Sarah Tutolo v Noongar Mia Mia Pty Ltd
[2023] FWC 793
•31 MARCH 2023
| [2023] FWC 793 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Sarah Tutolo
v
Noongar Mia Mia Pty Ltd
(U2022/1995)
| COMMISSIONER SCHNEIDER | PERTH, 31 MARCH 2023 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy
On 15 February 2022, Miss Sarah Tutolo (the Applicant) made an application to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) under section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) for a remedy, alleging that she had been unfairly dismissed from her employment with Noongar Mia Mia Pty Ltd (the Respondent). The Applicant seeks compensation.
Background
The Applicant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1 June 2018.
The Applicant, at the time of her termination, was employed, on a full-time basis, in the position of Tenancy and Property Management Coordinator.
The Respondent contends that the Applicant was required to comply with the Community Care Services Worker (Restrictions on Access) Directions No 2 (the Mandate) issued by the West Australian State Government.
The Mandate included vaccination requirements and deadlines for workers within the care services industry.
The Applicant contends that the Mandate did not apply to her employment with the Respondent.
The Applicant did not comply with the vaccination requirements or deadlines in the Mandate.
Subsequently, on 27 January 2022, the Respondent terminated the Applicant’s employment.
At the time of her dismissal, the Applicant was covered by an award, being the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2020 (SCHADS Award).
The matter was subject to a Hearing before the Commission.
At the Hearing, the Applicant gave evidence on her own behalf.
The Applicant also called Mr Kennet Latham (Mr Latham), a former employee of the Respondent, to give evidence.
Ms Tina Pickett (Ms Pickett), the Managing Director of the Respondent, gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent.
Legislation
Section 396 of the Act requires that I determine several initial matters before considering the merits of the Applicant’s application.
There is no dispute between the parties concerning these initial matters, and I am satisfied that none of the usual preliminary issues require attention.[1]
Section 387 of the Act provides that, in considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable, the Commission must take into account several criteria.
Section 387 of the Act reads:
“387 Criteria for considering harshness etc.
In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.”
I am required to consider each of these criteria, to the extent they are relevant to the factual circumstances before me.[2]
Submissions – Evidence – Consideration of criteria
Was there a valid reason for the dismissal related to the Applicant’s capacity or conduct?
In order to be valid, the reason for the dismissal should be “sound, defensible or well founded”[3] and should not be “capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced.”[4]
However, the Commission will not stand in the shoes of the employer and determine what the Commission would do if it was in the position of the employer.[5]
The reason proffered by the Respondent was that the Applicant was unable to perform the inherent requirements of her position as a result of the Mandate.
The Applicant submits that the above reason is not valid, as the Mandate did not apply to her employment and role with the Respondent.
The Applicant submits that her duties were not consistent with the duties of positions covered by the Mandate.
The Applicant submits that her duties were more consistent with Residential Tenancy Act and therefore the Mandate did not apply to her, leading to there being no valid reason.
The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s decision to not comply with the Mandate left it in a position whereby it could not allow the Applicant to attend the workplace. And, a result, she was unable to fulfill her duties.
The Respondent maintains that the Mandate indeed applied to the Applicant, as the Respondent’s business provided the following services, consistent with the coverage of the Mandate:
· Services for Aboriginal or Torres Strait islander people;
· Services relating to disability support;
· Services relating to public housing support;
· Services relating to homelessness including but not limited to services provided to people who are homeless or at risk of being homeless.
The Respondent submits that it is a provider of secure, quality, and long-term housing support to Aboriginal people in the Perth metropolitan area and also provides an outreach service to homeless Aboriginal people.
The Respondent submits that it provides community care services that are consistent with paragraph 19 of the Mandate. Paragraph 19 of the Mandate outlines that a community care services facility includes a service provider office or site.
The Respondent further notes that paragraph 20, and schedule 1, of the Mandate supports the position that the Applicant was required to comply with the mandate in order to attend the Respondent’s workplace. Paragraph 20, and schedule 1, of the Mandate outline the types of workers subject to the vaccination requirements.
