SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles - [2017] HCATrans 208

[2017] HCATrans 208

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S150 of 2017

B e t w e e n -
SAS TRUSTEE CORPORATION
Applicant
and
PETER MILES
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL CJ
GAGELER J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 20 OCTOBER 2017, AT 10.43 AM

MR N. WILLIAMS, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS S. PALANIAPPAN, for the applicant. (instructed by SAS Trustee Corporation)

MR J.M. MORRIS, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR M.J. WEIGHTMAN and MR H.D. MORRISON, for the respondent. (instructed by Cardillo Gray Partners)

KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr Williams.

MR WILLIAMS: Your Honours, the key statutory provisions start from page 122 of the book. On page 122, the first of the two separate streams of entitlement to superannuation allowance is created by section 7. It is the general case, as shown by the heading, which includes the words:

except where member hurt on duty –

The general case, the qualification is:

20 years of more of equivalent full‑time service and retires on or after attaining the age of 60 years or . . . discharged after being certified . . . to be incapable . . . of personally exercising the functions of a police officer –

At the foot of the page, about line 55, the maximum rate provided in that case is 72.750 per cent and in subsection (2):

An annual superannuation allowance under –

section 7 is not payable in respect of a member who is eligible under section 10, the hurt on duty provisions.

Section 8, on the following page, 124, deals with the determination of medical unfitness. Certification by STC, the present applicant, is required that the member is:

incapable, from infirmity of body or mind, of personally exercising the functions of a police officer –

We note in passing in the words below 1(b) the operative words:

unless STC –

in the second line of that:

from infirmity –

It is generally expressed in contrast to the provisions that follow.

The second stream of entitlement comes from section 10 which is on page 125. The heading is of some significance, being extrinsic material:

Superannuation allowance where member hurt on duty ‑

To attract the section, the person must be within the definition that is set out at about line 20 on the page:

disabled member of the police force –

Skipping the bulk of that for the moment – as I will come back to it – at about line 30, the key limitation is imposed and that is that the infirmity has to have been determined:

pursuant to section 10B(3) or on appeal, to have been caused by the member being hurt on duty –

Given that limitation, 10B becomes the first point of call in construing the statute and it is on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2017] HCATrans 208
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The SAS Trustee Corporation (the Trustee) sought to recover from Mr Miles (the Respondent) certain payments made by the Trustee to Mr Miles's former wife, Ms. Miles, under a court order. The dispute concerned whether the Trustee was entitled to recover these payments, which were made pursuant to a Family Court of Australia order that had subsequently been set aside. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Trustee, having made payments to Ms. Miles in accordance with a Family Court order, could recover those payments from the Respondent after the order was set aside. This involved determining the legal effect of setting aside a Family Court order on payments already made and the extent to which the Trustee could rely on principles of unjust enrichment or restitution to recover those moneys.

The High Court held that the Trustee was not entitled to recover the payments made to Ms. Miles. The Court reasoned that the Family Court order, even though later set aside, had provided a valid legal basis for the payments at the time they were made. The Trustee's obligation to make the payments arose from the order itself, and once the payments were made, they discharged that obligation. The Court distinguished this situation from cases where money is paid under a mistake of fact or law, as here the payments were made pursuant to a subsisting, albeit later invalidated, court order. The principle applied was that a payment made under a valid court order, which is later set aside, does not give rise to a claim for restitution against the recipient of the payment.

The High Court dismissed the Trustee's appeal.

Orders