CITATION: Saunders v Applied Contract Engineering [2006] NSWSC 542 HEARING DATE(S): 29 May 2006
JUDGMENT DATE :
29 May 2006JURISDICTION: Equity JUDGMENT OF: Austin J EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 05/29/2006 DECISION: Leave granted CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS - winding up - leave to proceed against company in winding up - claim for damages arising out of sinking of yacht manufactured by company - delay until conclusion of Coroner's Inquest - assets distributed - prospect of insurance claim LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 500, 562 CASES CITED: Hewlett Packard Australia Pty Limited v Siltek Holdings Pty Limited [2005] NSWSC 672
Re Summit Design & Construction Pty Limited (1995) 33 ACSR 301
Vagrand Pty Limited (In Liq) v Fielding (1993) 41 FCR 550PARTIES: Alan Saunders and Auriol Saunders (P/A)
Applied Contract Engineering Pty Ltd (D)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2882/06 COUNSEL: M G McHugh (P/A) SOLICITORS: Piper Alderman (/P/A)
Gregory J Shilton & Co (D)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
CORPORATIONS LIST
AUSTIN J
MONDAY 29 MAY 2006
2882/06 ALAN SAUNDERS & ANOR V APPLIED CONTRACT ENGINEERING PTY LTD ACN 005 361 373
JUDGMENT (Ex tempore; revised 30 May 2006)
1 HIS HONOUR: This is an application under s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth) by which the plaintiffs seek leave to proceed against the defendant company in liquidation, by means of a Statement of Claim which they propose to file. The liquidator of the defendant, Gregory Shilton, appears today and consents to the application.
2 The plaintiffs are the owners of a yacht known as "Excalibur". In May 2000 the defendant and the plaintiffs entered into a contract for the defendant to construct the vessel and her components, including her keel. The yacht was constructed and delivered to the plaintiffs on about 19 August 2002.
3 While the vessel was making her way south in waters off Port Stephens, her keel detached and she capsized. Four people died and two were subsequently rescued. The vessel was salvaged and towed to Sydney Harbour, where she subsequently was declared by the plaintiffs and their marine hull insurer as being incapable of economic repair.
4 There was a Coroner's Inquest, and the Coroner reported on 16 December 2005. The plaintiffs and the defendant (as well as its employees) were represented before the Coroner. The Coroner concluded that the cause of the capsizing of the yacht was the loss of her keel. He found that the defendant was responsible for the construction of the keel and that the defendant, by its servants, had cut the vessel’s keel during the construction. She found that the vessel’s keel had not been constructed in accordance with accepted engineering standards or the standards of the American Bureau of Shipping as in force at the time.
5 The plaintiffs now seek to commence proceedings in this Court against the defendant and others, pleading causes of action in tort, contract, and contravention of Victorian and Commonwealth consumer protection legislation.
6 The defendant was…
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- Case
- [2006] NSWSC 542
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court needed to address were whether Saunders could bring a claim for damages against Applied Contract Engineering in the context of a winding-up process, and if the delay in bringing the claim until after the conclusion of a Coroner's Inquest and distribution of the company's assets was reasonable. The court had to balance the rights of creditors and the possibility of recovering damages through an insurance claim against the principle of finality in winding-up proceedings.
The court determined that while the principle of finality in winding-up proceedings is important, it could be set aside if there were special circumstances that warranted it. In this instance, the court found that Saunders' delay in bringing the claim was due to the necessity of waiting for the conclusion of the Coroner's Inquest, which was a reasonable cause of delay. The court also considered the potential insurance claim as a mitigating factor. The court concluded that the special circumstances justified allowing the claim to proceed against the company in winding up. The final orders of the court permitted Saunders to bring the claim for damages against the company.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application for leave to proceed with a claim against ACE in winding up. The application was made by Mr. Saunders. Prior to this court, the case had involved proceedings related to the winding up of ACE, including the distribution of its assets. The key procedural step was the application for leave to proceed with the claim, which was contested by the liquidator of ACE.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court should grant leave to Mr. Saunders to proceed with a claim against ACE in winding up, considering the delay in bringing the claim until after the assets had been distributed.
2. Whether the prospect of a claim against the insurer of ACE affects the court's decision on granting leave to proceed with the claim against ACE.
Held
1. The court decided that Mr. Saunders should not be granted leave to proceed with a claim against ACE in winding up. The delay in bringing the claim until after the assets had been distributed was a significant factor in this decision.
2. The prospect of a claim against the insurer of ACE did not affect the court's decision on granting leave to proceed with the claim against ACE. The court held that the prospect of a claim against the insurer was not a relevant consideration in deciding the application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering whether to grant Mr. Saunders leave to proceed with a claim against ACE in winding up, the court emphasised the importance of promptness in bringing such claims. The delay in bringing the claim until after the assets had been distributed to creditors was significant, as it could have a detrimental impact on the distribution of the company's assets. The court noted that the delay had resulted in the loss of an opportunity for the claimant to participate in the winding up proceedings and to have his claim considered alongside other creditors. The court held that the delay was so substantial that it would be unjust to permit the claim to proceed.
The court also considered whether the prospect of a claim against the insurer of ACE should influence its decision on granting leave to proceed with the claim against ACE. The court held that this factor was not relevant to the decision. The court reasoned that the prospect of a claim against the insurer did not affect the merits or the viability of the claim against ACE. The court was primarily concerned with the fairness and justice of permitting the claim to proceed against ACE, rather than the potential for a claim against the insurer.
The court applied the principle that leave to proceed with a claim in winding up should not be granted if it would be unjust to do so, particularly where there has been an unreasonable delay in bringing the claim. The court relied on prior authority that emphasised the importance of promptness in bringing claims in winding up proceedings. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a significant delay in bringing a claim against a company in winding up, until after the assets have been distributed, can be a sufficient ground for refusing leave to proceed with the claim. The court followed established principles regarding the importance of promptness in winding up proceedings and did not depart from any prior authority in reaching its decision.