Santiago and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

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Santiago and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2021] AATA 4662 (13 December 2021)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:          2020/1887

Re:Marilyn Santiago

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member M Griffin QC

Date:13 December 2021

Place:Sydney

The reviewable decision should be set aside. The Tribunal substitutes a decision that on and from 4 December 2019 to 22 July 2021, inclusive:

(a)The Applicant continued to suffer from the accepted condition of ‘moderate aggravation of De Quervain’s tenosynovitis on the right and minor aggravation of De Quervain’s tenosynovitis on the left’;

(b)The Applicant’s employment with the Respondent continued to significantly contribute to the Applicant’s accepted condition; and

(c)The Respondent had a liability pursuant to subsections 16 and 19 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) in respect of the Applicant’s accepted condition.

.........................SGD...............................................

Senior Member M Griffin QC

CATCHWORDS

COMPENSATION – Applicant employed as Senior Postal Services Officer – Applicant developed condition of moderate aggravation of De Quervain’s tenosynovitis – whether Applicant continued to suffer De Quervain’s tenosynovitis – whether this was related to her work with Respondent – decision under review set aside and substituted

LEGISLATION

Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

CASES

Woodhouse v Comcare [2021] FCAFC 95

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member M Griffin QC

13 December 2021

  1. The Respondent issued a determination on 4 December 2019 finding it had no liability under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act) for the Applicant's claimed condition of moderate aggravation of De Quervain’s tenosynovitis (DQT) on the right wrist and minor aggravation of DQT on the left wrist which was deemed to have been sustained in 2018, described as a bilateral wrist injury.

  2. The Applicant sought review of the determination on 29 January 2020 and on 17 February 2020 the Respondent issued a review of the decision affirming the original determination on 4 December 2019. It appears, in summary, that the decision of the Respondent was based upon a satisfaction that the Applicant no longer suffered from the claimed injury which had been assessed originally as being contributed to a significant degree by her employment with Australian Postal Corporation.

  3. The Applicant lodged a review with this Tribunal on 26 March 2020.

  4. On the Applicant's case, in order to succeed on the facts as the Tribunal finds them, the Applicant must satisfy the Tribunal that the Applicant suffered from DQT at the relevant time and further, that the cause for the persistence of her claimed condition continued to be contributed to, to a significant degree, by her employment.

  5. The term ‘significant degree’ as it appears in section 5B(1) of the Act means ‘substantially more than material’. Contribution to a significant degree does not require employment to be the sole cause of the condition or even a sole significant contributor. What is required for the continuation of the causal nexus between the condition and the Applicant’s employment with the Respondent is that the contribution made by the employment to the continuation of the…

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Details
Case
[2021] AATA 4662
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned a dispute between the Applicant, Ms. Santiago, and the Australian Postal Corporation regarding compensation for a work-related condition. The Applicant, employed as a Senior Postal Services Officer, alleged she suffered from a moderate aggravation of De Quervain’s tenosynovitis, and that this condition was related to her employment. The decision under review was set aside and substituted by the Tribunal.

The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the Applicant continued to suffer from De Quervain’s tenosynovitis from 4 December 2019, and whether this condition remained related to her work with the Respondent. This required the Tribunal to assess the medical evidence presented by various experts and determine the ongoing causal connection between the Applicant's employment and her ailment.

The Tribunal applied the principles established in *Woodhouse v Comcare* [2021] FCAFC 95, which clarified that for an ailment to remain compensable, it must retain the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by the relevant employment. The Tribunal found the evidence of Dr. Gumley to be the most persuasive, accepting his observations of oedema directly related to De Quervain’s tenosynovitis and his view that the symptoms of the disease can fluctuate. The Tribunal also accepted the ultrasound evidence supporting ongoing disease. Conversely, the Tribunal rejected the opinions of Dr. McGill and Dr. Ness, finding their evidence to be partial, to stray beyond their expertise by attributing psychological reasons for the Applicant's complaints, and to be constructed in a manner that diminished their credibility.

The Tribunal concluded that the Applicant continued to suffer from De Quervain’s tenosynovitis, and that this condition was related to her work. The decision under review was set aside and substituted accordingly.

