Saunders & Yorke
[2022] FedCFamC1A 54
•13 April 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Saunders & Yorke [2022] FedCFamC1A 54
Appeal from: Yorke & Saunders [2021] FamCA 426 Appeal number(s): EAA 83 of 2021 File number(s): PAC 5517 of 2018 Judgment of: MCCLELLAND DCJ, AUSTIN & SCHONELL JJ Date of judgment: 13 April 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PARENTING – Where the father sought to challenge final orders that ceased the children’s time and contact with the father – Where the father is a part of a Community of people with similar proclivities – Where the primary judge found that the father posed a risk to the children and that restraints would not be sufficient in restraining the father – Where the father contended that the primary judge failed to balance the risks when making the final orders – Where the primary judge clearly balanced the risks and considered the primary and additional considerations under s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Adequacy of reasons – Where the reasons are clearly adequate – Where the father contended that the primary judge failed in considering that the risks were ameliorated by proposed restraints, which also addressed the concerns of the single expert – Where the primary judge’s findings were consistent with the single expert’s unchallenged evidence that the restraints were insufficient – Appeal dismissed – No order as to costs. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC Cases cited: DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Number of paragraphs: 63 Date of hearing: 31 March 2022 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Livingstone Solicitor for the Appellant: Men’s Legal Service Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Ang Solicitor for the Respondent: Maspero Legal Limited Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Blank Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Claremont Legal ORDERS
EAA 83 of 2021
PAC 5517 of 2018FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR SAUNDERS
Appellant
AND: MS YORKE
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
MCCLELLAND DCJ, AUSTIN & SCHONELL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 APRIL 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Notice of Appeal filed 1 September 2021 is dismissed.
2.The respondent’s oral application for leave to make an application for costs is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Saunders & Yorke has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCCLELLAND DCJ, AUSTIN & SCHONELL JJ:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant father (“the father”) appeals from orders made by the primary judge on 23 June 2021 in parenting proceedings relating to the parties’ two children then aged 10 and 6.
The primary issue at hearing was whether the father’s paraphilia, associated behaviours and connections with a Community of people with similar proclivities (“the Community”) exposed the children to a risk of harm. The father proposed that any alleged risks could be ameliorated by agreeing to certain restraints on his behaviour. It was not in issue that the children enjoyed their time with the father and wanted to spend time with him.
By the conclusion of the hearing, the ambit of proposed orders had narrowed to:
(1)That while the respondent mother (“the mother”) should have sole parental responsibility, the father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”) proposed that the father should be informed and consulted prior to the making of any decisions in relation to the children, which the mother opposed; and
(2)That the children should spend supervised time with the father once a month as proposed by the ICL or, following four occasions of supervision, unsupervised once a month as proposed by the father, or no time as proposed by the mother.
The primary judge determined that the father posed a risk of harm to the children and had no confidence that he would abide by the proposed restraints. The primary judge was not satisfied supervision was appropriate, and ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility and the children spend no time with the father.
The father appeals the orders and seeks that this Court make orders in terms of those sought by him at trial or, in the alternative, a remittal. The ICL supported the father’s position on appeal but contended error only in relation to Ground 5. The mother resisted the appeal.
The determination of the primary judge is presumed to be correct unless it can be established that the discretion reposed in the primary judge miscarried in the terms articulated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 (“House v The King”). It is trite to say, but bears repeating, that an appeal is not a rerunning of the case as presented before the primary judge in an endeavour to convince this Court that it should, absent identifiable appealable error, come to a different determination. It is not enough that this Court might come to a different conclusion. That does not establish error. What must be established is an error in the exercise of the wide discretion held by the primary judge.
There was a degree of overlap and repetition across the six grounds. At the commencement of the appeal, counsel for the father indicated that, whilst maintaining Ground 4, he did not press the argument in support as set out in the Summary of Argument. The father’s counsel during the course of his submissions returned to Ground 4 and indicated that he abandoned reliance on it, so there is no need to consider that ground.
For the reasons below, we find no merit in any of the grounds and will dismiss the appeal.
