Saveski v Velik
[2013] FCCA 712
•5 June 2013
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SAVESKI v VELIK | [2013] FCCA 712 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether further adjournment warranted – whether court should go behind judgment or order made on registration of a certificate of determination of costs under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) – service of the bankruptcy notice. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.40, 41 |
| Byron v Southern Star Group Pty Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 264; [1997] FCA 151 Oliveri v Stafford and Others (1989) 24 FCR 413; [1989] FCA 486 Re Bedford; Ex parte H C Sleigh (Qld) Pty Ltd (1967) 9 FLR 497; [1967] QWN 17 Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212; [1972] HCA 5 |
| Applicant: | GOCE SAVESKI |
| Respondent: | STEPHEN WAYNE VELIK |
| File Number: | SYG 607 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 5 June 2013 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 June 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 5 June 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | SV Law |
ORDERS
The application to set aside Bankruptcy Notice BN1365 issued 6 March 2012 filed on 23 March 2012 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent as agreed and in the absence of agreement taxed in accordance with the Federal Court Rules.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 607 of 2012
| GOCE SAVESKI |
Applicant
And
| STEPHEN WAYNE VELIK |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)
This is an application filed by Mr Goce Saveski on 23 March 2012 to set aside Bankruptcy Notice BN1365 issued on 6 March 2012 on the application of Stephen Wayne Velik trading as SV Law. The bankruptcy notice named the debtors as “Mrs Ruza Saveska” and “Mr George Saveski”. The Applicant does not dispute that he is one of the persons named in the Bankruptcy Notice.
The Bankruptcy Notice was based on a judgment or order (a copy of which was annexed to the Bankruptcy Notice) issued by the Local Court of New South Wales on 22 March 2011. It named Mrs Saveska and George Saveski as “defendants” who were liable to pay Stephen Wayne Velik, trading as SV Law, $26,336.96 and referred to a costs assessment registered at the Local Court.
In his application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice Mr Saveski acknowledged that the Notice was “served/arrived in post 8/3/2012”. He also sought a “stay” of bankruptcy proceedings on the basis of proceedings in the Supreme Court “to set aside judgement (sic)”.
Mr Saveski’s accompanying affidavit is brief in the extreme. Under r.3.02(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 (Cth) applicable at the time of the application, such an affidavit must state the grounds on which it is sought to set aside a bankruptcy notice. However, in this case all that was said was: “Have made application to set aside judgment as I was not a party to the costs assessment”. In addition, there are a number of annexures, including a copy of a Costs Agreement prepared by SV Law addressed to Mrs Saveska and George Saveski, the Bankruptcy Notice and some documents from what I will refer to as the first Supreme Court proceedings, in which Mrs Saveska (Mr Saveski’s mother) was one of the defendants and in which Mr Velik’s firm acted for her.
Also annexed is a copy of what I understand to be the “application to set aside judgment” referred to in the affidavit. This consists of a Statement of Claim filed in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 23 March 2012 (the second Supreme Court proceedings) in which the plaintiff is named as “Goce Saveski”. He sought to set aside what he described as a “default judgment” entered by SV Law on 22 March 2011 “in these proceedings (sic)” and “in the alternative stay the execution of the default judgement (sic)”. In that application and an accompanying affidavit Mr Saveski asserted that he was not a defendant in or party to the first Supreme Court proceedings, that he never retained SV Law for that matter, that he never signed any costs agreement and that he assisted his mother only as an interpreter due to her lack of English-speaking skills.
The reference to a “default judgment” is apparently intended to be a reference to the judgment or order of the Local Court issued 22 March 2011 on registration of a Certificate of Determination of Costs under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). Under s.368(5) of the Legal Profession Act a filed costs assessment certificate operates as a judgment of the Local Court for the amount of the unpaid costs.
The application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice has been on foot for some time. The hearing has been adjourned by consent on a number of occasions. There was a temporary stay on execution in relation to the Local Court judgment agreed to by the parties to the second Supreme Court proceedings that has now expired. I am told that the second Supreme Court proceedings are now maintained, in essence, as an application to stay the execution of the judgment of the Local Court. These proceedings have not yet been listed for hearing.