The Respondent submits that the Applicant was required to comply with the Mandate, by receiving a vaccination in line with its specifications, or by providing evidence of a medical exemption.
The Respondent submits that the Applicant, at no stage, provided evidence of vaccination consistent with the Mandate’s requirements nor any medical exemption.
The Respondent submits that, for the Applicant to meet the inherent requirements of her employment with the Respondent, she was required to attend the work site in person. In compliance with the Mandate, effective from 1 December 2021 and 1 January 2022, the Applicant needed to comply with the vaccination requirements in the Mandate to be able to access the worksite.
The Respondent submits that, because the Applicant was unable to comply with the requirements in the Mandate, she was unable to access the worksite and therefore it had a valid reason to terminate the Applicant’s employment, as the Applicant no longer had the capacity to perform the inherent requirements of her position with the Respondent.
The Applicant submits that the Respondent should have allowed her to perform her duties from home on an on-going basis.
The Applicant submitted that, during the periods of lockdowns, or at other periods, she had performed her duties from home.
The Respondent acknowledges that the Applicant requested to work from home. The Respondent submits that this request was considered, however, was not a viable option for the business to approve.
The Respondent outlined that it was not reasonable for the Applicant to be allowed to work from home for a prolonged period with no definite end in sight.
The Respondent submitted that the key duties of the Applicant’s role required her attendance in the office.
The Respondent submits that there was no requirement or obligation for the business to allow the Applicant to work from home on an on-going basis and that, generally, employees are expected to attend the office.
The Respondent submits that it provided the Applicant with the ability to take up a one day per week role from home, however, the Applicant was not interested in this position.
Findings
There is no evidence before the commission which leads me to believe the Respondent was unreasonable or incorrect in the assertion that the Mandate applied to the Applicant.
The Respondent provided a clear and reasonable explanation in relation to the Applicant’s duties and the requirements of her position and how these duties are consistent with those detailed in the Mandate.
The Applicant’s role required her to provide tenancy support and housing to Aboriginal people who are homeless or at risk of homelessness.
In completing her duties, the Applicant had to physically visit the properties managed by the Respondent to conduct inspections, provide tenancy support to Aboriginal people, and attend stakeholder meetings with various members of the public.
I am satisfied that the Respondent’s operations, the office premises, and role of the Applicant fall within the scope of the Mandate. That much is clear from inspection of the Mandate’s provisions, schedule, and the evidence regarding the tasks the Applicant was required to complete within the Respondent’s enterprise.
I find that the Respondent gave fair and reasonable consideration to the Applicant’s request to work from home. I find that it was a fair and reasonable decision of the Respondent to deny this request and that the Respondent’s refusal to grant this request does not make the decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment harsh.
The Respondent correctly gave consideration to other potential opportunities within the business, which the Applicant could undertake from home. The Respondent carefully considered the Applicant’s responses and explored alternatives, which were not embraced by the Applicant.
I have also considered that the Applicant’s employment conditions were governed by the SCHADS Award, not the Real Estate Industry Award 2020 in the way she submits.
The Applicant did not comply with the vaccination requirements in the Mandate. This issue is not in dispute, and I note that the Applicant was free to make her own decision regarding vaccination. However, this decision resulted in the Applicant's restriction from the workplace.
The Respondent was obliged to comply with the Mandate in the manner it required and by the dates specified within it.
The Respondent could not, at law, allow the Applicant to work at the business premises after 1 December 2021.
The Respondent made a considered decision that the Applicant could no longer perform the inherent requirements of her employment with the Respondent.
I find that this was a valid reason for the Applicant’s employment to be terminated by the Respondent.
Having regard to the matters I have referred to above, I find that there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the Applicant’s capacity; being that the Applicant was unable to perform her duties due to her exclusion from the workplace as required by the Mandate.
Was the Applicant notified of the valid reason?
Proper consideration of section 387(b) of the Act requires a finding to be made as to whether the applicant was notified of the reason for dismissal.[6]
Notification of a valid reason for termination must be given to an employee before the decision is made to terminate their employment,[7] and in explicit[8], plain, and clear terms.[9]
The Applicant submits that she was not notified of the valid reason on the basis that there was no valid reason for her termination of employment.
