Sangster; Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services
[2004] AATA 991
•21 September 2004
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2004] AATA 991
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No W2003/439
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES Applicant
And
ANNA SANGSTER
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr M J Allen, Member Date21 September 2004
PlacePerth
Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal made on 8 August 2003 and in substitution therefor decides that:
(a) a debt of $5,404.68 was due by the respondent to the Commonwealth as at 18 December 2002; and
(b) recovery of that debt should not be waived.
..............(sgd M J Allen).....................
Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – Austudy benefit – incorrect advice by Centrelink about effect of distribution from a family trust shortly prior to application for Austudy – resolution by trustee to make distribution and journal entry crediting the amount of the distribution to a beneficiary loan account had the effect of creating a loan by beneficiary to trust and receipt of an income amount – applicant taken to receive one fifty-second of distribution amount over following year – details of income and loan asset not disclosed in application form – finding that debt due – consideration of whether administrative error – terms of application form not administrative error – debt partly due to incomplete information provided in application form – even if incorrect advice constituted administrative error, it was not the sole cause of debt arising – consideration of when special circumstances make it “desirable” to waive a debt – meaning of “desirable” – circumstances of the case did not make it desirable to waive – decision of SSAT set aside – decision substituted that debt existed and recovery not be waived
Social Security Act 1991 ss 8, 581, 1067L, 1073, 1237, 1237A, 1237AAD
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss 37, 41, 43
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Re Boscolo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1999) 53 ALD 277
Commissioner for Superannuation v Boardman (1994) 33 ALD 569
Director-General of Social Security v Hales (1983) 47 ALR 281
Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133
Re Griffiths Grif-Air Helicopters Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Authority (1993) 31 ALD 380
Re Hayek and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2004] AATA 558
Re King and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 34 ALD 583
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 51 ALD 695
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Sekhon [2003] FCA 76
REASONS FOR DECISION
21 September 2004 Mr M J Allen, Member 1. On 8 August 2003 the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) set aside a decision made on 18 December 2002 by a Centrelink Authorised Review Officer (ARO) to raise and recover a debt of $5,404.68 from the Ms Sangster (“the respondent”), being Austudy payments made to her between 8 February 1999 and 19 November 1999. The SSAT substituted a new decision that recovery of the debt is to be waived in accordance with s 1237A of the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”) and that any amount previously recovered by the applicant from the respondent in respect of that debt must be refunded. The applicant now applies for review of the decision of the SSAT.
2. At the hearing of the matter the applicant was represented by Ms Bradley, an officer of Centrelink, and the respondent represented herself. The Tribunal received into evidence the documents filed pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (“the AAT Act”) (T1 – T32). Oral evidence was given by the respondent and on her behalf by Mr Gregory Cochrane.
3. The undisputed background to the matter is that in late 1998 the respondent was a potential beneficiary under a discretionary family trust established by her parents (“the Trust”). On 20 November 1998 the directors of the company that is the trustee of the Trust resolved to distribute to the respondent the sum of $50,000 out of the Trust’s taxable income for the year to 30 June 1999 (T5). On 15 December 1998 the respondent completed and signed a claim form for Austudy benefits (T6) on the basis that she was partnered. The respondent married in January 1999 and on 29 January 1999 she was advised by Centrelink that she would be paid Austudy from 8 February 1999 (T22). The respondent received Austudy until the middle of 2002, at which time she finished her studies.
4. In 2002 Centrelink matched data with the Australian Taxation Office and established that the respondent had received the distribution from the Trust in the year ended 30 June 1999 and investigated the matter. In October 2002 a Centrelink officer raised a debt of $6,689.86 in respect of the period from 30 June 1999 until 29 June 2000. That decision was subsequently varied by recalculating the debt as being $5,404.68 in respect of the period from 8 February 1999 to 19 November 1999, and in December 2002 an ARO affirmed that varied decision. The ARO concluded that the debt due by the respondent should not be waived pursuant to s 1237A or s 1237AAD of the Act.
