Sartini & Riaz
[2022] FedCFamC1A 164
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Sartini & Riaz [2022] FedCFamC1A 164
Appeal from: Sartini & Riaz [2022] FedCFamC2F 324 Appeal number(s): NAA 76 of 2022 File number(s): SYC 5674 of 2017 Judgment of: ALDRIDGE J Date of judgment: 11 October 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY – Where the appeal challenges an order permitting the respondent to retain the home – Where those orders provided that if the respondent paid a fixed sum to the appellant, she would be required to transfer her interest in the home to him – Where the appellant contends that the respondent abandoned his claim to retain the home in his written submissions – Where the home had increased markedly in value from its earlier agreed value and the appellant contends that the respondent received all the benefit of the increase in value – Where the change of the value of the home did not establish error –
Considerations taken into account – Procedural fairness – Where the primary judge failed to afford procedural fairness to the appellant by making the order that the respondent retain the home without providing notice to the appellant of that order being made – Appeal allowed – Relevant orders set aside – Parties to file minute of order in respect of the amendments to be made to the order requiring the sale of the property – Respondent to pay the appellant’s costs in a fixed sum.Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 33
Halstron & Halstron [2022] FedCFamC1A 65
Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28
Noetel and Quealey (2005) FLC 93-230; [2005] FamCA 677
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54
Tiley and Tiley (1980) FLC 90-898; [1980] FamCA 73
Number of paragraphs: 76 Date of hearing: 13 September 2022 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Jackson Solicitor for the Appellant: McCabe Partners Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Stapleton Solicitor for the Respondent: Southern Waters Legal ORDERS
NAA 76 of 2022
SYC 5674 of 2017FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS SARTINI
Appellant
AND: MR RIAZ
Respondent
order made by:
ALDRIDGE J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 OCTOBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application in an Appeal filed on 30 June 2022 is dismissed.
2.The Application in an Appeal filed on 28 July 2022 is dismissed.
3.The appeal is allowed.
4.Orders 15 and 16 made on 23 March 2022 are set aside.
5.If the parties cannot agree on a minute of order in respect of the amendments to Order 17 made on 23 March 2022, then the parties are to file and serve a minute of order on or before 26 October 2022.
6.The consideration of the amendments to Order 17 made on 23 March 2022 is adjourned to 10 am on 28 October 2022.
7.The respondent is to pay the costs of the appellant fixed in the sum of $16,000 within 28 days.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Sartini & Riaz has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALDRIDGE J:
Introduction
This is an appeal against property settlement orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) in proceedings between Ms Sartini (“the appellant”) and Mr Riaz (“the respondent”).
The primary judge found that the property should be divided so that the appellant receive
55 per cent of the net assets and the respondent 45 per cent. The significant asset was the family home which the respondent, at least in his Response, sought to retain. Thus, his Honour, ordered that the respondent pay $654,443.15 to the appellant within 60 days and if he did so, she was to transfer her interest in the family home to him. If the respondent did not, the home was to be sold with the proceeds divided so as to give effect to the above percentage distribution.
The appeal challenges the order permitting the respondent to retain the home. The appellant contends that he had abandoned his claim to retain the home in his written submissions and that the order was unfair at the time it was made because it had increased markedly in value from its earlier agreed value.
The hearing was approached on the basis that the home had an agreed value of $1.5 million. The appellant sought to adduce evidence on the appeal that the valuation which led to the agreed value was prepared in August 2020. She also wished to adduce a ‘kerbside’ valuation dated 7 April 2022 which valued the property at $1.85 million.
The appellant submitted that this evidence identified error on the part of the primary judge because the order enabling the respondent to retain the home by payment of a fixed sum had the effect that he received the benefit of all of the increase in value, which would have been shared had the order been for the sale of the property and a percentage division of the proceeds.
That is a statement of the effect of his Honour’s orders in the light of the proposed evidence, but that does not point automatically to error. It simply establishes that from August 2020 to April 2022 the property increased in value (leaving aside any obvious difficulties with the second valuation).