The Applicant did not provide any detailed submissions on how the Respondent failed to notify her of the valid reason for her termination.
The Applicant acknowledges that the Respondent sent communication to her regarding her impending termination.
The Respondent submits that the Applicant was notified of the valid reason in writing on 17 December 2021 and again on 6 January 2022.
The Respondent submits that the Applicant was also verbally advised of the reason for her dismissal at a meeting on 17 January 2022 and again in her termination letter of 27 January 2022.
The Respondent sent a letter to the Applicant on 17 December 2021, which articulated the below:
“The purpose of this letter is to give you an opportunity to explain your objection to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine and show cause why your employment should not be terminated in relation to the above concerns the Company has, and the effect your inability to perform the inherent requirements of your role will have on the business.”
The letter highlighted:
“After your letter of response has been received, the business will proceed to make a decision about your employment, having regard to your responses and feedback you provide in your letter. Should the business confirm its preliminary view about next steps, regrettably this may involve the termination of your employment on a summary basis.”
The above information was, again, provided to the Applicant, on 6 January 2022, in a further letter from the Respondent.
Findings
As I have found above, the reason relied upon by the Respondent was valid. Accordingly, the Applicant’s submission that she was not notified, as the reason was not valid, is not relevant to my consideration of this factor.
The Respondent communicated to the Applicant that her employment was at risk of being terminated in a clear and direct manner on 17 December 2021 and 6 January 2022.
The Respondent clearly articulated the reasons why it was considering termination and the reason for which termination was being considered, being that the Applicant could not preform her duties.
It is clear that this was an emotional time for the Applicant, and she was not happy with how this matter was dealt with by the Respondent.
However, on the evidence before me, it is clear that the Applicant was provided information by the Respondent as to why they were seeking to terminate her employment.
Having regard to the matters referred to above, I find that the Applicant was notified of the reason for her dismissal prior to the decision to dismiss being made, and in explicit and plain and clear terms.
Was the Applicant given an opportunity to respond to any valid reason related to their capacity or conduct?
An employee protected from unfair dismissal should be provided with an opportunity to respond to any reason for their dismissal relating to their conduct or capacity.
An opportunity to respond is to be provided before a decision is taken to terminate the employee’s employment.[10]
The opportunity to respond does not require formality and this factor is to be applied in a common-sense way to ensure the employee is treated fairly.[11]
Where the employee is aware of the precise nature of the employer’s concern about his or her conduct or performance and has a full opportunity to respond to this concern, this is enough to satisfy the requirements.[12]
The Applicant asserts that she was denied procedural fairness, however, has not advanced any clear argument or reasons in support of this position.
The Respondent submits that the Applicant did have an opportunity to respond.
The Respondent issued the Applicant a show cause letter on 17 December 2021. Followed by a further show cause letter on 6 January 2022.
The letter of the 6 January 2022 directed the Applicant to attend a meeting on 10 January 2022, which eventually occurred on 17 January 2022.
The Applicant attended the show cause meeting, on 17 January 2022.
The content of the meeting and what was discussed between the parties is, in part, contested.
On 25 January 2022, the Respondent emailed the Applicant.
The email outlined that the only alternative position available for the Applicant, to complete from home, was a Social Media and Communications role.
The role was offering only one day a week of work.
The Applicant sent an email to the Respondent, replying to the proposal of the role, on 25 January 2022.
In the email, the Applicant confirmed that she still disagreed with the Respondent’s requirement for her to comply with the Mandate and that she wished to continue in her current position, either from home or in the office.
Findings
The Applicant’s claims that she was not afforded a procedurally fair process are not consistent with the evidence provided by the parties.
The Applicant is clearly aggrieved that the Respondent did not accept her position that the Mandate did not apply to her.
This belief appears to have hindered the Applicant from making substantial submissions on several considerations, as she maintains that the procedural unfairness arises out of the invalid reason.
Had the reason been invalid, the consideration of other factors would be altered. However, this is not the case, as the reason was valid.
