SAVILLE & MEYER
[2012] FamCAFC 180
•12 November 2012
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SAVILLE & MEYER | [2012] FamCAFC 180 |
| FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ Challenge to the adequacy of the Federal Magistrate’s reasons for judgment ─ Where the issue which required determination fell within a very small compass ─ Where it is difficult to suggest what more the Federal Magistrate could have said, by way of revelation of his reasoning process, or have said in reliance upon the evidence which was before him ─ Challenge unsuccessful. FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ Asserted denial of natural justice ─ Where, although the father did materially alter his position late in the proceedings, there was ample opportunity thereafter for Counsel for the mother to make submissions in relation to that issue ─ Where there was no testing of the evidence of either party or the Family Consultant at trial ─ Where nothing to which the Court was referred, or otherwise discovered from the transcript of the proceedings established that the mother was denied natural justice or procedural fairness ─ Where it is not only difficult to suggest how natural justice or procedural fairness was denied, but difficult to suggest how, if it was, anything would have been different if it had not been ─ Challenge unsuccessful. FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ CHILDREN ─ Parenting arrangements ─ Best interests of child - Whether the Federal Magistrate’s decision was unsupported by the evidence before him ─ Where the Federal Magistrate was placed in the invidious position of having no expert opinion or other evidence upon which he could safely rely in determining the very narrow issue of best interests ─ Where no irrelevant or extraneous fact or circumstances was shown to have influenced the Federal Magistrate’s exercise of discretion ─ Not demonstrated that the Federal Magistrate failed to have regard to any relevant fact or circumstance ─ Appeal dismissed. FAMILY LAW ─ COSTS ─ Where the appeal was wholly unsuccessful ─ Where the father did not seek an order for costs ─ Where the process which led to the determination of the proceedings carried with it the great risk that one party would feel aggrieved by the outcome ─ No order for costs made. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Part VII, s 60CC |
| Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 De Winter v De Winter (1979) 23 ALR 211 Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1983) 3 NSWLR 378 Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 Pettitt v Dunkley (1971) 1 NSWLR 376 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud (1989) VR 8 Wen & Thom [2010] FamCAFC 81 |
| APPELLANT: | Ms Saville |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Meyer |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER | Legal Aid NSW Newcastle Family Law |
| FILE NUMBER: | NCC | 323 | of | 2008 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | EA | 32 | of | 2012 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 12 November 2012 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Coleman J |
| HEARING DATE: | 31 October 2012 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Magistrates Court |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 17 February 2012 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2012] FMCAfam 276 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: | Mr Davies |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT: | The Charlestown Law Firm |
| THE RESPONDENT: | Self Represented |
| COUNSEL/SOLICTOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | The ICL did not participate in the appeal |
Orders
That the appeal be dismissed.
That there be no orders as to costs.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Saville & Meyer has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
Appeal Number: EA 32 of 2012
File Number: NCC 323 of 2008
| Ms Saville |
Appellant
And
| Mr Meyer |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
introduction
By Notice of Appeal filed 16 March 2012, Ms Saville (“the mother”) appealed against orders made by Myers FM pursuant to Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 17 February 2012 in parenting proceedings between the mother, and Mr Meyer (“the father”).
The order which gave rise to the appeal provided:
29. The child shall live with and spend time with the mother and the father on a ten week repeating cycle commencing on Friday 23 March 2012 as follows:
(i)week one with the mother.
(ii)week two with the father from collection at school Friday return to school Monday
(iii)week three with the father from collection at school Friday return to school Monday
(iv)week four with the mother
(v)week five with the father from collection at school Friday return to school Monday
(vi)week six with the mother
(vii)week seven with the father from collection at school Friday return to school Monday
(viii)week eight with the father from collection at school Friday return to school Monday.
(ix)week nine with the mother
(x)week ten with the father from collection at school Friday return to school Monday
In her Notice of Appeal, the mother sought, in lieu of that order, that the parties’ child X born in 2005, spend time with the father for substantially shorter periods of weekends than the orders of the learned Federal Magistrate provided, or the mother had ultimately sought at trial.