The purpose of further evidence on appeal is to identify error, bolster the judgment or to provide evidence on any re-exercise of discretion (CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172).
In this matter, that necessarily involves a consideration of the grounds of appeal so as to determine the relevance of the change in value.
The respondent also sought to rely on further evidence, asserting that he never intended to abandon his claim to retain the home.
I will therefore return to the question of the proposed further evidence after discussing the grounds of appeal.
It is helpful at this stage to identify the following key facts.
The appellant filed a Second Further Amended Initiating Application on 9 April 2021 which sought an order for the sale of the home.
On 23 March 2020, the respondent filed an Amended Response in which he sought orders that he retain the home (Orders 10.1 and 10.2) and, alternatively, that it be sold (Orders 10.3–10.13).
The hearing proceeded over 28–30 April 2021 during which the respondent was cross-examined about his ability to raise funds to pay the appellant a fixed sum so as to be able to retain the home.
A further short hearing took place on 5 August 2021.
On 14 May 2021, the appellant filed her written submissions. Despite it being apparent at this time that the respondent was seeking to retain the home, the submissions did not address that question or the form of orders to be made other than to say:
… Further, the [respondent] failed to provide any cogent evidence that would support the proposition that he has the capacity to retain the … property.
(Appellant’s written submissions dated 14 May 2021, paragraph 20)
The respondent filed his written submissions on 11 June 2021. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are as follows:
Property
1. By way of final property division, the Respondent seeks Orders 10.3 to 15 within the Amended Response filed on 23 March 2020, save for:
a)Order 10.13(e) to be deleted, and the division be pursuant to Order 10.13(f) save for that the Respondent receive the sum of $107,233.78 and thereafter the remaining proceeds be divided such that the [appellant] receives 55% and the Respondent receives 45%; and
b)The base amount of the superannuation split to be paid to the [appellant] pursuant to Order 11.1 be increased to $120,000.
2. The Respondent submits that his proposal equates to an overall division of 53.6% to the [appellant], based on his Balance Sheet.
(Respondent’s written submissions filed on 11 June 2021, paragraphs 1–2)
There is no reference to Orders 10.1 and 10.2 which provided for him to retain the home.
Later in his written submissions, the respondent said:
3.The Respondent proposes that from the net sale proceeds of the … Property he receive the sum of $107,233.76 (being the Respondent’s initial contribution to the relationship which was applied towards the parties’ purchase of their first property together). Thereafter, he proposes that the net sale proceeds be divided such that the [appellant] receive 55% and he receive 45%.
…
12.Post-separation both parents will have a need to rehouse themselves, and ensure they have adequate accommodation to house the Children when they are in their respective care, thereby the Respondent submits that the global approach to a distribution of the funds at a ratio of 53.6% in favour of the [appellant] should apply such that both parties receive sufficient funds from the … property in order to re-house themselves.
(Respondent’s written submissions filed on 11 June 2021, paragraphs 3 and 12) (Footnote omitted)
The appellant’s written submissions in reply, dated 17 June 2021, again did not address the question of the respondent’s retention of the property. In particular, no suggestion was made that the respondent had, by way of his written submissions, withdrawn any claim to retain the property.
The Appeal
The appeal falls to be decided according to the grounds of appeal and the relevant principles to be applied.
Did the primary judge err by “failing to give any or sufficient consideration to the actual or probable or possible increase in the value” of the home “from the date of the hearing of the evidence in April 2021 and the date of judgment on 23 March 2022”? (Ground 1)
This ground is premised on the assumption that the primary judge was obliged to undertake a consideration of whether there had been an “actual or probable or possible” increase in value. The appellant’s submissions did not deign to identify any principle or authority which obliged the primary judge to do so or how his Honour would know that there had been such an actual or possible increase in value.