When this matter was last before the Court on 20 March 2013 Mr Saveski sought a further adjournment. This was opposed by the Respondent. I did not grant the adjournment and listed the matter for hearing at a time that enabled the parties to file further affidavit evidence, bearing in mind the considerable time that had elapsed since the application was filed.
Notwithstanding the limited evidence he had put before the Court, Mr Saveski did not take the opportunity to file further affidavit evidence in support of his application. There is, however, evidence before the Court in an affidavit sworn by Mr Velik on 8 May 2013 that in July 2012 Mr Saveski sought review under the Legal Profession Act of the Costs Assessment of 14 February 2011 on which the Local Court judgment was based (and an extension of time within which to seek such review). Mr Saveski has tendered recent emails between himself and the Office of the Manager of Costs Assessment and between himself and SV Law to which I have had regard.
It is clear on the evidence that the Local Court judgment that formed the basis for the Bankruptcy Notice was a result of the filing and registration of the certificate of determination of costs made under the Legal Profession Act in favour of SV Law issued on 14 February 2011 and sent on 16 February 2011 which named the costs respondents as Mrs Saveska and George Saveski. As discussed below, it is not a default judgment.
The statement of reasons of the Costs Assessor is in evidence as an annexure to Mr Velik’s affidavit. The Costs Assessor referred to a costs agreement between SV Law and both Mrs Saveska and Mr Saveski and to the circumstances of the first Supreme Court proceedings in which SV Law represented Mrs Saveska against whom a default judgment had been entered as a result of default in payment on a loan made to her son Mr Saveski which was secured on her property.
The Assessor expressed the opinion that the Costs Respondents (Mrs Saveska and Mr Saveski) had been given a reasonable opportunity to make written submissions in relation to the application and stated that he had given due consideration to the submissions in an email from George Saveski dated 8 December 2010 which, I note, is not in evidence before me.
The Assessor considered the Costs Respondents’ objection, among other things, to the amount of the bill and Mr Saveski’s objection to his inclusion in the application for costs assessment on the basis that his involvement in the [first] Supreme Court proceedings was “solely as an interpreter for his Macedonian-speaking mother”. The Assessor pointed out that the Costs Agreement dated 1 October 2009 was addressed to both Mrs Saveska and Mr Saveski and observed that the copy of the document before him was signed by the Costs Applicant but not by the Costs Respondent[s] and that there was no evidence or suggestion that either of the Costs Respondents had signed the agreement. However the Assessor stated that while he had not been advised as to how the Costs Agreement was presented to the Costs Respondents, the Costs Agreement provided for “acceptance by the Costs Respondents “giving us instructions to act or continue action in relation to the Work””. There was said to be no specific objection from the Costs Respondents to the terms of the Costs Agreement apart from their denial that they signed it. Nor had there been any allegation of non-compliance with Division 3 (which is clearly reference to the provisions of the Legal Profession Act applicable to costs agreements) or any application to have the Costs Agreement set aside under s.328 of that Act. The Assessor found that the Costs Applicant had provided the Costs Respondents with an update on the estimate of fees in satisfaction of its obligations under s.318 of the Legal Profession Act.
In these circumstances the Costs Assessor was of the opinion that the provisions in relation to costs disclosure under the Legal Profession Act had been “satisfied in full”. He assessed the costs by reference to the Costs Agreement, determining that the Costs Respondents (Mrs Saveska and Mr Saveski) were to pay the Costs Applicant $26,046.42.
As indicated, the Certificate of Determination of Costs was filed in the Local Court and the resulting Local Court judgment was the basis for the Bankruptcy Notice (which also claimed post-judgment interest).
