[2008] HCATrans 372
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A21 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
SANTOS LIMITED
Applicant
and
IAN MARKOS
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A22 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
DIEMOULD TOOLING SERVICES PTY LTD
Applicant
and
LYNETTE OATEN
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT ADELAIDE ON THURSDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 2008, AT 9.30 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, in the first matter I appear with my learned friend, MR J.D. EDWARDSON, QC, for the applicant. (instructed by Kelly & Co). In the second matter, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.J. CROCKER, for the applicant. (instructed by Rosey Bart & Associates)
MR M.G. HINTON, QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia: If the Court pleases, in the first of those matters I appear with MR S.G. HENCHLIFFE, on behalf of the respondent; in the second with MR K.W. SOETRATMA, on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, the provisions stipulating for the standards, contravention of which constitutes an offence, may be found starting at page 197 of the application book. Subsection 19(1) of the Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 repeats the formula “as is reasonably practicable”, as your Honours will see in the second line of the chapeau as well as in paragraph (c). That is a hallmark of the nature of the offence constituted by failing to provide what may be summarised as a safe workplace.
Subsection 22(2), which you will find relevantly on page 200 of the application book, has a similar important attribute, namely, the requirement to “take reasonable care”. These are matters which, in our submission, are of real significance when evaluating the nature of the charges which have been the subject of the complaint on our part.
Your Honours, those charges may be illustrated as to what we have submitted unsuccessfully are the vices presented for the prosecutions by an illustration to be found on page 187 of the application book – the important particulars, 2.5 and 2.6, which are repeated in various ways. Your Honours will have seen first the variety in terms of the substantive content of each of those items, plus the unhappy linguistic device of the “and/or”, which is repeated throughout them.
This is no mere linguistic device which happens, conveniently for my present argument, to be explicit on page 187. Exactly the same approach can be seen without using that device explicitly – implicitly in the particulars that one will find at page 241 in the Diemould case; again, a thoroughgoing differentiation of the substantive content of the particulars with the prosecution position amply clear as a result of the objection taken, the questions referred and…
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- Case
- [2008] HCATrans 372
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications between a client and legal practitioner, as codified in section 131 of the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA), is defeated by the fact that the communication was made for the purpose of obtaining advice on the commission of a future crime or fraud. This question necessitated an examination of the common law principles underlying legal professional privilege and how they are reflected or modified by the statutory provision.
The Court held that the privilege established by section 131 of the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA) does not extend to communications made for the purpose of obtaining advice on the commission of a future crime or fraud. French CJ and Hayne J, in separate judgments, affirmed that the common law exception to legal professional privilege, which denies protection to communications made in furtherance of a criminal or fraudulent purpose, remains applicable despite the statutory codification. They reasoned that the purpose of the privilege is to facilitate the administration of justice by enabling clients to obtain candid legal advice, and this purpose is not served when the advice sought is to facilitate unlawful conduct. The Court noted that the statutory language of section 131 did not suggest an intention to abrogate this well-established common law exception.
The appeals were allowed, and the orders of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia were set aside. The matters were remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings consistent with the High Court's judgment.
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi