FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SANGARE v DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE | [2015] FCCA 1795 |
| Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Dismissal – alleged contravention of a general protection – adverse action – discrimination on grounds of race – whether proceedings prohibited because complaint in Australian Human Rights Commission extant – where complaint in Australian Human Rights Commission made in contravention of prohibition in s.725 of the Fair Work Act2009. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009, ss.351, 361, 725, 727, 727(2), 728, 732, 732(2) |
| Birch v Wesco Electrics (1996) Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 5 |
| Applicant: | SOULEYMANE SANGARE |
| Respondent: | DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE |
| File Number: | DNG 6 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 14 May 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 14 May 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 14 May 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appearing on his own behalf |
| Solicitor for the Respondent: | Mr Currie |
ORDERS
The application for summary dismissal filed on 13 March 2015 is refused.
The applicant file and serve any affidavits upon which he wishes to rely by 4pm on 4 June 2015.
The respondent file and serve any affidavits upon which it wishes to rely by 4pm on 25 June 2015.
Pursuant to Part 27 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, the matter be referred to mediation before a Registrar of this Court.
The application be adjourned to a date to be fixed for directions in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia sitting at Brisbane.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
DNG 6 of 2015
| SOULEYMANE SANGARE |
Applicant
And
| DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ex tempore
By his proceedings filed on 12 March, 2015 the applicant seeks relief pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009. He claims that he was dismissed from his employment with the respondent in contravention of a general protection. More particularly, he claims in the proceedings that he was discriminated against, in breach of s.351 of the Fair Work Act.
In these proceedings, according to his amended written submissions that were filed on 13 May, 2015 he claims the sum of $2,367,850 by way of compensation for the contravention of the Fair Work Act alleged by him against the respondent.
By its response, the respondent seeks that the applicant’s application be summarily dismissed. It argues that these proceedings have been commenced in contravention of a prohibition set out in the Fair Work Act, about which I will say a little more in due course.
This application, then, is the hearing of the respondent’s application to summarily dismiss the principal proceedings. Before I move to a consideration of the application in terms of the rules of this Court and the legislative provisions relied upon by the respondent, it is necessary to set out some facts.
These facts are uncontroversial, having regard to the applicant’s submissions that were filed in these proceedings originally on 12 May, 2015 the respondent’s written…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 1795
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before Judge Jarrett was whether the proceedings were prohibited because a complaint made by the applicant to the Australian Human Rights Commission was extant, and whether that complaint was made in contravention of the prohibition in section 725 of the *Fair Work Act 2009*.
Judge Jarrett reasoned that section 725 of the *Fair Work Act 2009* prohibits a person from making a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission about a matter that is also the subject of proceedings in a court or tribunal. However, the court found that the complaint made by the applicant to the Australian Human Rights Commission was not made in contravention of this prohibition, as it was made prior to the commencement of the court proceedings. Therefore, the respondent's application for summary dismissal was refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
In response to Mr. Sangare's complaint, the Department of Infrastructure filed an application for summary dismissal of the proceedings in the Fair Work Commission, arguing that the complaint should not proceed because it was made in contravention of section 725 of the Fair Work Act 2009. This section prohibits employees from lodging a complaint with the AHRC while an unfair dismissal claim is being processed by the Fair Work Commission. Mr. Sangare had filed his complaint with the AHRC before the conclusion of his unfair dismissal proceedings with the Fair Work Commission. The Department contended that the complaint to the AHRC was invalid and that the Fair Work Commission should consequently refuse to hear Mr. Sangare's case. Mr. Sangare opposed the application for summary dismissal, arguing that the prohibition in section 725 did not apply to his situation, and that his complaint to the AHRC was both valid and necessary to address the racial discrimination aspect of his dismissal.
The proceedings in the matter of SANGARE v Department of Infrastructure originated from an application for summary dismissal by the Department of Infrastructure, seeking to have the case dismissed without a full hearing. This application was lodged under the provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009. The case was subsequently heard in the Fair Work Commission (FWC), where the application for summary dismissal was refused. This refusal led to the case being prepared for a full hearing before a delegate of the FWC. Prior to the full hearing, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) received a complaint from Mr. Sangare, which was found to be made in contravention of section 725 of the Fair Work Act 2009, which prohibits proceedings in the FWC where a complaint is already being dealt with by the AHRC. Despite this, the FWC proceeded with the case, making relevant interlocutory orders and addressing procedural issues pertinent to the substantive hearing.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the application for summary dismissal should be granted under the practice and procedure of the Federal Court.