As became clear during the course of the hearing of the appeal, the mother’s case before the learned Federal Magistrate was that, once it became appropriate to do so, as it clearly now has, the child spend time with the father, essentially from Friday afternoon on alternate weekends.
The position of the father at trial had been that the child spends time with the father three out of four weekends in one four-week period, and two out of four weekends in the ensuing four-week period, alternating thereafter during school term.
The orders sought by the mother at trial were that the child spend four weekends with the father in each eight-week period whilst the father sought that the child spend five weekends with him in each eight-week period. The orders of the learned Federal Magistrate provided that the child spend six weekends with the father in each ten-week period.
Notwithstanding the difficulty, if not impossibility, of directly comparing the orders made by the learned Federal Magistrate by reference to the orders sought by each party, given the different timeframes which were adopted, it is apparent that the issue which arises for determination in the appeal falls within a very narrow compass. The orders made by the learned Federal Magistrate were somewhat more generous to the father than the mother sought, but somewhat less than the father sought.
As Counsel for the mother, and the father, who was unrepresented at the hearing of the appeal and at trial, both acknowledged, the practical significance of the appeal is potentially to reduce by four, the number of weekend periods of time spent by the child with the father in each calendar year. Notwithstanding that reality, the Court must determine the mother’s appeal, and will do so according to law.
the hearing in the federal magistrates court
With the acquiescence of both parties, the hearing of the proceedings before the learned Federal Magistrate took a somewhat unusual, and with hindsight, perhaps regrettable course.
The proceedings continued before the learned Federal Magistrate over three consecutive days, the transcript of which occupied almost 140 pages of the Appeal Books.
During the course of the proceedings, the issues between the parties were resolved in some instances, and considerably refined in others. As Counsel for the mother submitted, the trial of the proceedings took a course more closely approximating an ongoing conciliation than a hearing in the common law tradition.
The Court reiterates that the learned Federal Magistrate is not to be criticised for having so conducted the proceedings. The measure of agreement achieved by the process adopted at trial confirms that the course which the learned Federal Magistrate permitted the proceedings to take was, save in the respect which gives rise to the present appeal, highly satisfactory for both parties.
As will be seen however, the difficulty which arises in the present appeal is that, no evidence, including evidence of matters which ultimately assume very considerable significance in the appeal, having been heard or tested, the learned Federal Magistrate was denied the ability to make findings of fact in relation to a number of matters which were relevant to the provisions of Part VII of the Act, and his Honour’s final determination of “best interests” pursuant to s 60CC of the Act. It is appropriate that these limitations be recorded.
The reality remains however, that the mother having challenged the learned Federal Magistrate’s decision, if appealable error is established, the good intentions, and substantial achievements of the process adopted by the learned Federal Magistrate, without opposition from the parties, cannot authorise the refusal of appellate intervention.
As Counsel for the mother helpfully identified, the grounds of appeal agitated on her behalf fall within three categories. Those categories are challenges to the adequacy of the learned Federal Magistrate’s reasons for judgment, the asserted denial of natural justice by the learned Federal Magistrate, and an assertion that the learned Federal Magistrate’s discretion was vitiated by reliance upon a material error of fact.
Challenges to the adequacy of the Federal Magistrate’s reasons for judgment
This challenge is articulated in ground 1 of the mother’s Notice of Appeal which provided:
1. The Learned Federal Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for his decision in relation to the time that the child would spend with the father in Paragraph 29 & 31 of his orders.
Counsel for the mother submitted that the learned Federal Magistrate’s reasons for preferring the father’s proposal in relation to weekend time spent with the child to those of the mother in that regard were to be found in paragraph 110 of his Honour’s reasons, which recorded:
110. I am of the view that the orders in place are such that the child is protected from, and should not be subject to, physical, psychological harm, abuse, neglect or family violence. The parties are essentially apart on the number of weekends the child will spend with both parents. I am of the view that in circumstances where the child lives in the mother’s household, where the child spends time with his brother, [Y], each day and the father will not spend time with the child mid week, that it is appropriate to make an order that there be more time than just simply each alternate weekend.