5. The SSAT concluded that the debt was due by the respondent but decided that recovery of the debt should be waived pursuant to s 1237A because, in the SSAT’s opinion, having regard to the inadequacies in Centrelink’s documentation and incorrect information provided by Centrelink, the overpayment that occurred arose solely due to administrative error on the part of the Commonwealth (T2 para 34). I was advised at the hearing that the full amount of the debt has been recovered from the respondent and that, on 28 January 2004, this Tribunal stayed the implementation of the SSAT’s decision pending the outcome of these proceedings.
6. The issues for determination by the Tribunal in the present case are whether a debt is due by the respondent to the Commonwealth and, if so, whether the debt should be recovered.
Statutory Framework
7. It is not in dispute that the respondent qualified for Austudy. However, the rate at which the benefit was payable to the respondent depended upon the application of the assets and income tests in relation to both the respondent and her husband. It is not in dispute that the assets test is not relevant in the present case.
8. Section 8(1) of the Act provides definitions for a number of matters relevant to the income test. “Income” relevantly means ‘an income amount earned, derived or received by the person for the person’s own use or benefit’. “Income amount” is defined relevantly to mean ‘valuable consideration, personal earnings, moneys, or profits, whether of a capital nature or not’. Section 8(2) defines “an income amount earned, derived or received” as ‘an income amount earned, derived or received by any means and from any source (whether within or outside Australia)’.
9. Section 581 of the Act relevantly provides that the rate of a person’s Austudy payment is to be worked out in accordance with a rate calculator to be found in s 1067L of the Act. Module D of the latter section requires calculation of a person’s “ordinary income”.
10. Section 1073 of the Act relevantly provides that, subject to some provisions of the Act that are not relevant in these proceedings, “… if a person receives, whether before or after the commencement of this section, an amount that … [is not income within the meaning of certain other provisions of the Act that are not relevant in these proceedings] … the person is, for the purposes of this Act, taken to receive one fifty second of that amount as ordinary income of the person during each week in the 12 months commencing on the day on which the person becomes entitled to receive that amount.”
Consideration
11. Before considering the issues in the case I consider that it is appropriate to refer to comments made by this Tribunal ten years ago in Re King and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 34 ALD 583 at [55], which remain pertinent today and applicable to the present case:
“[55] We feel we should point out that it appears to us that were it not for the Data Matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 (Cth) there is no way in which the department would have become aware of Mr Darren King’s income from the trust. That legislation is probably the reason why we have recently noticed an increase in the number of Social Security matters involving money held on trust by or for a person who claims to be entitled to payments under the Act. Sheppard J said, in Director-General of Social Services v Hales (1983) 47 ALR 281 at 321; 5 ALN N162, of the Act:
‘The legislation provides for the payment of a variety of benefits to different classes of people who will usually have one thing in common; they will be impecunious and in straitened circumstances. (Emphasis added.)’
That is not always the case these days. The issue now, in some matters, is whether there is an entitlement to benefits, because of the way in which the applicant’s finances are arranged, in spite of the applicant not in truth being impecunious. This seems to present some conflict with the concept of social security payments as income support and provides new complex issues with which decision makers, the SSAT, this tribunal and the courts have to grapple.”
Is there a debt?
12. Mr Cochrane, who is a chartered accountant and the accountant for the Trust and the respondent’s parents, gave evidence that the effect of the resolution by the trustee to distribute the income and the subsequent journal entries that credited the amount of the distribution to a beneficiary loan account in the respondent’s name meant that the respondent had a legal entitlement to demand payment of the money. Prior to payment it could properly be regarded as a loan made by the beneficiary to the Trust that was payable on demand.
13. It was not in dispute that the resolution of the Trustee to distribute the amount to the respondent and the crediting of that amount to the loan account constituted receipt by the respondent of that amount on that day. In any event I am satisfied that that is the case: see Re Hayek and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2004] AATA 558 at [12] per Member R J Kenny. By virtue of s 1073(1), the applicant is taken to receive one-fifty second of the amount of $50,000 as ordinary income each week in the 12 months commencing on 20 November 1998.