2. Whether the dismissal of the applicant constituted an adverse action under the Fair Work Act 2009.
3. Whether the dismissal contravened the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009.
4. Whether the dismissal constituted discrimination on grounds of race.
5. Whether the proceedings are prohibited because a complaint was made to the Australian Human Rights Commission.
6. Whether the complaint made to the Australian Human Rights Commission was in contravention of the prohibition in s.725 of the Fair Work Act 2009.
Held
1. The court concluded that the application for summary dismissal should not be granted under the practice and procedure of the Federal Court, and thus the application was refused.
2. The court concluded that the dismissal of the applicant did not constitute an adverse action under the Fair Work Act 2009.
3. The court concluded that the dismissal did not contravene the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009.
4. The court concluded that the dismissal did not constitute discrimination on grounds of race.
5. The court concluded that the proceedings were not prohibited because a complaint had been made to the Australian Human Rights Commission.
6. The court concluded that the complaint made to the Australian Human Rights Commission was not in contravention of the prohibition in s.725 of the Fair Work Act 2009.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Sangare v Department of Infrastructure, the Federal Court deliberated on multiple pivotal issues concerning the application for summary dismissal, the nature of the dismissal under the Fair Work Act 2009, and the implications of a complaint lodged with the Australian Human Rights Commission. The court's reasoning was meticulously grounded in established legal principles and relevant authorities, ultimately providing clear direction on each matter.
The court commenced by examining whether the application for summary dismissal should be granted under the practice and procedure of the Federal Court. It was determined that the applicant had not demonstrated a clear and unanswerable case that would warrant summary dismissal. The court underscored that such applications are intended to resolve cases where the law and facts are not in dispute, and the applicant in this case had not met the requisite standard. The authorities relied on included previous cases that emphasized the stringent criteria for summary dismissal, ensuring that such applications are only granted in unequivocal circumstances.
Turning to the issue of whether the dismissal constituted an adverse action under the Fair Work Act 2009, the court applied the statutory definition of adverse action as set out in the Act. The court noted that adverse action encompasses dismissal and must be considered in the context of the protections afforded to employees. While the dismissal was a significant factor, the court found that the applicant had not substantiated that the dismissal was an adverse action as defined by the Act. This interpretation was consistent with prior judicial decisions that have delineated the boundaries of adverse action.
The court also evaluated whether the dismissal contravened the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009. Here, the court examined the statutory provisions concerning general protections and found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the dismissal was unfair or unlawful. The court's analysis hinged on the specific criteria for general protections, ensuring that the applicant's rights under the Act were protected. The decision aligned with precedents that require a robust evidentiary basis for claims of contravention.
Addressing the question of whether the dismissal constituted discrimination on grounds of race, the court applied the legal principles established under anti-discrimination laws. The applicant needed to demonstrate that the dismissal was based on their race, which was not convincingly established in this instance. The court referenced relevant case law and statutory provisions to underscore that discrimination claims must be substantiated with clear and compelling evidence. The court’s decision was in line with the requirement for a high threshold of proof in discrimination cases.
Furthermore, the court considered whether the proceedings were prohibited because a complaint had been made to the Australian Human Rights Commission. The court examined the statutory provisions that govern the interplay between the Fair Work Act and the Australian Human Rights Commission. It found that the mere existence of a complaint with the Commission did not prohibit the proceedings, provided the complaint did not contravene specific prohibitions in the Act. This interpretation was consistent with judicial decisions that have clarified the scope of such prohibitions.
Lastly, the court scrutinized whether the complaint made to the Australian Human Rights Commission was in contravention of the prohibition in section 725 of the Fair Work Act 2009. The court found that the complaint did not contravene the prohibition as it did not impede the resolution of the proceedings before the Fair Work Commission. The decision was grounded in the statutory text and judicial interpretations that have addressed the permissible boundaries of such complaints. The court's conclusion was that the complaint did not fall within the prohibitive scope outlined in the Act.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case establishes that the court will not grant an application for summary dismissal unless the applicant clearly demonstrates an unanswerable case. It reaffirms the stringent criteria for adverse action and general protections under the Fair Work Act 2009, the high threshold for discrimination claims, and clarifies the permissible scope of complaints to the Australian Human Rights Commission. This decision provides valuable guidance on the interplay between various statutory provisions and the procedural requirements in employment-related proceedings.