The Applicant should have been aware, from 17 December 2021, that her employment with the Respondent was at risk of termination.
The Applicant was provided one month from the first email, sent on 17 December, until the meeting held, on 17 January 2022, to prepare and provide a response.
The Respondent did not seek to terminate the Applicant’s employment immediately, following the show cause meeting.
Rather, the Respondent correctly gave proper consideration to other potential opportunities within their business which the Applicant could undertake from home.
The Respondent carefully considered the Applicant’s responses and explored alternatives.
The alternative proposed was not embraced by the Applicant.
Eventually, the Respondent determined that termination was appropriate.
I understand that the Applicant is not satisfied that the Respondent did not accept her reasons raised in the show cause meeting.
However, this does not mean that the Applicant was not provided with a procedurally fair process or the opportunity to respond.
In all the circumstances, I find that the Applicant was given an opportunity to respond, and indeed did respond, to the reason for her dismissal prior to the decision to dismiss being made.
Did the Respondent unreasonably refuse to allow the Applicant to have a support person present to assist at discussions relating to the dismissal?
Where an employee protected from unfair dismissal has requested a support person be present to assist in discussions relating to the dismissal, an employer should not unreasonably refuse that person being present.
There is no positive obligation on an employer to offer an employee the opportunity to have a support person:
“This factor will only be a relevant consideration when an employee asks to have a support person present in a discussion relating to dismissal and the employer unreasonably refuses. It does not impose a positive obligation on employers to offer an employee the opportunity to have a support person present when they are considering dismissing them.”[13]
The Applicant submits that the Respondent did unreasonably refuse to allow the Applicant to have a support person present to assist at discussions. However, the Applicant did not provide any clear submissions or evidence in relation to this point.
The Respondent submits that it did not unreasonably refuse to allow the Applicant to have a support person present to assist at discussions relating to the dismissal.
The Respondent submits that it provided the Applicant with the ability to bring a support person of her choosing to the show cause meeting, on 17 January 2022.
The Respondent sent an invitation to Show Cause Meeting, on 6 January 2022, this correspondence stated:
“You are of course welcome to bring a support person to this meeting should you choose.”
Findings
There is no evidence provided by the Applicant that supports any assertion that the Respondent refused or denied the Applicant the ability to have a support person.
The Respondent’s letter clearly states the Applicant could bring a support person to the Show Cause Meeting.
In all the circumstances, I find that the Respondent did not unreasonably refuse to allow the Applicant to have a support person present at discussions relating to the dismissal.
Was the Applicant warned about unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal?
As the dismissal did not relate to unsatisfactory performance, this factor is not relevant to the present circumstances.
To what degree would the size of the Respondent’s enterprise and the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the Respondent’s enterprise be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal?
The Respondent submits that the size of its enterprise could have negatively impacted the termination procedure but, by engaging external assistance, it circumvented any potential issues.
The Respondent submits it is a relatively small organization and lacks dedicated Human Resources Management personnel.
The Respondent, aware of this deficiency, engaged Human Resources consultants to assist in the termination process.
The Applicant did not make any submissions in relation to this matter.
Findings
Despite not having internal resources, the Respondent took steps to mitigate this risk by engaging external support to ensure the Applicant was provided a procedurally fair process. As a result, the Respondent followed a procedurally fair process.
Having regard to the matters above, I find that the size of the Respondent’s enterprise was not likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal.
What other matters are relevant?
Section 387(h) of the Act requires the Commission to take into account any other matters that the Commission considers relevant.
The Applicant submits that the following matters are relevant to the Commission’s consideration of whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable:
· The Applicant submits that the Respondent failed to consult with her over the Mandate and that the Respondent had failed to consider the Applicant views in relation to the mandate being implemented. The Applicant, in her statement, outlines that there were no conversations or discussions of substance regarding the Mandate. Rather, the Applicant submits, it was decided by the management of the Respondent that the Mandate applied to its operation and there was no further consultation in relation to the Mandate. The Applicant asserts that the Respondent’s failure to consult with her over the introduction of the Mandate was inconsistent with the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1984.
