Savage v Registrar of Firearms

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal to a Single Judge)

SAVAGE v REGISTRAR OF FIREARMS

[2021] SASC 144

Judgment of the Honourable Auxiliary Justice Dart  

16 December 2021

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - NATURE OF RIGHT - SCOPE AND EFFECT OF APPEAL

FIRE, EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS - FIREARMS - FIREARMS PROHIBITION ORDERS

Appellant member of Hells Angels - delegate of Police Commissioner imposed a firearms prohibition order - Firearms Act 2015 - appellant appealed to the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) - appeal dismissed - leave to appeal to Supreme Court - appropriate to grant leave - parties consent to appeal being allowed - error in the material before SACAT - this Court required to exercise the discretion afresh - need to come to the correct or preferable decision - appropriate to impose firearms prohibition order - subject to conditions - parties to be heard on conditions.

Held:

1. Appellant granted leave to appeal.

2. Firearms prohibition order imposed on the appellant.

3. Parties to be heard on conditions to be imposed.

Criminal Law Consolidation (Criminal Organisations) Regulations 2015 (SA); Firearms Act 2015 (SA) ss 3, 41, 44, 45, 47, 49 and 56(11); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) ss 34, and s 71(2); Spent Convictions Act 2009 (SA) ss 7 and 8, referred to.
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; R v Cluse [2014] SASCFC 97; Strazdins v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2017] SASC 3, considered.

SAVAGE v REGISTRAR OF FIREARMS

[2021] SASC 144

Appeal

  1. These reasons deal with an appeal from a decision made at the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“SACAT”).  The subject matter of the appeal was a firearms prohibition order (“FPO”) made in relation to the appellant by a delegate of the Commissioner of Police.  The decision of the delegate was affirmed after a hearing by the Tribunal.

    Post-hearing developments

  2. Shortly after the hearing in this matter was conducted, the parties contacted the Court and asked that no judgment be delivered.  The Court heard no more from the parties for several months.  Eventually the Court was informed that the parties had a joint position to put to the Court in respect of the conduct of the appeal. 

  3. The issue was that certain material, which was before the original decision-maker, was not put before SACAT on the hearing of the appeal.  The particular evidence was a lengthy “Statement of Witness” prepared by Detective Senior Sergeant Brett Featherby (“Featherby”).[1]  That document was dated 13 February 2015.  It is a lengthy document about the nature and operations of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (“the Club”).  The appellant is referred to in the document.  It is the common submission of the parties that the failure to provide the statement to…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASC 144
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Savage v Registrar of Firearms involves the appellant, Mr Savage, who is challenging the imposition of a Firearms Prohibition Order (FPO) by the Registrar of Firearms. The dispute revolves around the decision-making process and the grounds upon which the FPO was imposed, specifically focusing on Mr Savage's membership in a criminal organisation. The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) initially upheld the Registrar's decision, and Mr Savage appealed this decision to the court.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal correctly exercised its review jurisdiction in upholding the Registrar's decision to impose an FPO on Mr Savage. The court had to determine if the Tribunal gave appropriate consideration to the statutory consequences of the FPO, the public interest, and the impacts on Mr Savage's rights and interests. Additionally, the court had to assess whether the Tribunal adequately articulated the reasons for imposing the FPO based on Mr Savage's membership in a criminal organisation and whether the Tribunal appropriately weighed the evidence, particularly the Featherby statement.

The court examined the process followed by the Registrar, including the invitation for Mr Savage to make submissions before the final decision. The court considered the grounds of appeal, which focused on the Tribunal's handling of the evidence and the exercise of discretion under the relevant Act. The Featherby statement, which details the operations and criminal conduct of the Hells Angels, was a central point of contention. The respondent argued that the statement was relevant to the exercise of discretion, while the appellant questioned its admissibility and relevance. The court found that the Featherby statement provided context for the Tribunal's decision but did not constitute direct evidence against the appellant. The court concluded that the Tribunal appropriately exercised its jurisdiction and correctly upheld the Registrar's decision.