GROUND 1
Her Honour [the primary judge] erred in failing to give proper consideration to the best interests of [X], born 2010, and [Y], born 2014, hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Children’, pursuant to section 60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), in determining that it is in the Children’s best interests for the Children’s relationship with the Appellant Father to be severed.
(As per the original)
Notwithstanding the language adopted in the ground, the father’s Summary of Argument contended that the primary judge “failed to balance the risks and treated the risk to the children if they are exposed to the father’s paraphilic behaviour and identity as trumping the risk to the children of severing their relationships with their father” (at paragraph 3.3).
In a carefully reasoned judgment, the primary judge recorded the historical facts and summarised the written and oral evidence of the single expert. Other than in one respect, as addressed in Ground 4 (which is erroneous and was abandoned), there is no challenge to the primary judge’s factual findings nor is it challenged that she accurately recorded the single expert’s evidence.
As was required, the primary judge addressed the s 60CC(2) primary considerations of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), recognising the following:
148.Given the evidence of the expert about the quality and nature of each child’s relationship with the father and his capacity to provide for the children’s needs (subject to one highly significant caveat to which I will return), I am satisfied that the children do receive a benefit from their relationship with their father and will continue to receive such a benefit so long as the father is able to address the one very significant shortcoming in his parenting capacity. In this regard, I must consider whether the father is able and willing to understand the children’s emotional needs and is likely to prioritise the children’s needs over his own needs in order to address the significant risk of harm he poses to them. If I am not satisfied as to these matters, then it may not be to the children’s benefit for the Court to foster a relationship with the father as it may not be considered that such a relationship is in the children’s best interests. …
The primary judge thereafter addressed the s 60CC(3) additional considerations, recognising that the children have a close relationship with the father and the loss they might suffer if contact with the father ceased. The primary judge recorded:
159.The expert was not challenged on her opinion that there are risks to the children if they have limited or no contact with their father. As noted she opined that the children would miss their father and would grieve the loss of this relationship and wonder why it had been terminated which may cause the children to fear that they have been abandoned and in the long term, internalise this loss and have issues with their identify.
…
165.The risks associated with the father’s lifestyle identity and Community is a matter to which I will return. It suffices at this stage to say that I consider the views of the children, nature of their relationships with each parent and likely effect of a change which will effectively sever their relationships with the father, are weighty matters. I am also of the view, however, that the identified risks are of even greater significance, particularly having regard to the unchallenged evidence of the expert as to these matters.
It is clear that the primary judge here was engaged in balancing the risks to the children of losing a relationship with their father against the risk to the children of the father’s behaviours and associations.
The primary judge recorded:
170.… The expert remained of the view that there is a necessity for some sort of supervision if the children are to physically spend time with the father. No proposal other than paid supervision, which the expert describes as “not a good long-term solution” is under consideration in these proceedings.
…
173.… The tenor of the expert’s opinion is that it is almost inevitable that the children will become exposed to the father’s behaviours, identity and business which the expert considers likely to cause psychological harm to the children in various ways.
(Footnotes omitted)
The primary judge observed that the children would be likely to experience humiliation and ridicule if the father’s links to the Community were exposed, that they would find the exposure confusing and embarrassing, and that they may be exposed to sexual ideas and concepts that they may not able to understand or comprehend.
The primary judge recorded:
176.Under cross-examination the father effectively agreed that it would not be difficult for the children to become aware of his connection to the Community, especially through his business and online presence. …
In relation to the issue of therapy and the various restraints proposed by the father, the primary judge concluded the following:
179.I have great reservations and ultimately do not accept that the father has an authentic willingness or capacity to disavow engaging in the behaviours in question and in his connections to the Community for the following reasons.
The primary judge then observed:
203.The father has not satisfactorily addressed the issues of risk identified by the expert, and the only way to mitigate risks he poses to the children is for their time with him, if it is to occur, to be supervised. The limitations associated with a paid supervision service for long term have been discussed. As no other arrangement has been proposed, it is in my view in the children’s best interests for their relationships with their father to be severed rather than for them to spend unsupervised time with him as he proposed.