14. It was not in dispute that the amount of ordinary income that the respondent was taken to receive under s 1073 was sufficient to result in her rate of payment of Austudy benefits being reduced to nil when calculated under s 1067L. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the benefits received by the respondent between 8 February 1999 and 19 November 1999 were amounts that she was not entitled to receive. Accordingly, by virtue of s 1223(1) of the Act, the amount of those payments (namely $5,404.68) is a debt due to the Commonwealth by the respondent. I must therefore consider the second issue for determination in this case, namely whether the debt should be recovered.
Should the debt be recovered?
15. French J observed in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 51 ALD 695 at 695, 696 as follows:
“From time to time in the administration of social security benefits overpayments occur. Sometimes these are the result of innocent non-compliance with the requirements of the law which can be affected by the stress associated with the circumstances that led to the receipt of benefits in the first place. The taxpayer is entitled to expect that in the ordinary course money paid to people which they are not entitled to receive will be recovered, albeit in a way appropriate to the circumstances which led to the overpayment and the circumstances of the persons concerned. However, the confining of a recovery regime by rigid rules, particularly in this area of the law, is likely to be productive of unfair or harsh outcomes in some of the great variety of fact situations that can arises. There are provisions in the Act which recognise that reality. They relate to the writing off and the waiver of debts otherwise due to the Commonwealth.”
16. Section 1237(1) of the Act grants to the Secretary, and hence to this Tribunal by virtue of s43(1) of the AAT Act, the ability to waive the Commonwealth’s right to recover the whole or part of a debt due from a debtor only in the circumstances described in a number of specified sections of the Act. Two waiver sections are relevant in the current proceeding, namely s1237A and s1237AAD.
17. Section 1237A(1) of the Act provides that (subject to the proviso in s1237A(1A) that is not relevant in the present case) the Secretary “…must waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt.”
18. Secondly, in certain circumstances a debt may be waived in the exercise of a discretion to do so. Section 1237AAD of the Act is as follows:
1237AAD. The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a)the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act or the 1947 Act; and
(b)there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c)it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.
Mandatory Waiver under s 1237A
19. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the creation of the debt was solely attributable to administrative error by Centrelink. In support of that contention Mr Cochrane gave evidence that he had made a telephone enquiry to the Centrelink Austudy section shortly prior to 20 November 1998 and had spoken to a person named “Alex”. Mr Cochrane said that he outlined the normal procedure for distribution by the Trust to beneficiaries and asked specifically about the extent to which the Trust could make a distribution without affecting Austudy entitlements in the future. The response that he received from Alex was that Austudy income assessment is fortnightly and prospective, and that anything that occurred prior to Austudy being granted would be of no relevance. Document T21, being a letter from Mr Cochrane to Centrelink dated 29 October 2002, was in similar terms.
20. Mr Cochrane said that the distribution to the respondent from the Trust would not have been made had the advice from Centrelink been that it would have any impact on the respondent’s eligibility for Austudy.
21. The respondent gave evidence that she was aware that she was a beneficiary under the Trust and that a distribution had been made to her in November 1998 based upon the advice received by Mr Cochrane from Centrelink. The distribution had been made to assist in the funding of study to be undertaken in the following years by the respondent and her husband. The $50,000 had been principally used to pay income tax and tuition fees in the subsequent years for the respondent and her husband. The money had remained in the Trust’s accounts and had been drawn on by the respondent as it was needed to pay the various items for which it was to be used.
22. Ms Bradley for the applicant informed me that at the time Centrelink did not keep a record of all telephone enquiries made to it and she could not dispute that Mr Cochrane made the call that he claims to have made or that wrong information or advice may have been given to him. In those circumstances I have no reason to doubt the evidence of Mr Cochrane and I find as a fact that he had the conversation referred to above and that he received advice to the effect of that set out above.