The father suggested that his Honour’s reasons were perhaps further revealed in paragraphs 84 and 87 of the reasons for judgment. With respect to the father, the Court does not consider that either of those paragraphs provides greater, or further elucidation of the learned Federal Magistrate’s reasoning process than paragraph 110 does.
It is tolerably apparent from paragraph 110 that the learned Federal Magistrate concluded that the father should have each alternate weekend with the child because he would not be spending time with the child overnight on a midweek basis. To the extent that his Honour’s reasons in paragraph 110 may have been somewhat cryptic, they must be read against the background that it was open to his Honour to conclude, by reference to the unchallenged report of the Family Consultant, which was before him, that the mother’s position was that the child spend time with the father each alternate weekend, and overnight midweek in each week during school term.
For reasons which do not assume significance for present purposes, the father did not wish to have the child spend time with him overnight midweek during school term, seeking instead, and on the basis that the child otherwise live full time with the mother and his brother Y, that the child spend one more weekend with the father in each eight week period than the mother proposed.
The adequacy of reasons for judgment varies according to the circumstances of the case (see Pettitt v Dunkley (1971) 1 NSWLR 376, Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1983) 3 NSWLR 378, Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247, Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud (1989) VR 8, Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191 and Wen & Thom [2010] FamCAFC 81).
The issue which required determination in this case fell within a very small compass, as the Court has earlier indicated. In those circumstances, the learned Federal Magistrate’s reasons for judgment did not need to be extensive. Whether the reasons advanced by the learned Federal Magistrate justified the order he made is another question, but in terms of the adequacy of his Honour’s reasons, the Court is not persuaded that this challenge is entitled to succeed.
It is clear, albeit perhaps more impliedly than expressly, that the learned Federal Magistrate considered that the child’s best interests would be served by, in effect, making up for lost overnight midweek time spent with the father by spending additional weekends with the father.
It is difficult to suggest what more the learned Federal Magistrate could have said, by way of revelation of his reasoning process, or have said in reliance upon the evidence which was before him.
The asserted denial of natural justice
These challenges are articulated in grounds 5, 6, 7, 8 which provided:
5. The Learned Federal Magistrate failed to [give] the mother adequate notice that he was to make an order in the Terms which he did.
6. The Learned Federal Magistrate failed to allow the mother to make Submissions in regard to the proposed orders.
7. The Learned Federal Magistrate did not afford the mother natural justice and procedural fairness in allowing the unrepresented father to constantly change in position.
8. The Learned Federal Magistrate accepted a position from the father only minutes prior to the conclusion of proceedings for the day prior to the decision being given.
The course which the proceedings took before the learned Federal Magistrate in relation to the issue which gives rise to the present appeal was perhaps unusual insofar as, very late in the proceedings, the father materially altered his position.
On the second day of the hearing, shortly prior to the father indicating that he sought to materially alter the orders he sought with respect to the time which the parties’ child would spend with him, the learned Federal Magistrate said:
Yes. Mr [Meyer], what usually happens in holiday periods is this, is “alternate” means simply that, alternate weekends. If you had the first week of the school holidays, in effect, if you had the first weekend and then the five days thereafter and returned [X] to [X’s] mother on the Friday she would have the following weekend and the next five days. Your alternate weekend would start the next weekend and then the mother’s time would be the weekend after. It would simply be the weekend after the mother’s weekend, if that makes sense, being an alternate. What’s suggested by Mr Davies is this: there’s a desire to ensure that [X] spends time with his brother and so that those weekends marry up so we don’t fall into a position where there are weekends where [X] is not with his brother, other than - because I understand it is that [X’s] brother [Y], is it, [Y], spends time with his father on alternate weekends as well.