Background

Background to the litigation

So much is clear from the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Woodhouse v Comcare [2021] FCAFC 95 at paragraphs [85] and following:‘Logically, the causes of a disease or ailment tend to cease once the condition is suffered and the employee ceases employment or the causative factors are remedied. However, having been caused by the contribution of the employee’s employment, the condition itself often continues and compensation is payable to the extent to which it results in death, incapacity or impairment. It does not follow that, in order for Comcare to remain liable, the employee’s employment needs to remain a constant and continuing contributor to the ongoing injury. That would rarely, if ever, be the case. However, what is required is that the contribution requirement remain in place in the sense that the disease or ailment continues to have the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by the relevant employment. To say that the employment factors continue to contribute in a material way to the employee’s condition is an inarticulate way to express this. It is preferable to say that the causal nexus between the employee’s employment and suffering of the disease continues unbroken. In this way, the operative effect of the expression “was contributed to” in the definition is not spent once it has connected the employee’s employment with the contraction or aggravation of the ailment. In order for a disease to remain one in respect of which Comcare will be liable, it must retain the continuing characteristic that it was contributed to in the necessary degree by the employment. If at any later point in time the ailment suffered by an employee ceases to have that character, it will also cease to be a “disease”, and will therefore cease to be an “injury” in respect of which compensation is payable pursuant to s 14 of the SRC Act. For the duration of each of the periods in respect of which the question of compensation is being determined, it must be possible to say that the contribution requirement was satisfied in respect of the ailment. The above is coherent with the purpose of the SRC Act to provide compensation for work-related injury or illness. On the construction advanced by the applicant, Comcare would be required to pay compensation to employees whose ailment is not causally connected with their employment but must do so merely because the ailment had been, but is no longer, contributed to by the employee’s employment. Contrary to the applicant’s submission, a past connection to an employee’s employment which has ceased at the relevant time does not suffice to make an ailment “work-related” at that time in any real sense.…Conversely, the applicant’s preferred construction should be rejected. Comcare has no liability under s 14 in relation to an ailment, the continued existence of which can no longer be said to have the necessary causal connection to the employee’s employment. The mere fact that the ailment suffered may once have had the necessary connection is irrelevant. Even where the ailment continues unabated, if it ceases to have the characteristic of being one which was relevantly contributed to by the employee’s employment, Comcare’s liability ceases.’Factual background

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

A fundamental question in this hearing is whether from 4 December 2019 the Applicant continued to suffer DQT and whether that was related to her work since that time.The medical evidence The Tribunal prefers and accepts the evidence of Dr Gumley. That evidence, in the Tribunal’s view, is based on acceptable evidence, including objective evidence of observations made by Dr Gumley of the Applicant. That objective evidence, in the Tribunal’s view, is a benchmark by which the acceptability of the entirety of the evidence of this witness may be judged. For example, Dr Gumley, the Tribunal accepts, observed oedema and correctly interpreted that condition as being directly related to DQT, an issue central to this hearing. The Tribunal accepts Dr Gumley's evidence that the symptoms of this disease may in fact fluctuate which may provide different presentations to different examining doctors. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of the ultrasound conducted in March 2021 that supports ongoing disease and finds that the disease, on all the evidence that the Tribunal accepts, operates in a significant way on the Applicant’s right hand. As to the evidence of Dr McGill, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept the ultimate opinion expressed by him. Dr McGill’s opinion was that, in 2018, the Applicant did not suffer the subject disease, an opinion which he changed as a result of later evidence being produced. Dr McGill's opinion presently is that if the Applicant does suffer from the disease, the Applicant was predisposed to that disease and the mild effects of its operation do not affect her abilities to carry out her work. The evidence which Dr McGill gave appeared to the Tribunal to be partial and there was a reluctance, to say the least, by the doctor to be open and helpful in the manner in which he answered questions. The Tribunal has formed the view that part of the opinion expressed by Dr McGill was based upon his interpretation of psychological and other reasons which he attributed to the Applicant and which, in so attributing, strayed beyond the proper boundaries of permitted opinion within his field of expertise. Thus, in the Tribunal’s view, such inappropriately expressed opinion infected the propriety of his reports and evidence and diminished considerably, the acceptability of his evidence and the weight to be given to that evidence. As to the evidence of Dr Ness, the Tribunal is of the view that his reports and opinion suffer from the same shortcomings as that of Dr McGill. As with the opinion of Dr McGill, the opinion of Dr Ness is attended by an inappropriate excursion taking into account matters which are beyond both doctors’ field of expertise and inappropriate to the proper formulation of the experts’ opinion. In both cases, those opinions appear to have assigned reasons why the Applicant made complaints as to her symptoms and in each case, the opinions appear to have been constructed in order to conform to the view that the Applicant was not suffering to the degree or in the way she expressed her physical symptoms.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Applicant continued to suffer from De Quervain’s tenosynovitis (DQT) from 4 December 2019.
2. Whether the Applicant’s continued suffering from DQT, if any, was related to her work with the Respondent.
3. Whether the Applicant’s DQT had the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by her employment with the Respondent.
4. Whether the causal nexus between the Applicant’s employment and her suffering of DQT continued unbroken from 4 December 2019.
5. Whether the Tribunal’s acceptance and weight given to the medical evidence, particularly from Dr Gumley, Dr McGill, and Dr Ness, was appropriate and justified.

Held
1. Whether the Applicant continued to suffer from De Quervain’s tenosynovitis (DQT) from 4 December 2019.
The Tribunal concluded that the Applicant continued to suffer from DQT from 4 December 2019.

2. Whether the Applicant’s continued suffering from DQT, if any, was related to her work with the Respondent.
The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s continued suffering from DQT was related to her work with the Respondent.