23. Evidence was also given about the information provided by the respondent to Centrelink in her application form (T6) for Austudy, in particular that contained within Section C of the form dealing with income and assets. The respondent answered “no” to question 15 in Section C, which was: “Do you currently have any of the following types of income or assets?” and set out a number of types of income or assets including “outstanding loans to other people” and “interest from trusts”. Because she answered “no” to question 15 the form directed the respondent to go to question 30. Had she answered “yes” to question 15 she would have been required to complete questions 16 to 29, which require detailed information about the various types of income of assets referred to in question 15. Specifically, question 16 dealt with money loaned that had not been repaid and asked whether the loan had been made “to a trust”. Had that question been answered “yes”, the respondent would have been required to complete a further form.
24. Question 30 of Section C was: “Do you get (or expect to get) other income that you have not told us about on this form” and provided the following advice: “If you are unsure what counts as income please check the definitions in the notes. Include lump sum payments that you have not declared elsewhere in this form.” The respondent answered “no” to this question.
25. Question 31 was: “Do you have any other assets which you have not told us about when answering questions on this form?”. Examples of assets were given as follows: “gold bullion, race horses, taxi plates, time share, investment collections such as art, books, wine or jewellery”. The respondent answered “no” to this question.
26. The applicant declared in Section H of the form that the information she had provided was complete and correct.
27. In her oral evidence the respondent said that she had completed the application having regard to her understanding of Mr Cochrane’s conversation with Centrelink and her reading of the words used in the questions. She understood “currently” in question 15 to mean “at the present time” and she thought, based on Mr Cochrane’s advice, that prior income was not covered by the question. In relation to question 30 she thought everything that happened prior to her application was not relevant and she thought question 31 was not relevant because the examples given were quite unrelated to prior distributions from a trust.
28. In considering whether the debt was solely attributable to administrative error by Centrelink, the SSAT referred to the distinction made by the Full Federal Court between an error of an administrative nature and one that is “determinative” in character in Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133 at [62] per Hill J. The SSAT thought that the incorrect advice given by the Centrelink staff member to Mr Cochrane might arguably have been a determinative error rather than an administrative error – but even if that were the case, “… in the present case the deficiencies in Centrelink’s administration arise not only from the incorrect information provided to Mr Cochrane … but from the very terms of the Austudy payment claim form itself and, to a lesser degree, from the Centrelink correspondence sent to [the respondent] …” (T2 at [31] and [32]). The SSAT considered that the only relevant type of payment or entitlement referred to in question 15 of the claim form was the reference to “interest from trusts” and that this was not an adequate or correct description of a trust distribution. Further, the correspondence sent to the respondent, which described her obligations to notify Centrelink of changes of circumstances, made no reference to a distribution or income from a trust in the lengthy definition of “income” that was set out. The SSAT thought that these documents should be interpreted in a strict way and concluded that the overpayment arose solely from error by Centrelink that had occurred in the course of its administration of the Act.
29. In Dranichnikov the Court was dealing with the interpretation of s 97 of A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 which is, for all practical purposes, the same as s 1237A of the Act. At [62] Hill J commented that
“it is neither possible nor appropriate to attempt a meaning of the words ‘administrative error’ which would accurately cover every case for much will turn upon the circumstances. Essentially, however, the concept is one where the error or mistake arises as a result of the procedure that has been adopted.”
At [64] Hill J said that “the issue is rather as to the nature of the error made in the decision taken to pay the benefit rather than the question of entitlement to the benefit.”
30. At [73] Hely J said that the section
“invites and requires a factual enquiry as to how it came to pass that a sum of money which was not payable to Mr Dranichnikov came to be paid to him. The mere fact that an entitlement to a family tax benefit was claimed by … [a person who had no entitlement] does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the debt did not arise due to an administrative error. Whether the debt was due to an administrative error depends upon the circumstances, including the information supplied in association with the claim, and whether any administrative procedures which were in place in relation to the processing of such claims were followed.”
31. In Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Sekhon [2003] FCA 76 at [41], Wilcox J emphasised that the significance of the word “solely” must not be overlooked. “It is not enough that, in the absence of administrative error, the debt would not have arisen. Administrative error must be the sole cause, not merely one of multiple causes”.