It was not until 28 June 2012 that the then solicitors for Mr Saveski wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment stating that Mr Saveski had recently instructed them. They raised what was said to be his primary contention that he was never a party to the Costs Agreement to which the assessment related and never a party to the litigation to which it related. They claimed that despite being notified of these matters, the Costs Assessor had not properly determined them. They sought an extension of time for the purpose of bringing an application to review the costs assessment issued on 14 February 2011 and claimed that Mr Saveski did not receive notice of any adverse determination until 29 February 2012 (referring to service of the bankruptcy notice).
On 3 July 2012 SV Law wrote to the Manager, Costs Assessment objecting to any such extension of time on the basis of a number of factors set out in some detail, including the considerable time that had elapsed since the date of the Certificate of Determination of the Costs Assessment and the advanced stage reached in enforcement. It was claimed that Mr Saveski had been sent a copy of the Certificate of Determination of Costs and that the application to extend time had no merit.
On 18 July 2012 SV Law received an email from the Manager, Costs Assessment which stated that “prospective extensions” were not granted and that the solicitors for Mr Saveski had been advised to lodge an application to extend the time “when” an application for review was lodged.
By letter dated 9 July 2012 a copy of an Application for Review of the Costs Assessment was served on SV Law. That application referred to the determination of 14 February 2011 and certified that the application was made within 30 days after the issue of determination (which it clearly was not), although it then stated in brackets “currently seeking an extension of time”. There is no further evidence before the Court as to the date on which this application was lodged or in relation to the basis for any application for an extension of time in relation to the review.
In an email exchange between the Manager, Costs Assessment and Mr Saveski from 26 March 2013 it was indicated that the file had been located (consistent with what Mr Saveski said from the bar table about the file going missing). However there is otherwise no evidence before the Court as to what occurred between July 2012 and March 2013 in relation to the review application. In particular, there is no evidence of attempts by Mr Saveski, or indeed his former solicitors, to progress the review in that time. There is no suggestion that the Manager has referred the application for review to a Panel (see ss.374 and 377 of the Legal Profession Act).
Mr Saveski sought an update from the Manager, Costs Assessment on 9 May 2013 and was advised that the file was still with the Manager to whom the email would be sent. Mr Saveski sought further advice on 30 May 2013 and was advised that the Manager was looking into the application for an extension of time as at 4 June 2013, that he should have a decision shortly but that an exact date could not be given. That is the present state of evidence before the Court in relation to the Application for Review of the Costs Assessment.
Turning then to the present proceedings, on its face the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice appeared to be brought on the basis that Mr Saveski had made an application to set aside the Local Court judgment that formed the basis for the Bankruptcy Notice. It emerged in submissions that he intended to raise other wider issues, notwithstanding that this was not made clear in his application and affidavit.
Dealing first with Mr Saveski’s claim that the Bankruptcy Notice should be set aside because there was an application to set aside the judgment, it is not in dispute that there have been no proceedings in the Local Court to set aside or otherwise challenge the judgment of the Local Court that was the basis for the Bankruptcy Notice. The proceedings relied on in that respect are the Supreme Court proceedings commenced by Mr Saveski on 23 March 2012 in which he sought that what he described as a “default judgment” should be set aside and in the alternative that the execution of that judgment should be stayed.
Having heard all the evidence relied on in the substantive proceedings, I am not minded to grant any further adjournment. Having regard to the nature of the judgment in question and the proceedings that have been brought, the circumstances are not such as to warrant a further adjournment in the hearing of this matter. Finally, there is no evidence before the Court to explain the basis on which the Supreme Court could make any order sought by Mr Saveski such as to warrant any further delay in these proceedings or the setting aside of the Bankruptcy Notice.
There is no evidence before me as to any date for a final hearing of the proceedings in the Supreme Court. Rather, it appears that, apart from an initial temporary stay on execution by consent, those proceedings have been adjourned on a number of occasions and have not been finally resolved.
The Bankruptcy Notice was based on a judgment of the Local Court of New South Wales which came about by virtue of the filing of a copy of a Certificate of Determination of Costs issued by a Costs Assessor. It is not a default judgment within the ordinary meaning of the word.