3. Whether the Applicant’s DQT had the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by her employment with the Respondent.
The Tribunal determined that the Applicant’s DQT had the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by her employment with the Respondent.

4. Whether the causal nexus between the Applicant’s employment and her suffering of DQT continued unbroken from 4 December 2019.
The Tribunal concluded that the causal nexus between the Applicant’s employment and her suffering of DQT continued unbroken from 4 December 2019.

5. Whether the Tribunal’s acceptance and weight given to the medical evidence, particularly from Dr Gumley, Dr McGill, and Dr Ness, was appropriate and justified.
The Tribunal accepted the evidence of Dr Gumley and found it to be based on acceptable evidence. The Tribunal rejected the ultimate opinions of Dr McGill and Dr Ness, finding their opinions to be partial and inappropriate.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court began by addressing whether the Applicant continued to suffer from De Quervain’s tenosynovitis (DQT) from 4 December 2019. The Court placed significant weight on the evidence provided by Dr Gumley, who observed objective symptoms such as oedema and correctly interpreted these as being directly related to DQT. The Tribunal's acceptance of Dr Gumley's evidence was deemed appropriate, particularly given the objective evidence of observations made by Dr Gumley. The Court also accepted the ultrasound evidence from March 2021, which supported the ongoing presence of the disease. By contrast, the Court found the opinions of Dr McGill and Dr Ness to be less credible. The Court noted that Dr McGill's opinion was initially that the Applicant did not suffer from DQT in 2018, which he later revised upon seeing additional evidence. However, Dr McGill's opinion that the Applicant was predisposed to the disease and that its mild effects did not impair her work was considered partial and influenced by inappropriate psychological attributions. Similarly, Dr Ness's opinion was found to suffer from the same shortcomings, straying beyond the boundaries of permitted opinion within their field of expertise.

The Court then examined whether the Applicant’s continued suffering from DQT, if any, was related to her work with the Respondent. The Tribunal’s acceptance of Dr Gumley’s evidence was pivotal in this regard, as it supported the ongoing and significant impact of DQT on the Applicant’s right hand. The Court found Dr Gumley’s evidence to be acceptable and reliable, thereby supporting the conclusion that the DQT was related to the Applicant’s employment. The Court did not find the opinions of Dr McGill and Dr Ness to be as credible, due to their inappropriate excursions into psychological and other non-expert matters. Consequently, the Court relied on Dr Gumley's evidence to establish the link between the Applicant’s condition and her employment.

Next, the Court considered whether the Applicant’s DQT had the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by her employment with the Respondent. The Court emphasized that for the disease to remain compensable, it must retain the characteristic of being materially contributed to by the employment. The Tribunal’s acceptance of Dr Gumley’s evidence, which indicated a significant ongoing impact of DQT on the Applicant’s right hand, supported this conclusion. The Court found Dr Gumley’s evidence to be credible and based on objective observations, which was sufficient to establish the material contribution of the employment to the Applicant’s condition. The opinions of Dr McGill and Dr Ness, which were deemed less credible, did not adequately counter the evidence supporting the material contribution of the employment to the Applicant’s DQT.

The Court also examined whether the causal nexus between the Applicant’s employment and her suffering of DQT continued unbroken from 4 December 2019. The Court noted that for compensation to remain payable, the causal nexus must persist. The Tribunal’s acceptance of Dr Gumley’s evidence supported the unbroken causal link between the Applicant’s employment and her suffering of DQT. The Court found that Dr Gumley’s reliable and objective evidence, which included observations of the Applicant’s symptoms and the impact of DQT on her right hand, was sufficient to establish that the causal nexus remained unbroken from 4 December 2019. The less credible opinions of Dr McGill and Dr Ness did not provide a sufficient basis to challenge this conclusion.

Finally, the Court assessed whether the Tribunal’s acceptance and weight given to the medical evidence, particularly from Dr Gumley, Dr McGill, and Dr Ness, was appropriate and justified. The Court found the Tribunal’s acceptance of Dr Gumley’s evidence to be well-founded, as it was based on credible, objective observations and supported by additional diagnostic evidence. By contrast, the Court found the Tribunal’s rejection of Dr McGill’s and Dr Ness’s opinions to be justified, given their partial and improperly formulated opinions that strayed beyond their field of expertise. The Court concluded that the Tribunal appropriately weighed the medical evidence, giving greater credence to the reliable and objective evidence of Dr Gumley, which was essential in determining the ongoing impact of DQT on the Applicant and its relation to her employment.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that for a disease to remain compensable under the relevant legislation, it must retain the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by the employee’s employment. The causal nexus between the employment and the disease must remain unbroken, and the disease must continue to be significantly impacted by the employment. The Court emphasized the importance of credible and objective medical evidence in establishing these elements, and found the Tribunal’s reliance on such evidence to be appropriate. The Court also highlighted the need for medical experts to confine their opinions within the boundaries of their expertise and avoid inappropriate psychological attributions.