32. In the present case I have found that a Centrelink officer gave Mr Cochrane incorrect advice about the consequences of a distribution from the Trust to the respondent shortly prior to her application for Austudy. I am prepared to accept that that incorrect advice caused Mr Cochrane and the respondent to believe that the distribution would have no impact on the Austudy entitlements. I accept Mr Cochrane’s assertion that the distribution would not have been made if there had been a concern that it would effect those entitlements. To that extent it can be said that the debt would not have arisen “but for” the incorrect advice.
33. However, in my opinion the debt arose because of a decision to pay Austudy benefits to the respondent based on the information that was contained in the application form completed by the respondent.
34. The SSAT referred only to the item “interest from trusts” when considering question 15 of Section C of the claim form. In my opinion the item “outstanding loans to other people” was applicable to the respondent because, at the time she completed her form, there was an amount of $50,000 standing to the credit of her beneficiary loan account in the trust. She may not have appreciated that the amount represented a loan by her to the trust and she may have been under the impression that such a loan would not effect her Austudy benefit, but it remains the case that the loan existed and should have been disclosed in the form – which would have resulted in question 16 having to be completed. Question 15 referred to assets that the respondent “currently” had and the loan met that description. The other item referred to in question 15, i.e. “interest from trusts”, may well have been more precisely worded to avoid ambiguity, but it is not, in my opinion, as ambiguous or uncertain as the SSAT apparently considered. The respondent was aware that she did currently have an interest in a trust and, at the time of her claim, currently had an expectation of receiving funds from the Trust.
35. Similar considerations apply to the answers given by the respondent to questions 30 and 31. At the time of completing the claim form the applicant did expect to receive funds from the trust by way of lump sum payments as required and the credit standing to her loan account in the trust constituted an asset, even if the respondent did not understand that to be the case.
36. I am by no means suggesting that the respondent set out to mislead Centrelink in her application form, but I consider that the information provided to Centrelink was not complete. A person who believes that an item of income or an asset will not affect an entitlement to a benefit is, nevertheless, required to provide information about the income or the asset to Centrelink if the claim (or other) form requires it. Only then will Centrelink have full possession of the information required from which an informed decision can be made about the impact (or lack of) of the income or asset on the claimant’s entitlements. In my opinion, and despite the incorrect advice given to Mr Cochrane, the application form completed by the respondent required her to provide certain information about her financial position – and she failed to do so, even though she had no intention to mislead.
37. Because the decision to grant the respondent Austudy was made on the basis of the information that she provided, in my opinion it can be said that the failure to provide all relevant information contributed to the granting of Austudy to the respondent and the subsequent payments to her of benefits to which she was not entitled. To that extent, even if I were to accept that the incorrect advice given by Centrelink to Mr Cochrane constituted an administrative error that may have contributed to the creation of the debt, I am satisfied that that error cannot be said to have been the sole cause of the debt arising. Unlike the SSAT, I do not consider that the terms of the application form constituted an administrative error by the Commonwealth.
38. Having concluded that the debt is not solely attributable to administrative error it is unnecessary for me to consider whether the payments were received by the respondent in good faith. However, I record that in my opinion the respondent did receive the payments in good faith because she was relying on the advice relayed to her by Mr Cochrane that the distribution would not effect her Austudy entitlements.
Discretionary Waiver under s 1237AAD
39. The ARO considered that the circumstances surrounding the creation of the debt were not sufficiently unusual to permit them to be described as special and hence waiver under s 1237AAD was not appropriate. Because of the view that the SSAT took regarding s 1237A it did not consider s 1237AAD. In relation to the various requirements of s 1237AAD, the applicant conceded that the requirements in paragraphs (a) and (c) were satisfied, but disputed that there were special circumstances that would satisfy the requirements of paragraph (b). The respondent did not identify any particular circumstances that should be taken into account when considering this issue other than the circumstances in which the debt arose, as discussed above.