Mr Velik brought to my attention the provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) in relation to the setting aside and variation of judgments, in particular in Part 36 of the Rules. As he submitted, these provisions are not such as to support any contention on the part of Mr Saveski that he has any prospects of success in the Supreme Court proceedings such as to warrant either a further adjournment or setting aside of the Bankruptcy Notice. There is nothing in those Rules to support any contention that the judgment of the Local Court can be properly described as a default judgment, or more generally that there is a basis for the setting aside of such judgment by the Supreme Court such as to warrant setting aside the Bankruptcy Notice.
There is clearly no consent to the setting aside of the Local Court judgment. Moreover, while there is provision for default judgments to be set aside after entry under r.36.16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, there is no evidence to support any contention that the judgment in question in this case was a default judgment in the sense of a judgment made in circumstances where a defendant was in default in the manner specified in the UCP Rules. Rather, as indicated, the judgment came about by way of registration of a Certificate of Determination of Costs.
Under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules “[a] judgment or order of the court in any proceedings may, on sufficient cause being shown, be set aside by order of the court if the judgment was given or entered, or the order was made, irregularly, illegally or against good faith” (see r.36.15(1)). However that provision provides for setting aside of a judgment by the court that made the judgment. Mr Saveski’s proceedings to set aside the Local Court judgment were commenced in the Supreme Court.
There is no suggestion that there is anything in the Legal Profession Act to support any claim that the Supreme Court proceedings are the appropriate way to challenge a Local Court judgment based on a Costs Assessor’s Certificate of Determination of Costs such that these proceedings should be adjourned or the Bankruptcy Notice set aside. Under s.372 of that Act a costs assessor’s determination of an application is binding on all parties to the application and no appeal or other assessment lies in respect of the determination except as provided by the Act.
The Legal Profession Act provides for a review of a costs determination within 30 days of the Certificate or such further time as the Manager may allow. Such review was not sought until over 16 months after the issue of the determination. Clearly there was no such review on foot at the time of the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice.
There is an alternative procedure under the Legal Profession Act. A party to an application for a costs assessment who is dissatisfied with the decision as to a matter of law arising in the proceedings to determine the application may appeal to the District Court in accordance with the rules of the District Court (see s.384). Insofar as some of the issues Mr Saveski has sought to raise may appear to be matters that might be considered on appeal, he has not sought to appeal to the District Court.
If there had been such an appeal (and again there is a time limit, albeit also provision for an extension of time) the District Court could have made any determination in relation to the application that ought to have been made or remit the decision to the costs assessor and order a redetermination. There is no such appeal on foot.
Finally, this is an application to set aside a Bankruptcy Notice. I bear in mind that the consequences of having committed an act of bankruptcy are not as severe as being subject to a sequestration order (Byron v Southern Star Group Pty Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 264; [1997] FCA 151 and Taubert v Eddaglide Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 567).
The ground specified in the affidavit accompanying the application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice is not made out.
While Mr Saveski has subsequently sought review of the Costs Assessment, that application requires a considerable extension of time. On the limited evidence before the Court, that application does not provide a basis on which I am satisfied that the Bankruptcy Notice should be set aside or the matter adjourned.
Mr Saveski contended that he was not a party to the Costs Assessment. However in submissions he suggested that his concern “now” was not so much that he was not a party to the Costs Assessment (albeit that this was what was claimed in his affidavit in support of the second Supreme Court proceedings) but rather that he should not have been a party. In this respect it appears that he may be raising an issue about the power of the Court to go behind the judgment based on the Costs Assessment or, in effect, to conduct a review of the Costs Assessor’s determination.
Bearing in mind that Mr Saveski is self-represented, I have considered whether, on the evidence before the Court, it is appropriate for the Court to go behind the judgment of the Local Court (see Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212; [1972] HCA 5, Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480; [1991] FCA 222, Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343; [1951] HCA 31) on the basis of Mr Saveski’s argument that he ought not to have been a party to the Costs Assessment and/or of his belated application for review of the assessment.