And concluded:
206.While the outcome of the orders to be made is most unfortunate for the children and they will undoubtedly experience loss associated with the severing of their relationships with the father, there are some risks involved in the mother being required to have some form of ongoing relationship with the father especially given the (albeit unusual) power imbalance between the parties and the mother’s tendency to capitulate to the father’s expectations in recognition of the children’s love for their father as she has done in the past.
It is apparent from the above that the primary judge clearly balanced the competing risks in making her final determination. It may be, in an appropriate case, that one risk outweighs all the others, including one that leads to the cessation of time between children and a parent. That is a function of the weighting of the evidence through the prism of the s 60CC considerations. That is not an error in the sense articulated in House v The King. No error is established by Ground 1.
GROUND 2
Her Honour [the primary judge] erred in failing to provide reasons, or adequate reasons, why the injunctions proposed by the Appellant are not adequate to sufficiently mitigate risk to the Children.
(As per the original)
Ground 2 contends error by either absent or inadequate reasons.
In DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1, the High Court observed:
130.… although the extent of reasons may depend on the circumstances of the case, reasons must identify the relevant principles of law, refer to relevant evidence, state the judge’s findings upon material questions of fact and provide an explanation for those findings and the ultimate conclusions reached by the judge.
(Footnote omitted)
The primary judge’s reasons complied with those requirements.
The primary judge recorded that the single expert had identified that there was a risk of psychological harm to the children from being exposed to the father’s business activities (at [61]), and found that the father had exposed the children to some extent to his business activities (at [67]). The primary judge identified that there was, according to the single expert, a risk to the children in relation to the father’s conduct and behaviour, which he said formed part of the father’s identity (at [69]).
The primary judge identified that the father insisted his behaviours did not pose a risk to the children in any way (at [89]). The primary judge recorded that it was the single expert’s view that the father’s behaviour is likely to pose a risk of psychological harm to the children (at [106]), and in the event that the father’s behaviours are made public, which the single expert considered likely to happen, the children are likely to be exposed to humiliation, ridicule and psychological difficulties (at [107]).
In relation to the ways that the father could mitigate the risk, the primary judge summarised the single expert’s evidence as follows:
109.… the only real option would be that the father cease his fetish behaviour in any manner to which the children were likely to be exposed. She explained that this would require that the father refrain from engaging in his minority lifestyle when the children are in his care, terminating his business or “completely de-identifying himself from his business and [the Community] at large”. The expert also added that this would require the father to accept that the children cannot know about this aspect of his behaviour and that any public profile he has presents a risk to the children.
The primary judge also identified the oral evidence of the single expert and recorded:
126.… After enumerating various examples in which the children were allegedly exposed to the father’s behaviours or had some awareness of it, the expert stated that she would have “real concerns” that the father would be able to contain his behaviours for periods of time such as a week or a weekend.
127.Further in cross-examination, the father’s lawyer questioned the expert about whether she considered the various restraints proposed by the father relating to his minority lifestyle activities and business would be sufficient to overcome the risks identified. While the expert stated that she thinks they go some way to overcome such risks she did not consider them to be sufficient. …
The primary judge further recorded:
135.In all of the foregoing circumstances I accept the opinion of the expert and attach significant weight to it.
It is clear from the acceptance by the primary judge of the single expert’s opinion that the single expert was not satisfied that restraints proposed by the father were sufficient to mitigate the risk. Likewise, the single expert expressed “real concerns” that the father would be able to contain his behaviours during periods of time with the children (at [126]). The primary judge recorded:
179.I have great reservations and ultimately do not accept that the father has an authentic willingness or capacity to disavow engaging in the behaviours in question and in his connections to the Community for the following reasons.