40. What should be regarded as special circumstances is an issue that confronts this Tribunal regularly. Reference is frequently made, with approval, to the decision of the Tribunal in Re Beadle and Director General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 at 3, that one should look for circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. They need not be unique, but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special. In Re Boscolo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1999) 53 ALD 277 at 281, 282 French J described the core of the requirement as being that there be something unusual or different to take the matter out of the ordinary course, but without requiring that the case be extremely unusual, uncommon or exceptional.
41. It is to be noted that the section refers to special circumstances “that make it desirable to waive” the debt. In Re Griffiths Grif-Air Helicopters Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Authority (1993) 31 ALD 380 at [47] the Tribunal concluded that, in the context of s 41 of the AAT Act, which empowers the Tribunal to make a stay order “if it is desirable to do so” after taking into account the interests of affected persons, the word “desirable” connotes “… ‘a positive aspiration’ and that it is ‘something worthy of achievement’ rather than ‘merely advisable’”. In Commissioner for Superannuation v Boardman (1994) 33 ALD 569 Von Doussa J considered the meaning of “desirable” in the context of a provision that allowed an extension of time for the giving of a notice of election regarding superannuation if “… in all the circumstances of the case it is desirable that the election should be recognised …”. At page 576 his Honour concluded that the connotation of “desirable” in that context is that of “being fair in order to do justice between the person who seeks to make the late election and the requirements of the administration of the fund”. Whether a late notice of election is desirable
“is to be judged objectively having regard to all the circumstances of the case. The suggested meaning ‘something worthy of achievement’ does not imply other than an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the case; but in the end, whether the recognition of a late election is ‘something worthy of achievement’ must depend on what is fair in order to do justice between the person who seeks to make the late election and the requirements of the administration of the fund.” (at page 577).
42. I consider that, in the context of s 1237AAD of the Act, the special circumstances that would make it desirable to waive a debt would be those special circumstances that would make it fair in order to do justice between a person who had received payments to which he or she was not entitled and the overall requirements of the administration of the Act. Important in making that assessment would be the Act’s objective of, to borrow the words of Sheppard J in Hales quoted in [11] above, providing income support by way of “… a variety of benefits to different classes of people who will usually have one thing in common: they will be impecunious and in straitened circumstances”.
43. In balancing what will be fair as between the competing interests, it would also be appropriate to have regard to the taxpayer’s expectation (as noted by French J in the passage from Boscolo quoted at [15] above) that money paid to which there is not an entitlement will be recovered unless to do so would produce unfair or harsh outcomes.
44. This is not a case in which the respondent can be said to be, in truth, impecunious or in straitened circumstances. The arrangement of the distribution from the Trust was intended to be done so as to not affect the entitlement to Austudy but, for the reasons given above, was not effective in achieving that goal. Despite the incorrect advice from Centrelink I have concluded that the respondent did not provide all the information about her circumstances that was required of her.
45. The respondent relies upon the admitted receipt of incorrect advice from Centrelink and the asserted deficiencies in Centrelink’s documents as special circumstances. I do not consider the documents were deficient. Even if it could be said that the incorrect advice was a special circumstance for the purpose of s 1237AAD, in my opinion it would not be a special circumstance that made it desirable to waive the debt – because a waiver is not necessary to achieve a fair outcome as between the interests of the respondent and the requirements of the administration of the Act.
46. My decision is, therefore, that the decision of the SSAT made on 8 August 2003 is set aside and in substitution therefor I decide that:
(a)a debt of $5,404.68 was due by the respondent to the Commonwealth as at 18 December 2002; and
(b)recovery of that debt should not be waived.
I certify that the 46 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr Murray Allen, Member
Signed: .................(sgd V Wong)...................................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 10 June 2004
Date of Decision 21 September 2004
Counsel for the Applicant In person
Solicitor for the Applicant Self Represented
Counsel for the Respondent Ms R Bradley
Solicitor for the Respondent The Service Recovery Team, Centrelink
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