It is well-established that this Court, as a court of bankruptcy, will generally accept a judgment on which a bankruptcy notice is based as conclusive of the existence of the debt unless the consideration on which it is founded is questioned (In re Beauchamp; Ex parte Beauchamp [1904] 1 KB 572, Re Bedford; Ex parte H C Sleigh (Qld) Pty Ltd (1967) 9 FLR 497; [1967] QWN 17). However in an appropriate case the Court has the power to go behind a judgment debt to examine whether there is in truth consideration for the judgment debt (Oliveri v Stafford and Others (1989) 24 FCR 413; [1989] FCA 486). This power may be exercised on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice (albeit it is more usually exercised on the hearing of a creditor’s petition), where substantial reasons are given for questioning whether there is in truth and reality a debt due to the creditor (See Oliveri v Stafford).
The considerations to which the Court has regard in the context of an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice are similar to those that are relevant on the hearing of a creditor’s petition. However the Court should also bear in mind when deciding whether to go behind a judgment founding a bankruptcy notice that the consequences of committing an act of bankruptcy are not as severe as those that follow a sequestration order (Byron v Southern Star Group).
First, as indicated above, there is no evidence that at this stage the Manager, Costs Assessment has granted any extension of time or referred the determination of the costs assessment to a review panel such as to suspend the operation of the determination under the Legal Profession Act or to give Mr Saveski any right to obtain a stay of the Local Court judgment. There is no evidence of any stay in effect at the time of issue and service of the Bankruptcy Notice. Mr Saveski did not seek to exercise any right to review of the Certificate of Determination of Costs until some 16 months after its issue. The fact that he has now sought a review and an extension of time does not in any way retrospectively invalidate the Bankruptcy Notice. There is nothing to support any contention that the Bankruptcy Notice was not validly issued in accordance with s.41(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. Nor was any issue taken as to whether the judgment of the Local Court was a final judgment or final order as required under s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. No issue was taken with the procedure whereby the Certificate of Determination of Costs was registered for enforcement in the Local Court of New South Wales. There is no suggestion that there has been a failure to annex a copy of the correct judgment to the Bankruptcy Notice and no issue was taken in relation to the calculations in the Bankruptcy Notice.
Rather, Mr Saveski disputes, in effect, that he is personally liable for the debt on the basis, as far as it can be a discerned on the evidence before the Court, that the costs assessment was in relation to SV Law’s costs of providing legal services to his mother in the first Supreme Court proceedings to which he was not a party. He claims that his role was only as an interpreter for his mother. It is the case that Mr Saveski was not a party to the first Supreme Court proceedings, but the costs agreement itself recognised this in drawing a distinction between Mrs Saveska, the “client”, and Mr Saveski. It is not clear whether Mr Saveski disputes any involvement in giving instructions to SV Law to act for his mother. Any such suggestion would be contrary to the content of the exchange of emails between himself and SV Law in evidence in these proceedings.
Mr Saveski appeared to take issue with the reasoning of the Costs Assessor. Insofar as Mr Saveski disputed that he was a party to the Costs Agreement on the basis that he had not signed the costs agreement and nor had his mother, this was considered by the Costs Assessor as set out above.
Mr Saveski had the opportunity to make submissions in relation to the costs assessment. He made such submissions. The Assessor stated that he took the submissions into account. Mr Saveski’s contention appears to be that there was an inadequate consideration in the costs assessment determination of the issues he raised about his liability for costs incurred by SV Law. However the Costs Assessor considered Mr Saveski’s arguments, referred to the terms of the Costs Agreement, noted the issues raised and pointed out that while the Costs Respondents did not sign the Costs Agreement, it also provided for acceptance by the client giving instructions to continue action in relation to the work. The Assessor also found that other relevant provisions under the Legal Profession Act had been met.
