FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Sangha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 164
File number(s): ADG 127 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD Date of judgment: 14 February 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Partner visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal decision was affected by apprehended bias – whether the Tribunal relied on findings in a previous decision – whether the Tribunal failed to consider evidence – whether the Tribunal failed to apply an active intellectual process –jurisdictional error established – writs issued Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5F, 5F(2), 5F(2)(a), 359AA, 375A, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15A, cll 800.211, 800.221
Cases cited: CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (M131 of 2999) (2000) 205 CLR 337
Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135
Jaggi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1267
Livesey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
SZHBP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 103 ALD 595
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41
Aronson M, Groves M, Weeks G, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (7th ed, Lawbook Co., 2022)
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 79 Date of last submission/s: 5 December 2024 Date of hearing: 11 December 2024 Place: Adelaide Counsel for the First Applicant: Sean Kikkert Solicitor for the First Applicant: Dentons Counsel for the First Respondent: Alex Chan Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
ADG 127 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: SATWANT SINGH SANGHA
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
14 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 8 March 2019.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicant’s review application according to law.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Sangha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 164
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal had acted with apprehended bias, whether it had relied on findings from a previous decision, whether it had failed to consider relevant evidence, and whether it had failed to apply an active intellectual process. The Court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision was affected by any of these errors.
The Court found that the Tribunal had indeed made jurisdictional errors. It concluded that the Tribunal's failure to disclose a s 375A certificate constituted a jurisdictional error. The Court also found that the Tribunal had not applied an active intellectual process to the evidence presented, leading to inconsistent findings. Furthermore, the Court determined that the Tribunal had not adequately considered the evidence provided by the applicant and his sponsor, impacting the fairness of the decision-making process.
In light of these findings, the Court issued writs to remedy the jurisdictional errors made by the Tribunal. The decision underscores the importance of thorough and fair consideration of evidence and the necessity for tribunals to avoid any appearance of bias in their decision-making processes.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The materials before the Court include:·the amended application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 15 November 2024;·the affidavit of the applicant affirmed and filed on 2 April 2019 (taken as read and in evidence on 2 October 2024);·the affidavit of the applicant affirmed and filed on 19 April 2024 (taken as read and in evidence on 2 October 2024);·the affidavit of Anthony John O’Brien affirmed and filed on 15 November 2024 (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 11 December 2024);·a Court Book numbering 841 pages (marked as Exhibit 1);·written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 8 September 2023;·written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 15 November 2024; and·written submissions addressing the applicant’s amended application, filed on behalf of the Minister on 5 December 2024.CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the amended application for judicial review contains four particularised grounds of review. Ground one Ground one contends that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal may not have brought an impartial mind to the applicant’s review. In simple terms, the applicant contends apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal. An allegation of bias must be clearly made and distinctly proven (Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69] and SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [22]). The relevant principles for apprehended bias are articulated in various cases, notably CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 76 at [17]-[18], [69]-[70] and [131]-[132] (CNY17); FSG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 456 at [32]; and Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135 at [12] (Isbester). The test for apprehended bias is “a test of a ‘double-might’: whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the adjudicator might not bring an impartial mind to the fair resolution of the issue to be decided” (CNY17 at [132] per Edelman J). Two steps flow from that test (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (M131 of 2999) (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [8]; CNY17 (at [56]); Isbester (at [12]); and Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, cited in SZHBP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 103 ALD 595 at [16]). This two-step test has been adopted by this Court (see, by way of recent example, Jaggi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1267). The first step requires one to identify what it is that might lead a decision-maker to decide a case other than on the factual and legal merits before it. In essence, this requires the Court to determine what may affect a decision maker’s impartiality by identifying that interest. Such an interest may include but is not limited to: a decision-maker’s failure to disqualify themselves by conduct, by extraneous information, by association, or by a direct or indirect interest in the proceedings (CNY17 at [57]; Isbester at [21]). In Isbester, the High Court clarified that (at [46]):A “personal interest” in this context is not the kind of interest by which a person will receive some material or other benefit. In the case of a prosecutor or other moving party, it refers to a view which they may have of the matter, and which is in that sense personal to them. The interest of a prosecutor may be in the vindication of their opinion that an offence has occurred or that a particular penalty should be imposed, or in obtaining an outcome consonant with the prosecutor’s view of guilt or punishment. It is not necessary to analyse the psychological processes to which a person in such a position is subject. It is well accepted… that it might reasonably be thought that the person’s involvement in the capacity of prosecutor will not enable them to bring the requisite impartiality to decision-making…