In Halstron & Halstron [2022] FedCFamC1A 65 (“Halstron”), McClelland DCJ and Austin J said:
36.In Manifold & Alderton (2021) FLC 94-015, Austin J at [116] (writing separately, but with whom Kent J also agreed), referring to Stanford at [37] and [50] and Hsiao v Fazarri (2020) 383 ALR 446 at [50], observed that the first task of a trial judge considering an application pursuant to Pt VIII of the Act is “to identify and value, as far as the evidence would allow, the parties’ existing legal and equitable property interests”. This necessarily involves identifying the value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties as at the date of the hearing: Hickey at [39].
Here, his Honour complied with that obligation by taking into account the family home at its agreed value. That must be stressed. The appellant agreed on the value of the home and asked the primary judge to proceed on that basis. It is difficult, if not impossible, now to assert that his Honour erred by doing so.
Halstron was quite a different case. There, it was held that the trial judge erred by allowing a party to rely on a revaluation of one asset but not of others, during a period of extended delay. The unfairness of such a course is obvious, but that is not the case here.
Property cases require the valuation of assets which, of course, must be undertaken prior to the hearing. It is therefore always possible, and in the case of assets the value of which is volatile, likely, that the actual value at the time of hearing or date of judgment will be different. That may affect the approach to be taken to valuation.
In this matter, the parties chose to agree on a valuation for the home. At no stage did the appellant suggest that another course should have been taken. She did not seek to tender an updated valuation, such as at the further hearing in August 2021 or subsequently apply to reopen the evidence.
The appellant did not raise with his Honour the difficulties of orders for the payment of fixed sums in property cases, which are well known. In Noetel and Quealey (2005) FLC 93-230, the Court said:
143.The practice of drafting orders based on a percentage entitlement rather than a fixed sum to achieve fairness between parties in the event of a sale is subject of many authorities. Those authorities were subject of comprehensive review in Sinclair and Sinclair [2000] FamCA 262. We take this opportunity to repeat that summary and emphasise the importance of the well established principle:
“108.A long line of authority in this Court (Waters and Waters (1981) FLC 91-019 at 76,208; Williams and Williams (1988) FLC 91-959 at 76,940; Docters van Leeuwen and Docters van Leeuwen (1990) FLC 92-148 at 78,024; Little and Little (1990) FLC 92-147 at 78,020; Smith and Smith (1991) FLC 92-261 at 78,759; and Bell and Bell (1993) FLC 92-347 at 79,683) establishes as a clear guideline for the exercise of discretion under s 79 of the Act, that, absent some special consideration (such as a desire by one spouse to retain a particular piece of property, in specie), and particularly where the value of an asset is contentious, or even where it is not but the market for the property is volatile, or there is likely to be a significant time lapse between judgment and sale, and where the value of the asset is to be divided between the parties, the Court should order its sale and the apportionment of the proceeds between the parties rather than order one party to pay to the other a fixed sum representing a notional proportion of its assessed value.
109.Moreover, in Docters van Leeuwin (sic) (supra) at 78,025, the Full Court (Fogarty, Nygh & Rowlands JJ), after citing a passage from the judgment of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis v Norbis (1986) FLC 91-712 at 75,165-6, said this:-
‘In our view the time has come to regard a departure from a long-standing guideline, such as the one given in Waters, without adequate explanation as a ground for finding that the exercise of discretion has miscarried.’
110.In Bell and Bell (supra) at 79,763, the Full Court (Ellis, Baker & Purvis JJ), after referring to the earlier decisions in Docters van Leeuwin (sic), Little, and Waters (all supra) said this:-
‘We see no reason to depart from the line of authority referred to above. There is always uncertainty in relation to the amount which will ultimately be obtained in respect of the sale of matrimonial property and, in particular, matrimonial real estate.
…
Although the order which the trial judge made was essentially discretionary in nature, in our opinion the authorities above referred to clearly establish that where a sale of property is necessary to satisfy a lump sum order for settlement of property and the calculation of any lump sum payable arises from a finding as to the value of the property to be sold, then the amount to be paid to one or other of the parties following any such sale should be expressed in percentage terms, rather than by way of lump sum payment, unless good and sufficient reasons are given for doing so.