· The Applicant made submissions that the Respondent’s Board of Directors were “reckless” and “constantly put the organization at risk”. The Applicant did not provide any evidence in support of this assertion and thus I am providing little weight to this statement.
· The Applicant made allegations that the “Chair of the Board of Directors (Mr Gordon Cole)” was conflicted by his support of the “Roll up for WA” ambassadorial role. Again, the Applicant has not provided any evidence in support of this assertion.
· The Applicant provided an email exchange between herself and the WA Department of Health. The Applicant submits that this email was evidence of her ability to perform her duties without needing to comply with the mandate, as it did not apply to her. The content of that emailed is discussed further below.
· The Applicant submits that the termination of her employment was harsh and disproportionate in consideration of her alleged misconduct. The Applicant outlined her personal circumstances and the financial impact that the Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment had on her and her family.
The Respondent submits that the following matters, largely in response to the Applicant’s reason above, are relevant to the Commission’s consideration of whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable:
· The Respondent submits that the Applicant was aware, from November 2021, that the Mandate would apply to the Respondent’s operation. The Respondent also outlined that, due to the position the Applicant held with the Respondent, she was required to communicate to employees who reported to her the impact that the mandate would have on them.
· Ms Pickett, in her evidence, outlined that the Applicant was evasive and did not provide accurate information to the business about the Mandate. Ms Pickett submitted that the Applicant’s conduct impacted the Respondent’s ability to consult and communicate with the wider workforce about the Mandate.
· The Respondent submits that the communication from REIWA is irrelevant and that, whilst the Respondent acknowledges that the tenancy law and regulations apply to their operations, the Respondent asserts it is not a commercial real estate operation rather it is a not-for-profit operation providing services to the community.
· The Respondent asserts that the Applicant’s employment being covered by the SCHADS Award is further evidence that the Respondent operates in the social and community services industry and was covered by the Mandate.
· The Respondent denies the Applicant’s allegations of bias associated with the Chair of the Board and his involvement with the “Roll Up for WA” campaign.
· The Respondent asserts it was legally required to comply with the Mandate and did not unfairly target the Applicant.
· The Respondent submits that the correspondence from WA Health, submitted by the Applicant, does not insinuate that the Mandate did not apply to the Applicant. Instead, it supports the position that it falls under the Mandate, noting the below passage:
“the answer to your question depends on the full scope of your business and role… if the property that you attend is not one that is already captured by a Directions, then the Directions do not apply to you”.
Findings
The Respondent, like many employers, had limited scope in which to consult with their employees over the Mandate and make changes to the implementation.
The Respondent was required to adhere to the Mandate issued by the State Government and therefore did not have room to accommodate suggestions or changes from employees that could potentially lead to the Respondent not correctly complying with the Mandate.
The Respondent did not seek to introduce their own policy in relation to COVID-19 vaccination, which could have been subject to greater consultation with employees. Rather, the Respondent was required to enforce the Mandate by the State Government.
As this Commission has found previously,[14] there is a difference in consultation requirements for employers who are required to follow a government-imposed vaccination mandate as opposed to employers who sought to introduce an internal vaccination policy.
From the information and evidence provided by the parties, the time prior to the Mandate coming into effect was chaotic.
It is clear that the Applicant’s lack of cooperation with the Mandate roll out caused issues for the Respondent in managing the implementation of the Mandate amongst employees. This conflict clearly added to tension within the workplace, however, I am not satisfied this contributed to the Applicant’s dismissal.
In relation to the Applicant’s submissions regarding the notification from REIWA, I have considered this material and do not believe it is relevant nor does it change the validity of the reason for her dismissal.
It is clear that workers in many industries must, dependant on their role, conduct their duties in accordance with potentially several pieces of legislation. Adhering to legislation in the administration of one’s duties does not negate the application of an industrial instrument that may apply to that individual.
In this matter, it is clear the Applicant was employed under the conditions of her employment contract and the SCHADS Award. Her need to comply with other legislation in the administration of her duties does not lead to a finding that her role was not covered by the Mandate or the SCHADS Award.