180.First, I accept the evidence of the expert that the father has come to accept his desires and behaviours as part of his identity and considers this acceptance to a positive attribute. The father was unable to explain why he had presented in this manner to the expert and why he had maintained at the final hearing that the expert was wrong in diagnosing that his desires and conduct amount to a paraphilia if such presentation and views were not correctly understood. The complete inconsistency of the father’s position under cross-examination in relation to various matters was also unexplained. The father gave evidence variously that his conduct was both within societal norms and “abnormal” and that he desired therapy to address this problematic behaviour while seeking it from a person who regarded it as non-problematic and promoted acceptance of it. He attempted to portray himself as willing to disengage from the Community of people with similar views and proclivities, while also making it clear that he intended to maintain his business and other connections with that Community in the future.
181.Further, I consider it weighty that the father claims to have recognised his need to obtain therapy to effect change for almost a year but has not only taken no steps to engage in such therapy but continued to engage with a therapist who took a diametrically opposed approach. Unfortunately for the children, I gained the impression that the father was prepared to say whatever he thought the court would expect him to say in order to maintain his connection with them. In his own words when being cross-examined about whether his desires and behaviours are “normal” or “abnormal” (unhelpful as those terms may be), the father said that he only gave answers to the effect that his these matters were “abnormal” because “the Community deems it as abnormal” and “because the Community thinks its abnormal”.
The unexplained inconsistency in the father’s position under cross-examination included the primary judge’s finding that “[h]e attempted to portray himself as willing to disengage from the Community of people with similar views and proclivities, while also making it clear that he intended to maintain his business and other connection with the Community in the future” (at [180]).
The primary judge concluded:
181.… I gained the impression that the father was prepared to say whatever he thought the court would expect him to say in order to maintain his connection with them. …
182.In considering the question of the father’s willingness or capacity to change I also attach weight to the expert’s oral evidence when informed of the father’s contradictory answers under cross-examination that she is much more convinced that the father would not be able to engage successfully in any change therapy.
…
185.For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the father does not have a genuine willingness or capacity to engage in the type of therapy recommended by the expert nor does he genuinely agree that his behaviour and associated identity poses a risk to the children. In these circumstances there is little utility in making an order that he engage in such treatment, notwithstanding his agreement to such an order. Further, his engagement in such therapy, if ordered, may be psychologically harmful to him.
The primary judge clearly set out her process of reasoning as to why she concluded that the proposed restraints were insufficient to mitigate the risk, informed as she was by the conclusions of the single expert. The process of reasoning is clear. There is no merit to the proposition that the primary judge failed to provide reasons or provided inadequate reasons.
The father’s Summary of Argument suggested, albeit not linked to any ground of appeal, that there was no evidence the father would not comply with an order if made in the terms of the restraints. The submission misses the point raised by the single expert that she did not believe the restraints provided sufficient protection if made and ignores the primary judge’s finding at [181], which was not the subject of challenge.
No error is established by Ground 2.
GROUND 3
Her Honour [the primary judge] erred in failing to provide reasons, adequate reasons or proper reasons, why the Respondent Mother should not be required to take into account the Appellant Father’s views when making decisions on major long term issues in respect of the Children.
(As per the original)
Ground 3 is also a reasons argument.
There was no issue at trial that the mother should have sole parental responsibility. The father and the ICL urged the primary judge that the mother should notify the father and consider his input prior to making long-term decisions in relation to the children. The primary judge considered the issue of the father’s involvement in parental responsibility in the context of a determination of the time arrangements (if any) with the father. It was not asserted that the primary judge was in error in considering the issues of parental responsibility within that context. The asserted error is solely limited to a lack of reasons.
Within the context of the time arrangements, the primary judge referenced her earlier reasons and identified:
201.As discussed at length in these Reasons, the shortcomings in the father’s parental capacity and associated risks he poses to the children of psychological harm is the most salient matter in these proceedings. …
The primary judge then records:
204.Having regard to all of the best interest considerations as discussed, I am of the view that the orders proposed by the mother that the children spend no time with the father are proper and in the children’s best interests.
205.In these circumstances, the additional orders proposed by the ICL in relation to the mother informing the father of proposed decisions … are in my view not proper.
The primary judge then finds, contrary to any suggestion of an absence of reasons:
206.While the outcome of the orders to be made is most unfortunate for the children and they will undoubtedly experience loss associated with the severing of their relationships with the father, there are some risks involved in the mother being required to have some form of ongoing relationship with the father especially given the (albeit unusual) power imbalance between the parties and the mother’s tendency to capitulate to the father’s expectations in recognition of the children’s love for their father as she has done in the past.