The trial judge gave no reasons for departing from the above principle and, given the facts of the case, we are unable to perceive that there was any justification in law for doing so. For this reason therefore, we consider the trial judge has erred in the proper exercise of his discretion and we would allow the appeal to this extent.’”
In these circumstances it is entirely unsurprising that the primary judge acted on the agreed value.
The appellant submitted that she could not proffer a submission to a trial judge that an asset may need to be revalued if judgment is delayed, because it would be improper to make a suggestion that there would be such a delay.
I do not accept that for a number of reasons. First, any reserved judgment is “delayed”, thereby incurring the risk that the value of an asset may change before judgment is given. The same is true of “excessive” delay, which the appellant faintly suggested was the case here. The delay was seven months from the last court date, which whilst beyond the court guidelines, cannot be described as excessive.
Secondly, there is no impropriety in submitting that the value of an asset may change whilst judgment is reserved. Indeed, that may well be a powerful submission against the making of a fixed sum order. Alternatively, a mechanism for providing the court with an up to date valuation could be proposed.
Thirdly, akin to the second point, a trial judge could be provided with the evidence that the value of the asset was volatile and that a provision should be made in the orders to take account of its rise or fall in value.
Fourthly, at any time before the delivery of judgment, the appellant could have filed an application seeking to reopen evidence to introduce an up to date valuation.
The appellant did none of these things. As far as his Honour was concerned, the appellant was content to rely on the agreed value. Thus, no occasion arose for his Honour to consider any “actual or probable or possible” change in value.
This ground fails.
Did the primary judge fail to make orders that were just and equitable in all of the circumstances because the orders “did not represent the distribution of the net property in accordance with the stated intent of the Court”? (Ground 2)
Unless “all of the circumstances” include the proposed further evidence, this ground must fail because the orders did, on the facts found by his Honour, include the value of the home and give effect to the intended division.
Thus, error can only be identified if the proposed further evidence is admitted. This raises a further problem. Parties are bound by the way that they run their case. See for example, Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68 at 483; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7–8.
It would be completely contrary to this principle to permit a party who has let a matter proceed to judgment on the basis of an agreed value to assert on appeal that the trial judge erred by relying on that value. That is so even if the asset has, in fact, changed in value. As I have said, there are ways that such changes in value can be accommodated. If it were otherwise, property cases would never be finalised except by the sale of all of the assets.
This ground also fails.
Did the primary judge fail to afford the appellant procedural fairness by making an order permitting the respondent to retain the family home without giving her notice of the possibility of that order being made? (Ground 3)
The essence of the appellant’s submission is that, whatever might have been the case prior to the respondent filing his written submissions, those submissions made it clear that he was no longer seeking to retain the home. Therefore, it was submitted that the appellant was entitled to proceed on the basis that the only order sought by both parties was the sale of the property and the division of the sale proceeds. If a different order was to be made, she should have been given notice of that intention.
The first step is therefore to see whether it is clear that the respondent abandoned his claim to retain the property.
Taken on their own, the terms of paragraphs 1–2 of the respondent’s written submissions filed on 11 June 2021 indicate that Orders 10.1 and 10.2 of his Response filed on 23 March 2020 were no longer sought. There is an express statement of what orders were sought together with a working out of the effect of the proposed orders in paragraph 12 of the written submissions. There is no equivalent working out of a sum payable to the appellant if the respondent was to retain the property and to pay the appellant a lump sum.
It must also be said that in his written submissions, the respondent’s proposed Orders 10.3–15 were amended in some detail.
At no time did the respondent suggest that these orders represented his ‘fallback’ position. They are not expressed as an alternative to Orders 10.1 and 10.2. Had they been merely that, one would have expected him to provide a calculation of the lump sum to be paid by him to the wife, representing the percentage division which he proposed. There was none.