I find there was no evidence that the Respondent had a bias against the Applicant, rather, the Respondent was required to ensure they were compliant with the Mandate in place at the time of the Applicant’s termination of employment.
There is no evidence that the Respondent unfairly targeted that Applicant compared to other employees nor that the Chair’s ambassador role contributed to her dismissal or caused any bias in the termination process.
In relation to the Applicant’s submissions regarding the email communication from the WA Department of Health, I have considered this material and do not believe it carries any considerable weight or changes the validity of the reason for her dismissal.
I accept the Respondent’s submission on this matter and agree that the correspondence does not imply that the Applicant is not subject to the Mandate. Rather, the correspondence clearly steers away from providing any specific answer and notes that an answer is entirely dependant on the specific circumstances.
The decision to terminate the Applicant was not made without proper consideration from the Respondent about the Applicant’s circumstances. I note that the Respondent decided to pay the Applicant an ex-gratia payment of $10,000 following her termination of employment.
Is the Commission satisfied that the dismissal of the Applicant was harsh, unjust or unreasonable?
I have made findings in relation to each matter specified in section 387 of the Act as relevant.
I must consider and give due weight to each as a fundamental element in determining whether the termination was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable.[15]
Having considered each of the matters specified in section 387 of the Act, I am satisfied that the dismissal of the Applicant was not harsh, unjust, or unreasonable.
The Applicant was provided with procedural fairness and had the opportunity to respond prior to being terminated from her employment with the Respondent.
The Respondent provided information to the Applicant for review and explained the reasons for their decision. These reasons are sound, defensible, and clearly explained.
The Applicant’s inability to complete the inherent requirements of her position with the Respondent left the Respondent with no alternative but to terminate the Applicant’s employment.
This process has been traumatic and upsetting for the Applicant, whilst being sympathetic to the situation that the Applicant has found herself in, I am not able to conclude that the dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unfair.
There is no evidence that suggests that the Applicant has been treated any differently to her fellow co-workers or that she has been targeted by the Respondent.
The Respondent took all the required steps to ensure the Applicant was provided with a procedurally fair process in the lead up to her eventual termination.
The Respondent considered the Applicant’s request to work from home and presented the Applicant with an alternative position to work from home which was not accepted.
This was, sadly, a situation whereby the Mandate, alongside the Applicant’s personal decision to not become vaccinated, gave rise to termination which, ultimately, was correctly actioned by the Respondent.
From the evidence and submissions provided, it is evident that the Applicant was a high performing and well-respected member of the Respondent’s business. However, the business had a legal requirement to ensure it complied with the Mandate and, as a result, this left it with no alternative but to terminate the Applicant’s employment.
Conclusion
Not being satisfied that the dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable, I am not satisfied that the Applicant was unfairly dismissed within the meaning of section 385 of the Act.
The Applicant’s application is therefore dismissed, an Order to that effect has been issued.[16]
COMMISSIONER
[1] The application was made within the relevant time period (s.394(2)). The Applicant is a person protected from unfair
dismissal (s.386) The Applicant’s dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy (s.389). The Small Business Fair
Dismissal Code is not applicable (ss.385; 388(1)).
[2] [2011] FWAFB 7498, [14]; PR915674 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002), [69].
[3] (1995) 62 IR 371, 373.
[4] Ibid.
[5] (1996) 142 ALR 681, 685.
[6] [2020] FWCFB 6429, [19]; [2020] FWCFB 533, [55].
[7] (2000) 98 IR 137, 151.
[8] Print Q3730 (AIRC, Holmes C, 6 October 1998).
[9] Ibid.
[10] Print S5897 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Acton SDP, Cribb C, 11 May 2000), [75].
[11] (2010) 194 IR 1, 14-15.
[12] (1995) 60 IR 1, 7.
[13] Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth), [1542].
[14] [2021] FWCFB 6059, [258].
[15] (2002) 117 IR 357, [51]; See also PR915674 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002), [92]; [1999] FCA 1836, [6]–[7].
[16] [PR760797].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR760796>
2
9
0