Insofar as in the course of these proceedings Mr Saveski contended that he was not a party or not properly a party to the Costs Agreement because his role was simply as an interpreter for his mother, the evidence in that regard is scant in the extreme. He annexed an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court proceedings, but gave no direct evidence in these proceedings. The evidence that Mr Saveski has put before the Court in these proceedings is not such as to enable this Court to go behind the Local Court judgment and to determine the issue that he now seeks to raise. That would require consideration of correspondence and communications at the time of the proceedings to which the Costs Agreement related. There is no such evidence before the Court. The mere fact that Mr Saveski was not a party to the first Supreme Court proceedings does not mean that he could not be liable for costs (see for example s.302A of the Legal Profession Act).
The exchange of emails between Mr Saveski and SV Law does not support his contention that he was not or was not properly a party to the Costs Agreement or that there was no debt due or that the Court should go behind the judgment. The evidence before the Court is not such as to warrant setting aside the Bankruptcy Notice on this basis.
Mr Saveski has had ample time to pursue any challenge to the costs determination. A considerable time passed before he made the application for review. The fact that he has now done so does not of itself warrant setting aside the Bankruptcy Notice or a further adjournment.
There is no suggestion of fraud, collusion or reason to doubt that the assessment (and hence the judgment) was founded on a real debt in the sense considered in Wren v Mahony or any suggestion of new evidence.
Nor, on the evidence before the Court, in the circumstances of this case I am not satisfied that the discretion to go behind the Local Court judgment ought to be exercised. I have borne in mind that the commission of an act of bankruptcy is of a different order of gravity to the change in status brought about by the making of a sequestration order and had regard to the interests of the judgment creditor. I am not satisfied that substantial reasons have been given for going behind the Local Court judgment and questioning whether there was in truth and reality a debt due. Nor am I persuaded that the Bankruptcy Notice should be set aside or the hearing further adjourned on the basis of the review belatedly initiated by Mr Saveski that has now been on foot for a considerable time.
At the heel of the hunt Mr Saveski raised as a fresh matter an issue about his first name. As I have indicated, the relevant documents leading up to and including the Bankruptcy Notice all identify Mr Saveski by the first name of “George”. An alternative of “Goce” is referred to in the Costs Assessor’s determination.
Mr Saveski claimed that he should be referred to as Goce Saveski. This claim is not such as to establish that the Bankruptcy Notice was misleading or defective such as to warrant setting aside a Notice based on a judgment in the same name as that used in the Notice. If there has been a misspelling and there were to be a creditor’s petition, then any such issue might be addressed. However at this stage Mr Saveski’s assertion (and the fact that he commenced these proceedings using the first name of Goce), is not such as to provide a basis for setting aside the Bankruptcy Notice. It has not been established that the Bankruptcy Notice does not relate to the person named in the judgment that formed the basis for the Bankruptcy Notice.
Finally, Mr Saveski raised an issue about the adequacy of service of the Bankruptcy Notice, apparently on the basis that it was posted to him rather than having been served personally. Section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act refers to a bankruptcy notice being served on a debtor. There is, however, no regulation or rule that specifies that a bankruptcy notice must be served personally. Indeed reg.16.01 provides among other things that:
Unless the contrary intention appears, where a document is required or permitted by the Act or these Regulations to be given or sent to, or served on, a person … the document may be:
(a) sent by post … to the person at his or her last-known address…
It has been held that this regulation applies to the method of service of bankruptcy notices (de Robillard v Carver (2007) 159 FCR 38; [2007] FCAFC 73, Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 107; [2004] FCAFC 321). In other words, personal service of a bankruptcy notice is not required if service by one of the other methods prescribed in reg.16.01 is used. There is no suggestion in the present case that the Bankruptcy Notice was not served by post in accordance with one of the methods provided for in reg.16.01. It has not been established that service of the Bankruptcy Notice was defective.
Having considered all of the contentions and material before the Court, I am not satisfied that the Bankruptcy Notice should be set aside. The application should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Barnes
Associate:
Date: 3 July 2013
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Civil Procedure
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Insolvency
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Costs
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Jurisdiction
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Stay of Proceedings
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