On the other hand, the respondent’s evidence was clear and demonstrated a firm wish to retain the property, even to the extent of borrowing from friends and relatives to do so if necessary. There is no evidence other than the written submissions themselves, that there had been a change of view.
A further complication is that at the end of the hearing when the written submissions were the subject of directions, attention turned to the parenting orders. Apparently, some parenting orders had been made by consent, making some of the orders that were sought in the Response redundant. The primary judge asked the respondent to file a document setting out the orders in the Response that were no longer sought. The respondent did so and referred only to parenting orders. The discussion at the hearing on this point, likewise referred only to the parenting matters. I did not obtain much assistance from it on the issue as to whether the respondent was no longer pressing to retain the home.
Taking into account the above matters the only reasonable construction of the respondent’s submissions is that he was seeking the sale of the home and not its retention. It can easily be inferred from his written submissions that the respondent had changed his mind about retaining the home. There is not a word about such a course. The written submissions only address the sale and subsequent division of the proceeds.
Thus, there is force in the submission that the appellant was denied procedural fairness because an order was made that had not been sought.
However, not every such failure will automatically lead to the appeal being allowed.
In Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175, the Court said:
94.…Where a party had had a sufficient opportunity to plead his or her case, it may be necessary for the court to make a decision which may produce a sense of injustice in that party, for the sake of doing justice to the opponent and to the other litigants.
(Footnote omitted)
There will be no miscarriage of justice if the further arguments that could have been put would have made no difference to the outcome (Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141).
Here, the complaint is that the primary judge should have notified the appellant that he was considering making an order that would enable the respondent to retain the property. The appellant submitted that had that occurred, she would have sought to adduce evidence of the change in value.
At the time the appellant filed her written submissions, as far as she was aware, the respondent wished to retain the home, yet she addressed only one sentence, quoted above, to the issue. It is not surprising then that perhaps his Honour thought the point of little moment.
The appellant did not return to the issue in her written submissions in reply on 17 June 2021. There is again some force in the proposition that she did not need to because the claim had been abandoned, but it would have been prudent, at the least, to have pointed out that no order for retention of the home should now be made.
This brings me back to the central plank of the appellant’s challenge – the delay between the valuation and the delivery of reasons, some eleven months. This is made plain in the following passage from her Summary of Argument:
19.There was consequently no procedural fairness provided to the Appellant, in that the Court did not give her notice that it was contemplating making such an Order, and contrary to the position both parties took, that there should not be an immediate sale of the … property.
20.In National Companies & Securities Commission v News Corp Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296 at 312, Gibbs CJ explained that:
“The authorities show that natural justice does not require the inflexible application of a fixed body of rules; it requires fairness in all the circumstances, which include the nature of the jurisdiction or power exercised and the statutory provisions governing its exercise.”
21.The flow on effect of this was that with the circumstances of a period of 11 months, it was not possible for the Court to ignore the consequence of the value of the … property changing in the 11 months that followed the completion of the evidence at Trial, including possible, if not probable, fluctuations in the values of real estate in the metropolitan Sydney market where the property was located.
22.Salient to this Appeal, the Orders made by the Court on 23 March 2022 pursuant to Section 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) reflected a set position that defined the Appellant’s interest in the property as of April 2021, being in essence a fixed sum of $1.5 million. The nature of Order 15 of the Final Property Orders made by the Court was based upon an earlier April 2021 valuation was at risk, even in the absence of adducing further evidence of an updated valuation, of producing an injustice to the Appellant if it was not based at least initially on a sale.
(Appellant’s Summary of Argument filed on 30 June 2022, paragraphs 19–22) (Emphasis removed)
It is implicit in the appellant’s contention that had she known a retention was a possibility, she would have sought to adduce evidence as to an up to date value. She does not say when she would have done so, rather, simply that at the time judgment was delivered she would have said that there had been a significant increase in value.