The question of the power imbalance had been referenced earlier by the primary judge as follows:
131.… The expert opined that while she had no concerns about the mother’s parenting capacity she did have concerns about the power differential between the parents explaining that although the father presents as very kind and loving there may be a dynamic between the parents whereby he puts social pressure on the mother and she capitulates to it because she knows that the children love their father. …
The primary judge clearly provided reasons as to why the mother should not have to take into account the father’s views when making long-term decisions. The primary judge explained why she made her decision that the father should not be involved in parental responsibility decisions. The path of reasoning is transparent.
Ground 3 establishes no error.
GROUND 5
Her Honour [the primary judge] erred in treating the Appellant Father’s willingness and capacity to disassociate from his behaviours, lifestyle and connection with his community as a critical issue.
(As per the original)
This ground contends that the primary judge erred in treating the father’s willingness and capacity to disassociate from his behaviours as a critical issue.
This was but one of many issues identified by the primary judge. Others included the father’s attitude towards his behaviours and the children’s likely exposure to them, the level of disruption and impairment to his parenting capacity as a consequence of his behaviours and connection to the Community (at [53]), whether he posed a risk of psychological harm to the children through exposure to his behaviour and activities (at [61]), his attitude towards his conduct and behaviour (at [69]), and the strength of the father’s connection to the Community (at [78]).
The thrust of this ground is encapsulated in the father’s Summary of Argument. To demonstrate the erroneous foundation for the submission, it bears recording. It states, “to the extent that there are any legitimate concerns about the fitness of the father to take charge of the children, those concerns are wholly ameliorated by way of the restraints that were proposed by the father” (at paragraph 7.5).
There was no issue that there were legitimate concerns about the father. The submission ignores the evidence of the single expert and the primary judge’s reasons, which record:
127.Further in cross-examination, the father’s lawyer questioned the expert about whether she considered the various restraints proposed by the father relating to his minority lifestyle activities and business would be sufficient to overcome the risks identified. While the expert stated that she thinks they go some way to overcome such risks she did not consider them to be sufficient. She reiterated that they are “completely opposite to” the way the father presented when assessed and concluded that she is sceptical that the father would be able to sustain compliance with those restraints over time.
It is clear that the single expert was not satisfied that the restraints were sufficient, let alone that they “wholly ameliorated” the risks. It is not submitted that the primary judge incorrectly recorded the single expert’s evidence. The primary judge’s findings were consistent with the expert evidence.
The father’s Summary of Argument contended, without connection to the ground:
7.6The requirement, described by the Court, of the father to take steps to engage in treatment from an appropriately qualified expert in order for the father to enjoy a parental relationship with his children offends the limits of the Court’s role in these proceedings.
(Footnote omitted)
This proposition is devoid of merit. It is illogical to contend that the primary judge imposed a requirement to engage in therapy when no such order was made.
No error was established. There is no merit to Ground 5.
GROUND 6
Her Honour [the primary judge] erred in determining that the Appellant Father had not satisfactorily addressed the issues of risk identified by the [single expert].
(As per the original)
This ground, as drafted, contended error on the part of the primary judge in finding the father’s proposed restraints did not address the issues of risk identified by the single expert. As recast, it bears a striking similarity to Ground 5. The Summary of Argument expanded the ground to argue that, as there was no evidence that the father had not complied with orders, the Court should then accept that he would comply with the restraints and so, supervision was unnecessary. This bears a striking similarity to part of the argument advanced in support of Ground 2. The argument also contended that the single expert’s expressed “scepticism” was not a proper foundation upon which to make a no time order (at paragraph 8.4).
