Sarah Wilson v Brisbane Crane Trucks Pty Ltd

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[2025] FWC 387

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.394—Unfair dismissal

Sarah Wilson
v

Brisbane Crane Trucks Pty Ltd

(U2024/13918)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAKE

BRISBANE, 17 FEBRUARY 2025

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – application filed out of time – exceptional circumstances – extension of time granted

  1. Ms Sarah Wilson (the Applicant) lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) seeking a remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) in relation to the termination of her employment with Brisbane Crane Trucks Pty Ltd (the Respondent).

  2. The Applicant commenced her employment with the Respondent on 4 April 2024. On 15 October 2024, the Applicant was notified that her position had been made redundant.

  1. The Applicant lodged her application on 21 November 2024. The application was lodged 16 days outside the statutory time limit prescribed by s.394(2) of the Act.

  1. The question before me is whether an extension of time pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act should be granted. The Respondent opposes the granting of an extension of time. The Respondent also objects to the application on the grounds of genuine redundancy.

  1. Directions were issued and material was filed by each party regarding the question of whether the Applicant should be granted an extension of time to file her application.  A hearing was held before me on 10 February 2025. The Applicant appeared self-represented. The Respondent was represented by Mr Jim Challis of the Queensland Trucking Association.

  1. I informed the parties that if the extension of time were granted, then the matter would be programmed to determine both the genuine redundancy jurisdictional objection and the merits.

Should a further period be granted?

  1. Section 394(3) of the Act sets out the circumstances in which the Commission may allow a further period for an application involving dismissal to be made:

“(3)       The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a)         the reason for the delay; and

(b)whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and

(c)         any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(d)         prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e)         the merits of the application; and

(f)         fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.”

  1. The test of ‘exceptional circumstances’ establishes a high barrier for an applicant.[1] In Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (later cited with approval by the Full Bench of the Commission in Tamu v Australia for UNHCR),[2] the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia stated that:

“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or…

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Details
Case
[2025] FWC 387
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sarah Wilson brought a claim against Brisbane Crane Trucks Pty Ltd before the Fair Work Commission, seeking a remedy for her alleged unfair dismissal. The claim was filed 16 days after the statutory deadline, and the employer objected to the late filing. The central issue for the Deputy President to determine was whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify extending the time limit for filing the application. The Deputy President considered several factors, including the reason for the delay, the applicant's awareness of the dismissal, any action taken to dispute the dismissal, prejudice to the employer, the merits of the application, and fairness in comparison to others in similar positions.

After evaluating these factors, the Deputy President found that the applicant had provided credible reasons for the delay, particularly in light of her pregnancy and the related health conditions. The applicant had been actively seeking new employment, which she had to prioritise over filing the application due to her family's financial dependence on her income. Additionally, the applicant's discovery of a job advertisement by the employer, which seemed to correspond with her previous role, suggested to her that the redundancy might not be genuine. While the applicant had suspicions about the redundancy's legitimacy prior to discovering the advertisement, the overall circumstances, including her health and job search efforts, were deemed exceptional. The employer did not present any evidence of prejudice caused by the delay. The Deputy President concluded that there were exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time for the application to be filed.

The Deputy President granted an extension of time for the application to be made, allowing the matter to proceed to determine the jurisdictional objection regarding the genuine redundancy and the merits of the case. The matter will now be programmed for further hearing on these issues.