Sangha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Sangha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 164

File number(s): ADG 127 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD
Date of judgment: 14 February 2025 
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Partner visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal decision was affected by apprehended bias – whether the Tribunal relied on findings in a previous decision – whether the Tribunal failed to consider evidence – whether the Tribunal failed to apply an active intellectual process –jurisdictional error established – writs issued
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5F, 5F(2), 5F(2)(a), 359AA, 375A, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15A, cll 800.211, 800.221

Cases cited:

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (M131 of 2999) (2000) 205 CLR 337

FSG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 456

Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135

Jaggi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1267

Livesey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288

Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 409 ALR 65

Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425

SZHBP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 103 ALD 595

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41

Aronson M, Groves M, Weeks G, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (7th ed, Lawbook Co., 2022)

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 79
Date of last submission/s: 5 December 2024
Date of hearing: 11 December 2024
Place: Adelaide
Counsel for the First Applicant: Sean Kikkert
Solicitor for the First Applicant: Dentons
Counsel for the First Respondent: Alex Chan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

ADG 127 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

SATWANT SINGH SANGHA

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GERRARD

DATE OF ORDER:

14 FEBRUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 8 March 2019.

2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicant’s review application according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 164
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sangha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves an Indian citizen who applied for a Partner visa in Australia. The application was refused, and the decision was reviewed by the Migration Review Tribunal, which affirmed the delegate's decision. The applicant sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court and subsequently in the Federal Court of Australia. The case eventually reached the High Court of Australia, where the applicant argued that the Tribunal had made several jurisdictional errors.

The primary legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal had acted with apprehended bias, whether it had relied on findings from a previous decision, whether it had failed to consider relevant evidence, and whether it had failed to apply an active intellectual process. The Court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision was affected by any of these errors.

The Court found that the Tribunal had indeed made jurisdictional errors. It concluded that the Tribunal's failure to disclose a s 375A certificate constituted a jurisdictional error. The Court also found that the Tribunal had not applied an active intellectual process to the evidence presented, leading to inconsistent findings. Furthermore, the Court determined that the Tribunal had not adequately considered the evidence provided by the applicant and his sponsor, impacting the fairness of the decision-making process.