The father later said:
I’m more than happy to work in with the mother in regards to that and maybe, your Honour, since it’s your decision if you can – you know it’s a suggestion. In odd months, the two weekends a month, even months, three weekends a month. That way he gets that little bit extra with his dad, he gets that even number where he is spending that [sic] two weekends with [Y], like, we work together, three one month, two one month, odd or even. Like, and it’s not agreed for me, it’s just about let’s work together now, let’s have this child have a life with both parents. I’m more than happy too - - -
The learned Federal Magistrate then asked the father:
... is it now your application that it’s two in the first, three in the next, two in the following, three after that?
which the father ultimately confirmed was his “position”.
Minutes thereafter, the proceedings were adjourned until the following morning. Upon resumption, further submissions were made which concluded in judgment being reserved.
With respect to Counsel for the mother, nothing to which the Court has been referred, or otherwise discovered from the transcript to the proceedings establishes that the mother was denied natural justice or procedural fairness.
Whilst the father did materially alter his position late in the proceedings, there was ample opportunity thereafter for Counsel for the mother to make submissions in relation to that issue. Whilst it can often be said in such circumstances that the opportunity to adduce evidence in relation to a party’s changed position was foregone, it would be unfair to rely upon that circumstance in this case given that no evidence given by any party or the Family Consultant was ever tested or sought to be tested. Moreover, no inability to adduce further evidence has been complained of in this context. The evidence, such as it was, did not change. All that changed was that the father asked for more. Unlike another litigant, and unlike Oliver Twist, the father got more.
The Court cannot accept that the learned Federal Magistrate failed to afford the mother procedural fairness or natural justice.
In relation to the complaint with respect to the learned Federal Magistrate failing to give “adequate notice” that he proposed making orders in the terms sought by the father, a number of observations are appropriate.
First, and most evidently, albeit no less generous to the father than the orders he sought, the learned Federal Magistrate in fact did not make orders in the terms sought by the father. Moreover, the complaint in relation to “adequate notice” is reliant upon the mistaken belief that the learned Federal Magistrate had, at that time, decided what orders he would make. In the absence of the learned Federal Magistrate indicating that he was either disposed to make orders in the terms sought by the father, or not disposed to make orders in the terms sought by the mother, there was nothing for his Honour to give “notice” of.
In the circumstances, both parties needed to proceed on the basis that neither party’s position had been accepted or rejected, expressly or impliedly, as being in the best interests of the child. The parties could make such submissions, if any, as they wished to make. Whilst allowing a litigant, represented or otherwise, to change position from time to time during a trial, or to change his or her position late in the trial may well have consequences in an appropriate case, the Court cannot accept that to be applicable to this case. The position of each party, and the essential basis of it, was not in doubt prior to the resumption of the trial on day three.
For his part, the father sought more weekends than the mother proposed in lieu of the midweek time which the Family Consultant recommended in her report. For her part, the mother opposed additional weekends on the basis that so doing reduced the time which X would spend on weekends with his sibling Y. On any objective view, neither party had a compelling claim, and neither party’s claim was unreasonable.
What further submissions Counsel for the mother would have made had there not been the asserted absence of natural justice or procedural fairness has, significantly, not been identified.
In circumstances where there was no testing of the evidence of either party or the Family Consultant, it is not only difficult to suggest how natural justice or procedural fairness was denied, but difficult to suggest how, if it was, anything would have been different if it had not been.
The Court is not persuaded by these complaints.
Whilst it is not said critically of the mother or her learned Counsel, as the Court’s introductory observations suggest, although commendable, and clearly producing a large measure of accord, the process adopted at trial in this case was potentially fraught.
Without suggesting that wide-ranging cross-examination of any witness or the Family Consultant should have been undertaken, as will be seen, the inability of the learned Federal Magistrate, though no fault of his, to make findings of fact with respect to critical issues does raise the prospect of appellate intervention where, with the benefit of hindsight, that inability may have been averted.
It is to challenges which relate to the evidence to which the Court now turns.