The single expert’s view about supervision was based on her conclusions about the father’s willingness to change his behaviour, as well as her “real concern” that he would not be able to contain his behaviour, notwithstanding the restraints that he proposed. During the course of cross-examination by counsel for the ICL, the single expert responded:
[THE SINGLE EXPERT]: … So, you know, I – obviously people change sometimes, and maybe something has happened, but I would be very sceptical. You know, for someone to truly engage in a behaviour that’s been reinforced and continuing and in some senses escalating their entire adult life, really requires a great degree of motivation, insight, preparedness to do difficult things, acceptance that the people – acceptance that that’s the right thing to do. And I’m not certain, based on what I saw, and the material and my assessment of him, that he was capable of doing those things.
HER HONOUR: Can I just add – and it’s along the lines of what I said before. The totality of his evidence today was not that he accepts how much his behaviour is outside the norm, and that he wishes to engage in treatment. It ranged completely within back and forth, within cross-examination, from agreeing, “Yes, it is part of my identity. I do get support from this community. I intend to continue my business. I acknowledge I get support”, and then these completely incongruous statements. Does that assist you at all in terms of this question about his capacity to change, and motivation?
[THE SINGLE EXPERT]: Yes. It – it leads me much towards the – I’m much more convinced that he would not be able to engage in successfully any change therapy.
(Emphasis added)
(Transcript 19 November 2020, p.147 line 39 to p.148 line 9)
This passage demonstrates that the single expert moves from not just scepticism to being “much more convinced that [the father] would not be able to engage in successfully any change therapy”. Likewise, in relation to the restraints, the single expert said she “would have real concerns that he was able to contain it … for periods of time, like a week or weekend” (Transcript 19 November 2020, p.149 line 28).
The ground is misconceived. The argument suffers from the following deficiencies:
(1)to the extent that the single expert expressed scepticism, the single expert was not challenged in cross-examination;
(2)the single expert’s evidence was much more than one of expressed scepticism but one expressed in the language of real concerns and an inability to change;
(3)during cross-examination by the father’s counsel, the single expert was asked “[d]o you think that those restraints will be sufficient to overcome the risks identified?”. The single expert responded, “I think they go some way but they’re not sufficient in my view” and then concluded “to be frank to the court, I’m sceptical that the father would be able to sustain those – those restraints over time” (Transcript 19 November 2021, p.161 lines 1–2 and line 11). No further questions were asked of the single expert;
(4)no submission consistent with what is now the subject of challenge was made to the primary judge; and
(5)the primary judge was invited by the father’s counsel in submissions to place great weight on the evidence of the single expert about the father’s capacity to change (Transcript 19 November 2020, p.183 line 45).
There is no merit to Ground 6.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that there is no merit to the appeal, it naturally follows that the appeal will be dismissed.
The father only sought costs in the event of success on the appeal.
In circumstances where the father’s appeal failed, the mother sought an order for costs.
The appeal registrar made orders for the conduct of the appeal on 12 October 2021. Those orders expressly provided as follows:
7.Any party who intends to seek an order for costs at the conclusion of the appeal, subject to the outcome of the appeal, must file and serve no later than seven (7) days prior to the first day of the sittings in which the appeal is listed for hearing, an itemised Schedule of Costs sought on a party/party basis at the scale prescribed pursuant to Schedule 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), and be in a position to address the Full Court as to costs (including quantum) whether sought by or against that party, at the conclusion of the hearing.
8.Failure to comply with the above order will prevent an application for costs being made to the Full Court without the leave of the Court. In the event of leave being sought it may result in the hearing of the application for costs being adjourned, the appeal thereby not being concluded, and/or leave being granted on terms, including as to the payment of costs by a defaulting party or that party’s legal representative.
Orders are made by the appeal registrar for the orderly administration of appeals, to afford procedural fairness to all parties, and to ensure the efficient disposal of matters before the Full Court.
The mother failed to comply with the orders of the appeal registrar.
Parties who elect not to comply with orders do so at their peril.
The mother filed her Schedule of Costs on the morning of the appeal. No adequate explanation was proffered on the oral application for leave to explain why she had not complied with the appeal registrar’s orders.
The mother’s oral application for leave to make an application for costs is dismissed.
The ICL did not seek costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice McClelland and Justices Austin & Schonell. Associate:
Dated: 13 April 2022
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