The court granted Mr Savage leave to appeal and upheld the Firearms Prohibition Order imposed on him. The court also directed that the parties be heard on the conditions to be imposed under the FPO.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held:

1. Appellant granted leave to appeal.

2. Firearms prohibition order imposed on the appellant.

3. Parties to be heard on conditions to be imposed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Decisions of this nature are dealt with by s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (“SACAT Act”) which provides as follows:34—Decisions within review jurisdiction(1) If the matter that a relevant Act gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to deal with is a matter that expressly or necessarily involves a review of a decision (a reviewable decision), the matter comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (and the other sections of this Division), and subject to the provisions of a relevant Act, a reviewable decision is—(a) a decision made by the Crown or an agency or instrumentality of the Crown; or(b) a decision made by a prescribed person or body; or(c) a prescribed decision or class of decision, but does not include a decision made by a person or body or a decision, or class of decision, excluded by the regulations.(2a) For the purposes of this Act—(a) unless paragraph (b) applies—the decision-maker for a reviewable decision is the person or body that made or is taken to have made the reviewable decision;(b) the rules may provide—(i) that the decision-maker for a reviewable decision will, instead of being the person or body under paragraph (a), be a person or body that is assigned by the rules as being a suitable entity to act as the decision-maker for the purposes of this Act (or specified provisions of this Act); or(ii) that a reference to the decision-maker for a reviewable decision in this Act (or specified provisions of this Act) will be taken to include a reference to a person or body that is designated by the rules as being a suitable entity to act jointly with the person or body under paragraph (a) for the purposes of this Act (or specified provisions of this Act), and rules made under this paragraph will then have effect in accordance with their terms.(3) Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (6), the Tribunal will, in exercising its review jurisdiction, examine the decision of the decision-maker by way of rehearing.(4) On a rehearing, the Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision but in doing so must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision-maker.(5) A procedure on a rehearing will include—(a) an examination of the evidence or material before the decision-maker (unless any such evidence or material is to be excluded under another provision of this Act or under any other law); and(b) a consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter.(6) In exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal is to deal with a matter in accordance with this Act and the relevant Act.(7) Furthermore, the relevant Act may modify the operation of this Act in relation to a matter that comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.The process adopted by the delegate On 3 September 2018 the delegate wrote to the appellant and advised him that she was inclined to impose a FPO against him.[18] The letter invited the appellant to make written submissions to her before any final decision was made. The basis on which the delegate was considering making the order was that Mr Savage was a member of a criminal organisation. The letter set out the history of the appellant’s association with the Hells Angels going back to 1998. It gave the appellant 28 days to respond, if he wished to do so. [18] Appeal Book, p 78.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and then an Amended Notice of Appeal. Each document complained about the Tribunal decision of 3 August 2020. The grounds of appeal are lengthy but, in summary, they were:1.The Tribunal failed to give realistic consideration or explain the extent to which an FPO would further the public interest.2.The Tribunal failed to give realistic consideration or explain how the statutory consequences of the FPO bore on the relevant risk to public safety.3.The Tribunal failed adequately to articulate why the appellant’s membership of the organisation meant it was in the public interest to impose a FPO on him.4.The Tribunal erred in treating the appellant’s mere membership of the Hells Angels as sufficient and misunderstood the nature of the discretion.5.The Tribunal failed to give realistic consideration and weight to the impacts the statutory consequences of the imposition of an FPO would have on the rights, interests and liberties of the appellant.6.The Tribunal erred in giving undue deference to the original decision-maker.Consideration The correct or preferable decision the Court is called on to make is that decision which, in all of the circumstances, best advances the policies and purposes of the Act. Much of the further submissions of the parties turn on the use of the Featherby statement. The appellant accepts that the document was before the original decision-maker and must therefore be before the Court. He notes that the rules of evidence did not apply before the original decision-maker or before the Tribunal. He says that much of the Featherby statement is hearsay and also that it is now more than six years old, thus reducing its value as contemporary evidence. The respondent takes a different view. She asks the Court to give considerable weight to the document. It is said that the material in the Featherby statement is relevant to the exercise of the discretion pursuant to s 44(1)(b) of the Act. In particular, the respondent notes that in previous criminal proceedings the evidence of Featherby has been accepted. The Court was referred to R v Cluse, [29] a Full Court decision on appeal from a trial in the District Court where Featherby had given evidence. Justice Vanstone said:[30]As already set out, Featherby gave evidence of the culture of the two clubs and their operations. This was not opinion evidence but was knowledge gleaned from long observation and study. In my view it was properly admitted.[29] [2014] SASCFC 97.[30] R v Cluse [2014] SASCFC 97 at [48]. Her Honour went on to note, however, that some of the Featherby evidence at trial was inadmissible hearsay and should have been excluded. The Featherby statement provides information as to the operations of the Hells Angels and, in particular, serious criminal conduct engaged in by members of the organisation. It is not relied upon as evidence of any specific instance of unlawful activity or any specific allegation against the appellant. The respondent does not rely on the Featherby statement for any more than the proposition that the Hells Angels, as an organisation, engage in serious unlawful conduct. It is relied upon by the respondent to give colour to the discretion in s 44(1)(b) of the Act.