Was the Federal Magistrate’s decision unsupported by the evidence before him?
These challenges find articulation in grounds 2, 3, 4 & 9 which provided:
2. The Learned Federal Magistrate failed to give any or adequate weight to the recommendation of the Family Report Writer.
3. The Learned Federal Magistrate was in error in rejecting a Submission that the Family Report Writer recommended alternate weekend time with the father.
4. The Learned Federal Magistrate acted on wrong principle in that he substituted weekend time with the father for the lack of week day time, which the father had eschewed.
9. The Learned Federal Magistrate gave little or no weight to the relationship the child has with this only sibling.
Pivotal to these challenges is the significance which the Family Report assumed in the determination of the proceedings.
As is not in doubt, the author of the Family Report was never required for cross-examination on the report.
The learned Federal Magistrate was entitled to rely upon the report as expert opinion evidence. To the extent that reliance upon the expert opinion evidence of the author of the Family Report was dependent upon findings of fact by reference to other evidence, the learned Federal Magistrate was severely constrained given that neither party sought to cross-examine any lay witness during the three days of the trial.
The Family Report recorded, under the heading “Agreements reached between the parties”:
·[X] will then spend each alternate weekend from Friday from school to Monday to school (or Tuesday if a long weekend), half holiday periods and time on special occasions with the father.
The report concluded with four “Recommendations”, one of which was:
91. … that the agreements reached by the parties on the day of interviews be reflected in final orders.
A further recommendation was:
92. … that [X] commence a midweek overnight each week after four occasions of spending Friday from school to Monday to school with the father.
In his reasons for judgment, the learned Federal Magistrate recorded:
74. I note particularly 91 refers to the agreement reached by the parties. I do not think there is any suggestion in the report and I do not accept that there is, that the agreement reached between the parties is one on which the report writer has placed considerable weight or consideration. It was simply a matter in my view, where the parties attended upon the family consultant, the parties reached agreement and, on that basis, it is my view that the recommendation at paragraph 91 falls from the agreement as opposed to the agreement being particularly in line with the views of the Family Consultant [Ms T].
Although, with respect to the learned Federal Magistrate, the second sentence in this paragraph is less than entirely clear, this Court concludes that his Honour was recording that the Family Consultant’s recommendation “that the agreements reached by the parties on the day of interviews be reflected in final orders” did not represent her expert opinion that such orders were necessarily in the child’s best interests.
Support for that conclusion is perhaps gained from paragraph 75 where the learned Federal Magistrate recorded:
75. There were submissions made by the Independent Children’s Lawyer to that effect and I reject the submission that the agreement reached by the parties is indicative and in fact clearly represents the views of the report writer.
Significantly, and unsurprisingly given the way in which the trial proceeded, and the late stage at which the father indicated that he wished that the child spend time with him on other than an alternate weekend basis during school term, the Family Consultant’s report was silent as to the possible advantages and disadvantages of the regime sought by the father compared with that sought by the mother in the light of the father not embracing the Family Consultant’s recommendation that the child spend time with the father overnight during midweek during school term.
In reality, neither the parties nor the learned Federal Magistrate could have known the extent to which the Family Consultant considered, if in fact she did, that alternate weekends would be in the child’s best interests on the basis that he would also be spending one night midweek with the father, or the extent to which, if the child were not to spend time with the father overnight midweek, alternative weekend, or the slightly more frequent weekend time sought by the father, would be in the child’s best interests.
With respect to the learned Federal Magistrate, and recognising that the issue raised by these grounds falls within a very small compass, the evidence as adequately or inadequately supported the position of the father as it did of the mother. The learned Federal Magistrate was placed in the invidious position of having no expert opinion or other evidence upon which he could safely rely in determining this very narrow issue of best interests.
To the extent that the learned Federal Magistrate relied, or may have relied, upon the Family Report, it does not seem to be controversial that, until the father changed his position in the circumstances earlier discussed, the parties agreed that contact would occur each alternate weekend, and that the Family Consultant recommended that the child spend time with the father overnight midweek during school term.