In light of these findings, the Court issued writs to remedy the jurisdictional errors made by the Tribunal. The decision underscores the importance of thorough and fair consideration of evidence and the necessity for tribunals to avoid any appearance of bias in their decision-making processes.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the Court has found a series of jurisdictional errors in the Tribunal’s decision. On that basis, the application has succeeded. BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of India and is 35 years old (Court Book (CB) 12). He arrived in Australia on 15 July 2009 as the holder of a Student visa. At the time of applying for the Partner visa which is the subject of this review, he held a Student (Class TU) (Subclass 572) visa, valid until 21 August 2013 (CB 38). The sponsor, Ms Smith (the sponsor), is an Australian citizen and is 30 years old (CB 1). The applicant and the sponsor met on 1 October 2011 and commenced a relationship on 1 January 2013 (CB 2, 18). They married on 10 April 2013 (CB 2). On 20 August 2013, the applicant applied for a combined Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (Subclass 820) and Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 801) visa (the visa) on the basis of his relationship with the sponsor (CB 1-30, 80). On 16 June 2014, Departmental officers conducted a home visit and interview of the applicant at the nominated residential address (CB 212-218). The sponsor was interviewed separately on 26 June 2014 (CB 205-211). On 3 October 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 221). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was in a spousal relationship with the sponsor as defined by section 5F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (CB 225-229). On 23 October 2014, the applicant applied to the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 248-258). On 11 September 2015, the MRT affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 331-337). On 30 September 2015, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. On 23 May 2016, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application. On 8 June 2016, the applicant appealed that decision to the Federal Court of Australia. On 26 June 2017, the Federal Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal by consent, noting that the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error for failing to disclose the existence of a s 375A certificate (CB 338-339). On 9 August 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicant to provide further information about the nature of his relationship with the sponsor by 23 August 2018 (CB 352-353). On 9 August 2018, the applicant requested an extension of time to provide the information (CB 354-355) which was denied by the Tribunal on 17 August 2018 (CB 366). On 20 August 2018, the applicant and sponsor were invited to attend a hearing scheduled for 27 September 2018 (CB 368-369). On 31 August 2018, the applicant appointed a migration agent as his authorised recipient (CB 372-373). On 3 September 2018, the applicant (via his migration agent) responded to the Tribunal’s request for further information (CB 379-380), annexing 22 documents in support (CB 381-785). On 27 September 2018, the applicant and sponsor attended a hearing before the Tribunal (CB 786). Following the hearing, the applicant also provided further evidence in response to the Tribunal’s questions (CB 789-800).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 2 April 2019, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Act. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in some detail. The Tribunal began by summarising the procedural background as outlined above. It confirmed that the issue for determination in this matter was whether, at the time of the visa application and the time of the Tribunal decision, the applicant was the spouse of Ms Smith (at [9]). Under s 359AA, the Tribunal put to the applicant that the sponsor’s mother and her current husband had given affirmed evidence that the sponsor was presently in a relationship with another man (Mr X), and that the applicant had been living in Brooklyn Park in February 2013 rather than sharing a home with the sponsor in Grange as claimed. The applicant was advised that if the Tribunal relied on this information, it would find that his sponsor did not have a mutual commitment to a shared life with him to the exclusion of all others. The applicant and sponsor were granted further time to comment on this information (at [22]-[23]). After the hearing, the applicant provided statutory declarations from the sponsor and from Mr X (at [26]-[28]). Mr X declared that he was a friend of the sponsor but not in a romantic relationship with her (at [28]). The sponsor additionally said that her mother has previously accused her of being with Mr X (at [24]). The applicant did not provide a statutory declaration from the sponsor’s mother, which the Tribunal inferred to mean that it would not have assisted the applicant’s case, noting that the sponsor appeared to have been in contact with her mother during this time (at [27]). The Tribunal found that the statutory declaration from Mr X is not consistent with the other evidence before it and was not satisfied that it could rely on it (at [29]). The Tribunal found that there were numerous inconsistencies in the documentary and oral evidence from both the applicant and the sponsor (at [30]-[45]). In particular, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the reason for the “absence of other than sparse items” of the sponsor’s clothing at the site visit was because of a mould problem, which the applicant says he showed to the officers at the time, but is not recorded in the record of the site visit (at [34]-[36]). The Tribunal was not satisfied that the officers would not have recorded this, if it was in fact the reason for the absence of clothing and was mentioned by the applicant to the officers during the site visit. The Tribunal found it is more likely that the applicant did not mention this at all during the site visit and instead later sought to rely on it. The Tribunal did not find this account to be truthful (at [36]). The Tribunal similarly found the explanations from the applicant and his sponsor about their lack of evidence of communication between them to be inconsistent (at [38]-[41]). The Tribunal did not accept that this was because the applicant had changed his SIM card, or that the messages would not be retained if he had changed his SIM card, or that the applicant and sponsor would decline to provide evidence of communication between them because it was private (at [41]). The Tribunal found that there was likely little communication between them, and it did not accept the applicant’s explanation that, because they lived together, it was not necessary for them to have such communication (at [41]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The materials before the Court include:·the amended application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 15 November 2024;·the affidavit of the applicant affirmed and filed on 2 April 2019 (taken as read and in evidence on 2 October 2024);·the affidavit of the applicant affirmed and filed on 19 April 2024 (taken as read and in evidence on 2 October 2024);·the affidavit of Anthony John O’Brien affirmed and filed on 15 November 2024 (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 11 December 2024);·a Court Book numbering 841 pages (marked as Exhibit 1);·written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 8 September 2023;·written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 15 November 2024; and·written submissions addressing the applicant’s amended application, filed on behalf of the Minister on 5 December 2024.CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the amended application for judicial review contains four particularised grounds of review. Ground one Ground one contends that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal may not have brought an impartial mind to the applicant’s review. In simple terms, the applicant contends apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal. An allegation of bias must be clearly made and distinctly proven (Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69] and SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [22]). The relevant principles for apprehended bias are articulated in various cases, notably CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76 at [17]-[18], [69]-[70] and [131]-[132] (CNY17); FSG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 456 at [32]; and Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135 at [12] (Isbester). The test for apprehended bias is “a test of a ‘double-might’: whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the adjudicator might not bring an impartial mind to the fair resolution of the issue to be decided” (CNY17 at [132] per Edelman J). Two steps flow from that test (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (M131 of 2999) (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [8]; CNY17 (at [56]); Isbester (at [12]); and Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, cited in SZHBP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 103 ALD 595 at [16]). This two-step test has been adopted by this Court (see, by way of recent example, Jaggi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1267). The first step requires one to identify what it is that might lead a decision-maker to decide a case other than on the factual and legal merits before it. In essence, this requires the Court to determine what may affect a decision maker’s impartiality by identifying that interest. Such an interest may include but is not limited to: a decision-maker’s failure to disqualify themselves by conduct, by extraneous information, by association, or by a direct or indirect interest in the proceedings (CNY17 at [57]; Isbester at [21]). In Isbester, the High Court clarified that (at [46]):A “personal interest” in this context is not the kind of interest by which a person will receive some material or other benefit. In the case of a prosecutor or other moving party, it refers to a view which they may have of the matter, and which is in that sense personal to them. The interest of a prosecutor may be in the vindication of their opinion that an offence has occurred or that a particular penalty should be imposed, or in obtaining an outcome consonant with the prosecutor’s view of guilt or punishment. It is not necessary to analyse the psychological processes to which a person in such a position is subject. It is well accepted… that it might reasonably be thought that the person’s involvement in the capacity of prosecutor will not enable them to bring the requisite impartiality to decision-making…