. The court cannot endorse such self help, which has the potential to lead to extreme instability in respect of care arrangements for the children concerned.
Again I am not in a position, as yet, to ascertain with certainty what occurred at the [T] School on both 3 and 5 December. The latter incident involved [X], who appears to have become aligned with her father and paternal grandparents in the bitter dispute over both [Y] and [Z]. This cannot be a good state of affairs for her emotional equilibrium, given that she is not yet thirteen years of age.
What happened seems to have involved some violence. [Z] and [Y] were the focus of the violence. Who was the protagonist of this behaviour is far from clear. In my view the children need to be protected from further exposure to this kind of behaviour. Regrettably, at this stage, this indicates that the children must live with one parent in preference to the other.
The mother asserts that [Y] has expressed a strong view to live with her. This is not congruent with expressions of [Y]’s views provided to Mr U in the earlier family report writing process. In this regard, Mr U was able to visit the family on multiple occasions. Accordingly his ultimate recommendations, in respect of the children, were able to be formulated after a significant level of interaction with the family.
The mother’s actions in November 2012 resulted in the separation of [Y] from his two siblings. The relationship between the three children concerned is likely to be significant. They have grown up in the same household to date. To my mind, it is also significant that [X] has elected to withdraw from her mother.
The mother presented the father with a fait accompli in respect of [Y]. She did not discuss her concerns about the child directly with him. Rather she embarked on a course of medical and psychological investigation in respect of [Y] without any consultation with
Mr Sawyer. At best, she disregarded his parental interest in [Y]. At worst, she was intent on gathering evidence to damage Mr Sawyer in her struggle with him to change the court’s earlier order.
I am concerned that [Y] was withdrawn from school for an extended period of time by his mother. Again this was a unilateral decision on her part. The mother says her actions were justified by the medical certificate of Dr V. However, in the light of what happened on 3 December, it may be that she feared loosing “control” of [Y]. Again this points to a parlous emotional environment for the child.
It was my view in August of 2011 that all three children had a significant and meaningful relationship with their mother. As such, I acknowledge that it is a significant thing for this relationship to be interrupted, particularly in the lead up to the Christmas period.
However, at this juncture, given the unacceptable level of conflict between the parties concerned, I find it difficult to envisage how the children can interact with their mother in a safe and orderly fashion. As I observed, in the earlier orally delivered reasons for judgment, the children need to pass through an emotional airlock involving a withdrawal from one of their warring parents. At this stage, I am satisfied that this withdrawal should be from their mother.
At this juncture, I have not been provided with any compelling evidence that Mr Sawyer is a poor and neglectful parent, either in the care of [Y] or in regards to the treatment of [Z]’s haemophilia. In this regard, I note that I have heard the gravamen of the mother’s allegations regarding Mr Sawyer’s alleged failure in respect of [Z]’s haemophilia.
In respect of Ms Clancy’s complaints of neglect made in February of this year, I have previously expressed my concern that these were overstated and not borne out by independent medical records.
In my view, the best interests of the children concerned clearly warrant the appointment of an independent children’s lawyer. The conflict between the parties, in my view, clearly meets the often misapplied descriptor of being “intractable”.
I acknowledge that the evidence available to me, at this stage, is far from complete. One potential source of evidence is the staff of the children’s school at [T]. I anticipate that the independent children’s lawyer will be a conduit for evidence to flow from the school to the court. It is also likely that the independent children’s lawyer will be able to take steps to canvas the views of both [Y] and [Z].
For all these reasons, I have no cause to revisit the earlier orally delivered reasons for judgment of 7 December 2012. I have requested that the independent children’s lawyer be appointed urgently. The next step in the proceedings will be to seek the input of the independent children’s lawyer as to what investigations need to be undertaken to advance the matter further and when it is appropriate for steps to be taken to reinstate arrangements for the children to engage with their mother.
For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventy-one (171) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Brown FM
Date: 14 December 2012
3
1