It seems to me that hindsight looms large in the appellant’s submission. That is to say the complaint is really that had she known that a claim for retention was in play, that the property had increased in value and that there would be a delay in delivery of judgment, she would have sought to adduce further evidence. That does not establish a material procedural unfairness.
This is confirmed by the following exchange on the stay application:
HIS HONOUR: …What date was this valuation report sought?
[SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT]: It was sought in April after the judgment, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: I see. Why wasn’t it sought before?
[SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT]: Your Honour, we weren’t expecting an order for a lump sum to be paid.
HIS HONOUR: Well, that was – that was in the orders sought by the respondent.
[SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT]: It was, your Honour, but we thought that evidence wasn’t strong enough for you to make those orders.
(Transcript 16 May 2022, p.3 line 38 to p.4 line 4)
However, it remains the position that the primary judge made an order that at the end of the written submissions was not apparently sought by either party. It was an order for payment of a fixed sum which is attendant with the difficulties noted earlier.
This was a material procedural unfairness.
Did the primary judge err by failing to give the appellant any opportunity to tender further evidence as to the value of the home prior to the delivery of judgment? (Ground 4)
The premise behind this ground of appeal is that there is a positive obligation cast upon a judge who has heard a property settlement case, but not yet given judgment, to monitor the value of the assets and, if he or she considers that the value has changed significantly, to then provide an opportunity to obtain a further valuation.
Unsurprisingly, no authority was provided for such a proposition. It is not part of a judge’s function to conduct a case on behalf of the parties, monitor the value of their assets and, from time to time, determine that the change in value was sufficient to trigger an obligation to alert the parties that the value had changed and give them an opportunity to adduce further evidence. No submissions were addressed as to how they might do so.
It is up to the parties to look after his or her own interests.
Nonetheless, the issue of delay in property cases is a real one, particularly where fixed sum orders are to be made. That is plain from the above authorities and cases such as Tiley and Tiley (1980) FLC 90-898 at 75,660 and Halstron at [52] and [53]. Thus, where there has been a significant delay in delivery of reasons, it is common and perhaps prudent for a trial judge to relist the matter.
However, the primary obligation is and must be on the parties themselves to seek to raise any relevant change in circumstances or value. They are the ones who know their own circumstances better than anyone else and they have the carriage of their case to run as they see fit. If they choose not to raise a relevant change with a judge, then it is difficult to see how that judge would err by failing to raise the matter.
This ground does not succeed.
Application to adduce further evidence
The error that I have found is that the primary judge made an order that was no longer sought by either party and which, having regard to the nature of the order, was material. That did not depend on the change in value of the property. Indeed, as explained earlier, evidence of change in value is not, of itself, evidence of error.
The respondent’s evidence was that he never had the intention to abandon his claim to retain the property and that he has taken extensive steps to raise the funds to do so since the order was made.
His subjective intention cannot be relevant to the objective intention he indicated to the primary judge. His conduct after the reasons cannot overcome the injustice of the order.
The applications to adduce evidence in the appeal will be dismissed.
Conclusion
The appeal will be allowed.
The appropriate orders to set aside are Orders 15 and 16, which provide for the respondent to retain the home and to amend the introduction to Order 17 to require its immediate sale. The parties agreed that since the date of the orders, the respondent has paid the appellant $654,443.15 pursuant to his Honour’s orders. That will need to be repaid from the proceeds of sale prior to their division.
The parties may be able to agree on a different course or seek appropriate variations to the above orders.
I shall therefore set aside Orders 15 and 16 made by the primary judge and stand the consideration of the appropriate amendments to Order 17 on 28 October 2022. If the parties cannot agree on a short minute of order that reflects the above finding, then each party is to file and serve their proposed minute on or before 26 October 2022.
Costs
The appeal has been wholly successful. The respondent will pay the appellant’s costs fixed in the sum of $16,000 within 28 days.
I certify that the preceding seventy-six (76) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Aldridge. Associate:
Dated: 11 October 2022
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