Regrettably, neither the evidence before the learned Federal Magistrate, nor the submissions of either party, engaged with this issue in ways likely to have assisted his Honour. With respect to him, the learned Federal Magistrate was entitled to assume, given the duration and nature of the hearing before him, that the parties were simply leaving it to his Honour to decide this issue.
Without criticising Counsel for the mother, where, as occurred in this case, no attempt was made to test evidence, or, in the case of the Family Consultant, to suggest scenarios, such as that raised by the father’s position, and recognising that, three days into the proceedings so doing had the potential to further prolong them, in the absence of the decision of the learned Federal Magistrate being totally unsupported by the evidence before him, other than by an unduly pernickety approach, and ignoring the caveats which the High Court has consistently enunciated with respect to appellate intervention in cases involving the exercise of judicial discretion, unless a finding or conclusion was patently unavailable, unreasonable or plainly wrong, this Court cannot and should not interfere (see De Winter v De Winter (1979) 23 ALR 211, Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513, Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 and CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172).
The critical issue in this case emerged late in the proceedings, as earlier recorded. The Court readily accepts that, in a practical sense, Counsel for the mother was thus placed in an invidious position. An option which then arose was to seek to have the Family Consultant called for cross-examination. Had there been cross-examination that may have provided compelling support for the mother’s position. It may also have provided compelling support for the father’s position.
Alternatively, in submissions arising from the father’s change of position, Counsel for the mother could have pointed to the absence of any expert opinion or other evidence tipping the balance of best interests in favour of the father’s position. Having not done so, it is difficult to accept that criticism should be levelled at the learned Federal Magistrate.
As noted earlier, the logic underpinning the learned Federal Magistrate’s decision is sufficiently apparent. It would be difficult to criticise his Honour’s logic in the undoubted absence of expert opinion evidence which contradicted it. Whilst it may seem an oversimplification, in the circumstances of this case, it was open to the learned Federal Magistrate to make the orders sought by the father. It was also open to his Honour to make the orders sought by the mother. As the authorities make clear, the latter reality does not advance the mother’s appeal. Unless it can be shown that the learned Federal Magistrate’s discretion miscarried in a relevant way, these challenges must fail.
To the extent that the learned Federal Magistrate was said to have proceeded on a mistake of fact in relation to the expert’s report, for the reasons which have earlier been articulated, the Court cannot accept that to have been the case. Similarly, the Court cannot accept that the learned Federal Magistrate was unaware of or failed to have regard to the child X’s relationship with his sibling Y.
No irrelevant or extraneous fact or circumstances has been shown to have influenced the learned Federal Magistrate’s exercise of discretion. Nor has it been demonstrated that his Honour failed to have regard to any relevant fact or circumstance.
In those circumstances, these challenges must fail.
conclusion
No challenge having been made out, the mother’s appeal must fail. In CDJ v VAJ (supra), in reiterating a number of “general principles” Kirby J said:
3. An additional peculiarity of appeals within, and from, the Family Court is that, in respect of what in Australia are now called “parenting orders”, very vulnerable and significant interests are at stake. It is commonplace to say that, in all appeals, public and private costs and the stresses, delays and other burdens of litigation, are reasons for adding an element of self-restraint to those ordinarily proper to the discharge of appellate judicial functions. ...
Those words of wisdom reinforce this Court in dismissing the present appeal.
costs
No order for costs was, or probably could have been sought by the father, and the Court would not have made an order even if the father had been able to ask for costs.
Whilst this appeal has been unsuccessful, as these reasons hopefully explain, the process which led to the determination of these proceedings carried with it the great risk that one party would feel aggrieved by the outcome.
As these reasons have also hopefully explained, on the evidence before the learned Federal Magistrate, one party was always likely to feel aggrieved.
I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Coleman delivered on 12 November 2012.
Associate:
Date: 12.11.2012
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